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This thesis focuses on how the Precautionary Principle, a general principle of 
international law, can strengthen the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights, when 
States’ actions may affect their lands and territories. This brings into focus the 
importance of Indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge, a system of knowledge 
tied to their lands, systematically developed by relying on observations, practices and 
experiences, which is able to predict outcomes. This knowledge represents an 
integral understanding of Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life, providing the 
‘best information available’ about customs, values, activities, their special 
relationship with their environment and even the existence of particular risks and 
uncertainties, making it vital when it comes to the adoption of informed decisions 
and the full understanding of the possible consequences of a determined action on 
their livelihood.  
This thesis shows that the precautionary principle has been influenced by a 
narrow understanding of one of its elements, ‘scientific uncertainty’, insufficient to 
effectively address potential threats that originate in human activities, like the 
extraction of natural resources, and seriously disturb the complex web of 
relationships and dynamics in determined ecosystem. This makes it necessary to 
embrace other sources of knowledge, in order to effectively avoid the materialisation 
of these potential impacts. It argues that traditional knowledge is recognised in 
international law as a source of scientific knowledge in a broad sense, and thus it 
should be integrated into the element of ‘scientific uncertainty’, providing a different 
understanding of risks, of ‘what is known/unknown, what is uncertain and what is 
controversial. Moreover, as a scientific basis for the adoption of precautionary 
action, the integration of traditional knowledge expands the application of the 
precautionary principle to deal with potential threats of non-negligible harm to 
Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life.  
From a procedural point of view, the integration of this traditional knowledge 
requires the existence of participatory mechanisms of public participation. In this 
case, the two participatory mechanisms that are at the front and centre of this 
discussion are the States’ duty to consult Indigenous peoples, with the objective to 
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obtain their free, prior and informed consent, when they may be affected by certain 
measures; and the implementation of impact assessments. In this sense, I argue that 
both mechanisms are precautionary measures, being triggered when there are 
‘reasonable grounds for concern’ about possibly non-negligible harm to Indigenous 
peoples’ rights. This means that States must not only conduct consultations/impact 
assessments but are also under the duty to avoid the materialisation of potentially 
serious harm to Indigenous peoples, which implies the need to consider their 
traditional knowledge and accommodate their concerns, at the risk of failing to 
comply with the precautionary principle. 
In addition, following a precautionary logic of ‘the higher the risk the greater 
the need for precaution’, States must reach an agreement or obtain Indigenous 
peoples’ consent in situations where the potential impacts on their traditional way of 
life are of a more substantive nature. This shows that the precautionary principle 
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1. Introduction  
 
In 2001, acting on concerns about the use of natural resources and possible serious 
impacts on biodiversity from the Gonds peoples’ activities in the Pench National 
Park, the Indian government introduced a management plan which included, as a 
precautionary measure, a ban on all local resource-use practices and restrictions of 
traditional passage in certain areas.1 The plan was adopted without consulting these 
Indigenous communities or respecting their values and customs, despite their close 
relationship with the lands they have lived in for generations;2 their dependence on 
these resources to survive and maintain their traditional livelihood;3 and ignoring the 
fact that their traditional practices, developed over long periods of time and based on 
an integral knowledge and understanding of their environment, actually contributed 
to maintain biodiversity.4 These restrictions severely disrupted the Gonds’ livelihood 
and practices (being even subject to harassment and arrests for attempting to access 
their sacred sites),5 and forced them to resort to illegal fishing and poaching, without 
following their traditional management rules, seriously affecting the ecosystem and 
ultimately rendering the precautionary ban ineffective.6  
                                                             
1 N. Kaur, N. Chowdhury and M. Khalid, “People, Parks and Precaution: The Evolution of the PP in 
Wildlife Conservation in India” in R. Cooney and B. Dickson (eds), Biodiversity and the 
Precautionary Principle: Risk and Uncertainty in Conservation and Sustainable Use (Earthscan, 
2005), pp 218-220. 
2 P. Devellu, M. Raj, K. Bhanumathi, S. Kumar and A. Bandhopadhyay, “Indigenous and tribal 
communities, biodiversity conservation and the Global Environment Facility in India”, A Report to 
Samata NGO (May 2005), pp 31-38. 
3 Ibid., pp 100- 101. 
4 A. Kulkarni and V. Vaidya, “Economics of Protected Area: A Case Study of Pench National Park” 
Environmental Economic Research Committee, Working Paper Series WB-4 (2002), pp 97-101.  
5 Devellu et al (n 2), pp 31 and 34-37. 
6 Kaur et al (n 1), pp 218-220. 
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As environmental threats and biodiversity loss increase due to the 
exploitation of natural resources and other human activities, 7  often especially 
affecting Indigenous peoples,8 it is becoming more important to anticipate and avoid 
these impacts, even if there is no absolute proof of their existence. This brings into 
focus the role of the precautionary principle (‘PP’),9 applicable when there are threats 
of serious or irreversible harm in a context of lack of full scientific certainty.10 
However, as I mention below, the narrow understanding that has shaped the notion of 
‘science’ and ‘scientific uncertainty’ since its emergence, 11  could provide an 
incomplete or inaccurate picture of risks and threats that not only affect the 
environment, but also peoples, as noted above. This is because the threats posed by 
these human activities can seriously disturb the dynamic and complex relations 
between the different elements of a particular environment, including humans,12 
making these non-environmental factors and the uncertainties surrounding them 
relevant in avoiding potential harm to the environment13 but, more importantly, to 
peoples, especially those who closely interact with it, like Indigenous peoples.   
The limitations of this narrow scientific approach are identified in the 
literature,14 together with the acknowledgment of the need to embrace broader forms 
of scientific knowledge,15 through public participation.16 In this context, Indigenous 
peoples’ traditional knowledge,17 which combines environmental, social, cultural and 
                                                             
7 J. Knox, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment”, A/HRC/34/49 (19 January 2017), 
para. 37. 
8  Ibid., para. 22. See also V. Tauli-Corpuz, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
indigenous 
Peoples”, A/HRC/36/46 (1 November 2017), para. 6. 
9 According to Judge Cançado Trindade, this principle is ‘more necessary than ever’. International 
Court of Justice, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) Judgment, ICJ Reports 
2010, p. 14 (‘Pulp Mills’), Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 89.  
10 See Chapter II, section 3. 
11  R. Cooney, “A long and winding road? Precaution from principle to practice in biodiversity 
conservation” in E. Fisher, J. Jones and R. von Schomberg (eds) Implementing the Precautionary 
Principle: Perspectives and Prospects (Elgar, 2006), p 230. See also Chapter II, section 3.2. 
12 A. Trouwborst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), pp 82-83. 
13 Cooney (n 11), pp 229-230. 
14 See for instance E. Fisher and R. Harding, “The precautionary principle: Towards a deliberative, 
transdisciplinary problem-solving process” in R. Harding and E. Fisher (eds), Perspectives on the 
Precautionary Principle (Federation Press, 1999), p 295; and Trouwborst (n 12), pp 195-196. 
15 J. Peel, Science and Risk Regulation in International Law (CUP, 2010), p 336. 
16  L. Boisson de Chazournes, “New Technologies, the Precautionary Principle, and Public 
Participation” in T. Murphy (ed), New Technologies and Human Rights (OUP, 2009), p 179. 
17 For an explanation regarding the use of this term, see Chapter III, section 4.  
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spiritual elements, can play an important role, especially considering that extractive 
activities are increasingly taking place on their lands, affecting their special and 
sustainable relationship with their territories, as well as their cultural identity. 
Therefore, incorporating ‘traditional knowledge’ into the notion of ‘scientific 
uncertainty’ would expand the application of the PP, addressing situations of 
potentially non-negligible threats identified through this scientific knowledge, that 
could affect Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life.18 Following this, the main 
research question is: how can the precautionary principle strengthen the protection of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights when States’ actions may affect their lands and 
territories?  
This is something that, to my knowledge, it has never been explored, and in 
my view, it would result in an important contribution to the protection of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights, by ensuring that their knowledge, interests and concerns are adopted 
in the decision-making process. Moreover, it would provide a consistent standard, by 
which States must adopt certain actions, such as accommodate Indigenous peoples’ 
concerns or obtain their consent, if there are reasonable grounds for concern about 
potential threats of non-negligible harm to their traditional way of life. This would be 
independent from controversial aspects, like control over natural resources; a broad 
or narrow recognition of Indigenous peoples’ self-determination, or the consideration 
of their consent as a veto power, among others, which have often resulted in a more 
limited compliance with States’ obligations related to Indigenous peoples. This 
requires a brief explanation of some key elements, to which I turn now. 
 
2. The Precautionary Principle 
 
The PP occupies a central position in international law in dealing with uncertainties 
regarding non-negligible effects, 19  something especially relevant in international 
environmental law, where there is a constant degree of scientific uncertainty, due to 
                                                             
18 See for instance, M. Kamminga, “The Precautionary Approach in International Human Rights Law: 
How It can Benefit the Environment” in D. Freestone and E. Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle 
and International Law: The Challenge of Implementation (Kluwer, 1996), p 185, arguing that 
Indigenous peoples’ cultural rights qualify for precautionary treatment. See also Chapters II, section 
4.3.1 and III, sections 4-5. 
19 J. Cameron, “The precautionary principle: Core meaning, constitutional framework and procedures 
for implementation” in Harding and Fisher (n 14), p 36. 
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the often insufficiently understood dynamics between the different elements of the 
environment. 20  This makes planning more difficult, because of the increased 
possibilities of making mistakes 21  and the fact that uncertainties could mask 
‘invisible’ risks, leading to delays in adopting measures until it could be too late.22 In 
this context, the PP requires States to adopt effective and proportionate actions to 
avoid potentially serious environmental impacts even if there is no conclusive cause-
effect relationship established,23 so if mistakes are made, the erring “is done on the 
side of caution and not to the detriment of the environment.”24  
The PP is not triggered in every situation of possible risks and scientific 
uncertainty; there has to be, based on the ‘best information available’,25 some degree 
of evidence or knowledge, a ‘reasonable ground for concern’,26 excluding ‘intuitions’ 
or ‘mere beliefs’, to prevent overregulation.27 In this sense, Cançado Trindade has 
equated precaution with ‘common sense’, “seemingly the least common of all 
senses”.28 Interestingly, it took some time for this ‘common sense’ principle to be 
adopted in international law, first appearing during the 80s in the Second 
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea. 29  It has been 
subsequently incorporated in several international conventions and instruments, most 
notably, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration,30  consolidating the PP as a legal norm 
                                                             
20 D. Bodansky, J. Brunée and E. Hey, “International Environmental Law: Mapping the field”, in D. 
Bodansky, J. Brunée & E. Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law 
(OUP, 2014), p 7. 
21 Trouwborst (n 12), p 71. 
22 J. Peel, “Changing Conceptions of Environmental Risk” in J. Viñuales (ed), The Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development: A Commentary (OUP, 2015), pp 75 and 79. 
23 N. De Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP, 2002), p 
91. 
24 Trouwborst (n 12), p 5. 
25 R. Harding and E. Fisher, “Introducing the precautionary principle” in Harding and Fisher (n 14), p 
20; Trouwborst (n 12), pp 144-145. 
26 Trouwborst (n 12), p 224; C. Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle in International 
Courts and Tribunals: Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality (CUP 2011), p 255; De 
Sadeleer (n 23), p 161. 
27 Foster (n 26), p 257; De Sadeleer (n 23), p 159. 
28 Pulp Mills, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade (n 9), para. 96. 
29 Paras. VII, XV and XVI of the “Second International Conference on the Protection of the North 
Sea,” London, 24-25 November 1987.  
30  1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (‘Rio Declaration’), UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I)/31ILM 874(1992). 
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of international environmental law,31 which has acquired the legal status of general 
principle of international law.32  
The threats and uncertainties that the PP faced at the time of its appearance 
were of a more technical nature, i.e., the introduction of potentially hazardous new 
substances/processes, without complete knowledge of their effects and interactions.33 
This means that the notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’ has been more oriented towards 
an experimental perspective, based on ‘conventional sciences’ like chemistry, 
biology and physics.34 However, most of the current environmental threats come not 
from poorly understood chemical or technologies, but from human activities like the 
exploitation of natural resources which, as noted above, deeply disturb the complex 
relations between the different natural elements, including human interactions with 
flora and fauna. 35  This indicates that a narrow understanding of ‘scientific 
uncertainty’ could leave important aspects unprotected, as it overlooks risks and 
uncertainties which “clearly go well beyond the biological and ecological sciences 
and into the murky realms of the dynamics of human social, economic and political 
systems”.36 In this context, it is interesting to note that some formulations of the PP 
mention socio-economic considerations, that need to be taken into account in 
applying this principle. 37  However, what appears to be absent are ‘cultural’ 
considerations, which are vital in the case of Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of 
life, increasingly threatened by extractive activities in their lands,38 creating risks to 
their knowledge, spiritual customs, and practices, as illustrated in the case of the 
Gonds.  
                                                             
31 Peel (n 22), p 75. 
32 Pulp Mills, para. 164; Chapter II, section 2.3. 
33  R. Cooney, “The Precautionary Principle in Biodiversity Conservation and Natural Resource 
Management: An issues paper for policy-makers, researchers and practitioners” IUCN Policy and 
Global Change Series No. 2(2004), p ix.  
34 A. Orford, ‘Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law’, EJIL Vol. 25 no. 2(2014), p 
370. See also Chapter II, section 3.2. 
35 See also Chapter II, sections 3.2 and 4.3.  
36 Cooney (n 11), p 230. See H. Moller, F. Berkes, P. O. Lyver, and M. Kislalioglu, ‘Combining 
science and traditional ecological knowledge: monitoring populations for co-management’, Ecology 
and Society 9(3):2 (2004), p 11. 
37  See for example, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771UNTS 107; UN Doc. 
A/AC.237/18(Part II)/Add.1; 31ILM849(1992), Article 3.3. 
38 V. Tauli-Corpuz, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous Peoples”, A/72/186 
(21 July 2017), para. 53.  
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Following this, and as recognised in the literature, it is necessary to adopt a 
broader approach to ‘scientific uncertainty’, incorporating other forms of knowledge 
beyond ‘conventional sciences’. 39  This would result in an expanded PP, able to 
address these types of risks and uncertainties that are ‘beyond biological and 
ecological sciences’. One of these forms of knowledge that is relevant here is 
Indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge. 
 
3. Indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge  
 
There is no agreed definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’ in international law, although 
there seems to be a consensus about their characteristics, i.e., a special relationship 
with their lands; historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies; 
distinctive cultural characteristics; and self-identification as Indigenous. 40  These 
characteristics are manifested in their traditional way of life, based on centuries-long 
ties with their lands and territories41 in a way that intertwines spiritual, social and 
environmental elements, 42  reflecting a holistic worldview where everything is 
connected. This relationship has enabled the development of a body of traditional 
knowledge that underpins their way of life 43  and has resulted in the careful 
conservation of biodiversity and natural resources,44 from which their physical (food, 
shelter, medicine) and cultural (sacred sites, ceremonies) 45  survival depends. For 
example, Indigenous peoples in Riung, Indonesia, based on their knowledge and 
understanding of seasonal changes and cycles, have established a cultural prohibition 
                                                             
39 Peel (n 15), p 336; Trouwborst (n 12), pp 195-196; and De Sadeleer (n 23), p 184, among others. 
40  See for instance, UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, “Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations (José Martinez 
Cobo, Special Rapporteur)” UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add-4(1986) paras. 379-381; see also J. 
Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2nd ed. 2004), Part I. 
41  See for instance, D. Smyth, “Indigenous land and sea management–a case study” (Canberra: 
DSEWPaC, 2011), p 11: “Australia’s Indigenous people and cultures have adapted to major climatic, 
sea level and environmental changes over the last 50,000 years.” 
42 See for instance, UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295 (‘UNDRIP’), 
preamble; Tauli-Corpuz (n 8), para. 9; and Anaya (n 40), among others. 
43 J. Seymour and H. Girardet, Far from Paradise: The Story of Human Impact on the Environment 
(3rd edition, Merlin Press, 1990). 
44 A. Gray “Indigenous Peoples, Their Environments and Territories” in D. Posey, “Introduction: 
Culture and Nature-The Inextricable Link” in D. Posey (ed), Cultural and Spiritual Values of 
Biodiversity (UNEP, 1999), p 62; see also Chapter III, sections 3-5. 
45 Knox (n 7), paras. 22-23.  
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over the exploitation of fish and shellfish in certain important ancestral sites, only 
lifted during October and November, allowing for the regeneration of these 
resources.46  
Indigenous peoples’ livelihood has inspired an inaccurate narrative of them as 
being ‘ecologically noble savages’,47 despite the fact that they are not a monolithic 
group, with practices regarding the use of natural resources varying around the 
world, 48  and that terms like ‘conservation’ are often at odds with Indigenous 
cosmologies, implying a separation between nature and humans.49 It would be more 
accurate to say that their sensible management of their lands and resources is not 
based on Western constructions of conservation 50  but on particular and holistic 
conceptions of their environment, in which each element has its own place and 
unnecessary destruction can affect the material and immaterial world,51 as well as on 
their direct dependence on these resources to survive as peoples.52  
There is no internationally agreed conceptualization of ‘traditional 
knowledge’ to date, although the World Intellectual Property Organization (‘WIPO’) 
is currently working on such definition.53 Generally speaking, traditional knowledge 
is understood as a broad notion, referring to knowledge, practices and innovations of 
Indigenous and local communities.54 The WIPO recognises that this knowledge is the 
result of an ‘intellectual activity’,55 that I argue in Chapter III is of a scientific nature, 
as it is developed to understand the universe, in a systematic way, based on 
observations and experiences and being able to predict outcomes. As such, it 
                                                             
46 WWF report “Working with Indigenous and Local Knowledge Systems for the Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services: An Analysis of Selected Case Studies from 
WWF Projects Worldwide as a Contribution to IPBES-2” (2013), p 29. 
47 See for instance K. Redford, “The Ecologically Noble Savage”, Cultural Survival Quarterly 15, No. 
1(1991) recounting how this myth arose; see also Chapter III, section 3. 
48 E. Desmet, Indigenous Rights Entwined with Nature Conservation (Intersentia, 2011), p 50. 
49 Gray (n 44), p 62.  
50 J. Colding and C. Folke, “Social Taboos: ‘Invisible’ Systems of Local Resource Management and 
Biological Conservation” Ecological Applications 11(2), 2001, p 595; Desmet (n 48), p 50. 
51 D. Posey, “Introduction: Culture and Nature-The Inextricable Link” in Posey (n 44), p 4. 
52 D. Shelton “Principle 22: Indigenous People and Sustainable Development” in Viñuales (n 24), p 
542. 
53 WIPO, “The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Draft Articles” WIPO/GRTKF/IC/40/18(June 
2019), Annex, p 5. As noted in Chapter III, section 4, some of the difficulties are because the term 
‘traditional’ is difficult to define. 
54 Convention on Biological Diversity (‘CBD’), UNTS vol.1760, p. 79, Article 8(j). See also WIPO 
Draft Articles (n 53), Annex, p 5.  
55 WIPO, “Glossary of Key Terms related to Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions” WIPO/GRTKF/IC/40/INF/7(April 2019), Annex, p 
44; Chapter III, section 4. 
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conforms to the notion of ‘science’, and it can be integrated into the notion of 
‘scientific uncertainty’.  
Another important aspect of this scientific knowledge is that, being developed 
by Indigenous peoples’ themselves, it reflects an integral understanding of their 
traditional livelihood and their special relationship with their lands. This includes the 
existence of uncertainties, as Indigenous cosmologies portray a universe in constant 
motion where changes that often cannot be accurately forecasted occur, so they must 
remain vigilant and adaptive.56 Following this, traditional knowledge represents the 
‘best information available’ about scientific uncertainties, threats to Indigenous 
peoples’ particular way of life, and how to address them. This is especially important 
when it comes to their cultural and spiritual aspects, difficult to identify and much 
less understood by foreigners, which could result in substantive harm to their cultural 
identity, by for instance, destroying a sacred tree.  
Therefore, when it comes to activities on their lands that could affect 
Indigenous peoples’ livelihood, we would be in the presence of ‘scientific 
uncertainty’ (identified by this traditional knowledge), and a ‘threat of 
serious/irreversible harm’, expanding the application of the PP to address these 
potential threats. In this context, traditional knowledge would have a crucial role in 
the adoption of effective precautionary action to protect their rights. Following this, 
it is necessary to look at the incorporation of this knowledge in decision-making, to 
which I turn now. 
 
4. Traditional knowledge and decision-making 
 
As suggested above, public participation plays an important role in expanding the 
notion of ‘science’, integrating other types of knowledge;57 for instance, Peel notes 
that this integration depends on the existence of appropriate mechanisms that 
facilitate public participation.58 In the case of Indigenous peoples, this refers to the 
right to be consulted, with the objective to obtain their free, prior and informed 
consent (‘FPIC’), conducted together with impact assessments to assess possible 
                                                             
56 R. Barsh, “Indigenous knowledge and biodiversity”, in Gray (n 44), p 74.  
57 Boisson de Chazournes (n 16), pp 179-180. See also De Sadeleer (n 23), pp 184-185. 
58 Peel (n 15), p 336. 
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environmental, social, and cultural impacts (with their participation), as noted by 
instruments like the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention C169; 59  the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues;60 the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples;61 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘IACtHR’)62 and 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘ACHPR’), 63  among 
others. This allows the development of a ‘genuine dialogue’64 by which Indigenous 
peoples can fully express their viewpoints 65  and exercise some influence over 
decision-making, especially when it comes to projects and developments on their 
lands, reversing a “historical pattern of exclusion from decision-making, in order to 
avoid the future imposition of important decisions on indigenous peoples”.66  
However, as I will analyse extensively in Chapters IV and V, there are some 
controversies that affect the proper implementation of these participatory rights, 
reducing their effectiveness, mainly related to Indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination and their control over their lands and territories; the ‘veto’ character of 
FPIC; and the situations where consent is required.67 This weakens the protection of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights, and strongly suggest that the emphasis is on issues of 
participation and control. In this context, it is important to consider that consultations 
and impact assessments are applicable in situations that ‘may’ affect Indigenous 
peoples,68 and that they enable them to ‘fully understand’ and be “aware of possible 
risks” of projects and developments on their lands.69  This, added to the role of 
                                                             
59 International Labour Organisation, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27 June 1989, 
C169, entered into force 5 September 1991(‘C169’), Articles 6, 7.3 and 15, among others. 
60 UN Economic and Social Council, Permanent Form on Indigenous Peoples, “Report on Free, Prior 
and Informed Consent”, UN Doc.E/C.19/2005/3 (17 February 2005), p 12. 
61  V. Tauli-Corpuz, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples”, 
A/HRC/45/34, (18 June 2020)(‘2020 Report’), para. 58. 
62 IACtHR, “Case of the Saramaka People v Suriname, Judgment of November 28, 2007 (Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs)”(‘Saramaka’), paras. 129-134. 
63  ACHR, “Case 276/03: Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights 
Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council)/Kenya”, paras. 227-228. 
64 Anaya (n 40), p 154. 
65 ILO, “Understanding the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No 169): Handbook for 
ILO Tripartite Constituents”, p 15.  
66 J. Anaya, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples” 15 July 2009, A/HRC/12/34 (15 July 2009)(‘2009 Report’), para. 
41; 2020 Report, para. 50. 
67 See 2009 Report, para. 48; Chapters IV, section 6.1-6.3 and V, section 2.2.3; M. Barelli, “Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent in the UNDRIP” in J. Hohmann and M. Weller (eds) The UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary (OUP, 2018). 
68 C169 Article 6; UNDRIP, Article 19. 
69 2020 Report, para 56-58; Saramaka, paras 129 and 133. 
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traditional knowledge in a ‘wider’ PP mentioned above, set the stage for my research 
question, which is how this wider PP can strengthen the protection of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights when States’ actions may have negative impacts on their lands. 
 This is important because, as outlined above, some of the criticisms directed 
to this process involve the issue of FPIC, generally an objective of consultations and 
not a requirement (only needed to be obtained in some exceptional circumstances).70 
This would leave the final decision about projects in Indigenous lands to States, even 
if there are potentially serious impacts on their way of life, without the requirement 
to consider their knowledge and the existence of potentially non-negligible risks to 
their lives. As noted by Venne, this  allows States to have “an alibi to say that they 
did ask us, but there is no requirement to implement our position”.71 However, if 
there is a duty for States to avoid the materialisation of serious/irreversible harm to 
Indigenous peoples’ livelihood, their traditional knowledge (i.e., the ‘best 
information available’ about possible risks, especially those of a cultural/spiritual 
nature), concerns and interests must be accommodated. Moreover, considering that 
precautionary actions must be ‘effective and proportionate’, when potential threats 
are of a substantive nature, an enhanced safeguard, FPIC, would be required, 
following a logic of ‘the higher the risk the greater the need for precaution’, 72 
ensuring that their knowledge and interests are actually considered and that only the 
risks that they deem acceptable will occur, strengthening the protection of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights. 
 
5. Thesis overview 
 
To answer my research question, I will do a doctrinal legal analysis of international 
law, that is, the analysis of international treaties, international declarations, action 
plans, voluntary guidelines, travaux préparatoires, jurisprudence of international 
courts and monitoring bodies, national legislation, international reports, doctrine and 
general principles of international law, from both international environmental and 
human rights fields. In addition, being this a work that focuses on Indigenous 
                                                             
70 See for instance Chapters IV, section 6.3 and V, section 2.2.3. 
71 S. Venne, “The New Language of Assimilation” in Without Prejudice Vol. II No 2(1989), p 58. 
72 Kamminga (n 18), p 185. 
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peoples’ traditional knowledge and participation, Indigenous perspectives must be 
taken into account; in this context, especially in Chapter III, several references to 
traditional knowledge and its uses, and Indigenous peoples’ cosmovision and 
livelihood are obtained from Indigenous writers, people that have translated their 
work or have been in direct contact with them in an academic context, including 
anthropologists, historians, sociologists, and even conventional scientists like 
geologists, climate scientist and biologists. Some of the Indigenous experiences are 
also taken from international jurisprudence, especially from testimonies in cases 
before the IACtHR. The inclusion of Indigenous perspectives do not constitute an 
attempt to simplify their complex and holistic understanding of their worldviews; as I 
mention in Chapter III, traditional knowledge cannot be ‘delocalised’ or ‘cherry-
picked’, at the risk of distorting its meaning and diminishing its vital importance for 
Indigenous peoples, who do not so much ‘learn’ the secrets of their lands and 
territories but experience them in a living process. I would also like to state that I 
mean no disrespect to any peoples by referencing them. 
 
The main body of the thesis is divided in five chapters. The analysis of the PP 
takes place in Chapter II, including its origins and development in international 
environmental law; its legal status as a general principle of international law; its 
elements; and its effects, including the alleged reversal of the burden of proof, 
providing some clarity about issues that are relevant for this research. In this context, 
I do not attempt to define the PP, relying instead (like several authors) on the 
existence of certain elements present in the different formulations of the PP in 
international law. These are: a threat of harm; of a serious/irreversible nature; and 
scientific uncertainty, being this last element shaped by a narrow understanding of 
‘science’, inadequate to address potential threats that involve socio-economic 
uncertainties, affecting the adoption of precautionary action. The analysis of non-
environmental considerations, especially cultural aspects and uncertainties, and the 
expansion of the ‘scientific uncertainty’ notion to incorporate other types of 
knowledge, such as traditional knowledge, forms an important part of this chapter.  
The scientific nature of traditional knowledge and its role in precaution is the 
focus of the first part of Chapter III. In this context, I highlight two important things: 
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first, that traditional knowledge reflects Indigenous peoples’ integral worldview, 
integrating social, cultural, spiritual and environmental aspects, and it is applicable in 
situations of uncertainty, an element embedded in Indigenous cosmovision. Second, 
that this notion is the product of an intellectual process, based on observations and 
experiences and tested in a systematic way, being able to predict outcomes, 
conforming to the general idea of ‘science’. This has been recognised in international 
law in several instances, including instruments with broad support like the Rio 
Declaration, Agenda 21 and the UNDRIP; States with important Indigenous 
populations; and academics. As such, it can be incorporated into the notion of 
‘scientific uncertainty’, providing the best information available regarding reasonable 
grounds for concern about potentially serious or irreversible environmental threats on 
their way of life. Considering this, I then turn to the question of the role of traditional 
knowledge in situations of threats of non-negligible harm to Indigenous peoples’ 
traditional livelihood, especially looking at the way in which it can help to fill 
information gaps and determine the existence of potential threats of 
serious/substantive harm, and how to address them. 
The second part of this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the biodiversity 
regime, explicitly guided by a precautionary approach, 73  being an example of a 
regime that relies on traditional knowledge as a basis for the adoption of 
precautionary action, both in the conservation of biodiversity74  but also when it 
comes to the avoidance of harm in regard to Indigenous peoples’ cultural aspects. In 
this context, I especially focus on the work of the Ad-hoc Open-ended Working 
Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions, resulting in several soft-law 
instruments that complement the CBD, which establish Indigenous participatory 
mechanisms (impact assessments and consultations) and the incorporation of their 
traditional knowledge in decision-making. They also acknowledge the need to obtain 
consent in certain situations where essential aspects of Indigenous peoples’ lives 
could be affected, like sacred sites. This regime provides a model where traditional 
knowledge and Indigenous peoples’ participation in decision-making play a vital role 
                                                             
73 See for instance, CBD Preamble. 
74 Ibid., Article 8(j). 
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in the avoidance of potential threats of non-negligible harm to both biodiversity and 
Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life,75 protecting their rights.  
Chapter IV focuses on the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights under the 
C169 (the only binding treaty regarding Indigenous peoples in international law) and 
the UN Treaty System, specifically three Conventions in which Indigenous peoples 
have relied the most to protect their rights: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (‘ICCPR’),76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’),77 and the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (‘ICERD’).78 The UNTS conventions do not 
mention the term ‘Indigenous peoples’, but their monitoring bodies have 
reinterpreted them to accommodate Indigenous claims, under the notion of ‘cultural 
rights’ (ICCPR and ICESCR)79 and under its broader work against discrimination, in 
the case of ICERD. The protection of these rights requires the ‘effective 
participation’ of Indigenous peoples in decision-making, allowing for the 
incorporation of their traditional knowledge. The monitoring bodies’ practice shows 
that this participation is understood as ‘consultations’, although without establishing 
concrete requirements, with has led to some authors alleging ‘proforma’ 
consultations in the complaint procedure. However, a more recent case before the 
Human Rights Committee, where the effects on the authors were substantive, may 
open the door to the inclusion of impact assessments into this notion of ‘effective 
participation’, and the possible recognition of FPIC as a requirement in certain 
situations. That being said, much remains to be clarified, especially the conditions in 
which FPIC is applied, and what would constitute ‘substantive harm’. The more 
general reporting procedure does not contribute much in terms of clarifying these 
issues, as there is a lack of a consistent and clear practice, in particular regarding 
‘obtaining’ and ‘seeking’ FPIC and when States should conduct impact assessments. 
                                                             
75 See Chapter III section 6.1. 
76 UNGA, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, 16 December 1966, UNTS, vol. 
999, p. 171.  
77 UNGA, “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 16 December 1966, 
UNTS, vol. 993, p. 3. 
78 UNGA, “International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination”, 21 
December 1965, UNTS, vol. 660, p. 195. 
79 ICCPR Article 27, ICESCR Article 15.1 (a). 
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For its part, C169 explicitly recognise the duty to consult Indigenous peoples 
before a measure may affect them, following a series of requirements that aim to 
ensure a genuine dialogue in good faith,80 and to conduct impact studies to assess 
cultural, economic, social and environmental harm with Indigenous cooperation.81 
Yet, due to concerns about self-determination, it also adopts a view of FPIC as a 
‘veto power’ that Indigenous peoples should not enjoy, restricting its application 
only to situations of relocations, and even then allowing States to circumvent the lack 
of consent,82 and remaining silent regarding other cases of potentially substantive 
harm. This indicates that while traditional knowledge is included in decision-making, 
there is no guarantee that it would actually be considered, as both the UNTS and 
C169 do not endorse a strong version of FPIC, leaving the final decision in the hands 
of States (even in situations of potentially serious/substantive threats), offering 
insufficient protection to Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life.  
In Chapter V, I analyse UNDRIP and the protection of Indigenous peoples’ 
rights under the American Convention on Human Rights83 and the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights,84 where there have been important developments. I 
begin by looking into the legal status of the Declaration, before moving to the 
protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights, where a similar approach as C169 is 
followed, as the latter influenced the former. However, there are some differences, 
such as the absence of explicit references to impact assessments (although I argue 
they are implicitly included) and the establishment of at least two scenarios where 
consent is required, relocation and the storage of hazardous materials in Indigenous 
territories. In this context, a majority of authors consider that another situation where 
FPIC would be required is when there may be substantive impacts on their traditional 
livelihood, including to their cultural and spiritual aspects, following an expansive 
interpretation of this Declaration; this would provide a higher degree of protection, 
aligning with a precautionary approach. Yet, this is countered by some Indigenous 
authors (and even some regional jurisprudence and States’ practice) who consider 
                                                             
80 C169, Article 6; 2009 Report, paras. 46-49. 
81 C169, Articles 7.3 and 15. 
82 Ibid., Article 16. 
83 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 
1144UNTS123, entry into force 18 July 1978. 
84 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter), 
OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21I.L.M.58(1982), entry into force October 21, 1986. 
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that UNDRIP reflects a colonialist approach which reinforces the power of States 
over Indigenous peoples, including having the final word in decision-making.  
I then move on to the protection of Indigenous peoples through the 
application and interpretation of the regional instruments mentioned above. This is 
achieved in the Inter-American system by, based on Indigenous peoples’ right to 
property over their territories, relying on consultations, environmental and social 
impact assessments and the need to obtain consent in the case of ‘large-scale 
developments’ on their lands, due to the substantive impacts that they may cause. 
That being said, the subsequent practice of the IACtHR has failed to uphold this 
standard, especially regarding spiritual/cultural impacts, generating some uncertainty 
about this heightened safeguard. The African System for its part presents an 
interesting contrast between the ACHPR, which follows the IACtHR safeguards, and 
the more recent jurisprudence of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
which in a more recent case omitted any references to FPIC and failed to provide a 
clear standard for the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights. Despite this, in 
general, there is a higher degree of protection in both UNDRIP and the regional 
systems compared to C169 and the UNTS, with FPIC figuring more prominently; 
however, some issues regarding self-determination and the inconsistent application 
of safeguards may undermine this protection.  
In Chapter VI, recalling the precautionary role of traditional knowledge, and 
based on the situations in which consultations/impact assessment are applied, I 
analyse how the PP influences this decision-making process, strengthening the 
protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights, by requiring the accommodation of their 
concerns and knowledge (the ‘best information available’ regarding potential threats) 
in the decision, at the risk of causing serious harm. Furthermore, I argue that when 
there are threats of potentially substantive harm, Indigenous peoples’ FPIC needs to 
be obtained, as a heightened precautionary safeguard, independent of issues 
regarding self-determination or control over natural resources. This would ensure 
that they have actual influence over the decision and that only the risks that they 
consider acceptable could occur, which is especially important when it comes to 
spiritual/cultural effects, more difficult to identify and address without their input. As 
Indigenous peoples’ right are not absolute, I then address possible conflicts between 
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the duty to obtain FPIC and the need to act to avoid potentially serious harm to other 
values, important for the society at large. To do this, I consider three scenarios: when 
a rapid response is needed; the establishment of conservation areas; and climate 
change mitigation, arguing that, generally, any measure that requires relocation 
would fail to comply with the PP, but other measures must be assessed on a case-by-
case basis. 
I finish this work in Chapter VII with some conclusions and mentioning 
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The precautionary principle (‘PP’) is broadly applied in international environmental 
law (‘IEL’), although this recognition has not translated into a universally accepted 
definition.1 This is a difficult task due to its several formulations in different fields,2 
                                                             
1 G. Marchant, “From General Policy to Legal Rule: Aspirations and Limitations of the Precautionary 
Principle”, Environmental Health Perspectives vol. 11 n. 14 (2003), p 1799. See also, S. Mead, “The 
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like biodiversity,3 marine pollution4 and climate change,5 among others. Generally 
speaking, the PP provides guidance when there is scientific uncertainty about adverse 
impacts of a determined measure on the environment, establishing a new paradigm: 
even if there is no clear cause-effect link established between a potential damage and 
its source, action to avoid the materialization of this harm must be taken;6 however, it 
remains a controversial notion.7 As a key part of this research, it is important to 
address some of the debates surrounding this principle, such as if it is a principle or 
an approach; its legal status and core elements; and its effects.  
What distinguishes the PP from ‘prevention’, 8  where the cause-effect 
relationship is known, is the existence of ‘scientific uncertainty’.9 Yet, not every case 
where there is some uncertainty triggers the PP; something more than ‘mere beliefs’ 
or simple intuitions are needed, otherwise the PP could cause overregulation or lead 
to a societal standstill.10 Generally, this element has been influenced by a narrow 
understanding of ‘science’, due to the more technical character of the environmental 
threats at the time of the PP’s introduction in IEL;11 however, human activities such 
as the exploitation of natural resources (often within Indigenous lands) have a wide 
range of potential impacts and uncertainties that go beyond biological or ecological 
questions, into the realms of human dynamics.12  Thus, a narrow approach could 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Precautionary Principle: A Discussion of the Principle's Meaning and Status in an Attempt to Further 
Define and Understand the Principle”, (8N.Z.J.Envtl.L137 2004), p 138. 
2 See for instance, P. Sandin, “Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle”, Human and Ecological 
Risk Assessment: An International Journal (1999); and R. Harding and E. Fisher (eds), Perspectives 
on the Precautionary Principle, (Federation Press, 1999), Appendix. 
3 Such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (‘CBD’), UNTSvol.1760, p. 79, 5 June 1992 (entry 
into force 29 December 1993), Preamble. 
4 See the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, signed 
22 September 1992 (entry into force 25 March 1998), 2354UNTS67; 32ILM1069 (1993), (OSPAR 
Convention), Preamble. 
5  UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘UNFCCC’), 1771UNTS107; UN Doc. 
A/AC.237/18(Part II)/Add.1; 31ILM849 (1992), Article 3.3. 
6 See section 2.1. 
7 N. De Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP, 2002), p 
91. 
8 Also known as the preventive principle. Ibid., p 61. 
9 P. Birnie, A. Boyle, and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd Edition, OUP, 
2009), p 156. 
10 A. Trouwborst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), pp 98 and 115-
116. See also section 3.2. 
11 See sections 3.2 and 4.3. 
12  R. Cooney, “A long and winding road? Precaution from principle to practice in biodiversity 
conservation” in E. Fisher, J. Jones and R. von Schomberg (eds) Implementing the Precautionary 
Principle: Perspectives and Prospects (Elgar, 2006), p 230. 
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result in ineffective precautionary measures by overlooking possible threats or 
elements relevant to avoid potential harm, not only to the environment, but also to 
humans. In practice, this is attenuated by balancing socio-economic considerations 
when adopting precautionary measures, 13  as it is also recognised in some 
formulations of the PP. 14  However, what are often absent are cultural/spiritual 
considerations, particularly relevant in situations where Indigenous peoples are 
involved, because of the special relationship that they have with their territories,15 
being then their traditional way of life seriously threatened by the effects of these 
human activities. 
Following this, it is important to highlight the importance of these non-
environmental considerations in the implementation of the PP, looking into adopting 
a broader notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’ by integrating other sources of ‘scientific 
knowledge’. In the case of Indigenous peoples, this would not only enable the 
incorporation of their traditional knowledge16 and their understanding of risks and 
uncertainties about their way of life in the decision-making process, but also extend 
the PP to address these risks, in line with other instances where the PP has been 
applied to avoid the materialisation of potential impacts on Indigenous peoples’ 
cultural and spiritual values. 
This chapter is divided into five sections; section two first contextualises the 
origins of the PP and its development in IEL, moving then to the questions of the PP 
as a ‘principle’ or an ‘approach’ and its legal status, supporting the view that the PP’s 
role of providing guidance and informing States 17  in adopting effective and 
proportionate action conforms better to the argument that it is a general principle of 
international law. In section three, I analyse the elements 18  of threat; serious or 
irreversible harm; and scientific uncertainty, including its development and some 
issues with its narrow approach. Section four focuses on the PP in action, including 
                                                             
13 Birnie, et al (n 9), p 163, noting that States consider “their own capabilities, their economic and 
social priorities, cost-effectiveness of proposed measures and nature and degree of the environmental 
risk” when assessing the adoption of precautionary measures. 
14 See section 4.3.  
15 See Chapter III, section 3. 
16  The issue of traditional knowledge a source of scientific knowledge in international law is 
addressed in Chapter III, section 4.1. 
17 J. Cameron, “The Precautionary Principle: Core meaning, constitutional framework and procedures 
for implementation” in Harding and Fisher (n 2), p 30. 
18 As mentioned in section 3, there are differences regarding the elements of the PP in the literature. 
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the duty to adopt effective and proportionate measures; the alleged reversal of the 
burden of proof (and the related issue of the standard of proof);19 and finally, the 
importance of non-environmental considerations in avoiding the materialisation of 
non-negligible harm, with a particular focus on cultural considerations, the situation 
of Indigenous peoples and the expansion of the notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’ to 
incorporate their traditional knowledge. Section five closes the chapter with some 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. Contextualising the Precautionary Principle 
 
2.1 Origins, formulations and the principle/approach question  
 
The PP appeared for the first time in international law during the 80’s, in the Second 
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (‘London Ministerial 
Declaration’), 20  but its origins can be traced to the German Vorsorgenprinzip 
(literally, principle of foresight),21 addressing the introduction of potentially harmful 
new substances in an industrial context in the face of scientific uncertainty. 22  It 
continued to gain influence during the late 80’s and early 90’s, mostly in IEL,23 
being included in several international binding and non-binding instruments,24 with 
variations. For instance, the London Ministerial Declaration notes that the ‘principle 
of precautionary action’ applies “when there is reason to assume that certain damage 
or harmful effects on the living resources of the sea are likely to be caused” by 
persistent and toxic substances, “even where there is no scientific evidence to prove a 
                                                             
19 See section 4.2. 
20 Paras. VII, XV and XVI of the “Second International Conference on the Protection of the North 
Sea,” London, 24-25 November 1987. 
21 See for example, Birnie et al (n 9), p 154; p 4; M. Pyhälä, A. Brusendorff and H. Paulomäki, “The 
Precautionary Principle” in  M. Fitzmaurice; D. Ong and P. Merkouris (eds) Research Handbook on 
International Environmental Law (E. Elgar, 2010) p 205;  and J. Wiener, “Precaution” in D. 
Bodansky, J. Brunée and E. Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law 
(OUP, 2014), p 599. 
22  B. Moyle, “Making the Precautionary Principle Work for Biodiversity: Avoiding Perverse 
Outcomes in Decision-making Under Uncertainty”, in R. Cooney and B. Dickson (eds), Biodiversity 
and the Precautionary Principle: Risk and Uncertainty in Conservation and Sustainable Use 
(Earthscan, 2005), p 276. See also section 3.2. 
23 Trouwborst (n 10), pp 12-13, noting that it is also present in other fields like health and international 
security. See also De Sadeleer, (n 7), pp 103-108. 
24 See Harding and Fisher (n 2), Appendix: Statements of the Precautionary Principle and Wiener (n 
21), p 601. 
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causal link between emissions and effects”;25 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 
(‘Principle 15’), 26  arguably the most well-known formulation of the PP in 
international law, 27  states that “[i]n order to protect the environment, the 
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation”;28 the Bamako Convention on the 
Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and 
Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa (‘Bamako Convention’), refers to 
the precautionary ‘principle’ and ‘approach’, which is to be implemented to prevent 
“the release into the environment of substances which may cause harm to humans or 
the environment without waiting for scientific proof regarding such harm”;29 and the 
1995 Straddling Fish Stock Agreement considers the precautionary ‘approach’ as a 
general ‘principle’ that States shall apply.30 Finally, some international conventions 
do not mention the word ‘precaution’ at all,31 while others refer to the ‘precautionary 
principle’.32 
                                                             
25 Para. XVI. 
26  1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (‘Rio Declaration’), UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I)/31ILM 874(1992), Principle 15. Sands mentions that the core of the PP is in 
this formulation. P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law” (2nd edition, CUP 2003), p 
268. The Rio Declaration was adopted by consensus by 176 States and it has almost universal 
acceptance. See P. Birnie and A. Boyle, Basic Documents on International Law and the Environment 
(Oxford, 1995), p 9.  
27 Aside from its broad support, Principle 15 is important because it confirms the incorporation of the 
PP in IEL. See D. Freestone, “The road from Rio: International Environmental law after the Earth 
summit” 6J.Envtl.L.193(1994), p 212; Trouwborst (n 10), p 23; and J. Viñuales, “The Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development: A Preliminary Study” in J. Viñuales (ed), The Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development: A Commentary (OUP, 2015), pp 39-40. This formulation is often 
included in other international instruments, like the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the CBD 
(‘Cartagena Protocol’), 2226UNTS208; 39ILM1027(2000), Preamble; and the Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, (‘POPs Convention’) 22 May 2011 (entry into force 17 May 2004) 
2256UNTS119; 40ILM532(2001), Article 1, among others. 
28 The inclusion of the word “approach” was due to US insistence. Birnie et al (n 9), p 155 and 
Viñuales (n 27), p 39.  
29 E/CN.4/RES/1991/47, 29 January 1991 (entry into force 22 April 1998), Article 4.3 (f). 
30 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (‘1995 Straddling Fish Stock Agreement’), Article 5 (c). 
31 See CBD Preamble, noting that “where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological 
diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to 
avoid or minimize such a threat.” 
32 See for example, OSPAR Convention, Preamble and Article 2; the Convention on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (‘Water Convention’)(entry into 
force 6 October 1996), UNTS  vol.1936, p.269, Article 2.5; and the Convention on the Protection of 
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This small sample of formulations in international instruments showcase the 
lack of clarity that surrounds this notion, being “difficult to speak of a single 
precautionary principle at all”.33 This extends to international cases, where applicants 
tend to refer to a precautionary ‘principle’ to strengthen their arguments, 34  and 
respondents insist on a precautionary ‘approach’, implying that there is no obligation 
to act in a precautionary way.35 Courts and judges have regularly been very cautious 
about this point: for instance, the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) and the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (‘ITLOS’) acknowledged the existence 
of a ‘precautionary approach’36 although dissenting and separate opinions do refer to 
the ‘precautionary principle’; 37  similarly, the World Trade Organisation dispute 
settlement system (which is not a court) has also relied on ‘approach’.38 In any case, 
and despite some attempts to differentiate these terms, 39  doctrine, 40  international 
practice and the flexible nature of the PP (see below) do not support a distinction 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, (‘Helsinki Convention’)(entry into force 17 January 
2000) 1507 UNTS 167; 1994OJ(L73)20; 13ILM546(1974), Article 3. 
33 D. Bodansky, “Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle”, 33(7) Environment:4, p 5.  
34 See for example, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. 
United Kingdom), “Request for provisional measures and Statement of case submitted on behalf of 
Ireland” and the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), “Request 
for the prescription of Provisional Measures submitted by New Zealand”; and some cases before the 
ICJ like “Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)”, Memorial of the Republic of Hungary-
volume 1; “Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay),” Memorial of Argentina; 
“Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colombia),” Memorial of Ecuador-volume 1; WTO Appellate 
Body Report, “EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (‘EC-Hormones’),” 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, where the EC argued the 
PP as a basis for its case. 
35 See for instance ICJ “Aerial Herbicide Spraying”, Counter-memorial of Colombia-volume I, para. 
8.57 arguing that the PP does not constitute an international obligation and it is an ‘approach’ rather 
than a principle; a similar argument was used by the US in the EC-Hormones case, paras. 60 and 122. 
36 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14, (‘Pulp 
Mills’) para. 164; Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area, 
Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011, ITLOS Reports 2011, p. 10, para. 135. 
37 See for example, Nuclear Tests case, Order of 22 September 1995, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry and Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad-hoc Palmer; in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Koroma; in Pulp Mills, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and 
Simma, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade and Dissenting Opinion Judge ad-hoc Vinuesa.  
38  See for instance EC-Hormones, Appellate Body Report and European Communities-Measures 
affecting the approval and marketing of Biotech products, Report of the Panel, Doc WT/DS291-
293/INTERIM. 29 September 2006. 
39 See footnote 35 and ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna, Separate Opinion of Judge Laing, para. 19: 
“(…)adopting an approach, rather than a principle, appropriately imports a certain degree of flexibility 
and tends, though not dispositively, to underscore reticence about making premature pronouncements 
about desirable normative structures.”  
40 See M. Ahteensuu, “In Dubio pro Natura? A Philosophical Analysis of the Precautionary Principle” 
in Environmental and Health Risk Governance Vol. 20 (2008) University of Turku, Finland, p 35, 
noting that most authors used them as synonyms; Trouwborst (n 10), p 12; De Sadeleer (n 7), p 92. 
23 
 
between them, and they are generally used interchangeably in international law.41 As 
noted by the International Law Commission (‘ILC’), “the two concepts lead to 
similar results in practice when applied in good faith”.42 Following this, I will use 
both terms interchangeably throughout my work. 
 
2.2. The Precautionary Principle and International Environmental Law 
 
As noted above, the PP is present in several IEL instruments across a wide range of 
topics (e.g., marine pollution, climate change, and biological diversity), often with 
their own formulation of this principle.43 To understand why this is the case, it is 
necessary to take a step back and briefly refer to IEL and its characteristics. 
The main goal of IEL is the protection of the environment,44 a very broad notion that 
can be defined in different ways for different purposes.45 For instance, the 1987 
Bruntland Report on Environment and Development says that the environment “does 
not exist as a sphere separate from human actions, ambitions, and needs(…) the 
environment is where we all live”,46 and the ICJ in the 1996 Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion remarked that “the environment is not an 
abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of 
human beings, including generations unborn”. 47  Another understanding of what 
                                                             
41 See Freestone (n 27), p 212; E. Hey, “The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and 
Law: Institutionalizing Caution”, 4 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 303 (1991-1992), p 304; Trouwborst (n 
10), p 11; and Birnie et al (n 9), p 155. 
42 ILC, “Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, with commentaries” (2008), Article 12 
commentary, p 59. 
43 Birnie et al (n 9) pp 157-158.  
44  Ibid, p 2; see also, S. Maljean-Dubois, “The making of International Law challenging 
environmental protection” in Y. Kerbrat and S. Maljean-Dubois (eds), The Transformation of 
International Environmental Law (Hart publishing, 2011), p 28.  
45 ILC, “Draft Principles on the allocation of loss in the case of Transboundary Harm arising out of 
Hazardous Activities, with commentaries” (2006) Principle 2, para. 19. Sands makes a brief recount of 
several direct and indirect definitions in international law. Sands (n 26), pp 15-18.  Redgwell says that 
‘environment’ is an amorphous term, so far “proved incapable of precise legal definition save in 
particular contexts.” C. Redgwell, “International Environmental Law” in M. Evans (ed), International 
Law (4th ed, OUP 2014), p 689. 
46  “Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future” 
UNGA Res. 42/187 (1987). 
47 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226, 
para. 29, noting how the effects on the environment could last over several generations. 
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constitutes the environment is the one held by Indigenous peoples, who usually 
consider themselves and every element of the environment as a whole.48  
In essence, ‘environment’ is a very general concept that encompasses the 
place where we live and develop, and the way we relate and interact with it. As such, 
thanks to the different scientific breakthroughs about our understanding of nature and 
the ways to protect it, it is a notion constantly evolving. Thus, in order to incorporate 
new information and adopt measures to address changing threats,49 IEL relies on 
broad notions (like ‘sustainable development’ 50  or ‘damage’), 51  framework 
conventions52 and soft-law instruments (like declarations) capable of being modified 
or subsequently complemented.53 Yet, there are still some issues that remain outside 
our current understanding 54  (e.g., long term impacts, unknown or unexpected 
interactions) which means that IEL is bound to coexist with a degree of scientific 
uncertainty at any given time; this in turn can represent a serious threat to the 
environment, since uncertainty could mask ‘invisible’ risks, preventing effective 
action until it is maybe too late.55 
It is against this background of changing problems, ad hoc instruments, 
adaptable concepts and uncertainties that the PP appeared and evolved in IEL, as an 
                                                             
48 See Chapter III, section 2, as well as F. Berkes, Sacred Ecology (3rd edition, Routledge 2012), p 33 
recounting the Australian aboriginal conception of the environment and S. Venne, “The New 
Language of Assimilation” in Without Prejudice Vol. II No 2 (1989), p 54 noting how the Indigenous 
worldview “centers on our relationship with the land, the animals, the fish, the plants, the lakes and 
rivers(…) we do not view ourselves as being separate and distinct from the world around us”. 
49 Like classifying a new element as a pollutant or protecting a recently endangered species. Y. 
Kerbrat and S. Maljean-Dubois, (n 44), p 29. 
50  See for instance V. Lowe, “Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments” in A. Boyle 
and D. Freestone, International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future 
Challenges (OUP 1999). 
51 See ILC Draft Principles (n 45), footnote 322. 
52  Which are treaties that establish general obligations, elaborated more precisely in subsequent 
instruments such as protocols or annexes. These obligations could detail, inter alia, specific 
commitments (e.g., UNFCCC article 4(2) and Annex I), the regulation of activities concerning species 
(Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora Article 2 and 
Appendices) or the inclusion of new substances that need to be limited (POPs convention and 
Annexes). 
53 For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1522UNTS3; 
26ILM 1550(1987) complements the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
UNTS vol.1513, p.293 (1988). 
54 Bodansky et al, “International Environmental Law: Mapping the field”, in Bodansky et al (n 21), p 
7. 
55 J. Peel, “Changing Conceptions of Environmental Risk” in Viñuales (n 27), pp 75 and 79. 
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answer to how to deal with uncertainty in different areas56 and playing a role in 
situations where causation is not fully demonstrated. 57  Considering this, a rigid 
definition of the PP would not be desirable or necessary; the strength and usefulness 
of this principle resides precisely on its broadness and flexibility,58 and hence the 
several formulations of the PP in international law mentioned above.  
In sum, a good way to understand the difficulty of having a single definition 
of the PP lies on its relationship with IEL. The PP has evolved as a flexible concept 
capable of providing guidance in different topics because first, it is needed as an 
adaptable notion in order to deal with various kinds of uncertainties and ever-
changings threats to the environment, and second, it allows for the incorporation of 
evolving knowledge to address the former. A rigid definition would be unsuitable for 
this role of influencing States in decision-making to avoid the materialisation of 
harm, simply because the PP does not impose particular norms or directly prescribe a 
conduct, but recommends courses of action, based on ongoing developments 
regarding information, uncertainties and effects. 
 
2.3.  Legal status of the Precautionary Principle  
 
The legal status of the PP is a controversial issue in which there appears to be no 
agreement. There seems to be a minority position which denies its importance in 
international law,59 and a majority that defend its legal force, i.e., a source of an 
                                                             
56 For instance, potential risks from the introduction of a new chemical element are different than in 
biodiversity, in which environmental harms result not from new activities or products but from 
“incremental impacts of well understood acts”. Cooney (n 12), p 230. See also section 4 below. 
57 De Sadeleer (n 7), p 222, noting how the PP “transforms doubt into possible certainty and hence 
strengthens action by the public authorities in the face of uncertainty.” See also Birnie et al (n 9), p 
156; and Pyhälä et al (n 21), p 205. 
58 ‘Paradoxically, we conclude that the application of precaution will remain politically potent so long 
as it continues to be tantalizingly ill-defined and imperfectly translatable into codes of conduct, while 
capturing the emotions of misgiving and guilt… [I]t is neither a well-defined nor a stable concept’. A. 
Jordan and T. O' Riordan, ‘The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary Environmental Policy and 
Politics,’ in C. Raffensperger and J. Tickner (eds.), Protecting Public Health and the Environment: 
Implementing the Precautionary Principle (Island Press, 1999), p 15. These characteristics are also 
important for the way science (and scientific uncertainty) work, which is, at the risk of 
oversimplifying, starting with tentative hypotheses and see which one is able to better explain the 
facts; yet, as noted by Sagan, “absolute certainty will always elude us”. C. Sagan, The Demon-
Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark (Headline Book Publishing, 1997), p 31. 
59 C. Sunstein, “Beyond the Precautionary principle”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 
151, No. 3 (January 2003), p 1023, and Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cop, 
2005); see also A. Wildavsky, But is it True? A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental Health and Safety 
26 
 
obligation that translates into the adoption of measures to avoid potentially 
serious/irreversible environmental harm, 60  either as a general principle of 
international law61 or as customary law.62 In order to analyse this issue, I will first 
briefly review the conceptual difference between principles and rules in order to see 
if the PP is actually a principle, and then I will address the point of being a general 
principle of international law. 
 
2.3.1 Principles and rules 
 
The ICJ has not defined what a principle is, although in one case assimilated 
“principles” to “rules”, noting that the former are more general and fundamental than 
the latter.63 For their part, several authors have given definitions that include the 
function of a principle; for instance, Beyerlin states that “principles can be 
understood as norms that are first and foremost designed to give guidance to their 
addressees for future conduct in rule-making processes, as well as to shape the 
interpretation and application of rules already in existence”. 64  They would be 
different than rules in the sense that rules are norms that directly prescribe a conduct 
(take action, refrain from action or achieve a fixed result) whereas a principle’s 
objective is to influence States’ decision-making “which otherwise remains open to 
choice, as well as their interpretation of the rules”.65 He also adds that principles can 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Issues (Harvard University Press 1997) “Conclusion: Rejecting the Precautionary Principle”; and 
Marchant (n 1), p 1802. 
60 M. Biddulph and D. Newman, “A Contextualized Account of General Principles of International 
Law”, 26PaceL.Rev.286, 344(2014), p 314; R. Kolb, “Principles as Sources of International Law 
(with special reference to good faith)”, Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 53, no.1(2006), p 
12. 
61  A. Boyle, “Soft law in international law-making”, in Evans (n 45), p 130; Birnie et al (n 9), pp 159-
164; Cameron (n 17), p 30; Biddulph and Newman (n 60), p 310, also noticing that it is unclear if 
there is enough State practice to consider it custom.  
62 A. Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (Kluwer, 
2002), p 52; O. McIntyre and T. Mosedale, “The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary 
International Law” 9 Journal of Environmental Law 221(1997); A. Sirinskiene, “The Status of 
Precautionary Principle: Moving towards a Rule of Customary Law.” Jurisprudence 4(118)(2009), 
among others. 
63 ICJ, “Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area”, Judgment, ICJ Reports 
1984, p. 246, para. 79. See also Biddulph and Newman (n 60), pp 291-302, noting that there is a lack 
of consensus regarding what a general principle of international law is.  
64 U. Beyerlin, “Different types of norms in International Environmental Law: Policies, Principles and 
Rules” in Bodansky et al, (n 21), p 437. 
65 Ibid.  
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be characterized as “imperfect norms” that lack the normative force that rules have.66 
Lang mentions that principles are “a norm of a general nature which gives guidance 
to state behaviour, but are not directly applicable; the violation of such principles 
cannot be pursued in international courts unless they are made operational by means 
of more concrete norms.”67 Similarly, Dworkin states that legal principles “do not set 
out legal consequences that follow automatically when conditions provided are met” 
and that a principle must be taken into account by officials “if it is relevant, as a 
consideration inclining in one direction or another”.68 Bodansky argues, in line with 
Dworkin, that “principles embody legal standards, but the standards they contain are 
more general than commitments and do not specify particular actions.”69 Finally, De 
Sadeleer contends that because of their nature, legal principles are not subject to an 
exhaustive definition because it would restrict its meaning; instead, “what is sought 
is a flexible norm able to adapt to the heterogeneous situations in which it will be 
used.”70  Thus, principles have a more general character than rules; they exist to 
provide guidance and influence States’ behaviour in decision-making, and have also 
a role of interpretation and the filling of gaps, although the latter function probably 
belongs more to the judicial sphere. They are not intended to be automatically 
applied, neither are they able to directly prescribe particular conduct, otherwise they 
would not be principles, but rules.  
As noted by Cameron, the PP informs States in the adoption of effective 
measures to protect the environment,71 and similarly, De Sadeleer mentions that the 
PP set “the conditions for action without actually describing that action, thus leaving 
a wide margin” for implementation, 72  having then an incomplete normative 
character.73  In other words, it provides guidance certain situations (threats of non-
negligible harm to the environment in the face of scientific uncertainty), which, 
added to its flexible nature illustrated by its various formulations, indicates that the 
                                                             
66 Ibid.  
67  W. Lang, “The United Nations and International Environmental Law”, Geneva Yearbook IX 
(1995), p 52. 
68 R. Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1978), pp 25-26.   
69 D. Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’, 
18 Yale Journal of International Law 451(1993), p 501.  
70 De Sadeleer (n 7), pp 173-174. 
71 Cameron (n 17), p 30. 
72 De Sadeleer (n 7), p 370. 
73 Ibid., p 368, noting the PP has “sufficient legal force to be considered normative-that is, giving rise 
to legal effects” but its normative character is different than other, more complete norms. 
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PP fits the notion of ‘principle’ instead of ‘rule’, which is more specific. Is it then a 
general principle of international law? 
 
2.3.2 Approaches to general principles of international law  
 
The Statute of the ICJ mentions the “general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations”74 as a source to decide disputes, filling gaps in law and prevent a 
non liquet situation.75 The meaning of the words in the Statute have been subject to 
different interpretations, with two major views in this respect: one that argues in 
favour of a ‘domestic’76  or ‘narrow’77  approach, defending the idea that general 
principles must be found in all or a majority of national legal systems; and a 
‘broader’ 78  or ‘hybrid’ approach, 79  defending that this expression also includes 
general principles drawn from the international arena. This last one seems to be the 
majority view,80 supported also by the reliance of international courts on general 
principles of international law without resorting to domestic law.81  
As mentioned by a majority of authors, the role of a general principle is not 
only to fill gaps, but also to assist in interpreting, applying and developing other 
norms;82 as such, they can be used to introduce changes in existing law and influence 
and guide State behaviour. 83  In this connection, and in order to fulfil this role, 
                                                             
74 UN, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, Article 38.1. 
75 See ICJ, “North Sea Continental Shelf”, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3. See also M. Aznar-
Gomez, “The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory opinion and Non Liquet in International Law”, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 48 (1999). 
76 Biddulph and Newman (n 60), pp 298-299. 
77 T. Kleinlein, “Customary International Law and General Principles: Rethinking their Relationship” 
in B. Lepard, (ed) Reexamining Customary International Law (CUP 2017), p 134. 
78 Ibid., saying that this approach distinguishes three categories: principles that come from domestic 
law, general principles originated in international relations and general principles applicable to all 
kind of legal relations. 
79 Biddulph and Newman (n 60), pp 299-300, noting that general principles can be adapted from 
domestic law and also directly from the international order.  
80 Ibid; see also B. Simma and P. Alston, “The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens 
and General Principles”, 12 Aust. YBIL 82 (1988-1989), p 102; D. Moeckli, S. Shah and S. 
Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights Law (OUP 2014, 2nd edition), p 85; H. Thirlway, 
“The Sources of International Law” in M. Evans (n 45), pp 104-105. 
81  J. Rehman, International Human Rights Law (2nd edition, Pearson 2010), pp 23-24. Kleinlein 
mentions the example of the International Criminal Court. Kleinlein (n 77), pp 136-137. 
82 Boyle (n 61), p 128; Kleinlein (n 77), pp 142-143; Redgwell notes that general principles of 
international law influence the interpretation of treaty provisions and judicial decisions and the 
application of custom. Redgwell, (n 45), p 697, among others. 
83 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP 2007), p 225.  
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general principles need to be endorsed by States, as Article 38 of the ICJ Statute 
implies when it uses the words “recognized by civilized nations”,84 or, in the words 
of Boyle, “what gives general principles(…) legitimacy and authority is opinio 
iuris.”85  
The question of where to look for evidence of opinio iuris has been addressed 
by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case,86 ruling that it can be deduced from international 
treaties as well as the attitude of States towards soft law instruments87  like UN 
General Assembly resolutions or resolutions of other international organizations,88 
albeit some authors argue that support for binding and non-binding sources is also an 
example of State practice,89 which, in my opinion, seems to contradict international 
courts’ jurisprudence, as noted by Boyle and Chinkin,90 but the controversy remains. 
 
 
                                                             
84  See B. Cheng, General principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals 
(Cambridge, reprinted 2006), p 24, comparing the requirements of custom (widespread and 
consistence practice plus opinio iuris) and general principles, where practice is absent. See also 
Kleinlein, noting that some scholars consider that general principles, like custom, also require State 
practice but to a lesser degree, which would go against the distinction included in Article 38 of the ICJ 
Statute and in contravention of international judicial practice, also highlighting that when the ICJ does 
not find enough State practice to consider a norm as custom, it refers to it as a principle. Kleinlein (n 
77), pp 144-147. 
85 Boyle (n 61), p 129, defining opinio iuris as “evidence of a belief that [State] practice is rendered 
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it”; North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para. 77. 
86 ICJ, “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua” (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1984, (‘Nicaragua case’) p. 392, 
paras. 188-189. 
87 Boyle defines soft law as a “convenient description for a variety of non-legally binding instruments 
used in contemporary international relations by States and international organizations.” Boyle (n 61), 
p 119. Shelton refers to soft law as non-legally binding instruments “containing principles, norms, 
standards, or other statements of expected behaviour.” D. Shelton, “International Law and Relative 
Normativity” in M. Evans (n 45), p 159. Despite their non-binding character, soft-law instruments are 
far from being deprived of legal importance; in effect, they are carefully negotiated so there is at least 
a good faith commitment involved in the adoption of a soft law instrument, and they may provide 
evidence of opinio iuris or State practice, depending on the context. Boyle (n 61), pp 120 and 128. See 
also Boyle and Chinkin (n 83), p 214 and Birnie et al (n 9), pp 34-35. 
88  Nicaragua case, paras. 188-189. 
89 See for instance, J. Wouters and C. Ryngaert, “The Impact of Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law on the Process of the Formation of Customary International Law” in M. 
Kamminga and M. Scheinin (eds) The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law 
(OUP 2009), p 115 and ILC, “Report of the International Law Commission Sixty-eighth session” 
A/71/10(2016), pp 91-92, noting that acts of States regarding negotiation, adoption and 
implementation of treaties and non-legally binding resolutions, decisions and other acts adopted by 
States within international organizations can count as practice, although later also notes that 
“statements are more likely to embody the legal conviction of the State”, p 99. 
90 Boyle and Chinkin (n 83), p 215; see also A. Roberts, “Traditional and Modern Approaches to 
Customary International Law: A Reconciliation” (2001), p 789. 
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2.3.3 The Precautionary Principle as a general principle of international law 
 
As noted above, the PP originated in German domestic law, but it has evolved and 
developed mainly in the IEL field, being incorporated in various international 
instruments with widespread support (treaties like the UNFCCC and the CBD and 
soft-law ones91 like the Rio Declaration), showing abundant evidence of opinio iuris, 
in accordance with the broad model ideal of a general principle.92 As to its role, it is 
clear that the PP fill gaps and guides States in situations of threats of serious harm to 
the environment and scientific uncertainty across different fields and contexts such as 
biodiversity, climate change, marine pollution, human health and even trade, 93 
among others,  and actually influences the development of other international norms 
(like the EU Directive regarding genetically modified organisms);94 this is possible 
thanks to its flexible nature, making it able to adapt to various circumstances, in 
contrast with the more rigid structure of an international rule, which has well-defined 
requirements that must be followed. 95  At the same time, there are several 
formulations of the PP that diverge in a range of issues like the type of risks that 
triggers the application of the principle; if it applies only to the environment or also 
to other risks; and if non-environmental considerations should be taken into account 
and which ones, among others.96 Wiener highlights that it is unclear which type of 
action should be adopted by States when this principle is triggered (with some 
versions simply stating that uncertainty is no excuse for inaction),97 allowing States 
                                                             
91 In this sense, see Boyle (n 61), p 130, noting that “widespread acceptance of soft law instruments 
will tend to legitimize conduct and make the legality of opposing positions harder to sustain.”  
92 Biddulph and Newman (n 60), p 310. 
93 As mentioned above. See also, C. Mercado, "Erring on the Side of Precaution: An Assessment of 
the Application of the Precautionary Principle in International Trade Law," Ateneo Law Journal 62, 
no. 3 (2018). 
94 EU Directive 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 11 March 2015. 
95 De Sadeleer (n 7), pp 308-309.  
96 Wiener (n 21), p 601, noting that there are versions of the PP in over 50 multilateral instruments, 
including treaties and soft-law instruments; see also Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(‘IACtHR’), “Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 of November 15, 2017 Requested by the Republic of 
Colombia: The Environment and Human Rights (State obligations in relation to the environment in 
the context of the protection and guarantee of the rights to life and to personal integrity: interpretation 
and scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights)” (‘IACtHR Advisory Opinion’), paras. 176-178. 
97 Wiener (n 21), p 603. 
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to adopt a broad range of actions to implement this principle, 98  such as 
Environmental Impact Assessments (‘EIA’); research; participatory decision-making 
procedures; bans; and even the establishment of taxes or subsidies; but in general, 
“any measure can be a precautionary measure”. 99  Following this, even an 
administrative delay that results in the avoidance of a serious impact could be 
considered as a precautionary measure.  
The range of existing alternatives makes it difficult to argue that there is 
widespread and consistent State practice to consider the PP as customary law;100 
instead, I agree with the opinion that the PP is a general principle of international 
law. As such, the PP has an important role guiding States and when courts and 
decision-makers decide cases and interpret treaties101 (as noted by the ICJ102 and the 
IACtHR),103 in situations of potentially serious threats of harm, where it is necessary 
to adopt effective precautionary action, but leaving a discretionary margin to decide 
which measure(s) are to be taken.104 In other words, the PP, as a general principle of 
international law, does not impose the adoption of particular actions; as long as 
States are able to adopt effective and proportionate measures to avoid the 
                                                             
98 R. von Schomberg, “The Precautionary Principle and its normative challenges” in Fisher et al (n 
12), p 25; E. Fisher, “Precaution, Precaution Everywhere: Developing a 'Common Understanding' of 
the Precautionary Principle in the European Community”, 9Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L.7(2002), p 
15; O. Pedersen, “From Abundance to Indeterminacy: The Precautionary Principle and Its Two 
Camps of Custom”, Transnational Environmental Law, Vol 3 Issue 2 (2014), pp 9-11; P-M. Dubois, 
“Formation of Customary International Law and General Principles” in  Bodansky et al (n 21), pp 
452-453. 
99 Trouwborst (n 10), pp 177-179. 
100 Pedersen (n 98), pp 15-16, noting that in following a traditional approach to what constitutes a 
norm of customary law, which emphasizes the existence of strong State practice, the PP cannot be 
considered as having a customary law status; Dubois (n 98), p 464, highlighting that the skepticism 
about the customary nature of the PP is understandable because “[S]tate practice is sparse and often 
inconsistent.”  
101 Boyle, (n 61), p 133; Boyle and Chinkin (n 83), p 223; Biddulph and Newman (n 60), p 310, 
among others. 
102 See Pulp Mills judgment, para. 164, noting that “a precautionary approach may be relevant in the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Statute”; see also ITLOS, “Responsibilities and 
obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area”, Advisory Opinion, para. 135. 
103  See IACtHR Advisory Opinion para 180, noting that it is necessary to consider the PP in 
interpreting States’ obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights. 
104 Ibid., noting that States must adopt effective measures when there are plausible indications of 
potentially severe and irreversible environmental damage, without detailing which type of actions are 
needed, leaving this decision to States; see also Beyerlin (n 64), p 440, saying that it is not at the 
discretion of States to adopt adequate precautionary action when the factors that trigger the PP are 
present, but “[d]iscretion exists only as to the choice of measures to be taken”; and von Schomberg (n 
98), p 23, among others.  
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materialisation of potentially serious environmental harm, the precautionary duty is 
discharged. 
As a flexible principle applicable in several fields in international law, the PP 
has been expressed in different ways; yet, throughout its different formulations a 
basic core can be identified, to which I now turn.   
 
3. A common understanding of the Precautionary Principle 
 
The idea of looking for common elements in the different formulations, showing the 
existence of a basic understanding, is perhaps more adequate than trying to come up 
with a general formula that accurately captures the essence and flexibility of the PP. 
This has been explored by several authors, although not in a uniform way; for 
instance, Trouwborst proposes 3 elements (threat of environmental harm, uncertainty 
and action);105 Boisson de Chazournes identifies 4 criteria, 3 a priori (risk, damage 
and scientific uncertainty) and 1 a posteriori (capacities);106 Sandin considers that 
there are 4 dimensions (threat, uncertainty, action and command);107 Mead proposes 
4 elements (threat of harm, lack of scientific certainty or evidence, cause and effect 
relationship not proven and necessity or duty to act);108 and De Sadeleer identifies 3 
elements (risk, damage and proportion),109 to name a few. 
In my view, there are three core elements that appear in the different 
formulations of the PP: threat or risk to the environment, serious or irreversible 
damage and scientific uncertainty. These elements relate to the German “principle of 
foresight”, the idea of anticipating threats and taking measures in advance to prevent 
damage to the environment, which in turn underpins the PP. In the presence of these 
three elements the PP is triggered, and therefore actions to protect the environment 
(which in my opinion are not an element but rather an effect), must be taken. The 
first two elements will be analysed together, due to their close relationship, whereas 
scientific uncertainty will be considered on its own merits. 
                                                             
105 See Trouwborst (n 10), in particular Part Two, Definition. 
106 L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Precaution in International Law: Reflection on its Composite Nature in 
T. Ndiaye and R. Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: 
Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007). 
107 Sandin (n 2), p 889. 
108 Mead (n 1), p 150.  
109 De Sadeleer (n 7), p 150.   
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3.1 Threat of serious or irreversible damage 
 
A threat to the environment involves the idea of an adverse effect, an impact on the 
environment, an “undesirable state of the world”.110 This possible adverse effect has 
to be more than a mere change,111 and constitute a real possibility of damage, in 
order to avoid overregulation112 or other negative effects.113 In some international 
treaties, this ‘threshold of probability’ seems to be included; for instance, the OSPAR 
Convention requires ‘reasonable grounds for concern’;114  the 1996 London Protocol 
requires ‘reason to believe’115 and the Helsinki Convention a ‘reason to assume’;116 
however, there are others where the consideration of this requirement of probability 
appears to be implied.117  
When it comes to the severity of the damage, the terminology varies from 
‘serious or irreversible damage’; 118  to ‘significant’ damage, 119  or even unclear 
thresholds, relying on words like ‘potential’ damages120 or ‘may’ cause harm.121 The 
terms ‘significant’ and ‘serious’ have an unclear meaning, not the least because these 
notions are subjective or value-charged, in the sense that what is significant/serious 
for someone could be irrelevant or just a minor disturbance to others; for instance, 
felling part of a forest may not constitute ‘serious’ damage compared to the overall 
surface, but it could be very serious for the Indigenous peoples that consider the 
                                                             
110 Sandin (n 2), p 891. 
111 Report of the Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Liability and Redress in the Context of 
Paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the CBD. UNEP/CBD/COP/8/27/ADD3, para. 19, noting that for a 
change to constitute damage “it had to result in an adverse or negative effect, and it should be 
measurable.” See also Trouwborst (n 10) p 40. 
112 Sunstein (n 59), p 1023. 
113 Overreaction to false or even true positives could result in “opportunities foregone, innovations 
rejected (including those that would improve human and environmental health), public cynicism about 
future warnings (…), and new countervailing risks.” Wiener (n 21), p 609. 
114 Article 2.2 (a). 
115 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter, 36ILM1(1997), Article 3.1. 
116 Article 3.2. 
117 De Sadeleer (n 7) p 173; Trouwborst (n 10), p 47. 
118 Principle 15 and UNFCCC Article 3.3. 
119 CBD, Preamble. 
120 Cartagena Protocol, Preamble and Water Convention, Article 2.5 (a). 




forest as sacred land.122 In this respect, Trouwborst considers that when the threat is 
‘significant’, a State has a right to take precautionary measures, but when it is 
‘serious or irreversible’ it is no longer an option, but a duty.123  
‘Irreversible harm’ on the other hand can be a confusing term; every action is 
‘irreversible’ because it occurred in a certain point of time and space and it can’t be 
undone; to this, Trouwborst understands irreversible as “damage (…) that…cannot 
be undone in the course of several human generations”,124 which I consider is an 
appropriate definition, emphasizing long-term consequences that cannot be repaired 
in a short period of time (like radioactive contamination or the extinction of a 
species) and thus are going to be suffered by future generations; indeed, it would be 
hard to consider an effect “irreversible” if it is easily undone or efficiently mitigated.  
In sum, it is clear that the threat needs to be of a certain degree,125 at least 
‘serious’ or ‘irreversible’, as every new development has risks and an extreme PP 
can effectively paralyse society. This does not mean that States or other actors cannot 
take precautionary measures before the thresholds are crossed, just that there is no 
obligation to do so. 
 
3.2 Scientific uncertainty  
 
Before looking at this element, it is convenient to distinguish between the PP and 
prevention. Both principles have the objective to avoid environmental harm in the 
face of a threat; 126  the main difference lies in how certain this threat is. The 
preventive principle,127 is applicable when there is certainty, i.e., the cause and effect 
                                                             
122  See IACtHR, “Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname”, (‘Saramaka case’) Judgment of 
November 28, 2007 (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), para. 150, noting how a 
logging company destroyed forests and, in the process, offended the spirits.  
123 Trouwborst (n 10) p 62-67, See also See ILC Draft Principles (n 45), Principle 2 para. 2: where 
“significant” refers to something more than “detectable” but not at the level of “serious” or 
“substantial”. 
124  A. Trouwborst, “The Precautionary Principle in General International Law: Combating the 
Babylonian Confusion”, RECIEL 16 (2) 2007, p 189. 
125 Pyhälä et al (n 21), p 212. 
126 S. Kravchenko, T. Chowdhury and J. Bhuiyan, “Principles of International Environmental Law” in 
S. Alam, J. Bhuiyan, T. Chowdhury, R. Tareq and E. Techera (eds) Routledge Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (Routledge, 2013), p 46. 
127 See Sands (n 26), pp 246-249; Pyhälä et al (n 21), p 204; Rio Declaration, Principle 2; and Report 
of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5–16 June 1972, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, Principle 21.  
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relationship is demonstrated, 128  so a risk (“a function of the expected adverse 
consequences of a particular event and the likelihood of these consequences actually 
coming about”) can be estimated and expressed in numbers in a reliable way129 and 
dealt with using normal risk management approaches like defining a threshold.130  
The PP, on the other hand, applies only when there are likely potential 
threats,131 so if there is “little or no room for uncertainty in the calculation of risk, 
then there is no justification for the PP to be applied at all.”132 Scientific uncertainty 
(or ‘lack of full scientific certainty’, as expressed in Principle 15) is therefore the 
third core element of the PP. We are in the presence of ‘scientific uncertainty’ when 
we know (or think we know) the possible impacts but not the chances that these 
effects will occur,133 which could be due to a “lack of knowledge, the variability or 
complexity of nature, or simply the novelty of the activity or technology 
concerned”; 134  but also because of scientific controversy, 135  that is, a “lack of 
agreement as to the nature and scale of the likely adverse effects”,136 caused by 
conflicting or unclear evidence or divergent scientific opinions due to different ways 
of appreciating and evaluating the data available and/or methodology.137 An example 
is the issue of long-term effects of the introduction of GMOs, where biotechnologists 
have made more favourable risk predictions based on analogies with conventional 
plant breeding, in contrast with ecologists, who also use analogies but argue that the 
risks are similar to the introduction of certain species in new environments, causing 
problems like invasion and pests.138 Finally, the PP is applicable in situations of 
                                                             
128 De Sadeleer highlights that risks are by nature a question of chance, but qualifying a risk as certain 
is possible because the link between the cause and the adverse effect is established and it is feasible to 
calculate the probability of the occurrence. De Sadeleer (n 7) p 158. In any case, absolute certainty 
does not exist. Trouwborst (n 10), p 97; Boisson de Chazournes (n 106), p 24. 
129 Trouwborst (n 10), pp 86-87.  
130 Von Schomberg (n 98), p 29; European Environment Agency, “Late lessons from early warnings: 
the precautionary principle 1896–2000”, (2001), p. 170, box 16.1. 
131 Pulp Mills, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 62; Pyhälä et al (n 21), p 205; 
Sands (n 26), p 267.  
132 Birnie et al (n 9), p 156. 
133 “[T]he adequate empirical or theoretical basis for assigning probabilities to outcomes does not 
exist”.  European Environment Agency, (n 130), p. 170, box 16.1; Trouwborst (n 10), pp 86-87. 
134 Trouwborst (n 10), p 87.  
135 Mercado (n 93), p 1004, Von Schomberg (n 98), pp 29-30. 
136 European Commission, Science for Environment Policy, The Precautionary Principle: decision 
making under uncertainty (Future Brief 18, 2017), p 5. See also Mercado (n 93), p 1004. 
137 Mercado (n 93), p 1004. 
138 Von Schomberg (n 98), pp 29-30. He notes that the debate has seen the dismissal of the other 
‘camp’ knowledge, despite the plausible reasons behind them. 
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ignorance, the ‘area of the unexpected’, where both the potential effects and their 
likelihood of occurrence are unknown.139 The European Environment Agency notes 
the difficulty to respond to ignorance, but also highlights that by giving more 
importance to the potential irreversibility and long-term effects of certain actions, 
even if their potential consequences are unknown, it is possible to avoid serious 
harm; for instance, considering the persistence and bioaccumulation in the 
environment of a substance would eliminate potential hazards and reduce surprises. 
There are different degrees of ambiguity, depending on the scientific data 
collected and the particular characteristics of the given situation, although it is often 
possible to at least estimate the chances of adverse impacts, with various degrees of 
precision. In this context, it is important to note that uncertainty could be: epistemic, 
deriving from missing/incomplete data and linked to measurement mistakes or 
biases, being temporary in nature as it can be usually solved with more research; or 
ontological, which derives from the complexity, variability and dynamism of the 
system studied, being inherent to it and thus, by definition, not temporary. 140  
Although it is not always possible to know in advance which category will be 
encountered, the PP is applicable to both.141 
Despite the theoretical distinction between precaution and prevention, in 
practice it is often difficult to separate both, as it is not uncommon to come across 
damages from both unforeseeable (precautionary) and known causes in the same 
situation;142 thus, when looking at an event that already materialised, it is easier to 
trace back cause-effect relations, possibly causing a bias towards prevention. 
Conversely, it may also be difficult to assess the effectiveness of a precautionary 
measure in avoiding certain effects that did not materialise. 
 
It is important to mention that not every uncertain situation triggers the PP; 
some degree of evidence, based on the best information available is needed, because 
                                                             
139 Trouwborst (n 10), p 87. See also Science for Environment Policy (n 136), p 5, noting that the PP 
can play an important role in addressing multiple layers of uncertainty, including ignorance. 
140 See Cooney (n 12), pp 229-230; and Trouwborst (n 10), pp 85-86. The main example is climate 
change. 
141 Trouwborst (n 10), pp 85-86. 
142  For instance, see Saramaka case, para. 152, where environmental damage and effects on the 
Saramaka people were caused by logging and ill-constructed bridges that blocked creeks, with 
unintended and far-reaching consequences. 
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there are no zero-risk activities and adopting precautionary action based on intuitions 
or at the first hint of risk would lead to overregulation, paralysing innovation;143 in 
the words of De Sadeleer, “a strong presumption should be sufficient basis for an 
appeal to precaution, whereas simple intuition excludes its use”.144 In other words, if 
there is no cause-effect relationship conclusively established, and there is a credible 
presumption, a reasonable ground for concern regarding potentially serious or 
irreversible harm, there is a base to trigger the PP. 
When we think about ‘science’ (and by extension ‘scientific uncertainty’), 
what tends to come to mind, as noted by Orford, is an ‘ideal model of science’ based 
on the theoretical physics model, where hypotheses that aim to establish universal 
laws are tested in experiments and examined by peers.145 Incidentally, the scientific 
uncertainties that motivated the adoption of the PP were not far from this image, 
being of a very technical nature, related to the potentially serious effects of new 
industrial substances or technologies and the efforts to better deal with and 
understand cause-effect relationships.146 For example, the 1987 London Declaration 
states that the PP is necessary to deal with possible effects of ‘dangerous substances’ 
in the North Sea,147 similar to other early references to the PP.148  As such, this 
element has been shaped by a narrow understanding of science, based on 
experiments and natural sciences;149  however, nowadays environmental risks and 
uncertainties come often not from insufficiently analysed substances but from human 
                                                             
143 Wiener (n 21), p 609. 
144  De Sadeleer (n 7), p 159. See also C. Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle in 
International Courts and Tribunals: Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality (CUP, 2011), p 
257 noting applying the PP to every situation where there is scientific uncertainty can produce 
“irrational, protectionist, or overly risk-averse” decisions. 
145 A. Orford, ‘Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law’, EJIL Vol. 25 no. 2 (2014), 
p 370. See also G. McDonell, “Risk management, reality and the precautionary principle: Coping with 
decisions” in Harding and Fisher (n 2), p 192, noting that normally people consider the ‘model’ of 
science to be “the physical and natural sciences” that rests on criteria such as experimentation, theory 
falsification and predictability. 
146 See footnote 22. 
147 London Declaration paras. VII and XVI. 
148 See Cameron (n 17), pp 31-33.  
149 Cooney (n 12), p 230. See also J. Peel, Science and Risk Regulation in International Law (CUP, 
2010), p 150, noting that the PP as developed in international law is ‘rarely divorced’ from 
conventional science; and R. Thaman, P. Lyver, R. Mpande, E. Perez, J. Cariño and K. Takeuchi 
(eds), The Contribution of Indigenous and Local Knowledge Systems to IPBES: Building Synergies 
with Science IPBES Expert Meeting Report (2013), UNESCO, p 56, noting that the “term ‘science’ is 
often used in too narrow a sense, excluding the social and human sciences”, among others. 
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activities like exploitation of natural resources, 150  with associated risks and 
uncertainties that are beyond this narrow understanding but still may have 
environmental implications. For instance, Cooney highlights that the potential risks 
represented by the overexploitation of a timber species requires the consideration of 
uncertainties and threats that are not exclusively of an environmental nature like 
biological factors (e.g., status of the tree species) or the consequences for 
biodiversity and ecosystems’ functions (e.g., impact of logging on the local forest 
fauna) but also socio-economic uncertainties like the motivations behind the 
overexploitation of the resource (e.g., poverty, market forces).151 Interestingly, often 
socio-economic considerations are considered in the adoption of precautionary action 
(and are even explicitly mentioned in some PP formulations); what seems to be 
absent though are references to cultural uncertainties and elements, especially 
relevant in the case of Indigenous peoples (who are very often affected by these type 
of activities),152 because of the possible effects on their traditional and sustainable 
way of life, as I will analyse in more depth later on.153 What I want to highlight now 
is that a narrow understanding of ‘science’ and ‘scientific uncertainty’ is insufficient 
to adequately identify potential threats and uncertainties that are not ‘strictly 
scientific’ but could nevertheless cause environmental harm, or even seriously 
impact humans. I will come back to this point in section 4.3.  
 
4. The Precautionary Principle in action 
 
In the presence of the three elements (threat or risk to the environment, serious or 
irreversible damage and scientific uncertainty) the PP is triggered, and therefore 
there is an obligation to take precautionary action. Yet, as per its flexible nature, the 
                                                             
150 I. Wills, “The Environment, Information and the Precautionary Principle”, Agenda, Vol 4 No 1 
(1997), p 7. 
151  Cooney (n 12), pp 229-230. See also T. Balangue, “The Precautionary Approach and Local 
Livelihoods: A Study of a Protected Landscape and Seascape in the Philippines” pp 241-247 in 
Cooney and Dickson (n 22), p 247, noting that the complex interrelationships of a forest ecosystem 
are not fully understood nor measurable by science and technology. 
152 See V. Tauli-Corpuz, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 
A/HRC/36/46 (1 November 2017), para. 6. 
153 See Chapter III, sections 2-5. 
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PP does not impose any particular measures154 leaving some margin to decide which 
course of action to take,155 considering the particular risks that need to be abated. 
Three important issues are discussed in this section: first, that whatever the 
measure/action taken, it has to be effective and proportionate;156 second, the debate 
about the alleged reversal of the burden of proof; finally, the role of non-
environmental considerations in the adoption of precautionary measures. 
 
4.1 Effectiveness and proportionality 
 
Effectiveness is the most fundamental prerequisite for a measure to be considered 
precautionary; otherwise the PP would be meaningless.157 This means that it needs to 
be able to avoid the serious/irreversible harm and also that in doing so it cannot be 
more harmful to the environment than the threat intended to avoid;158 in addition, it 
should be undertaken as early as possible.159  
Proportionality refers to the need to have an appropriate relation between the 
degree of risk and the response;160 thus, the more significant or serious the damage 
expected (and the greater the degree of uncertainty)161 the more rigorous measures 
must be,162 so catastrophic events may require special efforts even if they are very 
unlikely.163  
                                                             
154 Wiener describes this as “uncertainty does not justify inaction” that “does not answer the real 
question, which is what action to take in the face of (inevitable) uncertainty” Wiener (n 21), pp 604-
605. 
155 See section 2.3 above. 
156 Trouwborst (n 10), p 147; De Sadeleer (n 7), p 132. 
157 Trouwborst (n 10), p 147-148.  
158   “The PP should not call for precautionary regulation of uncertain irreversible risks if such 
regulation would itself yield the very dangers the PP seeks to avoid. At the extreme, the PP could 
swallow itself, prohibiting both the risky activity and the risky regulation of this activity.” Wiener (n 
21), p 609. 
159 Trouwborst (n 10), p 182; De Sadeleer (n 7), p 91.  
160  R. Cooney, “The Precautionary Principle in Biodiversity Conservation and Natural Resource 
Management: An issues paper for policy-makers, researchers and practitioners” IUCN Policy and 
Global Change Series No. 2, 2004, p 36; De Sadeleer (n 7), p 168. 
161 M. Kamminga, “The Precautionary Approach in International Human Rights Law: How It can 
Benefit the Environment” in D. Freestone and E. Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle and 
International Law: The Challenge of Implementation (Kluwer, 1996), p 185. 
162 Trouwborst (n 10), p 150; De Sadeleer (n 7), p 155 and p 168; von Schomberg (n 98), p 37; A. 
Nollkaemper, “‘What you risk reveals what you value’, and Other Dilemmas Encountered in the Legal 
Assaults on Risks” in Freestone and Hey (n 158), pp 82-84. 
163 Wiener (n 21), p 608. This is why there is a ‘planetary defense coordination office’ in charge of the 
early detection of potentially hazardous objects (asteroids and comets) with predicted orbits close to 
the Earth. See https://www.nasa.gov/planetarydefense  
40 
 
What are effective and proportional measures depend on the context and the 
kind of harm that needs to be abated: typical precautionary measures include bans, 
use of best technology available, EIAs164 and consultations,165 among others,166 but 
any measure can be a precautionary measure.167  
 
4.2 The issue of the burden of proof 
 
Traditionally, environmental requirements are established only after the authorities 
have proven the need to regulate or forbid a certain activity.168 The application of the 
PP implies a change in this approach: since lack of full scientific certainty is not an 
excuse for not taking measures, an action (standard, ban, moratorium, etc) adopted 
by a State to prevent serious harm or a risky activity does not require the absolute 
establishment of a cause-effect relation, as before. In other words, a State would have 
the possibility to take measures before having absolute proof of harm,169 reinforcing 
the anticipatory nature of the PP; for instance, a ban on genetically modified 
organisms would be justified even though its adverse effects are not, to date, fully 
demonstrated. Cameron argues that this sort of reversal of the burden of proof is 
accepted in international law 170  but then mentions a possible second reversal, 
consisting on shifting the burden to the proponent of a potentially risky activity, who 
will have to convince the regulator that the activity is harmless.171 An example of 
                                                             
164 Biddulph and Newman (n 60), p 306; Pulp Mills, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, 
para. 96; Trouwborst (n 10), pp 174-175. 
165  See for instance G. Handl, “Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to 
International Law” 1 Y.B.INT'LENVTL.L.3, 29(1990), p 21; J. Brunnee, “A Conceptual Framework 
for an International Forests Convention: Customary Law and Emerging Principles” in Canadian 
Council on International Law (eds), Global Forests and International Environmental Law (London 
1996), p 73; L. Starke, "Breaking new ground: Mining, minerals, and sustainable development." 
London: Earthscan (2002), p 158; and Trouwborst (n 10), p 177, among others. 
166 See for instance Trouwborst (n 10), Chapter 7 “Precautionary measures”; D. Freestone and E. Hey, 
“Origins and development of the Precautionary Principle” in Freestone and Hey (n 158), p 13; and 
Cameron (n 17), among others. 
167 Trouwborst (n 10), p 179. 
168  De Sadeleer (n 7), p 202; Mead (n 1), p 155; Pyhälä et al (n 21), p 213.  
169  Birnie et al (n 9) p 163. 
170 Cameron (n 17), p 46. See also Birnie et al (n 9) p 158 and Foster (n 141), p 245.  
171 Cameron (n 17), p 46-47. See also De Sadeleer (n 7), p 202-203. 
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activities forbidden until proven harmless would be the ban on industrial waste 
dumping at sea and the whaling moratorium.172 
If we consider the PP as a change of paradigm (from the polluter benefitting 
from scientific doubt to having uncertainty work to the benefit of the 
environment),173 shifting the burden of proof seems a logical effect.174 After all, the 
proponent of an activity is seeking to change the status quo to a potentially more-
polluted state, so it makes sense for him/her to prove the relative (i.e., not absolute) 
harmlessness of the activity175 and not waiting until there is harm to change course.176 
Also, this proponent has been planning and preparing for some time, having more 
information about impacts and a general view of a project, 177  being in a better 
position than the people opposing it178 when it comes to providing evidence (and 
reduce uncertainties). Thus, this reversal would be a natural result of the PP. 
However, this is controversial and there are good arguments against it; for instance, 
most formulations of the PP do not mention this alleged reversal, so it does not seem 
to be a normal or widely accepted consequence of the PP,179 and there is no sufficient 
international practice to support it, as the Pulp Mills case shows.180 Moreover, it 
would impose a near-impossible standard to meet, as it is logically very difficult to 
conclusively establish that a certain activity is absolutely harmless or that it will not 
                                                             
172  Birnie et al (n 9) p 159; yet, they mention that this is exceptional and it was deliberately not 
subsequently adopted in further implementations of the PP; also Wiener (n 21), p 606. 
173  De Sadeleer (n 7), p 203; see also D. Freestone and E. Hey, “Implementing the PP: Challenges and 
Opportunities” in Freestone and Hey (n 158), p 259. 
174  Trouwborst (n 10), p 225. See also J. McDonald, “Tr(e)adding cautiously: precaution in WTO 
decision-making” in Fisher et al (n 9), p 162: “placing the burden of proving safety to the proponent 
will generally serve precaution better than locating it in those seeking to prevent harm”; Kravchenko 
et al (n 126), p 47.   
175 Cameron (n 17), p 47. 
176 L. Emerton, M. Grieg-Gran, M. Kallesoe and J. MacGregor, “Economics, the PP and Natural 
Resource Management: Key Issues, Tools and Practices” in Cooney and Dickson (n 22), p 254. 
177 Trouwborst (n 10) p 198; A. Cançado Trindade “Principle 15: Precaution” in Viñuales (n 27), p 
409; see also Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in Nuclear Test case, p 343 noting that “New 
Zealand has placed materials before the Court to the best of its ability, but France is in possession of 
the actual information.” 
178 Often vulnerable people directly affected but without the means to discharge this burden of proving 
with certainty the potential harm. Moyle (n 22), p 164.   
179  J. Jones and S. Bronitt, “The burden and standard of proof in environmental regulation: the 
precautionary principle in an Australian administrative context” in Fisher et al (n 9), p 137, and J. 
Tickner and D. Kriebel, “The role of science and precaution in environmental and public health 
policy” in ibid, p 70. 
180 Pulp Mills, para. 164: “the Court considers that while a precautionary approach may be relevant in 
the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Statute, it does not follow that it operates as 
a reversal of the burden of proof.” See also Trouwborst (n 10), p 226 and Foster (n 141), p 274.  
42 
 
become a future source of harm when there is incomplete knowledge of possible 
adverse effects; 181  every activity has associated risks, so this standard would 
effectively halt progress.182 Finally, an automatic reversal may affect vulnerable or 
poor communities, including Indigenous peoples, because they engage in local use of 
natural resources (e.g., customary practices) that some may consider as a threat to the 
environment, placing an overwhelming burden on them that they would hardly 
meet.183 
Naturally, a zero-risk proof is unachievable, but this is not the standard 
required by any formulation of the PP;184 as noted above, what is usually required is 
to prove that serious/irreversible harm is not going to result from the proposed 
activity in the presence of scientific uncertainty,185 so the discussion is more about 
what needs to be proven and not so much about who needs to prove it. In other 
words, the PP lowers the standard of proof,186 so the opponent of a pollutant activity 
has to only demonstrate in the initial allegation that, based on the available scientific 
evidence, there are ‘reasonable grounds for concern’ that non-negligible damage may 
be caused to the environment,187  instead of needing to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt an alleged environmental damage. If this standard is met, the procedure 
continues its normal course, being the turn of the potential polluter to disprove the 
allegations188  and if unsuccessful, the decision-maker has to adopt effective and 
                                                             
181 Sunstein (n 59), p 1023, also noting that often the options available entail some degree of risk; and 
Morris, arguing that the standard of proof would become infinitely high. J. Morris “Defining the 
Precautionary Principle”, pp 8-9 in J. Morris (ed) Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle 
(Butterworth-Heinemann, 2000); Tickner and Kriebel (n 164), pp 70-71. 
182 Sunstein (n 59), p 1023. 
183 Cooney (n 12), pp 234, noting that asking Indigenous communities “to demonstrate that their use 
of non-wood forest products, sea turtle eggs or pasture was not causing any harm would be 
tantamount to ending” their traditional livelihoods; and Cooney (n 157), p 37. 
184 Trouwborst (n 10), pp 200-201 and 225; De Sadeleer (n 7), p 207, noting that there is no obligation 
of harmlessness.  
185 Trouwborst (n 10) p 226; Foster (n 141), p 255; Cooney (n 157), p 8. 
186 See S. Maguire and J. Ellis, “Redistributing the Burden of Scientific Uncertainty: Implications of 
the Precautionary Principle for State and Nonstate Actors”, Global Governance 11 (2005), p 505; 
Trouwborst (n 10), p 227; and Jones and Bronitt (n 176), pp 138-139. 
187 Trouwborst (n 10), p 224; Foster (n 141), p 255; J. Whitehouse, “Will the precautionary principle 
affect environmental decision-making and impact assessment?” in Harding and Fisher (n 2), p 66 
citing Walton who notes that when the PP applies, the authority should be able to reject a 
development proposal based on ‘reasonable belief’ of harm to human health and environmental capital 
or irreversible harm to natural assets. 
188 Jones and Bronitt (n 176), pp 141-142.  
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proportionate precautionary measures to avoid the materialization of the harm, since 
it must assume it will materialise.189  
Logically, if a party is guided by the PP and another party challenges this, the former 
would just need to meet the ‘reasonable ground for concern’ standard,190 to prevent a 
loophole. This is important for situations in which Indigenous peoples’ way of life 
may allegedly cause environmental harm,191 as they tend to live in a sustainable 
way,192 avoiding unnecessary harm to their environment.193 
To summarise, the PP does not seem to automatically reverse the burden of 
proof, an effect not sufficiently supported by international law; it does however 
lower the standard of proof, favouring the consideration of arguments to err on the 
side of caution and avoid potentially unacceptable harm. 
 
4.3 Non-environmental considerations 
 
The main purpose of the PP is the protection of the environment from potentially 
serious/irreversible threats in the presence of scientific uncertainty. In theory, this 
means that once the PP is triggered, the only thing that would matter is to avoid 
environmental damage, however uncertain, so non-environmental concerns would be 
irrelevant as long as the precautionary measure is effective. This is because, as noted 
by the European Environmental Agency, for too long decision-makers have ignored 
situations where there were reasonable grounds for concern about non-negligible 
environmental harm, which materialised “because of short-term economic and 
political interactions”, 194  placing other considerations in front of environmental 
                                                             
189 Trouwborst (n 10), p 224. See also D. Farrier, “Factoring biodiversity conservation into decision-
making processes: The role of the precautionary principle” in Harding and Fisher (n 2), p 108. 
190 Trouwborst (n 10), p 224. 
191  For instance, Kenya defended the eviction of the Endorois from their ancestral lands for 
conservation purposes, argument rejected by the African Commission, ruling that “the Endorois-as the 
ancestral guardians of that land-are best equipped to maintain its delicate ecosystems”. African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and 
Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council)/Kenya” Decision of November 25, 
2009, paras. 3, 173 and 235, among others. 
192 See Chapter III, sections 3-5.  
193 See for instance, Saramaka case, para. 144, testimony of a Saramaka person saying that “[w]hen 
we cut trees, we think about our children, and our grandchildren, and future generations(…) We are 
very careful not to destroy anything that is in the forest”. 
194 Late lessons from early warnings (n 131), p 168, citing the cases of asbestos and polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs), among others. See also Nollkaemper (n 159), p 73; and N. Myers, “Debating the 
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protection; thus, the PP would rectify this by “adjusting the balance in favour of the 
environment”.195 Therefore, socio-economic arguments like how much money would 
be needed or potential job losses would not be able to be invoked to abstain/excuse 
from the obligation to prevent harm,196  and there would seem to be no role for 
economic tools like cost-benefit analysis (‘CBA’). This tool analyse possible impacts 
and benefits, estimates its likelihood and translate them into monetary value, in order 
to compare the pros and cons of certain alternatives, taking action only if “the likely 
benefits exceed the likely costs”.197 In this context, CBAs are unable to “quantify the 
unquantifiable”, 198  i.e., adequately capture the value of the animals, plants, 
ecosystems and their interrelations199 or provide an effective and reliable way to 
compare different options in situations of irreversibility or uncertainty. Trouwborst 
also mentions that it is practically impossible to assign an accurate economic value to 
undiscovered properties or uses of known species, much less unknown ones,200 and 
that the cost of the irreversible harms (such as a species’ extinction) is infinite by 
definition.201 Even if there is a way to assign ‘right’ or ‘fair’ economic values, it can 
be argued that it would still be more convenient to rely on the PP, as precautionary 
measures are usually cost-effective, being cheaper to avoid harm than to mitigate 
it.202 For example, it is more cost-effective to preserve mangroves than to allow 
mangrove loss and then invest on restoration or rehabilitation;203 and maintaining and 
restoring wetlands is more cost-effective and sustainable than relying on alternative 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Precautionary Principle”. Science and Environmental Health Network (2000), p 6, stating that cost-
considerations have stopped regulatory action in the past.  
195 Trouwborst (n 10), p 236. 
196 Nollkaemper (n 159), p 76; Trouwborst (n 10), p 278; De Sadeleer (n 7), p 170; also, costs can 
easily be manipulated, exaggerating the benefits and underestimating environmental costs. Myers (n 
191), p 5.  
197 C. Sustein, “Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment”, Ethics 11 (January 2005), pp 351-353. 
198 De Sadeleer (n 7), p 199. 
199 Trouwborst (n 10), pp 249-250, noting how CBAs do not do justice to the cost of environmental 
degradation; Emerton et al (n 173), pp 261 and 265; and F. Ackerman, “Critique of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and Alternative Approaches to Decision-Making A report to Friends of the Earth England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland” (January 2008) pp 3-5. 
200 Trouwborst (n 10), pp 250-251; see also De Sadeleer (n 7), pp 167 and 170; Ackerman (n 184), pp 
5-6. 
201 Trouwborst (n 10), p 247.  
202 Emerton et al (n 173), p 255; Trouwborst (n 10), p 246.  
203 Also considering that mangroves protects against floods and storms, among other benefits. See A. 
McIvor, F. Tonneijck, S. Tol and P. van Eijk, “Mangroves for coastal defence”. Guidelines for coastal 
managers & policy makers (Wetlands International and The Nature Conservancy, 2014), p 33. 
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man-made infrastructures.204 Similarly, several examples show how establishing a 
precautionary measure like a ban or capture limits, could avoid the collapse of a 
whole industry and the subsequent impacts in terms of direct and indirect jobs and 
other social effects.205  
However, in practice the circumstances that trigger the PP vary in each case, 
making it hard for decision-makers to dismiss these socio-economic factors;206 in 
addition, the PP does not impose a specific precautionary measure but leaves some 
discretion to choose one (or more) among a range of effective and proportional 
options, from which the decision-maker must select the most appropriate, having 
some space to balance different interests, including socio-economic ones.207 In this 
context, the application of the PP will be “tempered by reference to a range of 
economic and political factors which will potentially compete for priority with the 
concept of precaution.” 208  This is something that some formulations of the PP 
actually acknowledge; for instance, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration refers to 
“cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”, as well as the 
UNFCCC, which also adds that precautionary measures “should take into account 
different socio-economic contexts”, be comprehensive and comprise all economic 
sectors, among others; 209  and the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement states than in 
implementing the PP, “environmental and socio-economic conditions” need to be 
taken into account.210  Thus, as long as the action adopted is effective in avoiding 
                                                             
204 Also considering the different services that wetlands provide, like filtering water and erosion 
control. D. Rusii, P. ten Brink, A. Farmer, T. Badura, D. Coates, J. Förster, R. Kumar and N. 
Davidson, “The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity for Water and Wetlands” (IEEP, 2013), 
pp 5 and 48. 
205 Trouwborst (n 10), pp 238-239; Late lessons from early warnings (n 131), in particular pp 17-26, 
mentioning the socio-economic costs of the collapse of the Newfoundland cod fisheries, among 
others; see also European Environment Agency, “Late lessons from early warnings: science, 
precaution, innovation” (2013). 
206 Cooney (n 12), pp 234-235, saying that the effective implementation of the PP seems to demand an 
integrated policy and management framework that addresses environmental, social and economic 
dynamics. 
207 Cooney (n 157), p 36, noting how decision-makers consider the uncertainty surrounding threats, 
the seriousness and possible likelihood of threats, the likely economic, social (and environmental) 
costs of the protective action, the environmental, economic and social benefits of the action, and the 
level of security that is desired.  
208 M. Feintuck, “Precautionary Maybe, but What's the Principle? The Precautionary Principle, the 
Regulation of Risk, and the Public Domain” Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2005), p 377. 
209 UNFCCC, Article 3.3. 
210 1995 Straddling Fish Stock Agreement, Article 6.3 (c).  
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environmental harm, there is some space for the consideration of socio-economic 
elements.211 
 
4.3.1 Cultural considerations and Indigenous peoples 
 
Considering the above, it is interesting to note the absence of explicit references to 
cultural considerations, particularly relevant when it comes to potential threats of 
serious/irreversible harm from activities that take place in Indigenous peoples’ lands, 
as it is often the case. 212   In effect, as mentioned in the analysis of ‘scientific 
uncertainty’, human activities like mining or logging generate risks and uncertainties 
that go beyond natural sciences, into human-environmental dynamics. In the case of 
Indigenous peoples, it is necessary to take into account that the basis of their 
traditional way of life is their special relationship with their lands; thus, the risks 
generated by projects and developments on their territories involve important cultural 
aspects, including the use and development of their traditional knowledge, and 
practices such as the protection of certain species that have spiritual significance and 
the establishment and maintenance of sacred places.213 In addition, their practices 
have resulted in the careful and sustainable use of natural resources, 214  with 
Indigenous peoples having “a vital role in environmental management and 
development”, as mentioned by the Rio Declaration.215  This means that overlooking 
these cultural considerations may result in serious environmental harm216 but, more 
importantly for this research, also in serious effects on Indigenous peoples’ 
traditional way of life. For instance, the declaration of the Surin Islands as a national 
park in Thailand has been instrumental in their protection, but it also resulted in 
access restrictions to materials for boatbuilding and serious limitations on the 
                                                             
211 Trouwborst (n 10), p 279. 
212 See supra 152. 
213 See Chapter III, sections 3-5. 
214 Ibid., sections 2-3. 
215 Rio Declaration, Principle 22. 
216  See for instance, D. Smyth, “Indigenous land and sea management–a case study” (Canberra: 
DSEWPaC, 2011), p 11, mentioning that there was an increase in wildfires in Australia following the 
removal of Indigenous peoples from certain areas; A. Ross, K. Pickering Sherman, J. Snodgrass, H. 
Delcore and R. Sherman, Indigenous Peoples and the Collaborative Stewardship of Nature: 
Knowledge Binds and Institutional Conflicts (Left Coast Press, 2011), pp149-153, noting how the 
management of lands and resources by the US government in former and current Lakota lands 
disregarding the latter’s practices has resulted in ecological degradation and extinction. 
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nomadic way of life of the Moken who live in the area, affecting their traditional 
knowledge and practices on construction, foraging (including the customary rotating 
use of resources to prevent overuse and degradation) and navigation; in addition, the 
government’s support for eco-tourism activities added more pressure on their 
livelihoods. These factors forced them into a more sedentary way of life, seriously 
affecting their traditional livelihood, practices and cultural identity, and also resulting 
in a more intense use of resources in smaller areas, against their traditions, negatively 
impacting their environment. 217  A similar situation, described in the previous 
chapter, happened to the Gonds in India and the imposition of a management plan on 
their lands.218 
 As noted above, to address this is necessary to expand the notion of ‘science’ 
and ‘scientific uncertainty’, which as mentioned in section 3.2, is shaped by a narrow 
approach, “largely inadequate for addressing the vast cultural and natural diversity 
which must be considered” to deal with complex natural relationships and multi-
dimensional threats.219 This requires embracing “broader forms of knowledge that 
extend beyond science, narrowly conceived” 220  which, following the standard 
established for the element of ‘scientific uncertainty’, cannot constitute ‘mere 
beliefs’ or simple intuitions, as they would be insufficient to trigger the PP. In this 
context, whenever Indigenous peoples may be affected, the ‘broader form of 
knowledge’ required to be integrated is traditional knowledge, for various reasons: 
first, as I argue in more depth on the next chapter, this knowledge has a scientific 
character; second, it constitutes the ‘best information available’ regarding possible 
effects on their traditional way of life, including those of a cultural and spiritual 
nature, often difficult to identify with certainty without Indigenous peoples’ input;221 
and third, this knowledge has proven more accurate than conventional science or 
methods in situations of scientific controversy. For instance, Johannes et al recount 
                                                             
217  N. Arunotai, “Moken traditional knowledge: an unrecognised form of natural resources 
management and conservation” International Social Science Journal 58(187),(2006). 
218 See Chapter I, section 1. 
219 Thaman et al (n 146), p 56. See section 4.2. 
220  Peel (n 146), p 336. See also S. Jasanoff and M. Martello, “Conclusion: Knowledge and 
Governance” in S. Jasanoff and M. Martello (eds), Earthly politics: local and Global in 
Environmental Governance (MIT Press, 2004), pp 335-6; and E. Fisher and R. Harding, “The 
precautionary principle: Towards a deliberative, transdisciplinary problem-solving process” in 
Harding and Fisher (n 2), p 295.  
221 See Chapter III, sections 3-5. 
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the situation of traditional fishermen in the Solomon Islands who, based on their 
observations, maintained that the overfishing of small fish used for commercial bait 
was significantly decreasing the number of certain predatory fish necessary for their 
subsistence. Australian marine biologists hired by the government wrongly (as 
refuted by later studies) concluded that the bait fishery had a minimum impact on 
predatory fish, because the data was gathered without considering the seasonal or 
nocturnal nature of fishing activities in the region, among other elements.222 Another 
case is recounted by Ross et al, where the Australian government implemented a 
program to monitor the numbers of dugong (an endangered species), by which any 
decline triggered precautionary restrictions on commercial and Indigenous hunting 
(being the latter unfairly considered as a main factor of their declining numbers, 
disregarding evidence of their sustainable hunting practices based on strict social and 
cultural safeguards). In 2001, scientific aerial surveys suggested that such decline 
was happening, until traditional hunters, voluntarily sharing their knowledge and 
experience, informed the crew about the inadequacy of both the survey method (the 
noise scared the dugongs) and the location of the study (the dugongs were on 
different seasonal feeding grounds), which was later corroborated in subsequent 
studies.223 Although this latter example could be construed as an example of ‘erring 
on the side of caution’, which is what the PP is about, it could have resulted in the 
imposition of unacceptable restrictions on Indigenous peoples’ sustainable practices, 
based on unreliable data collection methods,224 potentially forcing them to abandon 
their traditional practices, severely affecting their way of life.  
However, there have been occasions where scientific controversies between 
traditional knowledge and conventional sciences have resulted in the disregard of the 
former.225 For instance, Nadasdy mentions the case where in the context of managing 
Dall sheep population in Yukon territory, Kluane First Nation members expressed 
                                                             
222 R. Johannes, M. Freeman and R. Hamilton, “Ignore fishers’ knowledge and miss the boat”, Fish 
and Fishries vol 1 issue 3 (2000), pp 258-260.  
223 Ross et al (n 200), pp 120-129. 
224 Ibid., pp 127-129. 
225 Or even as ‘obsolete or merely anecdotical’. N. Chalmers and C. Fabricius, ‘Expert and generalist 
local knowledge about land-cover change on South Africa’s wild coast: Can local ecological 
knowledge add value to science?’ Ecology and Society 12:10(2007), p 11; M. Stevenson, “The 
Possibility of Difference: Rethinking Co-management”, Human Organization, Vol. 65, No. 2 (2006), 
p 170; Ross et al (n 205), p 95; S. Mackinson, “Integrating Local and Scientific Knowledge: An 
Example in Fisheries Science”, Environmental Management 27, p 542. 
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their concerns to scientists and resource managers about allowing hunters only to 
shoot full mature rams, due to their importance for the sheep population of their role 
as teachers (in aspects like mating and survival strategies), recounting that one 
person “specifically likened to killing off all the elders in the community”; 
nevertheless, these concerns were ignored by biologists, some of who did not take 
this ‘social’ information seriously.226  
 If this traditional knowledge is scientific in nature (and I argue in the next 
chapter that it is), incorporating it into the notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’ in 
situations where Indigenous peoples may be affected would contribute to the 
avoidance of potentially serious environmental harm, based on their sustainable 
practices and understanding of the environment. More importantly, and closer to the 
point of this research, it would mean that this traditional knowledge is recognised as 
a scientific basis to adopt precautionary action, which implies that other types of 
potential threats of non-negligible harm identified by relying on this knowledge, 
especially those that threaten Indigenous peoples’ rights, would be subject to 
precautionary treatment,227 broadening the scope of the PP (which as noted above is 
a flexible notion that constantly incorporate new information to deal with ever-
changing threats), and enabling its application to avoid the materialisation of these 
threats. This is due to the fact that, as this scientific traditional knowledge constitutes 
the ‘best information available’ regarding Indigenous peoples’ traditional livelihood 
(see next chapter), it provides credible scientific evidence (i.e., ‘reasonable grounds 
for concern’) about possible significant effects on their way of life from a determined 
measure taking place on their territories, something particularly relevant when it 
comes to cultural and spiritual aspects. In this sense, there would be a ‘threat’, of a 
‘serious’ nature, in the presence of ‘scientific uncertainty’, which triggers the PP.  
Interestingly, there are other instances of the PP being applied to protect 
Indigenous peoples’ rights. For example, the IACtHR has emphasized States’ 
obligation to ensure the rights to life and personal integrity, acting “diligently to 
prevent harm to these rights”; in order to do so, they “must act in keeping with the 
                                                             
226  P. Nadasdy, “The Politics of Tek: Power and the "Integration" of Knowledge”, Arctic 
Anthropology, Vol. 36, No. 1/2 (1999) pp 7-8. 
227 See also Kamminga, (n 161), p 185 noting there is no inherent reason why violations of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights should not be subject to this precautionary treatment. 
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precautionary principle” in the face of potentially serious environmental threats, and 
adopt effective precautionary action. 228  These actions include the regulation of 
activities that could cause serious environmental damage, 229  conduct EIAs when 
there are risks of significant environmental harm 230  and mitigate environmental 
effects, using the best information available, even if the source of the pollution is 
unknown.231 In the case of Indigenous peoples, and in attention to the fact that these 
rights to life and personal integrity include their fundamental right to cultural 
identity, based on the special relationship that they have with their lands,232 the Court 
has ruled that States also have to consult them and conduct social impact assessments 
(in addition to EIAs) with Indigenous participation. 233  This allows them to 
incorporate their knowledge in decision-making, in order to anticipate potentially 
serious harm for Indigenous communities, protecting their deep connection with their 
territories, their cultural identity and values and traditional practices,234  and ensure 
that they are aware of all possible risks that could affect them.235  
In addition, as I will mention in Chapter III in more detail, in the context of the 
biodiversity regime there are the Akwe:Kon voluntary guidelines for cultural, social 
and environmental impact assessments.236 These guidelines have the objective to, 
inter alia, avoid “potential adverse impacts on the livelihood” of Indigenous 
peoples237 through the implementation of different types of impact assessments with 
Indigenous participation, enabling them to integrate their knowledge, concerns and 
interest in this process. These various impact assessments are guided by the PP,238 
and are aimed to identify and help to avoid possible impacts on the environment 
(EIAs), but also on: Indigenous peoples’ way of life, values, belief systems, 
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relationship with the local environment and particular species and customs, among 
others (cultural impact assessments); the physical manifestations of a community’s 
cultural heritage, including sites and remains of historical, religious, spiritual and 
cultural values (cultural heritage impact assessments); and the well-being and quality 
of life of a community (social impact assessments).239  
This shows that this flexible principle is able to be extended beyond 
environmental aspects, avoiding in these cases the materialisation of potential 
impacts on Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life, by relying on their traditional 
knowledge, concerns and interests, protecting their rights.240  
 Finally, as mentioned by Boisson de Chazournes, the existence of 
uncertainties that derive from human activities requires an effective application of 
public participation, 241  in line with Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, which 
establishes that “[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with participation of all 
concerned citizens(…)” and that “each individual shall have appropriate access  to 
information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including 
information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making processes.” 242  Similarly, Cançado 
Trindade notes that the PP entails an obligation to notify, share information and 
consult local populations. 243  This means that the integration of new sources of 
knowledge into the notion of scientific uncertainty has to be done through public 
participation mechanisms,244 which, as outlined above, in the case of Indigenous 
peoples refers to consultations and impact assessments, according to several 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The PP is, and will likely remain, a controversial principle in international law, 
despite its inclusion in a wide range of areas (biodiversity, climate change, etc); 
however, it plays a critical role regarding the protection of the environment, allowing 
for the adoption of early measures to anticipate harm even if there is no full scientific 
certainty about the potential threat. In clarifying some of the controversies 
surrounding the PP, I first noted that, as a principle developed and applied mostly in 
IEL, the PP needs to remain as a flexible notion, because the environmental threats 
and risks are constantly evolving, which is also why this field relies on broad 
concepts and framework conventions. I then mentioned that, following the position 
held by several authors, the PP is a general principle of international law, guiding 
and influencing States conduct in every situation where there are threats of 
serious/irreversible environmental damage in a context of scientific uncertainty. This 
includes for example the introduction of new technologies or substances which 
effects are not completely clear, and situations where the threats come from human 
activities such as the exploitation of natural resources in Indigenous peoples’ lands. I 
then moved on to analyse the elements of the PP (threat, of a serious/irreversible 
nature and scientific uncertainty), in which presence the PP is triggered, and 
precautionary action must be taken to avoid the materialisation of non-negligible 
environmental harm, action that must be effective and proportionate. However, the 
PP does not reverse the burden of proof, as sometimes argued, but lowers the 
standard of proof (what needs to be proven), allowing the opponent of a potentially 
pollutant action to just prove that, with the best scientific information available, there 
are reasonable grounds for concern that serious or irreversible harm is going to 
occur; following the regular procedure, it is then the potential polluter who has to 
disprove these allegations. 
The element of  scientific uncertainty is shaped by a narrow understanding of 
‘science’ based on natural sciences, adequate to address risks arising from the 
introduction of substances which could interact with the environment in ways that 
are not well understood (the original task of the PP), but not when it comes to the 
existence of threats and uncertainties arising from other human activities like mining 
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or logging, that involve dynamics beyond the ecological or biological aspects. The 
implication is that a narrow approach could result in ineffective precautionary action, 
causing both environmental harm and impacts on humans, as not all the elements 
necessary to decide the best course of action (the ‘best information available’) would 
have been considered.  
This narrow approach is somewhat attenuated by the inclusion of socio-
economic considerations in precautionary decision-making (as noted in some 
formulations of the PP); however, there is a notable absence, cultural considerations, 
which are sometimes equally or more relevant, especially in situations where 
Indigenous peoples may be affected, due to their special relationship with their lands 
and environment, the base of their traditional way of life. In this context, it is 
necessary to broaden this notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’, integrating  this narrow 
approach to science with other sources of knowledge that do not correspond to the 
‘ideal model of science’ through public participation mechanisms, providing a 
different and complementary view of what constitutes scientific uncertainty and risks 
and better foundation for the adoption of effective and proportionate precautionary 
measures. In the context of Indigenous peoples, this ‘other source of knowledge’ 
would be traditional knowledge, if it is recognised as having a scientific character. 
This would not only result in the avoidance of possible environmental harm, 
considering Indigenous peoples’ sustainable practices, but it would enable the 
implementation of this principle in the protection of their rights when there are 
threats of serious or irreversible harm to their traditional way of life.  
Following this, I will analyse in the next chapter the issue of traditional 
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1. Introduction  
 
It is widely recognised that Indigenous peoples have a special relationship with their 
lands in a way that includes deep religious, cultural, social and environmental bonds 
which constitute the basis of their collective traditional way of life.1 This relationship 
has resulted in the development of a body of ‘traditional knowledge’ (‘TK’) that has 
enabled their survival through long periods of time2 and has led to the conservation 
                                                             
1 See International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27 June 
1989, entered into force 5 September 1991 (‘C169’), Article 13; UN General Assembly, UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 2 
October 2007, A/RES/61/295 (‘UNDRIP’), preamble and Articles 11-12 and 24-26, among others; S. 
Venne, “The New Language of Assimilation” in Without Prejudice Vol. II No 2, 1989; J. Anaya, 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2nd ed. 2004); F. Berkes, Sacred Ecology (3rd edition, 
Routledge 2012), and K. Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, 
Strategy (Duke University Press, 2010). 
2  F. Mamani, “Saberes y conocimientos del pueblo indigena del ayllu Sullka del municipio de 
Tomave, Potosi, Bolivia” in B. Baptiste, D. Pacheco, M. Carneiro and S. Diaz, Knowing our Lands 
and Resources: Indigenous and Local Knowledge of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services in the 
Americas (UNESCO 2017), p 97 noting that their collective way of life guarantees their survival; and 
D. Shelton “Principle 22: Indigenous People and Sustainable Development” in J. Viñuales (ed), The 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: A Commentary (OUP, 2015), p 542, noting that 
the intimate knowledge of their environment sustain a self-sufficient lifestyle over the long term.  
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of biodiversity.3 It also reflects an Indigenous understanding of ‘belonging to the 
Earth’ where nature is “an extension of society”,4 as opposed to a western worldview 
that differentiates between the environment and other spheres of life (scientific, 
political, religious, etc).5 This cosmovision means that what may be considered an 
‘environmental issue’ from an international law perspective is not perceived in the 
same way by Indigenous peoples, who could have their whole livelihood and even 
their very survival seriously affected; they are “a special case where human rights 
and the environment intersect”.6  
As outlined in Chapter II, Indigenous peoples’ TK could be useful in 
situations of potentially non-negligible threats to their livelihood, providing a 
different understanding of possible risks and scientific uncertainties, not based on 
‘conventional science’; yet this is only possible if TK constitutes more than ‘mere 
beliefs’ or ‘simple intuition’. Thus, it is necessary to analyse what is understood by 
‘traditional knowledge’, as it does not have a universally agreed definition in 
international law;7 and if it is recognised as a source of scientific knowledge. After 
this, I will then focus on the role of Indigenous peoples’ TK in the face of threats of 
non-negligible harm to their traditional way of life. In doing so, and to obtain a better 
picture about the Indigenous cosmovision, livelihoods and disposition towards 
uncertainty and potential threats of harm (including examples of precautionary action 
adopted by Indigenous peoples and governments with their collaboration), I will rely 
on analyses of non-legal sources and studies from other disciplines, because most of 
                                                             
3 Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, “State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples” 
(UN publications, 2009) ST/ESA/328 (‘SOWIP’), p 84, noting the high correlation between the areas 
Indigenous peoples inhabit and high biological diversity; WWF report “Working with Indigenous and 
Local Knowledge Systems for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services: An Analysis of Selected Case Studies from WWF Projects Worldwide as a Contribution to 
IPBES-2” (2013) (‘WWF Report’), p 2.   
4 D. Posey, “Introduction: Culture and Nature-The Inextricable Link” in D. Posey (ed), Cultural and 
Spiritual Values of Biodiversity (UNEP, 1999), p 7; Berkes (n 1), p 249, “the distinction between 
nature and culture is meaningless”; SOWIP, p 52 noting that Indigenous peoples see themselves as 
part of nature; and A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards (CUP, 2007), p 15.  
5 SOWIP, p 52; D. McGregor, “Coming full circle: Indigenous knowledge, environment, and our 
future”, American Indian Quarterly 28.3-4 (2004), p 391, noting that categories like art, religion or 
sciences do not exist in Indigenous thought. See also the “Indigenous peoples Earth Charter”, from the 
Kari-oca Conference, 1992, para. 97 expressing that “[t]raditions cannot be separated from land, 
territory or science.”  
6 C. Metcalf, “Indigenous Rights and the Environment: Evolving International Law” 35 Ottawa L. 
Rev. 101 2003-2004, p 106.  
7 A. Savaresi, “Doing the Right Thing with Traditional Knowledge in International Law: Lessons for 
the Climate Regime”, University of Edinburgh, BENELEX Working Paper no 8, Research Paper 
Series No 2016/16, p 6. 
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the academic literature regarding Indigenous peoples’ ways of life and their actions 
vis-à-vis their environment have been written by conservation biologists, ecologists, 
sociologists and anthropologists, as noted by Desmet.8  
The second part of this chapter will focus on a regime where TK has been 
developed and explicitly incorporated in several instruments, influencing States’ 
conduct and international jurisprudence:9 the biodiversity regime. This regime has 
the objective to protect and conserve biodiversity, guided by the precautionary 
principle (‘PP’) 10  and taking into account the value of biodiversity and its uses 
(including cultural aspects) by local communities and Indigenous peoples, promoting 
their participation in decision-making. Considering this, it is important to analyse if 
this regime relies on TK for the adoption of precautionary measures and how would 
this enable Indigenous peoples’ protection of their cultural and spiritual rights and 
traditional livelihood. 
With this in mind, I will begin looking at Indigenous peoples’ relationship 
with their environment and their traditional way of life (sections two and three), and 
then analyse the notion of TK and its scientific character (section four), which will be 
followed by its practical role regarding precaution (section five). In section six, I 
analyse the biodiversity regime, where although the most important legal instrument 
in this field, the CBD, mentions TK, its role in biodiversity conservation has been 
mostly developed  through the work of the Ad-Hoc Open-ended Working Group on 
Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the CBD, especially the Akwe: Kon Voluntary 
Guidelines for Cultural, Social and Environmental Impact Assessments;11 the Mo’otz  
Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines on Consent and Benefit-sharing from the use of 
Traditional Knowledge;12 and the Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct,13 as well 
                                                             
8 E. Desmet, Indigenous Rights Entwined with Nature Conservation (Intersentia, 2011), p 19. 
9 E. Morgera, “Under the radar: fair and equitable benefit-sharing and the human rights of indigenous 
peoples and local communities related to natural resources” BENELEX Working Paper N 10 
(December 2016), and Savaresi (n 7), p 13. 
10 See Convention on Biological Diversity (‘CBD’), UNTS vol. 1760, p. 79, 5 June 1992 (entry into 
force 29 December 1993), Preambular paras. 7-9 and Article 1. 
11 See Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, “Akwe: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for 
the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments regarding Developments 
proposed to take place on, or which are likely to impact on, Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters 
Traditionally occupied or used by Indigenous and Local Communities” (CBD Guideline Series, 
2004)(‘Akwe Kon Guidelines’). 
12  Mo’otz Kuxtal Voluntary guidelines for the development of mechanisms, legislation or other 
appropriate initiatives to ensure the “prior and informed consent”, “free, prior and informed consent” 
or “approval and involvement”, depending on national circumstances, of Indigenous peoples and local 
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as in some other instruments established under the CBD. Finally, I end this chapter 
with some concluding remarks in section seven. 
 
2. Indigenous peoples and the environment 
 
‘Environment’ is a concept relatively new in international law, as the first major 
conference about it, the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment that started 
the modern era of international environmental law (‘IEL’),14 took place almost three 
decades after the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(neither of which refers to ‘environment’). Before this, environmental concerns were 
addressed as ‘resources’ issues and the responses tended to be ad-hoc in nature.15 As 
noted in the previous chapter, this is a broad notion, difficult to define16 which on 
occasions has been characterised as encompassing almost anything.17 For example, 
the Brundtland report states that “the environment does not exist as a sphere separate 
from human actions, ambitions, and needs (…) the environment is where we all 
live”;18 the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’)  highlighted that “the environment is 
not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very 
health of human beings, including generations unborn”;19 and the 1992 Convention 
on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 
                                                                                                                                                                            
communities for accessing their knowledge, innovations and practices, for fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits arising from the use of their knowledge, innovations and practices relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, and for reporting and preventing unlawful 
appropriation of traditional knowledge. (‘Mo’otz Kuxtal’), CBD/COP/DEC/XIII/18, 17 December 
2016. 
13 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, “Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct to 
Ensure Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage of Indigenous and Local Communities 
Relevant to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity” (‘Tkarihwaié:ri Code of 
Ethical Conduct‘)(Montreal, 2011). 
14 P. Sand, “The Evolution of International Environmental Law” in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnee and E. 
Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP, 2008). 
15 D. Bodansky, J. Brunnee and E. Hey, “International Environmental Law: mapping the Field” in 
Bodansky et al (n 14), pp 2-3. 
16 See also T. Luke, “On Environmentality: Geo-Power and Eco-Knowledge in the Discourse of 
Contemporary Environmentalism” in N. Haenn and R. Wilk (eds), The Environment in Anthropology: 
A Reader in Ecology, Culture and Sustainable Living, p 259.  
17 P. Birnie, A. Boyle, and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd edition, OUP, 
2009), pp 4-5, noting that ‘environment’ “could be used to encompass anything from the whole 
biosphere to the habitat of the smallest creature or organism.” 
18  “Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future” 
UNGA Res.42/187(1987).  




establishes that ‘transboundary impacts’ means effects on the environment, including 
“effects on human health and safety, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, climate, landscape 
and historical monuments or other physical structures or the interaction among these 
factors; they also include effects on the cultural heritage or socio-economic 
conditions resulting from alterations to those factors”.20  
The environment has a crucial role sustaining human life and societies, being 
a healthy environment a precondition for the enjoyment of several rights (e.g., life, 
health, food) and socio-cultural development;21 however, and albeit in some cases 
definitions refer to ‘socio-economic conditions’, IEL is mostly concerned with the 
protection of the physical environment such as lakes, rivers, animals, and the like.22 
The political, economic, social and cultural considerations are separated from 
environmental issues and are mainly addressed on the human rights field, 23  and 
treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 24  and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’), 25 
reflecting an approach that separates humans and nature.26 
By contrast, Indigenous peoples do not have the same compartmentalised 
understanding of the ‘environment’; they have an holistic conception of the world in 
which all elements, physical (living and inanimate) and spiritual are interconnected,27 
so ‘nature’ or ‘environment’ constitute another integral part of existence and not 
                                                             
20 UNTS vol.1936, p. 269, Article 2.  
21 J. Knox, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment”, A/HRC/37/59 (24 January 2018), 
para. 2. 
22 As noted by Bodansky, “international environmental law focuses primarily on the interactions of 
humans and the natural world— the air, water, soil, fauna, and flora.” D. Bodansky, The Art and Craft 
of International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press, 2009) p 10; C. Redgwell, 
“International Environmental Law” in M. Evans, International Law (OUP, 5th edition), p 677. 
23 Boyle even notes that when environmental issues are raised in international cases, the complaint’s 
focus is often shifted towards the human rights affected (property, health, etc). A. Boyle, “Human 
Rights and the Environment: Where Next?” European Journal of International Law, Volume 23, Issue 
3, 2012 p 614. Several examples can be found in the following two chapters. 
24 UNGA, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, 16 December 1966, UNTS, vol.999, 
p. 171.  
25 UNGA, “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 16 December 1966, 
UNTS, vol.993, p. 3. 
26 Bodansky (n 22), p 10. 
27 F. Lenzereni, “Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights and the Controversy over the Commercial Use 
of their Traditional Knowledge” in F. Francioni and M Scheinin (eds), Cultural Human Rights (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), pp 119-149. 
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something separated that requires protection.28 This understanding is expressed in 
different international settings like the 1992 Indigenous Peoples Earth Charter 
(“[o]ur territories are living totalities in permanent vital relation between human 
beings and nature. Their possession produced the development of our culture”);29 the 
1992 Kari-oca Declaration (“[w]e, the Indigenous peoples are connected by the circle 
of life to our lands and environments”);30 the 2002 Kimberley Declaration (“[o]ur 
lands and territories are at the core of our existence  we are the land and the land is 
us; we have a distinct spiritual and material relationship with our lands and territories 
and they are inextricably linked to our survival”);31 the 2012 Kari-oca II Declaration 
(“Mother Earth is the source of life which needs to be protected, not a resource to be 
exploited and commodified as a ‘natural capital.’ We have our place and our 
responsibilities within Creation’s sacred order”);32 and even during the drafting of 
UNDRIP. 33  This holistic conception greatly influences Indigenous peoples’ 
livelihood and management of resources. 
 
3. Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life 
 
Indigenous peoples base their traditional way of life on the careful use of natural 
resources,34 as illustrated by the words of a Saramaka representative: “[w]hen we cut 
trees, we think about our children, and our grandchildren, and future generations(…) 
                                                             
28 See McGregor (n 5), pp 3-4; and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘IACtHR’), “Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua”, Judgment of August 31, 2001, para. 149: “the close 
ties of Indigenous people with the land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis 
of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival.”  
29 Indigenous peoples Earth Charter, para. 32.  
30 Kari-oca Declaration, Brazil, 30 May 1992, in the context of the World Indigenous Conference in 
Kari-oca, Brazil.  
31  Kimberley Declaration, South Africa, 23 August 2002, in the context of the International 
Indigenous Peoples Summit on Sustainable Development, para. 6. 
32 Kari-oca 2 Declaration, 17 June 2012, in the context of the Indigenous Peoples Global Conference 
on Rio+20 and Mother Earth, para. 8.  
33 See C. Charters, “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Lands, Territories and Resources in the UNDRIP: 
Articles 10, 25, 26, and 27” in J. Hohmann and M. Weller, The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (OUP2018), p 402. See also Chapter V, section 2. 
34 This has been often considered as ‘sustainable’; see for instance A. Gray “Indigenous Peoples, 
Their Environments and Territories” in Posey (n 4), p 63 citing Whitt, arguing that Indigenous peoples 
have “the principles of sustainability embedded in their knowledge” but these can only be 
implemented by recognising their rights and respecting their culture; and Shelton (n 2), p 542, noting 




[w]e are very careful not to destroy anything that is in the forest”;35 the Igorots 
traditional and ecologically sensitive mining activities (using hand tools, making 
narrow tunnels and without using chemicals) as opposed to the multinational 
corporations depredatory practices (poisoning water supplies and destroying 
mountainsides);36 or the Moken rotating different food sources to avoid overuse and 
degradation.37 This approach is very important for their survival, as they depend on 
their natural resources,38 but it is also reflective of a worldview in which everything 
is connected and therefore sacred, 39  so unnecessary destruction can affect the 
immaterial world40 and/or the communication with the spirits/ancestors that manifest 
in the form of animals.41  
This lifestyle has inspired the inaccurate narrative that Indigenous peoples are 
‘conservationists’ or ‘ecologically noble savages’.42 To begin with, they are not a 
monolithic group, and the degree of concern/awareness for the environment, the 
traditional practices, and the use of natural resources varies among them43  (with 
some instances of depredatory practices).44  Also, natural conservation efforts are 
                                                             
35  IACtHR, “Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname”, Judgment of November 28, 2007 
(Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), para. 144. 
36 G. Clarke, “From Ethnocide to Ethnodevelopment? Ethnic Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in 
Southeast Asia”, Third world quarterly vol 22 No 3(2001), p 425. 
37  N. Arunotai, “Moken traditional knowledge: an unrecognised form of natural resources 
management and conservation” International Social Science Journal 58(187)(2006), p 144. 
38 Posey (n 4), p 4; Desmet (n 8), pp 48-9; Arunotai (n 37), p 144. 
39 Posey (n 4), p 4. The Maori for instance believes that all elements of the natural world and people 
descend from Ranginui and Papatuanuku and are thus related. See New Zealand Conservation 
Authority, “Maori customary use of native birds, plants and other traditional materials. Interim report 
and discussion paper” (Wellington, 1997)(‘Maori report’), p 84.  
40 For example, the Sarayaku believe that “the destruction of the jungle erases the soul”, IACtHR, 
“Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador” (‘Sarayaku case’) Judgment of June 
27, 2012 (Merits and Reparations), para. 151; and the Maori believe that the essential life-force 
(Mauri) can be weakened or destroyed by mistreating nature. Maori report, pp 85 -86. 
41 Maori report, p 85; P. Mwaura, Indigenous Knowledge in Disaster Management in Africa (UNEP 
2008), p 51, noting how the Banyala consider pigeons as clan symbols; S. Laird, “Forests, Culture and 
Conservation” in Posey (n 4), p 357, mentioning the Kantu, who believe that the deities communicate 
through birds; WWF report, p 8 mentioning that the Udege consider the tiger the god of the forest. 
42 See for instance K. Redford, “The Ecologically Noble Savage”, Cultural Survival Quarterly 15, No. 
1(1991); this narrative is rejected by Indigenous peoples, Posey (n 4), p 7. Desmet mentions how this 
could impose excessive burdens on Indigenous peoples of acting in a certain way, affecting the 
recognition of their rights. Desmet (n 8), p 47. 
43 Gray (n 34) p 62 “for each Indigenous people, this nature-culture relationship is defined in specific 
ways, rooted locally in the territory.” See also K. Redford and A. Steadman, “Forest-Dwelling Native 
Amazonians and the Conservation of Biodiversity: Interests in Common or in Collision?” p 251; and 
Desmet (n 8), p 50. 
44  M. Chapin, ‘A Challenge to Conservationists’ World Watch Magazine (November/December 
2004), 17-31 p 18 mentioning as examples the Kayapó in Brazil logging their forests and Mayans 
slashing and burning the forests in Guatemala; and A. Ramos, The Hyperreal Indian” Critique of 
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generally based on a ‘western’ perspective of preservation (i.e., minimum human 
interference) designed without Indigenous peoples in mind,45 generating conflicts 
with their way of life46 and/or imposing restrictions on it (e.g., declaring illegal the 
use of traditional resources); 47  furthermore, concepts like ‘conservation’, 
‘sustainability’ or ‘biodiversity’ are actually unknown and/or incompatible48 with the 
Indigenous worldview, mainly because they present a perspective in which humans 
and nature are disconnected from each other, implying that they can be separated.49 It 
would be more precise to say that while their management of resources has resulted 
in the protection of biodiversity, it is based “on other rationales than most Western 
nature management and conservation systems”, 50  in line with their holistic 
cosmology and actions needed to ensure their survival. However, this has not 
prevented them to engage in partnerships for conservation projects51 and participate 
in the drafting of instruments using ‘western terminology’ at the international level in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Anthropology; 1994 vol 14(2), p 154, mentioning the example of some Tukanoans Indians in Brazil, 
pressured to make unsustainable deals with the military and mining companies. Desmet argues these 
conducts are a result of poverty and exposure to a liberal market economy, but that biodiversity threats 
still come mostly from habitat destruction, large developments, extractive projects and the like, not 
traditional or small-scale practices. Desmet (n 8), pp 51 and p 57; see also Redford and Steadman (n 
43) p 251 (emphasizing external pressures on Indigenous peoples); and Shelton (n 2), p 542, noting 
that many problems faced by Indigenous peoples come from outside interference, not the preservation 
of their traditional economic resources and social structures 
45 E. Bernbaum, “Mountains: the Heights of Biodiversity” in Posey (n 4), p 342 citing Schaaf; Chapin 
(n 44) pp 18 and 21, noting that usually Indigenous peoples do not have a voice in conservation 
projects that are managed by NGOs, who in turn lack the proper understanding of situations and 
complain about them not being good conservationists. See also Desmet (n 8), p 48 and 66.  
46 L. Jan Slikkerveer, “Ethnoscience, TEK and its application to Conservation” in Posey (n 4), pp 192-
3, citing R. Pierotti and D. Wildcat: “[l]iving with nature is very different from ‘conservation’ of 
nature. Those who wish to 'conserve' nature still feel that they are in control of nature, and that nature 
should be conserved only insofar as it benefits humans, either economically or spiritually. It is crucial 
to realize that nature exists on its own terms, and that non-humans have their own reasons for 
existence, independent of human interpretation.” See also Arunotai (n 37), p 147, noting that the 
declaration of their territory as a national park and the promotion of tourism made the Moken adopt 
outsider’s consumption behaviour, eroding their livelihood. 
47 Chapin (n 44) p 18; J. Alcorn, “Indigenous Peoples and Conservation A White Paper for The 
MacArthur Foundation” (April 2010) pp 6 and 21; SOWIP, pp 91-93; WWF report, p 15 mentioning 
the case of the BaAka and the restrictions suffered due to their hunting grounds being declared a 
National Park. 
48 Posey (n 4), p 7; Gray (n 34), p 62; SOWIP p 84; P. Nadasdy, “The Politics of Tek: Power and the 
"Integration" of Knowledge”, Arctic Anthropology, Vol. 36, No. 1/2 (1999) pp 3-4, also mentioning 
that since terms like this do not have a counterpart in aboriginal languages, misunderstandings 
happen, leading to perceptions of bad faith, and biasing the discussion towards a western perspective. 
49 Desmet (n 8), p 58; Gray (n 34), p 62. 
50 J. Colding and C. Folke, “Social Taboos: ‘Invisible’ Systems of Local Resource Management and 
Biological Conservation” Ecological Applications 11(2), 2001, p 595; Desmet (n 8), p 50, concluding 
that Indigenous peoples are “neither intrinsic destroyers of nature nor ecologically noble savages”. 
51 Alcorn (n 47), pp 15-21, mentioning both successful conservation examples like Tiburon island in 
Mexico and unsuccessful ones like the PEMASKY Biosphere Reserve project in Panama. 
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order to protect their rights.52  
 
4. Traditional knowledge 
 
The Indigenous peoples’ special and collective relationship with their lands 
has enabled the development of a communal body of knowledge that is passed down 
through the generations, shared in socio-cultural settings (e.g., myths, story-telling, 
rituals),53 with a strong spiritual component,54  and which underpins their way of 
living,55 known as ‘traditional knowledge’.  This knowledge is linked to their lands, 
so if Indigenous peoples are removed from them it can be seriously disrupted, not 
being able to be taught and experienced by subsequent generations and losing its 
concrete applications,56 thus affecting not only every aspect of their traditional way 
of life but the environment itself.57 The elders of the Ogiek people in Kenya for 
instance could not transmit the knowledge of their sacred sites to the new generations 
because they were evicted from their ancestral lands in the Mau Forest, cutting their 
access and depriving the Ogiek the possibility to protect them.58  
This notion of ‘traditional knowledge’ is difficult to define because 
‘traditional’ is an ambiguous concept that means different things depending on the 
                                                             
52 For instance, in UNDRIP. 
53 Gray (n 34), p 64. 
54 Ibid., pp 63-64; McGregor, (n 5), p 388: “in the Aboriginal worldview, knowledge comes from the 
Creator and from the Creation itself”. See also Posey (n 4), p 4. 
55 J. Seymour and H. Girardet, Far from Paradise: The Story of Human Impact on the Environment 
(3rd edition, Merlin Press, 1990), p 21, saying that Indigenous peoples’ survival “through enormous 
spans of time is the best possible proof of their great range of knowledge”; A. Ross, K. Pickering 
Sherman, J. Snodgrass, H. Delcore and R. Sherman, Indigenous Peoples and the Collaborative 
Stewardship of Nature: Knowledge Binds and Institutional Conflicts (Left Coast Press, 2011), noting 
that pp 34-35. 
56 R. Barsh, “Indigenous knowledge and biodiversity”, in Gray (n 34), p 75; Posey (n 4), p 5.  
57 See for instance, D. Vargas-Huinca, L. Araca, W. Vargas, J. Huanca and J Yang, “Conocimientos 
locales para la sostenibilidad de la biodiversidad y servicios ecosistémicos en las comunidades 
aymaras del sur del Perú” in Baptiste et al (n 2) p 107, documenting soil degradation and effects on 
biodiversity due to the loss of traditional Aymara practices; SOWIP p 66, noting there were more 
wildlife in the Massai territory in Kenya before the establishment of national parks and reserves; D. 
Smyth, “Indigenous land and sea management–a case study.” (Canberra: DSEWPaC, 2011), p 11, 
noting the increase in wildfires in Australia following the removal of Indigenous peoples from certain 
areas. 
58 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights v. Republic of Kenya”, Application No 006/2012, Judgment, 26 May 2017, para. 158.  
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people and location,59 and it is constantly evolving;60 in addition, because of how it is 
conceived and used, Indigenous peoples generally disagree with conceptualisation 
attempts. 61  In general, TK is characterised as a broad notion 62  that includes 
knowledge, practices and innovations of Indigenous and local communities, as noted 
by the CBD Article 8(j) and the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(‘WIPO’).63 The latter is working on a more detailed definition to protect TK within 
the intellectual property system, which currently states that TK “refers to knowledge 
originating from indigenous [peoples], local communities and/or [other beneficiaries] 
that may be dynamic and evolving and is the result of intellectual activity, 
experiences, spiritual means, or insights in or from a traditional context, which may 
be connected to land and environment, including know-how, skills, innovations, 
practices, teaching, or learning” [sic].64  
There is another concept sometimes used in the literature, traditional 
ecological knowledge (‘TEK’),65  considered as a subset of TK more focused on 
natural resources, and the environment, without leaving aside the 
social/cultural/spiritual elements that permeate Indigenous conceptions;66 yet, I will 
use the more commonly known TK (or sometimes Indigenous knowledge) because it 
encompass more broadly Indigenous practices/activities/knowledge.67 
 
                                                             
59 Berkes (n 1), pp 3-4; Posey (n 4), p 4; McGregor (n 5), p 390; Barsh (n 56), p 74, noting that 
‘traditional’ refers to how the knowledge is acquired and used (unique to every Indigenous culture) 
and not antiquity.  
60 T. Stoll, “Intellectual Property and Technologies” in Hohmann and Weller (n 33), p 312; Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23: Article 27(Rights of Minorities), 8 April 1994, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 para. 7.  
61 McGregor (n 5), pp 389-90 highlighting that TK is a gift from the Creator, and that other aboriginal 
scholars question the need to define it; Barsh (n 56), pp 73-74, noting that Indigenous peoples prefer 
to focus more on the respect for the customary laws of the respective peoples and not definitions. Stoll 
(n 60), p 311 remarks that, in any case, Indigenous peoples as creators/practitioners, have wide 
discretion to decide what they consider TK is. 
62 Stoll (n 60), p 311. 
63 WIPO, “Glossary of Key Terms related to Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions” (April 10, 2019) WIPO/GRTKF/IC/40/INF/7 
Annex, p 44. 
64 WIPO, “The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Draft Articles” WIPO/GRTKF/IC/40/18 (June 
2019), Annex, p 5. The parts in brackets indicate no consensus about them yet. 
65 See for instance, WIPO (n 63), pp 43-44. Berkes defines TEK as “a cumulative body of knowledge, 
practice and belief, evolving by adaptive processes and handed down through generations by cultural 
transmission, about the relationship of living beings (including humans) with one another and with 
their environment”. Berkes, (n 1), p 7.  
66 WIPO, Glossary of Key Terms, pp 43-44; Berkes (n 1), pp 2-6.  
67 Berkes (n 1), p 9.  
65 
 
4.1 Traditional knowledge as a source of scientific knowledge 
 
The recognition by the WIPO of TK as the result of an ‘intellectual activity’ and 
experiences that is dynamic and evolving goes in line with the academic literature; 
for instance, Gray mentions that TK “is not only a cerebral activity; it is also bound 
up in practical activity and technological systems reflecting both collective and 
personal experience and long-term observation”;68 the Intergovernmental Science-
Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (‘IPBES’)  notes that 
Indigenous knowledge continuously evolves through interactions between 
experiences and different kinds of knowledge that are empirically tested and 
validated by Indigenous peoples; 69  and Barsh highlights that each generation of 
Indigenous peoples make observations, compare their experiences with what they 
have been taught, conduct experiments to test the knowledge and exchange their 
findings to advance it;70 among others.71 In this sense, TK as an intellectual process 
to understand the universe72 that is continuously evolving through observations and 
experiences in a systematic way, conforms with the general idea of ‘science’ (another 
concept not well-defined in international law),73 i.e., “the intellectual and practical 
activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the 
physical and natural world through observation and experiment”.74 This scientific 
                                                             
68 Gray (n 34), p 62. 
69 IPBES “Work on indigenous and local knowledge systems (deliverable 1 (c))” IPBES 4/7 16 
November 2015, p 8. 
70 Barsh (n 56), p 74. 
71  See also ACIA, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (CUP, 2005), p 65 noting that Indigenous 
peoples in the Arctic have refined the information and observations through the generations, 
combining the lessons received from the elders with personal experiences. N. Chalmers and C. 
Fabricius, ‘Expert and generalist local knowledge about land-cover change on South Africa’s wild 
coast: Can local ecological knowledge add value to science?’ Ecology and Society 12:10(2007), p 11, 
remarking that “[l]ocal knowledge, based on peoples’ direct interactions with their environment, is 
accumulated on a trial-and-error basis through learning from feedback and interaction”. 
72 L. Whitt, “Indigenous peoples, their environments and territories” in Gray (n 34), p 70. 
73 ‘Science’ is difficult to define, because of the different fields of science like natural and social 
sciences and humanities, and the various fields within these disciplines. F. Coomans, “A dual 
perspective on the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress” in G. Corradi, K. De Feyter, E. 
Desmet and K. Vanhees (eds), Critical Indigenous Rights Studies (Routledge 2019), p 94; Ross et al 
(n 55) p 55-56 noting that “Indeed, even the Western idealized model of science is complicated, and 
philosophers of science do not agree on what it entails.” 




character has been also recognised in international law; for instance, Agenda 21,75 
one of the most important action plans in international environmental law 76  that 
“reflects a global consensus and political commitment at the highest level on 
development and environment cooperation”77 states that Indigenous peoples “have 
developed over many generations a holistic traditional scientific knowledge of their 
lands, natural resources and environment” [emphasis added];78 the former Special 
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities, in a 1993 study about the protection of Indigenous cultural heritage79 
mentioned that “Indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge of ecosystems 
includes(…) a wide range of scientific insights and understanding of basic processes 
in ecology and animal behaviour;” 80  the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’) in a General Comment 81  about ICESCR’s Article 
15.1(c)82 noted that ‘scientific productions’ includes “knowledge, innovations and 
practices of indigenous and local communities”;83 the UNDRIP, widely supported in 
international law,84 considered the “most advanced and comprehensive international 
instrument on Indigenous peoples’ rights” 85  and constituting an authoritative 
reflection of an international consensus regarding Indigenous peoples’ rights, 86 
recognise Indigenous peoples’ right “to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well 
                                                             
75  Agenda 21 (A/CONF.151/26, vol. II), adopted by the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development on 14 June 1992. 
76 J. Friedrich, International Environmental “soft law”: The Functions and Limits of Non-binding 
Instruments in International Environmental Governance and Law (Springer, 2013), p 21. 
77 Agenda 21, para. 1.3.  
78 Ibid., para. 26.1. 
79 E. Daes, “Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples. Study on the protection of the cultural and 
intellectual property of indigenous peoples”, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28 (28 July 1993). 
80 Ibid., para. 140; see also paras. 3, 5, 18-19 and 21, among others, referring to Indigenous sciences. 
81 The UN Treaty Bodies elaborate general comments, addressed to all States parties, providing an 
authoritative interpretation of the respective treaty. See Chapter IV section 2. 
82 CESCR, “General Comment 17: The right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral 
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is 
the author”, 12 January 2006, E/C.12/GC/1712. 
83 Ibid., para. 9. See also CESCR, “General Comment 21: Right of everyone to take part in cultural 
life”, 21 December 2009, E/C.12/GC/21, para. 37, noting that Indigenous peoples can protect their 
right to maintain control over the manifestations of their sciences and technologies, including 
knowledge of the flora and fauna. 
84  See Chapter V, section 2.1. 
85 M. Fitzmaurice, “The 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 
Austrian Review of International and European Law 17: 139-266, 2012, pp 139-141. 
86  J. Anaya, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People”, 11 August 2008, A/HRC/9/9, para. 43.  
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as the manifestation of their sciences, technologies and cultures”,87 with the terms 
‘sciences’ and ‘technologies’ covering “any findings, insights and knowledge”;88 and 
the 2016 American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,89 adopted by 
consensus, expresses that “Indigenous peoples have the right to full recognition and 
respect for the ownership, dominion, possession, control, development, and 
protection of their tangible and intangible cultural heritage and intellectual property, 
including its collective nature”, 90  being their ‘collective intellectual property’ 
composed by, among others, “traditional knowledge and traditional cultural 
expressions, including traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, 
ancestral designs and procedures, cultural, artistic, spiritual, technological, and 
scientific expressions”91 [emphasis added].  
Some States with an important number of Indigenous habitants have also 
recognised the scientific character of TK; for example, the New Zealand government 
points out that both traditional knowledge and science “seek to make sense of the 
world, to render it comprehensible and to draw order out of apparent chaos; both are 
based on observations of natural species and phenomena and on generalisations 
deriving from those observations”; 92  the Australian Department of Industry, 
Innovation and Science has recognised that “Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples have unique knowledge systems that can contribute to all fields of scientific 
endeavour, including science-based activities such as the management of Australia's 
natural resources”;93 and the Finnish Ministry of the Environment has observed that 
in many cases TK has proved to be more accurate than modern science.94 This is also 
noted in a more indirect way by Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration, 95  when 
acknowledges Indigenous peoples’ “vital role in environmental management and 
                                                             
87 UNDRIP, Article 31.  
88 Stoll (n 60), p 317; Coomans (n 73), p 92. 
89 American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, AG/RES.2888, (XLVI-O/16), Adopted 
at the third plenary session, held on June 15, 2016. 
90 Ibid., Article XXVIII para. 1. 
91 Ibid., para. 2. See also Coomans (n 73), p 92. 
92 Maori Report, p 89. 
93  Expert Working Group Report, “Indigenous Engagement with Science: Towards Deeper 
Understandings” August 2013, p vi. 
94 Ministry of the Environment of Finland, Indigenous Peoples and Traditional Knowledge related to 
Biological Diversity and Responses to Climate Change in the Arctic Region (CBD Secretariat, 2009) 
(‘Finnish report’), p 4. 
95  1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (‘Rio Declaration’), UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I)/31ILM874(1992), Principle 22. 
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development because of their knowledge and traditional practices”, recognising TK 
as a useful form of knowledge equivalent to other forms of environmental 
management, which are often based on science;96 and the former Special Rapporteur 
on Indigenous Peoples explicitly notes that “traditional knowledge of the 
environment can substantively enrich scientific knowledge and adaptation activities” 
in the context of climate change.97  
This is also acknowledged by several authors; for example, Berkes states that 
“[b]oth western and indigenous science may be considered (….) the result of the 
same general intellectual process of creating order out of disorder”;98 Slikkerveer 
says that TK originated in “the human/scientific quest to come to terms with the 
universe”, also highlight its intellectual nature;99 Stevenson remarks that TK “is the 
intellectual product of countless generations of direct observation and intuitive 
experience handed down through oral tradition”;100 Hobson notes that “[w]estern 
science has been defined as a systematic approach, a methodological approach to 
answering questions. Science is equated with knowledge, and it is the development 
of knowledge that promotes the solution of problems(…) science also equates to 
traditional knowledge, and southern scientists must never forget that traditional 
knowledge is science”;101 Alessa et al prefer to use ‘Indigenous science’ instead of 
TK, because it better reflects the “cumulative place-based observations of natural 
phenomena that includes humans and non-human others and tends to integrate and 
acknowledge humans as a part of the natural world and its processes” conducted by 
Indigenous peoples; 102  and Barsh mentions that TK “is scientific in that it is 
empirical, experimental and systematic” and that Indigenous individuals “must be 
                                                             
96 D. Brockington, R. Duffy and J. Igoe, Nature Unbound: Conservation, Capitalism and the Future 
of Protected Areas (Earthscan 2008), pp 151-152, naming the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species as model on environmental management based on science; Chalmers and 
Fabricius (n 71), p 11. See also UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001), Annex 
II, para. 14. 
97  V. Tauli-Corpuz, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples”, 1 
November 2017, A/HRC/36/46, para. 15 (‘2017 Report’). 
98 Berkes (n 1), p 10. 
99 Slikkerveer (n 46), p 169. 
100 M. Stevenson, “Indigenous Knowledge in Environmental Assessment” Arctic, Vol. 49 No 3(1996) 
p 287. 
101 G. Hobson, “Traditional knowledge is science” Northern Perspectives 20(1992), p 1. 
102 L. Alessa, A. Kliskey, J. Gamble, M. Fidel, G. Beaujean and J. Gosz, “The role of Indigenous 
science and local knowledge in integrated observing systems: moving toward adaptive capacity 
indices and early warning systems”, Sustainability Science, Vol 11(2016), p 91. 
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scientists in order to survive as hunters, fishers, foragers or farmers with minimal 
mechanical technology”.103   
Particular examples are not difficult to find; for instance, Inuit knowledge “is 
based on extensive, repeated observation and experience that is further verified, 
shared, and improved in a collective context. This implies both rigour and confidence 
in local understandings of complex systems,” 104  and an astrophysicist, Sagan, in 
describing the tracking abilities of the !Kung San from Botswana and Namibia, notes 
that they observe and analyse patterns following a certain methodology, akin to the 
one used in planetary astronomy to analyse craters, being these tracking skills 
“science in action”.105 In addition, TK’s findings have been used (and abused) by 
pharmaceutical companies to develop medical products106 and played an important 
role in climate change,107 natural resources management108 and geological data,109 to 
name a few, indicating at the very least some degree of scientific corroboration and 
credibility. As especially noted by Chief Wavey, “[r]ecently, academics, scientific 
researchers and others have ‘discovered’ that the knowledge which indigenous 
people hold of the earth, its ecosystems, the wildlife, fisheries, forests and other 
integrated living systems is extensive and extremely accurate.”110 
Despite all this, there have been some reluctances to consider TK at the same 
                                                             
103 Barsh (n 56), pp 73-74. See also Ross et al (n 55), p 39 “Native peoples certainly think abstractly 
and build hypotheses.”  
104 G. Laidler, “Inuit and Scientific Perspectives on the Relationship between Sea Ice and Climate 
Change: the Ideal Complement?” Climate Change 78 (2006), p 411. 
105 C. Sagan, The Demon Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark (Ballantine Books, 1995), 
pp 295-296. 
106  E. Cloatre, “Biodiversity, knowledge and the making of rights: reviewing the debates on 
bioprospecting and ownership” in M. Bowman, P. Davies and E. Goodwin (eds.) Research Handbook 
on Biodiversity & Law (Elgar, 2016), pp 361-386. 
107 See for instance ACIA (n 71), Chapter 3 ‘The Changing Arctic: Indigenous Perspectives’; and D. 
Mijatović, F. Van Oudenhoven, P. Eyzaguirre and T. Hodgkin, ‘The role of agricultural biodiversity 
in strengthening resilience to climate change: towards an analytical framework’, International Journal 
of Agricultural Sustainability (2013)11:2, pp. 95-107 noting how Indigenous agricultural practices 
help to build resilience against climate change. 
108 See for instance Berkes (n 1), Chapter 4 ‘Traditional Knowledge Systems in Practice’, and H. 
Moller, F. Berkes, P. O. Lyver, and M. Kislalioglu, ‘Combining science and traditional ecological 
knowledge: monitoring populations for co-management’, Ecology and Society 9(3):2(2004), p 11, 
noting that TK contributes to detect important changes in the environment and “pave the way for the 
formulation of useful scientific hypotheses.” 
109 W. Masse and M. Masse, ‘Myth and catastrophic reality: using myth to identify cosmic impacts 
and massive Plinian eruptions in Holocene South America’ in L. Piccardi and W. Masse (eds.) Myth 
and Geology (Geological Society London, London, 2007). 
110  Chief R. Wavey, “International Workshop on Indigenous Knowledge and Community-based 
Resource Management: Keynote Address” in J. Inglis (ed), Traditional Ecological Knowledge: 
Concepts and Cases (IDRC, 1993), p 11. 
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level as ‘conventional science’,111 with situations where the former was disregarded 
as ‘anecdotal’ or ‘obsolete’,112 and experts having trouble in accepting that what they 
see as ‘uneducated’ people may know more about local species.113 Likewise, some 
degree of mistrust from Indigenous peoples towards scientists exists because of their 
lack of understanding of TK, especially its holistic aspect114 and the impossibility of 
‘delocalise’ it, i.e., ‘extract’ and use TK without considering the cultural context,115 at 
the risk of distorting it.116 Some ideas to integrate western science and TK have been 
proposed, especially in natural resource management;117 yet, it is also important to 
keep in mind that TK is primarily ‘local’, used to make decisions and set priorities 
for the community.118  
 
From all this, it can be concluded that TK is a system of knowledge, able to 
support Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life and being applied in their daily 
activities. This knowledge has been tested and perfected through long periods of time 
by Indigenous peoples, in a systematic and rigorous fashion, and it is able to provide 
answers and predict outcomes, based on information and experiences; as such, it has 
a clear scientific nature. This means that TK can be integrated into the element of 
‘scientific uncertainty’, constituting a knowledge-based source of information 
regarding ‘reasonable grounds for concern’ or ‘credible threats’ of 
serious/irreversible harm that may affect Indigenous peoples’ way of life. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, this expands the scope of the PP, which can be 
                                                             
111 S. Mackinson, “Integrating Local and Scientific Knowledge: An Example in Fisheries Science”, 
Environmental Management 27, pp 541-542; see also WWF report, p 8 and M. Tengö and E. 
Brondizio “Connecting Diverse Knowledge Systems for Enhanced Ecosystem Governance: The 
Multiple Evidence Base Approach” AMBIO, Vol 43(2014), p 583. 
112 WWF report, p 8; Nadasdy (n 48), p 3; Chalmers and Fabricius (n 71), p 11; M. Stevenson, “The 
Possibility of Difference: Rethinking Co-management”, Human Organization, Vol. 65, No. 2(2006), p 
170. 
113 Mackinson (n 111), p 542; Maori report p 135. 
114 Nadasdy (n 48), p 6.  
115 UN Economic and Social Council, “Protecting the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
traditional knowledge”, E/C.12/2000/17 (27 October 2000), para. 32, where an Indigenous 
representative noted that “[t]he traditional knowledge of Indigenous peoples provides the foundation 
of our personal identity and ancestral anchorage. It provides a distinctive world view that outsiders 
can rarely grasp.” Gray (n 34), p 64 noting that “[s]ocio-cultural life, spirituality and biological 
diversity combine to provide the context for Indigenous knowledge”. 
116 WWF report, p 9 “Cherry-picking” isolated and de-contextualized bits of information can end up 
trivializing and distorting traditional knowledge; Posey (n 4), p 5. 
117 See for instance, Moller et al (n 108), Chalmers and Fabricius (n 71); Tengö and Brondizio (n 111). 
118 ACIA (n 71), p 65. 
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then applied to deal with these potential threats and uncertainties, protecting their 
rights and values. This is especially important regarding possible effects over certain 
aspects particular to them, difficult to identify, understand, and address by non-
indigenous persons. 
 
5. Indigenous peoples, uncertainties, and traditional knowledge  
 
As previously mentioned, there is a degree of uncertainty present in environmental 
issues, especially in situations of complex and dynamic interactions between human 
and natural systems, in which uncertainty is an inherent feature. 119  As noted in 
Chapter II, this requires a broader approach than the original narrow understanding 
of the precautionary principle,120 insufficient to address these dynamics and relations; 
in the words of Moller et al, “[t]here is a growing recognition that conventional 
scientific approaches may be insufficient in the face of complexity.”121 This is the 
situation of Indigenous peoples, which have a special relationship with their lands 
and environment, constituting the foundation of their traditional livelihood, that 
relies on multiple and complex interactions; as such, a ‘wider precautionary 
approach’ that integrates TK is clearly relevant in this context. This is because, as 
mentioned above, this knowledge underpins and guides their traditional way of life, 
providing an integral understanding of every aspect of their livelihood, activities and 
practices; this includes a comprehensive knowledge of their territories and the 
interactions between its elements, 122  as well as the existence of risks and 
uncertainties. In effect, Indigenous cosmologies “portray a universe in continuous 
flux, driven by known forces as well as a diversity of powerful random elements 
('tricksters'). Everything is bound eventually to change in ways that cannot be 
forecast accurately, hence the need for humans to remain vigilant and adaptive.”123 In 
this context, Ross et al note that knowledge that “allows for action in situations of 
                                                             
119  R. Cooney, “A long and winding road? Precaution from principle to practice in biodiversity 
conservation” in E. Fisher, J. Jones and R. von Schomberg (eds) Implementing the Precautionary 
Principle: Perspectives and Prospects (Elgar, 2006), p 229. See also Chapter II section 3.2.  
120 Chapter II, section 4.3. 
121 Moller et al (n 108), p 12. 
122 Seymour and Girardet (n 55), p 21, noting that Indigenous peoples “must know and understand the 
environment they inhabit, its rock formations and watercourses, its caves, springs, plants and animals, 
if they want to survive in it.”; Posey (n 4), p 5; Mwaura (n 41), p 56, WWF report, p 2. 
123 Barsh (n 56), p 74.  
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incomplete understanding” is more valuable than knowledge of facts because of its 
applications in real-world contexts.124  
Following this, when confronted with credible evidence of possibly 
serious/irreversible consequences to their livelihood, they seemingly err on the side 
of caution.125 For instance, Indigenous peoples in Africa mix maize with other crops 
like beans, potatoes or pumpkins, so if there are floods or droughts, at least one 
would survive; 126  the Mohawk, when gathering herbs, do not pick up the first 
medicinal plant they see but the second because “if you take that first one, who is to 
know, maybe that's the last one that exists in the world'”; 127  and Polynesian 
navigators manage an incredible amount of data, intuitions and insights from a range 
of dynamic factors like the interactions of winds, waves, clouds, birds and fish 
behaviour and patterns, among others, to successfully complete their trips in the 
Pacific Ocean, avoiding storms and other possible risks in “the constantly changing 
world of weather and the sea”.128 This is also reflected in the maintenance of sacred 
sites (relevant for their survival as peoples), 129  which are usually under certain 
restrictions, 130  resulting in the conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity, 131 
reducing in turn the risk of exposure to fluctuations in the abundance of species.132 
These precautionary attitudes are based on their experience and knowledge,133 and 
extend to extraordinary incidents like catastrophic events, incorporated in Indigenous 
                                                             
124 Ross et al (n 55), p 49. 
125 In line with their sustainable approach to natural resources management. See R. Cooney, “The 
Precautionary Principle in Biodiversity Conservation and Natural Resource Management: An issues 
paper for policy-makers, researchers and practitioners” IUCN Policy and Global Change Series No. 
2(2004), p 27. 
126 Mwaura (n 41), p 33. 
127 J. Barreiro, “The Search for Lessons” Akwe:kon vol. 9 no 2(1992), p 21. 
128 W. Davis, The Wayfinders: Why Ancient Wisdom Matters in the Modern World (Anasi, 2009), 
chapter II “The Wayfinders”. 
129  Pyhätunturi Statement Recognizing and Safeguarding Sacred Sites of Indigenous Peoples in 
Northern and Arctic Regions. Conference Statement and Recommendations from the International 
Conference “Protecting the Sacred: Recognition of Sacred Sites of Indigenous Peoples for Sustaining 
Nature and Culture in Northern and Arctic Regions” held in Pyhätunturi and Rovaniemi, Finland, on 
11–13 September 2013, p 1; WWF report, p 18. 
130 Colding and Folke (n 50), pp 590-593. 
131 Ibid. See also M. Kahn, A. Khumbongmayum and R. Tripathi, “The Sacred Groves and Their 
Significance in Conserving Biodiversity: An Overview”, International Journal of Ecology and 
Environmental Sciences 34(3)(2008), p 278, noting that rare or endangered plants and animals are 
often found in sacred groves, protected by Indigenous peoples due to cultural and religious beliefs. 
132 Barsh (n 56), p 75. 
133  ACIA (n 71), p 65, “Holders of this knowledge use it when making decisions or in setting 




stories as cautionary tales and lessons to be learned.134 For example, the Moken 
avoided casualties during the Indonesian 2004 tsunami because they included in their 
stories the account of an event that happened long ago, the coming of  waves that 
killed people, so when they saw the shore drying up, they ran to the mountains.135  
 Considering this, Indigenous peoples’ TK constitutes the ‘best information 
available’ about their cultural, social and environmental aspects, as well as risks and 
uncertainties particular to them. This is especially relevant because it is increasingly 
the case that Indigenous peoples are threatened by outside interference, potentially 
disturbing their traditional livelihood in ways not always properly understood by 
outsiders and/or States.136 This is perhaps more clearly reflected when it comes to 
sites of significant cultural and spiritual importance, which can be affected not only 
by extractive activities or projects, but also by actions that may be less harmful from 
a material point of view, and yet devastating on a cultural-spiritual plane.137 Some 
examples are the use of helicopters which destroyed part of the Wichu kachi 
Mountain (“place of the parrots”) in Sarayaku territory, causing the animals and the 
spirits to leave the place, rendering it sterile according to their traditions;138 the risks 
faced by Suba sacred sites from outside presence, desecrated if visited by someone 
other than a ritual leader;139 the fact that for the U’wa peoples, the extraction of any 
elements from their territory not in accordance with their cultural rules may affect 
their cultural integrity and cosmovision140 and the possible disturbances caused by 
archaeologists when studying Indigenous artefacts or places. 141  Furthermore, 
alterations or interferences on sacred sites may change their special status or result in 
                                                             
134 Masse and Masse (n 109), p 198. 
135 See Arunotai (n 37), p 143.  
136 L. Siwila, “An Encroachment of Ecological Sacred Sites and its Threat to the Interconnectedness 
of Sacred Rituals: A Case Study of the Tonga People in the Gwembe Valley”, Journal for the Study of 
Religion 28.2(2015), p 145.  
137 Even activities that may seem harmless at first, like tourism or scientific endeavours. J. Hubert, 
“Sacred Beliefs and Beliefs of Sacredness” in D. Carmichael, J. Hubert, B. Reeves and A, Schanche 
(eds) Sacred Sites, Sacred Places (London: Routledge Publishers 1994), p 9-10. 
138 Sarayaku case, paras. 105 and 218 and footnote 291.  
139 Hubert (n 137), p 15.  
140 See Report of the Tripartite Committee, submitted following a Representation under article 24 of 
the ILO Constitution regarding ILO C169 Colombia 2001 (GB.277/18/1):(GB.282/14/4), para. 30. 
141  G. Nicholas, “The persistence of memory; the politics of desire: archaeological impacts on 
Aboriginal peoples and their response” in C. Smith and H.M. Wobst, Indigenous Archaeologies: 
Decolonizing Theory and Practice (Routledge 2005), p 81 “archaeology’s focus on material culture 
and human remains may compromise other aspects of Aboriginal belief systems by ignoring the 
potentially animate qualities they may possess.”  
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their abandonment, not only substantively affecting Indigenous peoples’ cultural 
identity, but also causing severe environmental damage, like erosion or loss of 
biodiversity.142 
 Following this, TK has an important role in avoiding the materialisation of 
potentially non-negligible harm to Indigenous peoples, in particular in two aspects: 
- first, and being the best information available about their traditional livelihood, TK 
can fill information gaps in issues like Indigenous’ traditional practices; the status of 
their lands and resources; or where sites of significant cultural and spiritual 
importance are located, information not always widely known outside the Indigenous 
community. This provides a better sense of what is known/unknown, as well as 
identifying situations where there may be scientific controversies that need to be 
addressed. For instance, a joint survey between biologist and Kluane First Nation 
members was conducted, in order to assess lamb survival rates, during which only a 
small amount of sheep was spotted. For the Kluane this was clear proof of a steep 
decline in sheep population, as the place surveyed use to have hundreds or thousands 
of sheep at that time of the year; however, the biologists only saw an insufficient 
sample, despite Indigenous concerns.143  Moving forward with a measure without 
having sufficient information could result in a failure to recognise and address 
potential risks and threats to Indigenous peoples’ livelihood. 
- second, closely related to the above, TK can determine the existence of 
uncertainties and possible risks of non-negligible harm to Indigenous peoples’ way of 
life, as well as how to address them. This refers to both threats to their cultural and 
spiritual values (such as effects on sacred places,144 or on spiritual celebrations145), 
but also to their territories146 because, as noted by Chief Wavey, Indigenous peoples 
“spend a great deal of our time, through all seasons of the year, travelling over, 
drinking, eating, smelling, and living with the ecological system which surrounds us. 
                                                             
142 Mwaura (n 41), p 10; see also Kahn et al (n 140), p 279, mentioning that the erosion of traditional 
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143 Nadasdy (n 48), p 9. 
144 Hubert (n 137), p 16 recounting how an Indigenous archaeologist decided against excavating a 
sacred site because of “the effects his interference would have on the status of the site” for the locals.  
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Aboriginal people often notice very minor changes in quality, odour and vitality long 
before it becomes obvious to government enforcement agencies, scientists or other 
observers”.147 This means that they can make predictions about potential impacts;148 
present alternatives and adjust their behaviour;149 and draw attention to threats that 
otherwise may go unnoticed until it is too late, such as encroachment on their lands, 
illegal logging or mining in remote locations, and changes that could affect their 
traditional practices. For instance, the Rakiura Maori in New Zealand, when they 
noticed a steady decline in the number of Puffinus griseus, modified their traditional 
hunting goals and instigated an international cooperation effort to identify the 
reasons behind the decline, research that would have never started without their 
observations.150  
  
To sum up, it is clear that TK, as a knowledge system of a scientific character, 
can be integrated into the notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’. This means that TK 
constitutes a source of scientific information regarding reasonable grounds for 
concern about potentially non-negligible threats to Indigenous peoples’ traditional 
livelihood, expanding the scope of the PP; as such, it triggers an obligation for States 
to avoid the materialisation of these potential threats. In this context, TK also 
provides the best information available about the determination of risks (especially 
those of a cultural/spiritual nature); the existence of uncertainties; and alternatives to 
address potential threats, playing a fundamental role in the adoption of effective 
precautionary measures, thus requiring its incorporation in the decision-making 
process,151 at the risk of failing to comply with this ‘wider’ PP. As noted in the 
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148 Barsh (n 56), p 73; Moller et al (n 108), p 5; Cooney (n 119), p 238 noting that Indigenous peoples 
“may have a better understanding of the dynamics of threat and risk than formal scientific or other 
institutions.” See also J. Anaya, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, Extractive industries and Indigenous peoples”, 1 
July 2013, A/HRC/24/41, para. 59, noting that they can “actively contribute to the prior assessment of 
all potential impacts of the proposed activity, including the extent to which their substantive rights and 
interests may be affected.” 
149 See for instance, WWF report, p 4. 
150 Moller et al (n 108), p 11. 
151  J. Nauber and A. Paulsch (eds), Indigenous valuation of biodiversity and ecosystem services 
compared to other ways of valuation in the context of IPBES, (Federal Agency for Nature 
Conservation, 2014), p 16, arguing that holders of Indigenous knowledge should be involved, on an 
equal basis, in assessing, reviewing, and disseminating results, among others, “wherever issues touch 
upon their rights, territories and resources”.  
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previous chapter, 152  this is achieved by recognising and respecting Indigenous 
peoples´ participatory rights, establishing mechanisms for them to freely express 
their concerns and expertise, and ensuring that they can influence the outcome of this 
decision-making process. In this context, an example is the adoption in Canada of a 
bill that requires the integration of scientific information and Indigenous knowledge 
in impact assessments to identify possible effects on their livelihood.153 However, at 
the international level, the biodiversity regime provides a concrete example of 
Indigenous participation and the integration of TK in decision-making, due its 
extensive work on developing TK and considering Indigenous peoples concerns and 
interests in the conservation and sustainable use of species and ecosystems. 
Naturally, being the objective of this regime the protection of biodiversity, this is 
more oriented to environmental decision-making and the contribution of TK in this 
respect. Yet, it also recognises the role of TK as a source for the adoption of 
measures to avoid the materialisation of non-negligible harm to their traditional way 
of life, as I explore below. 
 
6. Traditional knowledge and precaution in the biodiversity regime 
 
The CBD is “the preeminent international legal instrument on the preservation of 
biological diversity”,154 and it has an almost universal reach (196 parties at the time 
of this writing) and a very wide approach, being potentially applicable to “all species 
in any habitat in the world”.155 It is a legally binding treaty that covers “all aspects of 
biodiversity, ranging from the conservation of biological diversity and sustainable 
use of biological resources to access to biotechnology and the safety of activities 
relating to modified living organisms”.156 To achieve its objectives (conservation, 
sustainable use, and fair and equitable sharing of the benefits of biodiversity),157 it is 
guided by the PP, and it is complemented by a network of ancillary instruments, 
                                                             
152 See Chapter II, section 4.3. 
153 House of Commons, Impact Assessment Act Bill c-69, adopted in June 2019.  
154 Desmet (n 8), p 126. 
155 See D. Ong, “International environmental law governing threats to biological diversity” in M. 
Fitzmaurice, D. Ong and P. Merkouris, Research Handbook on International Environmental Law 
(Elgar, 2010), p 523. 
156 Ibid., p 533, citing M. Bowman and C. Redgwell (eds), International Law and the Conservation of 
Biological Diversity (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p 1. 
157 CBD, Article 1. 
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focusing on more specific aspects of biodiversity conservation, that conform and 
advance its overall vision and objectives,158 allowing the CBD to rapidly respond to 
ever-changing threats and uncertainties.  
Its preamble recognises the Indigenous’ traditional lifestyle based on 
biological resources, and highlights the role of TK and practices in “the conservation 
of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components”,159 although the 
CBD does not explicitly refers to situations of potential threats of serious/irreversible 
harm, even though the PP being mentioned in this preamble as well.160 The CBD also 
refers to Indigenous peoples in Article 10(c),161 but the main reference is Article 8(j), 
in the context of in-situ conservation,162 which establishes a very qualified obligation 
for each State to, “as far as possible and appropriate” and “subject to its national 
legislation” 163  respect, preserve and maintain Indigenous peoples’ knowledge, 
innovations and practices, “relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and 
involvement of the holders of such knowledge”.164 This covers not only Indigenous 
peoples but also the knowledge, innovations and practices of “local communities 
embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity”,165 although the focus of this research is on Indigenous peoples’ 
TK. Despite this, the CBD itself is silent about any precautionary role of TK,166 an 
issue developed in those other instruments that focus on more specific aspects of 
biodiversity conservation.    
 
                                                             
158 M. Bowman, “Environmental protection and the concept of common concern of mankind” in 
Fitzmaurice et al (n 155), p 504.  
159 CBD, preambular para. 12. 
160 CBD, preambular para. 9. The CBD Guide notes that the preambular para. 8 (“Noting that it is vital 
to anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity at 
source”) is also a reflection of the PP. See L. Glowka, F. Burhenne-Guilmin and H. Synge, A Guide to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (IUCN, Gland and Cambridge, 1994) (‘CBD Guide’), p 11.  
161 “Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: (c) Protect аnd encourage 
customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices that are 
compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements”. 
162 See CBD Guide, p 48. Article 2 defines in-situ conservation as “the conservation of ecosystems 
and natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural 
surroundings and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in the surroundings where they 
have developed their distinctive properties.” 
163 The implication is that national legislation takes precedence over this Article. CBD Guide, p 48.  
164 CBD, Article 8(j).  
165 Ibid. 
166 For instance, the CBD Guide does not make any references to a link between TK and the PP. 
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6.1 The Ad-Hoc Open-ended working group on Article 8 (j) and Related 
Provisions 
 
Highlighting the importance of Article 8(j), the Conference of the Parties 
established in 1998 an Ad-Hoc Open-ended working group on Article 8(j) and 
Related Provisions of the CBD, to provide advice on the application and protection 
of TK, innovations and practices of Indigenous peoples and local communities as 
well as on the implementation of this Article. 167  Interestingly, the Decision that 
established this Ad Hoc Working Group highlights that “traditional knowledge 
should be given the same respect as any other form of knowledge” in the 
implementation of the CBD,168 speaking to the scientific character of TK.  
In implementing this mandate, the Ad-Hoc Working Group has consistently  
- recommended and encouraged CBD Parties to incorporate TK, innovations and 
practices into their conservation efforts and the sustainable use of biodiversity,169 
promoting the full and effective participation of Indigenous peoples in the 
implementation of the Convention;170  
- drafted a Voluntary Funding mechanism to facilitate the participation of Indigenous 
peoples in meetings held under the CBD;171  
- finalised a report on the status and trends regarding TK, innovations and 
practices,172 identifying measures and initiatives to protect, promote and facilitate 
their use in the management of protected areas (among them, Indigenous peoples’ 
                                                             
167 Established by the fourth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP4). See ‘Report of the 
Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity’, 
UNEP/CBD/COP/4/27 (15 June 1998), Decision IV/9 Implementation of Article 8(j) and related 
provisions, para 1.  
168 Ibid., preamble. 
169 See for instance ‘Report of the Ad-Hoc Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Working Group on Article 8(j) 
and Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity on its Eleventh Meeting’ 
CBD/WG8J/11/7 (22 November 2019), Recommendation 11/1 para 1. 
170 Ibid., Recommendation 11/2 para. 6, and Annex I, “Draft Objectives, General Principles, and 
Elements of Work for the New Programme of Work on Article 8(J) and Other Provisions of the 
Convention related to Indigenous peoples and Local Communities 2020-2050” para 1, among others. 
171 Adopted by the COP8. See ‘Report of the Eighth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’, UNEP/CBD/COP/8/31 (15 June 2006), Decision VIII/5: Article 
8(j) and related provisions. 
172 Ad-Hoc Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Working Group on Article 8(j) and Related Provisions of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Composite report on the status and trends regarding the 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities relevant to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity: Executive summary and recommendations’ 
UNEP/CBD/WG8J/3/4 (28 September 2003). 
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full and effective role in decision-making in cooperation with local authorities,173 
their participation in the management of protected areas,174 and the use of TK in 
community planning, and natural resources management);175 and 
- developed a Plan of Action on Customary Sustainable Use of Biological 
Diversity176 that should be implemented with the “full and effective participation” of 
Indigenous peoples, 177  and reiterates the importance of TK in biodiversity 
conservation, highlighting that it “should be valued, respected and considered as 
useful(…) as other forms of knowledge”.178 It also highlights the contribution of 
Indigenous peoples’ TK and their cultural and spiritual values and practices in 
maintaining biological diversity and ecosystem services, lands, waters and territories 
management, climate change adaptation and the strengthening the social and 
ecological systems’ resilience;179 among other initiatives.  
All this indicates that Indigenous peoples’ TK, innovations and practices 
(including cultural and spiritual) are generally considered as an important source of 
scientific information for the protection of biodiversity. More directly related to the 
PP, there are three outcomes from this Ad-Hoc Working Group which are very 
relevant:  
 
a) the 2004 Akwe:Kon Voluntary Guidelines for Cultural, Social and Environmental 
Impact Assessments, which aims to, among other things, the avoidance of potential 
effects on Indigenous peoples’ way of life, 180  incorporating their cultural, 
environmental and social concerns and interests (as well as their knowledge and 
practices) in impact assessments procedures, 181  and providing “concrete and 
systematic indications on how impact assessments should be conducted” when 
                                                             
173 Ibid., para. 21. 
174 Ibid., para. 24. 
175 Ibid., paras. 26-27. 
176 Adopted by the COP12. ‘Report of the Twelfth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’, UNEP/CBD/COP/12/29 (17 October 2014), Decision XII/12: 
Article 8(j) and related provisions. 
177 Ibid., para. 2. 
178 Ibid., para. 3. 
179 Ibid., para. 6 (a)-(c) and (f), among others. 
180 Akwe:Kon Guidelines, foreword. 
181 Ibid., paras. 3 and 59, among others. 
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Indigenous peoples’ may be affected.182 In doing so, the PP plays an important role, 
establishing that “where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of 
biodiversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat.”183  
The Akwe:Kon Guidelines establishes different types of impact assessments, 
to be conducted “whenever developments are proposed to take place on, or which are 
likely to impact on, sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally occupied or 
used” by Indigenous peoples184 [emphasis added],  taking into account the diverse 
circumstances surrounding these developments.185 These impact assessments provide 
information and a reliable and reasonable assessment of possible effects on a wide 
range of Indigenous aspects and values, to avoid and mitigate them, with their 
participation and incorporating their knowledge and practices. In this context, these 
Guidelines establish cultural impact assessments (which evaluate possible effects on 
values, beliefs, relationship with their environment and language); cultural heritage 
impact assessments (evaluating possible impacts on the physical manifestations of a 
community’s cultural heritage, including sites and structures); social impact 
assessments (evaluating possible impacts on the quality of life and rights that have 
economic, social, cultural, civic and political dimensions); and EIAs (evaluating 
possible impacts on the environment and interrelated socio-economic and cultural 
elements).186 Depending on the circumstances, some impact assessments may not be 
required; for example, in implementing the Akwe:Kon Guidelines in Finland, after 
some discussions between the government and the Saami peoples, it was determined 
that no new developments would affect sacred sites, which would continue to be 
managed and maintained as usual, so no cultural heritage impact assessments were 
needed nor conducted.187  
The guidelines also detail a series of specific steps in conducting impact 
assessments, such as screening, scooping, impact assessment, mitigation measures, 
                                                             
182  E. Morgera, “Dawn of a New Day? The Evolving Relationship between the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and International Human Rights Law”, BENELEX Working Paper no 17, p 8. 
183 Akwe:Kon Guidelines, para 61. 
184 Ibid., para. 1. 
185 Ibid., paras. 4-5. 
186 Ibid., para. 6 (a)-(b), (d) and (f). 
187 S. Juntunen and E. Stolt, Application of Akwe:Kon Guidelines in the Management and Land Use 
Plan for the Hammastunturi Wilderness Area: Final Report (Metsähallitus Natural Heritage Services 
2013) (‘Finnish Final Report’), pp 51-54.  
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reporting, review, decision-making and monitoring188 and as part of those steps, the 
notification and consultation of Indigenous peoples, especially when there are 
‘likely’ impacts on sacred sites, lands and waters traditionally used or occupied by 
them.189 These consultations should take place from early on, beginning with the 
impact assessments’ design and terms of reference; 190  during the screening and 
scoping stages (which are part of the preparatory stage); 191  and during the 
compilation and identification of habitats and species that could be affected,192 as 
well as in the identification of the possible effects on sacred sites during cultural 
impact assessments,193 among others. During these steps, Indigenous peoples’ prior 
and informed consent should be obtained, as per the ‘General Considerations’194 and 
agreements should be reached regarding the implementation of measures to “prevent 
or mitigate any negative impacts of the proposed development”. 195  This would 
ensure that their TK, concerns and interests are taken into account from early on, 
moving to identify and implement appropriate measures to avoid possible effects196 
but also gives them the opportunity to exercise control over the process, providing 
strong participatory mechanisms and instances to protect their socio-cultural rights. 
For instance, in the case of Finland mentioned above, the Finnish government was 
able gather more information and complete their baseline reports about customary 
use of natural resources and their cultural significance only after consulting Saami 
reindeer cooperatives, 197  designing then a draft impact assessment (with Saami 
representatives) further refined after negotiations with the Saami parliament, which 
subsequently approved it. This allowed the establishment of a management plan that 
avoided serious disruptions to the Saami livelihood and environment, allowing them 
                                                             
188 Akwe:Kon Guidelines, para. 7. 
189 Ibid., paras. 8, 10, 11, 13 and 14. The way in which these consultations must be conducted is not 
detailed here. 
190 Ibid., paras. 13-14. 
191 Ibid., para. 7(a). 
192 Ibid., para. 37. 
193 Ibid., para. 32. 
194 Ibid., paras. 52-53. See also S. Rombouts, Having a Say Indigenous peoples, international law and 
free, prior and informed consent (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2014), p 330 pointing out that “in the 
Guidelines it is correctly stated that FPIC should be obtained in different phases in the process”. 
195 Akwe: Kon Guidelines, paras. 8(i) and 21. 
196 Ibid., para. 3(b)-(c) and (e). 
197 Finnish Final Report p 33. 
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to continue with their traditional practices and sustainable use of natural resources, 
and the exercise of their cultural rights.198  
In sum, these non-binding Guidelines, explicitly influenced by the PP, 
establish very high standards of participation for Indigenous peoples (different types 
of impact assessments, mitigation measures and consultation processes where their 
consent or approval should be obtained), incorporating their TK and concerns and 
enabling the early identification and assessment of possible risks in every aspect of 
their traditional way of life,199 with a particular emphasis on spiritual and cultural 
manifestations (like sacred sites), protecting both Indigenous peoples’ livelihood and 
their environment from potentially serious threats of harm, in the absence of full 
scientific certainty. 
 
b) the 2011 Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct, which aims to provide guidance 
to State parties in interacting with Indigenous peoples and preserve, respect and 
maintain their TK. 200  Section 2 of this Code establishes that “[a]ny 
activities/interactions related to traditional knowledge associated with the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, occurring on or likely to 
impact on sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by 
Indigenous and local communities and impacting upon specific groups, should be 
carried out with the prior informed consent and/or approval and involvement of 
Indigenous and local communities(…)”201 [emphasis added]; furthermore,  paragraph 
16 expressly mentions the PP, stating that the assessment of potential harms to 
biological diversity should “fully involve the relevant Indigenous and local 
communities”, which is also reaffirmed in section 3.202 Although it does not specify 
exactly how this consent should be obtained or what full involvement means, this 
ethical code has to be read in conjunction with other CBD instruments, including the 
                                                             
198 Ibid., pp 37 and 53. 
199 The Finnish report highlights that the application of these Guidelines improved the precision of 
planning thanks to the more detailed information received from the Saami. Finnish Report, pp 57-59. 
200 Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct, Introduction, pp 4-5. The introduction also notes that one 
way of respecting TK is to value it “equally with and complementary to scientific knowledge”, 
highlighting its scientific nature. 
201 Ibid., para. 11. 
202 Ibid., para. 30, recognizing the crucial role of Indigenous peoples’ effective and full participation in 
activities related to biodiversity and conservation that ’may’ impact them. 
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Akwe:Kon Guidelines,203 so it is possible to assume that this involves consultations 
and impact assessments in situations “likely to impact on sacred sites and on lands 
and waters traditionally occupied or used” by Indigenous peoples. 
 
c) the 2016 Mo’otz Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines on Indigenous Consent, which are 
intended to ensure that Indigenous ‘prior and informed consent’; ‘free, prior, and 
informed consent’ or ‘approval and involvement’ is obtained when it comes to the 
use of TK.204 These Guidelines were developed pursuant to COP Decision XII D, 
with the objective to provide “consistency throughout the programme of work on 
Article 8(j) and related provisions” (including the CBD and the Tkarihwaié:ri Code 
of Ethical Conduct),205 thus having a common understanding of certain terms used in 
the biodiversity regime. This objective of harmonization is also expressed in the 
latest COP meeting, noting that all tools and guidelines developed by this working 
group “are interrelated and mutually supporting” in particular the Mo’otz Kuxtal 
Voluntary Guidelines on Indigenous Consent.206 In this context, ‘free’ implies that 
Indigenous peoples “are not pressured, intimidated, manipulated or unduly 
influenced and that their consent is given, without coercion”; 207  ‘prior’ implies 
“seeking consent or approval sufficiently in advance of any authorization to access 
traditional knowledge respecting the customary decision-making processes” and 
Indigenous peoples’ time requirements;208 ‘informed’ implies that information about 
relevant aspects should be provided, including “the intended purpose of the access; 
its duration and scope; a preliminary assessment of the likely economic, social, 
cultural and environmental impacts, including potential risks; personnel likely to be 
involved in the execution of the access; procedures the access may entail and benefit-
sharing arrangements” 209  [emphasis added]; and ‘consent or approval’ is the 
                                                             
203 Ibid., foreword and introduction. 
204 Mo’otz Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines on Indigenous Consent, para. 1. 
205 Decision XII/12 D on tasks 7, 10 and 12 could best contribute to work under the Convention and to 
the Nagoya Protocol and Mo’otz Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines on Indigenous Consent, para. 2. 
206 Report of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity’, UNEP/CBD/COP/14/4 (20 March 2019), Decision 14/12: Introduction to the 
Rutzolijirisaxik Voluntary Guidelines for the Repatriation of Traditional Knowledge of Indigenous 
Peoples and Local Communities Relevant for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological 
Diversity Article 8(j) and related provisions, paras. 4-5. 
207 Mo’otz Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines on Indigenous Consent, para. 7 (a). 
208 Ibid., para 7 (b). 
209 Ibid., para. 7(c); see also para. 17(c)(ii). 
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agreement of Indigenous peoples to grant access to TK and “includes the right not to 
grant consent or approval” [emphasis added];210 even when the consent is granted, it 
is only temporary unless agreed otherwise. 211  It also clarifies that ‘involvement’ 
refers to “the full and effective participation” of Indigenous peoples in decision-
making processes; that “[c]onsultation and full and effective participation of 
[I]ndigenous peoples (…) are crucial components of a consent or approval 
process”;212 and that FPIC, or approval and involvement do not follow a ‘one-size-
fit-all’ approach, varying according to the circumstances, although should always be 
implemented through a continuous process aimed to build “mutually beneficial, 
ongoing arrangements between users and holders” of TK based on trust, good 
relations and mutual understandings, and with the full and effective participation of 
Indigenous peoples.213 These Guidelines do not define ‘consultation’, but it can be 
argued that they follow the understanding included in UNDRIP, based on Decision 
14/12, which highlights the importance of harmonizing various instruments, 
standards, programmes and processes, and expressly mentions UNDRIP.214 
 
These three instruments drafted by the Ad-Hoc working group clearly 
establish a role for TK and cultural, environmental and social concerns through 
important participatory mechanisms (impact assessments, conservation/mitigation 
measures and Indigenous consultation) in situations of potential harm and 
uncertainty, guided by the PP, even including a stronger safeguard in the form of 
consent, in at least certain situations where impacts on cultural values could be of a 
substantive nature, such as possible effects on sacred sites and lands and waters 
traditionally occupied and used by Indigenous peoples. This not only provides a 
strong degree of protection to their spiritual and cultural values, but also ensures that 
Indigenous interests and concerns will be taken into account in the decision-making 
process.  
Although these are non-binding instruments, meaning that strictly speaking 
there is no legal obligation for States to implement them, they were adopted in COP 
                                                             
210 Ibid., para 7(d). 
211 Ibid., para. 11. 
212 Ibid., para. 7(e); see also para. 17(f). 
213 Ibid., paras. 8-9. 
214 Decision 14/12, para 5. See Chapter V section 2.  
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decisions by consensus of the States parties to the CBD. This is important because as 
noted by Parks and Schröder, COP decisions are used to implement the legally-
binding CBD and “represent the source for understanding how its interpretation has 
evolved”, having then “political and legal weight and can influence both the 
subsequent development of international and regional rules, and the interpretation of 
existing norms”. 215  Morgera also notes that these decisions are “carefully 
negotiated”, can be “considered a source of ‘universal consensus on the scope of a 
protected interest’ that legitimizes and promotes consistent State practice”216 and that 
they are influential in developing international law, with for instance the IACtHR 
considering the CBD and the COP decisions as “mutually supportive of indigenous 
and tribal peoples’ rights”.217 In this context, when it comes to the assessment of 
possible environmental, social, cultural and spiritual effects on Indigenous peoples, 
States do not have an obligation to rely on the Akwe:Kon Guidelines; they could use 
other instruments or domestic legislation, as long as they achieve the same outcome, 
that is, the avoidance of potentially serious harm to the environment or Indigenous 
peoples’ way of life. That being said, the guidance provided by Akwe:Kon 
Guidelines “cannot be found in the relevant international human rights law 
sources”,218 as they are “one of the most comprehensive and used standards for 
environmental and social impact assessments” in an Indigenous peoples’ context;219 
and it is unlikely that a proper assessment of impacts of project on Indigenous 
peoples’ lands and environment, vital for decision-making about possible risks, can 
be done without the guidance of the Akwe:Kon Guidelines, especially considering 
the role of TK in detecting “unforeseen effects and impact”,220 particularly those of a 
socio-cultural and spiritual nature. This is reflected in practice, as for example their 
                                                             
215  L. Parks and M. Schröder, “What we talk about when we talk about ‘local’ participation in 
international biodiversity law: The changing scope of Indigenous peoples and local communities’ 
participation under the Convention on Biological Diversity”, PACO, Issue 11(2)(2018), pp 750 and 
754. 
216 Morgera (n 9), p 20. 
217 Ibid., p 12. 
218 Morgera (n 182), p 7. 
219  IACtHR, “Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname”, Judgment of August 12, 2008 
(Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), para. 41, 
footnote 21. See also J. Anaya, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of Indigenous people” A/HRC/15/37, 19 July 2010, para. 73, considering the 
Akwe:Kon Guidelines as a reference for impact studies in relation to Indigenous peoples because of 
their human rights based approach. 
220 Rombouts (n 194), p 331. 
86 
 
implementation allowed the Finnish government to address Saami concerns about the 
protection of their culture; improved their engagement in decision-making; and 
avoided potential harm to their livelihood in a way that it would have been difficult 
to achieve without these Guidelines;221 however, it is also true that these instruments 
have not yet been widely applied by States.222 
 
6.2 Other instruments adopted by the COP 
The acknowledgment of the role of TK in avoiding potential harm, its incorporation 
in decision-making, and the establishment of participatory mechanisms that allows 
Indigenous peoples to protect their livelihood (including cultural and spiritual 
values), is also present in other soft-law instruments adopted by consensus by the 
COP, such as the 2004 Ecosystem Approach Implementation Guidelines,223 which 
establish a strategy (the ‘ecosystem approach’) “for integrated management of land, 
water and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an 
equitable way”. 224  This approach is based on the application of scientific 
methodologies that focuses on levels of biological organization, like processes, 
functions and interactions between different organisms and their environment, 
including humans and their cultural elements, 225  constituting a complex web of 
dynamic interactions where there is a constant degree of uncertainty and surprises.226 
To deal with this and anticipate changes, the ecosystem approach “requires adaptive 
management”, which includes ‘learning-by-doing’ and adopting measures even 
“when some cause-and-effect relationships are not yet fully established 
scientifically”, 227  based on the best information available. 228  In doing so, it 
                                                             
221 Finnish Final Report, pp 8 and 61. 
222 For instance, Suriname has not yet implemented measures to ensure that impact assessments, in 
conformity with the Akwe:Kon standards, are conducted before awarding concessions in Indigenous 
lands. IACtHR, “Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname”, Order of September 26, 2018 
(Monitoring Compliance with Judgment), p 17.  
223 See Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, “The Ecosystem Approach”, (CBD 
Guidelines, 2004). Adopted by the COP7. ‘Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity’, UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21 (13 April 2004), Decision 
VII/11. 
224 Ibid., para. 1. 
225 Ibid., para. 2. 
226 Ibid., para. 4; Principle 3 rationale and Principle 9 rationale, among others. 
227 Ibid., para 4. See also Principle 6 annotations to the rationale, and Implementation guidelines 6.2.  
228 Ibid., Foreword; see also Principle 11, stating that the ecosystem approach should consider all 
forms of relevant information, including TK. 
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recognises an important participatory role for Indigenous peoples (whose rights and 
interests should be taken into account as relevant stakeholders and should be 
effectively involved in decision-making) 229  and TK (as a source of relevant 
information and expertise, together with scientific knowledge),230 in detecting and 
understanding ecosystem changes and generating adaptation measures. 231  The 
integration of TK is done through EIAs and Strategic EIAs, which should be carried 
out in the case of developments that “may have substantial environmental impacts”232 
[emphasis added]. In doing so, other decisions adopted by the COP under Article 8(j) 
should be considered,233 arguably a reference to the Akwe:Kon Guidelines (adopted 
at the same meeting), providing further guidance regarding how EIAs (and 
presumably cultural, cultural heritage and social impact assessments) should be 
conducted to avoid potentially non-negligible harm to the environment and 
Indigenous peoples’ rights. 
This is not the only instrument that contains this reference to decisions 
adopted under Article 8(j); there is also the 2004 ‘Addis Ababa Principles and 
Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity’,234 which provide a framework to 
ensure that the use of biological diversity would not lead to its long-term decline.235 
In doing so, it establishes that natural resources and management should take into 
account the PP236 and adaptive management, due to the impossibility of “having 
knowledge of all aspects” of biological systems, relying on various sources of 
information, in particular scientific knowledge and TK.237 Moreover, in their role as 
user and managers of natural resources, Indigenous peoples’ rights should be 
recognised and respected, and they should participate in decision-making, enabling 
                                                             
229 Ibid., Principle 1 rationale and annotations to rationale. See also Implementation guidelines 1.4 and 
1.5. 
230 Ibid., Principle 11, Principle 11 rationale and Implementation guidelines 11.2. 
231 Ibid., Implementation guidelines 9.9. 
232 Ibid., Implementation guidelines 3.3. and 6.6. 
233 Ibid., Principle 11 rationale and Implementation guidelines 11.3. 
234 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, “Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for 
the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity”, (CBD Guidelines, 2004). Adopted by the COP7. ‘Report of the 
Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity’, 
UNEP/CBD/COP/7/21 (13 April 2004), Decision VII/12. 
235 Ibid., introduction. 
236 Ibid., Practical Principle 5 Operational guidelines; see also para. 8(f). 
237  Ibid., Practical Principle 4 and Practical Principle 4 rationale. See also Practical Principle 6 
Operational guidelines, encouraging collaboration between scientific research and TK and the 
involvement of Indigenous peoples as research partners, using their expertise to assess management 
methods and technologies. 
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them to reinforce and protect their rights.238 The Addis Ababa Principles do not 
clearly state how this participation should take place, but as per the link to the 
Akwe:Kon Guidelines, it is presumably through their involvement in impact studies 
(including cultural and social ones), consultations, the adoption of 
conservation/mitigation measures and consent in certain cases. 
There are also the Voluntary Guidelines on Biodiversity-Inclusive Impact 
Assessment, 239  which have the objective to reach a “better integration of 
biodiversity-related considerations into the EIA process”.240 Like the previous two 
instruments, these Voluntary Guidelines acknowledge that there is a degree of 
uncertainty present when dealing with biodiversity, which can be addressed by 
relying on the PP during impact assessment processes, 241  evaluating the likely 
environmental impacts of a project or development, considering inter-related socio-
economic, cultural and human health impacts. 242  Due to the importance of 
Indigenous peoples in the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, these 
Voluntary Guidelines expressly require their involvement, stating that, as relevant 
stakeholders, their participation is a “precondition for a successful EIA”, 243  and 
recommending to “actively seek information from relevant stakeholders and 
Indigenous and local communities”,244 integrating their interests and concerns. One 
way to do this is through consulting stakeholders at the time of defining the focus of 
the EIA and the identification of key issues, allowing Indigenous peoples to bring 
attention to potential effects on ecosystems and ecosystem services and the measures 
to avoid or mitigate them, contributing with their TK to account for gaps in 
knowledge. 245  More importantly, these Voluntary Guidelines should be used in 
                                                             
238 Ibid., Practical Principle 2 rationale; Practical Principle 9 rationale and Operational guidelines; and 
Practical Principle 12 rationale and Operational guidelines.  
239 Adopted by the COP 8, (n 171), Decision VIII/28.  
240 Voluntary Guidelines on Biodiversity-Inclusive Impact Assessment, para. 1. 
241 Ibid., para. 30. See also para. 42, emphasising the application of the precautionary principle in 
situations of scientific uncertainty. 
242 Ibid., para 5. 
243 Ibid. See also para. 35, highlighting the importance of full and effective participation of Indigenous 
peoples throughout this process, to ensure that the information for decision-makers is sufficient, 
focuses on key issues and it is scientifically and technically accurate.  
244 Ibid., para. 31 c. 
245 Ibid., paras. 20 and 20 (b), 22-23 and 25, among others. 
89 
 
conjunction with the Akwe:Kon Guidelines, as explicitly stated in both the Voluntary 
Guidelines and the COP decision that adopted them.246 
These three instruments seem to focus more on potential effects on elements 
of an environmental character, and the role that TK and Indigenous participation can 
have in protecting biodiversity (e.g., providing information, identifying threats), once 
again highlighting the role of TK in adopting environmental actions, including in 
situations of uncertainty. However, the reliance on the Akwe:Kon Guidelines and 
references to Indigenous peoples’ rights shows that their way of life and socio-
cultural practices are also considered in these instruments, protecting their livelihood 
from potentially non-negligible threats of harm but also showing an integrated 
approach across the biodiversity regime.  
  
In sum, the biodiversity regime incorporates TK as a relevant source of 
scientific information in general and also in situations of potential threats of non-
negligible harm to the environment and Indigenous peoples’ rights, establishing 
important participatory mechanisms for them to effectively get involved and 
influence decision-making processes. This allows them to not only complete the 
information needed to avoid the materialisation of potential threats, identify risks and 
propose way to address them, but also protect their traditional way of life, especially 
their spiritual and cultural aspects and manifestations (like sacred sites), an area 
where without Indigenous participation it would be very difficult to overcome the 
lack of information. These participatory mechanisms also seemingly ensure that, 
considering the circumstances, in the face of more substantive threats (including 
those affecting spiritual rights), Indigenous peoples have a stronger safeguard in the 
form of consent, in my view following a precautionary approach and logic of the 
higher the risk the greater the need for precaution. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
Indigenous peoples have a particular way of life, based on a close relationship with 
their land and where spiritual, social, cultural and environmental elements are 
                                                             
246 Ibid, Box 1. See also COP Decision VIII/28 para. 1.  
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intertwined. This livelihood has enabled the development of a body of knowledge, 
TK, that reflects an integral understanding of several processes and dynamics, 
including risks and uncertainties, allowing for the careful use of natural resources 
and conservation of biodiversity and, in situations of potential threats of 
serious/irreversible harm, to act erring on the side of caution. Although difficult to 
define, this knowledge is recognised as an intellectual process, a system of 
knowledge based on observations and experiences tested in rigorous ways, able to 
predict outcomes and provide answers; as such, it conforms to the general idea of 
‘science’ and it is recognised in international law as a source of scientific knowledge.  
Because it includes environmental, social, cultural and spiritual aspects, it 
provides a different understanding of risks and uncertainties that the narrow notion of 
‘scientific uncertainty’, shaped by conventional science, does not regularly address. 
This is particularly important due to the increasing threats faced by Indigenous 
peoples from human activities, such as development projects and extractive 
industries, which can deeply disturb their traditional livelihood and special 
relationship with their lands. In this sense TK, as a ‘scientific’ system of knowledge, 
broadens this narrow notion, expanding the PP to protect Indigenous peoples’ rights, 
also playing an important role as the ‘best information available’ by filling 
information gaps and identifying threats of non-negligible harm to Indigenous 
peoples’ way of life and how to address them. In this context, TK must be 
incorporated in decision-making, at the risk of failing to comply with this ‘wider’ 
precautionary approach, which requires the recognition and respect of Indigenous 
peoples’ participatory rights, and mechanisms to implement them. 
An example of a regime that follows this is the biodiversity regime, which is 
guided explicitly by a precautionary approach. This regime establishes participatory 
mechanisms in soft-law instruments, such as Indigenous consultations and cultural, 
social and environmental impact assessments, ensuring that their concerns, 
knowledge and practices are considered in decision-making, avoiding potential 
adverse impacts on their livelihood as well as biodiversity (being the protection of 
the latter the focus of this regime). There is even the recognition of an enhanced 
safeguard, consent, when there could be impacts on cultural/spiritual aspects that 
constitute a vital part of Indigenous way of life, i.e., sacred lands or waters 
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traditionally used by them, providing a strong degree of protection. Despite the fact 
that these instruments are non-binding in a strict sense, they were carefully 
negotiated and reflect a consensus from the State parties to the CBD, interpreting the 
way in which the CBD should be implemented, so they represent an important 
standard and guidance, although there is no widespread practice by States in this 
respect yet. Regardless, it provides an important model that acknowledges and 
important role for TK and Indigenous participation in the avoidance of potential 
threats of non-negligible harm to their traditional way of life. The question that 
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As previously noted, Indigenous peoples have a deep relationship with their lands 
and territories, as well as a profound knowledge of the interactions between its 
elements, including the awareness of uncertainties. To protect this special 
relationship and their sustainable way of life, Indigenous peoples rely on their 
traditional knowledge (‘TK’), playing an important role in the avoidance of 
potentially serious/irreversible harm, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Considering this, at least one regime in international law, the biodiversity regime 
(explicitly guided by a precautionary approach), incorporates TK in decision-making 
in situations of potential threats of serious/irreversible harm to both biodiversity and 
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their traditional livelihood. This is done through various types of impact assessments, 
as well as the recognition of the need to consult Indigenous peoples; in addition, 
when the potential effects could affect more essential values, like sacred sites, 
consent should be obtained as a heightened safeguard.  
Being Indigenous peoples situated at the intersection between international 
environmental and human rights law,1 it is important to continue this analysis in the 
latter field; as such, in this chapter I analyse first the UN Treaty System (‘UNTS’), 
more specifically, the three treaties that have addressed Indigenous issues more 
often: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), 2  the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’),3 and 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (‘ICERD’), 4  (‘the Conventions’), followed by the International 
Labour Organization Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries C169 (‘C169’),5 the only treaty regarding Indigenous peoples 
in international law. 
As human rights instruments, it is not surprising that the precautionary 
principle (‘PP’), more identified with environmental law, is not explicitly mentioned; 
however, this does not mean that in situations of potential threats of serious harm to 
Indigenous peoples’ way of life the PP is absent; in fact, there seems to be an implicit 
reliance on this principle when it comes to the identification of risks and threats, with 
an important role for TK in decision-making, allowing Indigenous peoples to 
influence the outcome. Yet, there are other situations, like potential threats of a 
substantive nature or where cultural and spiritual values are involved, where there is 
some controversy about the degree of protection provided by these instruments and 
their effectiveness, in particular regarding ‘obtaining’ or ‘seeking’ free, prior, and 
informed consent (‘FPIC’). 
                                                             
1 C. Metcalf, “Indigenous Rights and the Environment: Evolving International Law” 35Ottawa L. 
Rev. 101 2003-2004, p 106.  
2 UNGA, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, 16 December 1966, UNTS, vol. 999, 
p. 171.  
3 UNGA, “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, 16 December 1966, 
UNTS, vol. 993, p. 3. 
4 UNGA, “International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination”, 21 
December 1965, UNTS, vol. 660, p. 195. 
5  Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27 June 1989, C169, entered into force 5 
September 1991. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (‘UNDRIP’) and regional 
systems will be analysed on the next chapter. 
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I begin with the analysis of the UNTS, starting section two with a brief 
summary of the ICCPR, ICESCR and ICERD and their compliance mechanisms, 
including how the bodies deal with future harm and uncertainties, and assessing the 
influence of the PP (if any), in upholding the rights recognised by the Covenants. 
The analysis of the situation of Indigenous peoples is in section three, looking 
especially into issues of cultural rights and ‘effective participation’ (as a way to 
protect the former) in the complaint and reporting procedures, where there are 
indications that TK plays a role in the avoidance of potential harm. Yet, there is also 
a lack of clear and consistent practice, especially when it comes to an enhanced 
safeguard, obtaining FPIC, which creates uncertainties and weakens the protection of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights. I conclude the analysis of the UNTS with an assessment 
in section four. Section five has a brief overview of the C169 and the rights that it 
recognises, including the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights. Section six 
analyses the mechanisms for the protection of these rights, participation and 
consultation, and the practice of the ILO monitoring bodies, especially the 
integration of impact studies with consultations and the incorporation and role of TK 
in assessing potential threats. This section also deals with the important question of 
FPIC (where we can find the PP as a requirement of ‘informed consent’); its 
conception in terms of ‘veto power’ that would allow Indigenous peoples to cancel 
projects; and how the C169 minimises its role in the protection of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights, creating some uncertainties. Section 7 provides an assessment of 
C169 and the chapter concludes in section 8 with some concluding remarks.  
 
2. A general view of the Conventions 
 
Since the end of the Second World War the international community has been 
promoting and strengthening human rights; as a result, the development of human 
rights norms has greatly progressed from the time of the UN Charter 6  and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,7 with several human rights instruments,8 
                                                             
6 United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations”, 24 October 1945, 1UNTSXVI. 
7 UNGA, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, 10 December 1948, 217A(III).  
8 Treaties like the ICCPR or C169 and declarations such as UNDRIP, among others. 
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international courts9 and monitoring bodies10  that deal with these issues, and the 
recognition of some of these rights as customary law11 or general principles.12 The 
core of the human right system is the UNTS, composed of nine treaties13 with an 
almost universal character,14 which elaborates standards and procedures in human 
rights issues. Of these treaties, three have more often addressed Indigenous issues, 
influencing the development of Indigenous rights:15 the ICCPR,16 the ICESCR17 and 
the ICERD,18 and their monitoring bodies: the Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’),19 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’); 20  and the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD’),21 respectively. 
                                                             
9 Such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘IACtHR’). 
10 Several UN treaties have established their own monitoring bodies; for a complete list, see the UN 
Human Rights Office (‘OHCHR’) webpage at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx [accessed May 2020]. 
11  For instance, the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) stated that customary international law 
prohibits genocide. ICJ, “Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion” ICJ 
Reports 19-51, p. 15, p 23. 
12 B. Lepard, “International law and human rights” in T. Cushman (ed), Handbook of Human Rights 
(Routledge, 2012), p 589. 
13 These are the ICCPR; the ICESCR; the ICERD; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families; and  the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance. See also OHCHR, “Strengthening the United Nations Human 
Rights Treaty Body System: A report” by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, N. Pillay, 
26 June 2012, A/66/860 (‘OHCHR Report 2012’), pp 15-16; I. Bantekas and L. Oete, International 
Human Rights, Law and Practice (CUP, 2013), p 184; and S. Egan, The UN Human Rights Treaty 
System: Law and Procedure (Bloomsbury, 2011), p 3. 
14 For instance, the ICCPR has 173 State parties and its purpose is to be applied to every person, 
according to the Preamble; the ICESCR and ICERD have 171 and 182 State parties respectively. 
15 J. Anaya, Indigenous peoples in International Law (2nd edition, 2004), p 228; B. Saul, Indigenous 
peoples and Human Rights: International and Regional Jurisprudence (Bloomsbury 2016), pp 54 and 
84.  
16 Being “the most comprehensive and well-established UN treaty on civil and political rights”. S. 
Joseph and M. Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Case, Materials and 
Commentary (OUP 2013, 3rd edition), p 8.  
17 Considered the “most important reference point for economic, social and cultural rights in the 
field.” Egan (n 13), p 77.  
18 Representing “the most comprehensive and unambiguous codification in treaty form of the idea of 
the equality of races.” E. Schwelb, “The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.15, No.4(1966), p 1057. 
19 Established by ICCPR Article 28 and regarded as “the most prominent body among the treaty 
bodies”. Bantekas and Oete (n 13), p 184. 
20 Established by the Economic and Social Council (‘ECOSOC’) Resolution 1985/17 of 27 of May 
1985. 
21 Established by the ICERD in Part II. 
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Their role is to supervise the implementation of the treaty obligations,22 and for this 
they: 
-elaborate general comments, providing an authoritative interpretation of the 
respective treaty,23 clarifying the meaning of its articles24 and contributing to the 
development of treaty obligations;25  
-examine State’s reports about the compliance with the respective covenant, issuing 
concluding observations 26  that serve as guidance for the implementation of the 
conventions;27 and  
-analyse individual,28 group29 or inter-state30 complaints concerning violations of the 
rights of the covenants, at the end of which they adopt ‘views’ (not judgments, since 
they are not judicial bodies).31  
Despite this, none of the comments, concluding observations or views have a 
legally binding character and they may be viewed as soft law.32 This does not mean 
                                                             
22 Egan, (n 13), p 3, also mentioning that the system was not designed like this and just informally 
evolved as a de facto system. S. Egan, “Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body 
System”, HRLR13(2013), p 211.   
23 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin The Making of International Law (OUP 2007), p 155; Egan (n 13), p 85 
and 90; Y. Tyagi: The UN Human Rights Committee, practice and procedure (CUP 2011), p 302; V. 
Krsticevic and B. Griffey “Remedial Recommendations” in M. Langford, B. Porter, R. Brown and J. 
Rossi (eds), The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Commentary (PULP 2016), p 328.  
24  Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee Fact Sheet No. 15(Rev.1)(‘HRC 
factsheet’), pp. 24-25 and ICCPR Article 40(4). See also Egan (n 13), p 77; M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Bloomsbury, 2nd Edition 2016), p 42; and ICERD 
Article 9.2; P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination: A Commentary (OUP 2016) pp 53-55. 
25 C. Chinkin, “Sources of International Law” in D. Moeckli, S. Shah and S. Sivakumaran (eds), 
International Human Rights Law (OUP 2014, 2nd edition), p 80; Boyle and Chinkin (n 23), p 155; 
Ssenyonjo (n 24), p 42; Tyagi (n 23) pp 301-302; Thornberry (n 24), p 65, noting the role of the UN 
treaty bodies in developing standards that contribute to the formation of customary law. 
26 HRC Factsheet, pp 14-23 and ICCPR Article 40; ICESCR Articles 16 and 17; and ICERD Article 9. 
For an analysis of reporting procedures see Egan (n 13), Chapter 4 “Periodic Reporting Procedures” 
and the OHCHR Report 2012 (n 22).  
27 Tyagi (n 23), p 270; Egan (n 13) p 137-138 and 144; and Ssenyonjo (n 24), pp 44-45.  
28   HRC factsheet, pp. 25-27 and Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, 
U.N.Doc.A/6316(1966), entered into force March 23, 1976 (‘OP-ICCPR’); Article 2 Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR, A/RES/63/117, 10 December 2008(‘OP-ICESCR’), p 309; ICERD Article 
14. 
29 Ibid. 
30 HRC Factsheet, pp. 27-28 and ICCPR Articles 41-42; ICERD Articles 11-13. ICERD also has an 
‘Early warning and urgent action’ procedure addressed below. 
31 See Egan (n 13), p 306 and Ssenyonjo (n 24), pp 40-41; Joseph and Castan, (n 16), p 22; Saul (n 
15), p 2; see also HRC, General Comment 33, Obligations of States parties under the OP-ICCPR 
(‘General comment 33’)(25 June 2009)CCPR/C/GC/33, para. 11; Thornberry (n 24), p 61, noting that 
CERD makes ‘suggestions and recommendations.’ 
32 Boyle and Chinkin (n 23), p 156. 
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that they are deprived of any legal value; as noted in Chapter II, soft-law can play a 
very important role regarding opinio iuris (and possibly State practice);33 moreover, 
even if the views are technically not legally binding, they constitute authoritative 
determinations which appear to all intents and purposes as written judicial opinions, 
providing detailed legal reasoning, 34  and indicating how to comply with legal 
obligations;35 in this sense, disregarding them is evidence of bad faith.36 Also, the 
comments, concluding observations and views work like a ‘system’: for instance, 
general comments enrich and expand human rights jurisprudence, being often cited 
in concluding observations and views, 37  and the consistent repetition of general 
comments/recommendations, concluding observations and views “creates a 
consensus that a lawyer would be foolish to ignore.” 38  In this context, Egan 
highlights their important role in clarifying treaty obligations and providing guidance 
to States, instead of focusing on a ‘strict compliance’ approach,39 where there is still 
some work to do.40  
Generally speaking, in analysing States’ compliance with human rights 
obligations, the bodies leave little space for the PP; for instance, the purpose of the 
individual complaint procedure is to provide ex post facto redress41 to ‘victims’42 and 
not to avoid the materialization of harm, precautionary or otherwise. When threats of 
violations of rights are addressed, it is only when the author can substantiate its 
allegations,43 demonstrating that the risk of being affected is ‘imminent’44 or ‘real’45 
                                                             
33 See also A. Boyle, “Soft law in international law-making”, in M. Evans (ed), International Law (4th 
ed, OUP 2014), p 130, pointing out that “widespread acceptance of soft law instruments will tend to 
legitimize conduct and make the legality of opposing positions harder to sustain.”   
34 Egan (n 13), pp 253 and 262. 
35 Joseph and Castan (n 16), p 22. 
36 Ibid. See also Tyagi (n 23), pp 577-578, saying that HRC decisions are morally binding and can be 
regarded as “soft law applicable to the parties concerned”, so disregarding them could be ‘politically 
damaging’. 
37 Tyagi (n 23), p 301; Krsticevic and Griffey (n 23), p 328; Bantekas and Oete (n 13), p 199. 
38 Boyle and Chinkin (n 23), p 156.  
39 Egan (n 13) pp 171-172.  
40 Tyagi (n 23), pp 186-187; OHCHR Report 2012; Joseph and Castan (n 16), p 53; Bantekas and Oete 
(n 13) pp 182-183. Also, 116 States out of 173 adopted the OP-ICCPR; 25 out of 171 the OP-
ICESCR; and 59 out of 182 ICERD’s Article 14 (competence to receive communications).  
41 M. Kamminga, “The Precautionary Approach in International Human Rights Law: How It Can 
Benefit the Environment” in in D. Freestone and E. Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle and 
International Law: The Challenge of Implementation (Kluwer, 1996), p 180. 
42 See OP-ICCPR Article 2; OP-ICESCR Articles 2 and 4; and ICERD Article 14(1), requiring the 
author of a communication to be a ‘victim’, i.e., suffered a violation of its rights.  
43 Like in every case at the admissibility stage. Tyagi (n 23), p 463.  
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(“a necessary and foreseeable consequence”, according to the HRC) 46  with the 
bodies disregarding ‘theoretical possibilities of harm’47 as they are unable to examine 
hypothetical violations of the Covenant which “might occur in the future”. 48 
Although this aligns with the existence of ‘reasonable grounds for concern’ (i.e., not 
mere intuitions or beliefs)49 to trigger the PP, when allegations of potentially serious 
harm supported by credible evidence were raised (e.g., possible effects on the 
environment and human health from nuclear tests;50 the risks posed by genetically 
modified crops51) they were declared inadmissible by the HRC because the authors 
were unable to establish their victim status, as the risk from nuclear tests was deemed 
too remote or controversial,52 and the threat presented by GMOs was not imminent.53 
It seems that the bodies adopt a rather restrictive interpretation regarding future 
violations, requiring a standard closer to certainty (restricting the possibility of 
invoking the PP),54 perhaps influenced by their constrains and limited fact-finding 
capacities that do not allow them to go beyond what is presented by the parties,55 
making it difficult to deal with uncertain and disputed effects.56 
                                                                                                                                                                            
44  See for instance HRC: E.W. et al. v. The Netherlands, No.429/1990, para. 6.4; Mrs. Vaihere 
Bordes and Mr. John Temeharo v. France, No.645/1995(‘Bordes and Temeharo’) para. 5.5; and André 
Brun v. France, No. 1453/2006(‘Brun’), para. 6.3. See also CERD: The Jewish community of Oslo et 
al. v. Norway, No.30/2003, para. 7.3, where there was an imminent risk of racial discrimination.  
45  HRC: Kindler v. Canada, No.470/1991(‘Kindler’) para. 13.2 and Toonen v Australia No.488/1992, 
para. 5.1, where the author demonstrated that the threat of enforcement and pervasive impact of a 
provision had affected him; CERD: Hermansen et al v Denmark, No.44/2009 para. 6.2, declared 
inadmissible because, inter alia, the authors did not demonstrate that they suffered a disadvantage or 
the measure in question had the potential to produce effects in the future. See also Thornberry (n 24), 
pp 60-61 and Egan (n 13), p 270 and 318-319. 
46 Kindler, para. 14.1. See also Joseph and Castan (n 16), p 91.  
47 HRC-Aumeeruddy-Cziffra et al v Mauritius, No.35/1978, para. 9.2. 
48  HRC-V.M.R.B. v. Canada, No.236/1987, para. 6.3, although in this case the author merely 
expressed ‘fear’ for its life in case of being deported. 
49 See chapter II section 3.2. 
50 Bordes and Temeharo paras. 2.3 and 4.1-4.4, presenting scientific evidence like studies and reports. 
51 Brun paras. 3.2-3.3, relying explicitly on the PP. 
52 C. Dommen, “Nuclear Testing Vaihere Bordes and John Temeharo v. France-Communication No. 
645/1995.” Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 6.1(1997), p 93, 
criticising that the HRC did not clarify what degree of risk would have resulted in a different outcome. 
See also Bordes and Temeharo, paras. 5.4-5.6, where the HRC seems to conflate ‘imminent’ and 
‘real’. 
53 Brun, para. 6.3.  
54 See Kamminga (n 41) p 180. This could affect complaints about climate change’ effects on human 
rights because of the difficulty to prove precise causation. See Joseph and Castan (n 16), p 89 
55 During the procedure the bodies rely on information from both parties, distributing the burden. 
Article 3 OP-ICCPR and HRC rules of procedure rule 96.b; OP-ICESCR Article 3.2(e); CERD rules 
of procedure, rule 91. 
56 Kamminga (n 41), p 177; Thornberry (n 24), p 53. Tyagi (n 23), p 422, saying that the HRC has a 
conservative approach regarding future violations and allegations in abstracto because it is not its 
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The bodies can also adopt interim measures to guarantee the effectiveness of 
the complaint mechanism57 when there are actions taken or threatened by a State that 
“would appear likely to cause irreparable harm”58 to the author; this requires an early 
and urgent risk assessment of the situation with limited information available, paying 
particular attention to the irreversibility of the consequences that the author may 
suffer,59  thus having a lower standard of proof than the one needed to prove a 
(potential) violation of rights. 60  The HRC is the only body to address interim 
measures to date, mostly in situations of direct risks to life (e.g., death sentences) and 
deportations/extraditions where there were risks of torture or similar violations.61 
Yet, when an interim measure of a precautionary character was requested by the 
authors (the suspension of nuclear tests until an independent commission ruled that 
there were no risks to the people and the environment), the HRC rejected it because 
there was no immediate danger, 62  despite being aware of the serious threats 
represented by nuclear weapons 63  and the scientific evidence presented by the 
authors. 64  Thus, despite the existence of reasonable grounds for concern that 
serious/irreversible harm may occur, the HRC relied on a restrictive interpretation of 
‘likely to cause irreparable harm’, closer to clear and immediate danger, disregarding 
situations where the causal link is inconclusive.  
In the reporting procedure, the focus is on a more general analysis of States’ 
compliance with most (or all) of the rights of the respective convention and not an in-
depth analysis of particular matters, with the bodies identifying and expressing 
                                                                                                                                                                            
function “to make a hypothetical assessment of what would have happened if a particular event had 
taken place nor is it feasible.” 
57 V. Krsticevic and B. Griffey “Interim Measures” in Langford et al (n 23), p 294. Disregarding 
interim measures is a violation of the OP-ICCPR and good faith according to HRC-general comment 
33, para. 19. 
58 HRC-general comment 33, para. 19. See also Krsticevic and Griffey (n 57), p 298, noting that they 
also apply on situations that are occurring. 
59 Kamminga (n 41), p 182; Tyagi (n 23), p 515. ‘Irreparable damage’ would be “the inability of the 
author to secure his rights, should there later be a finding of a violation of the Covenant on the 
merits”, following the HRC’s view in Stewart v. Canada, No. 538/1993, para. 7.7. 
60 Krsticevic and Griffey (n 57), pp 300-301, noting that CESCR has to base any requests for interim 
measures on a ‘reasonable conviction’ that there is, prima facie, a possibility of irreparable damage, 
based on a clear and credible factual narrative.  
61 See for instance J.D. v Denmark, No. 2204/2012; K.B. v Russian Federation, No. 2193/2012, 
among others. See also HRC-general comment 33 para. 19 and Kamminga (n 41), p 183. 
62 Bordes and Temeharo, para. 2.3; Dommen (n 52), pp 92-93. 
63 See HRC-General Comment No. 14: Article 6 (Right to Life) Nuclear Weapons and the Right to 
Life, 9 November 1984, noting that testing nuclear weapons is one of the “greatest threats to the right 
to life which confront mankind today”. See also Bordes and Temeharo paras. 2.2 and 5.9;  
64 Bordes and Temeharo, paras. 2.2-2.3, based on several studies; Dommen (n 52), pp 92-93. 
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‘concerns’ for infringements, suggesting broad recommendations for redress and 
prevention. 65  This indicates a more ‘preventive’ approach, where cause-effect 
relationships regarding human right violations are foreseen or established. However, 
the broad nature of the recommendations allow for a degree of precaution, as they 
may help to avoid not only known/ongoing but also potential harms; for instance, the 
HRC recommended Israel in 2014 to end the blockade on the Gaza Strip and allow 
access to ‘all basic and life-serving’ goods and services to improve food, health, 
water and sanitation conditions (known effect);66  this would have also probably 
avoided/mitigated the effects of future disease outbreaks67 (uncertain effect). This 
general nature can extend to situations where the PP plays a more explicit role, like 
climate change 68  and the potentially serious threats on human rights caused by 
effects on biodiversity, floods, food security and extreme weather, among others69 as 
addressed for instance by the CESCR.70  
The CERD for its part, and exercising its ‘preventative powers’,71 has an ‘Early 
Warning and Urgent Action’ procedure (‘EWUA’) designed to “prevent serious 
violations” of ICERD derived from structural problems escalating into conflicts 
(‘early warning’) and “respond to problems requiring immediate attention to prevent 
or limit serious violations” of ICERD (‘urgent action’).72 To achieve this, it must 
assess the gravity and scale of a particular situation, for which relies on indicators,73 
                                                             
65 See for instance HRC-concluding observation Romania, CCPR/C/ROU/CO/5(11 December 2017) 
paras. 27-28, expressing concerns for police brutality; CESCR-concluding observation Korea, 
E/C.12/KOR/CO/4(19 October 2017), paras. 38-39 expressing concerns about restrictions on the right 
to strike; and CERD-concluding observation Slovakia, CERD/C/SVK/CO/11-12(12 January 2018) 
paras. 13-14, expressing concerns about hate speech in the media. 
66 HRC-concluding observation Israel, CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4(21 November 2014) paras. 19-20. 
67  See the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the occupied Palestinian 
territory, Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, March 2017, reporting an outbreak of animal disease 
worsened by the blockade. 
68 The PP is explicitly included in Article 3.3 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
69  V. Tauli-Corpuz, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples”, 1 
November 2017, A/HRC/36/46, para. 6. 
70 See for instance, CESCR-concluding observation Australia, E/C.12/AUS/CO/4(12 June 2009) para. 
27.  See also M. Orellana, M. Kothari and S. Chaudhry, “Climate Change in the Work of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, Geneva Office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
(May 2010), p 30. 
71 S. Subedi, The Effectiveness of the UN Human Rights System: Reform and the Judicialisation of 
Human Rights, Routledge (2017), p 86.  
72 Prevention of racial discrimination, including early warning and urgent procedures: working paper 
adopted by the CERD, A/48/18 Annex III para. 8. The procedure is based on art 9.1(b) of ICERD 
granting CERD the power to request a report at any time. 
73 Ibid, para. 12 
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like the existence of patterns of racial discrimination, the adoption of discriminatory 
legislation/policies and the encroachment on or forced removal from Indigenous 
lands,74 which can lead to measures like requesting information, adopting decisions 
or issue recommendations.75 This also seems to be a more preventive mechanism, 
because preventing structural problems from escalating implies a known cause-effect 
relation that is worsening; however, when acting in an urgent context it is reasonable 
to expect a degree of uncertainty, due to lack of information, resulting in 
precautionary measures. For instance, in a letter addressed to Japan, the CERD 
expressed its concerns over the proposed construction of US military bases in 
Okinawa, regarding potentially serious environmental harm and social 
consequences.76 In other words, due to its broad nature that reaches a wide range of 
scenarios, this procedure could address situations where there is scientific uncertainty 
about potentially serious effects; however, it seems more oriented to preventive cases 
where there is a more direct and clear cause-effect link that results in violations of 
human rights. 
In sum, there is little indication that precaution plays a relevant role in 
general in the UNTS, although some avenues for the consideration of the PP in these 
procedures exist, not fully explored by the bodies; for this, it would be necessary a 
more flexible approach that goes beyond the focus on imminent or foreseeable 
effects. Yet, this flexibility may be present in cases related to Indigenous peoples’ 
rights, as the bodies have recognised their special relationship with their lands and 
territories, having a more organic connection to environmental aspects, where the PP 





                                                             
74 Ibid. 
75  Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Seventieth session (19 
February-9 March 2007) Seventy-first session (30 July-17 August 2007)A/62/18 Annex III Guidelines 
for the Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure, paras. 13-14. 
76 Letter of March 9, 2012, sent by the CERD Chairperson to the Japanese Ambassador in Geneva. 
See J. Taylor, “Environment and Security Conflicts: The US Military in Okinawa” Geographical 
Bulletin 48:3-13(2007), detailing the possible impacts on the environment, including deforestation, 
local fauna and coral reefs as well as social effects. 
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3. Indigenous peoples in the Conventions 
  
Most of the human rights treaties do not mention Indigenous peoples,77 including the 
ICCPR, ICESCR and ICERD; yet Indigenous peoples have often relied on them to 
protect their rights, 78  leading to the reinterpretation of the respective treaties to 
address these issues. For instance, the HRC refers specifically to Indigenous peoples 
in the General Comment about Article 27, 79  rights of minorities’ 80  to culture, 81 
religion and language (although ‘Indigenous peoples’ and ‘minorities’ are not the 
same);82 CESCR refers to Indigenous peoples in different comments, 83  being the 
most important in this context General Comment 21, right to take part in cultural 
life;84 finally, CERD elaborated a specific comment regarding Indigenous peoples,85 
having a broader perspective about Indigenous issues, beyond cultural rights.  
                                                             
77  Gomez notes that they have been systematically excluded from the evolutionary process of 
international human rights law. F. Gomez, “The Role of Soft Law in the Progressive Development of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights” in S. Lagoutte, T. Gammeltoft-Hansen and J. Cerone (eds), Tracing the 
Role of Soft Law in Human Rights (OUP 2016), p 185. 
78 See supra 15. 
79  See HRC, General Comment No. 23: Article 27(Rights of Minorities), 8 April 1994, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5(‘HRC-General Comment 23’). 
80 There is no internationally agreed definition of minorities; see, in general, F. Caportori, Study on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, para. 568; OHCHR, 
“Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation”, 2010, HR/PUB/10/3, p. 
2 and M. Weller, Universal Minority Rights: a commentary on the jurisprudence of international 
courts and treaty bodies (OUP 2007). 
81 In general, the notion of cultural rights has a double meaning: as a concept related to high arts and 
literature, music and similar expressions of the human mind; and as knowledge, way of life, 
traditional activities, beliefs and practices of a group. The ICCPR appears to follow the latter whereas 
the ICESCR incorporates both. A. Yupsanis, “The Concept and categories of cultural rights in 
international law: their broad sense and the relevant clauses of the international human right treaties”, 
37SyracuseJ.Int’L.&Com. 207, p 211, and “The Meaning of ‘Culture’ in Article 15(1)(a) of the 
ICESCR – Positive Aspects of CESCR’s General Comment No. 21 for the Safeguarding of Minority 
Cultures” German Yearbook Of International Law 55, 2012, pp 348-352.  
82 Indigenous peoples do not identify themselves as ‘minorities’ because they consider that this status 
does not adequately protect them, as noted in R. Wolfrum, “The Protection of Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law”, 59 Heidelberg Journal of International Law (1999), p 371. Wiessner states that the 
definitive feature that separates Indigenous peoples from minorities is the collective spiritual 
relationship to their land. S. Wiessner, “The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and 
Continuing Challenges”, EJIL Vol.22no.1 (2011), p 129. See also “Mikmaq tribal society v. Canada”, 
No. 78/1980 (30 September 1980)(1984)(‘Mikmaq’), para. 7.3, where the Mikmaq claimed to be a 
people, not a minority. 
83  For instance, CESCR, “General Comment No. 15, the right to water”, 20 January 2003, 
E/C.12/2002/11. 
84 CESCR, “General comment No. 21: Right of everyone to take part in cultural life”, 21 December 
2009, E/C.12/GC/21(‘CESCR-General Comment 21’). 
85 CERD, “General Recommendation 23, Rights of Indigenous peoples” U.N.Doc. A/52/18, annex V 
at 122(1997)(‘CERD-General Recommendation 23’) 
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The HRC and the CESCR address Indigenous situations in several 
concluding observations, mainly under ‘cultural rights’ but also in connection with 
self-determination, whereas the CERD focuses on non-discrimination issues across 
their social, civil, political, economic and cultural aspects. 86  In the complaint 
procedure, the HRC (the only body that has addressed issues related to the focus of 
this research to date), tend to focus on the violation of cultural rights (see below), 
although Indigenous peoples often raised claims based on self-determination (article 
1),87 looking for the protection of their collective88 rights.89 This is because the HRC, 
despite its competence to review claims under “any of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant”,90 considers self-determination a right not cognizable under the protocol,91 
and that the complaint mechanism is only for individual victims.92 Yet, as Indigenous 
peoples often seek the protection of their collective rights, the bodies adopted a more 
pragmatic approach, by which right to culture is interpreted as a ‘way of life’, 
entailing the protection of certain elements like the environment and TK, as I will 






                                                             
86 Anaya notes that the CERD treats Indigenous issues as a non-discrimination issue, not connected to 
particular articles. Anaya (n 15), p 230; Saul (n 15), p 97. 
87 See Mikmaq; Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, No.167/1984(26 March 1990)(‘Lubicon Lake Band’); 
Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, No.197/1985(‘Kitok’); Marshall v. Canada, No.205/l986(‘Marshall’); Apirana 
Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand No.547/1993(‘Apirana Mahuika’); J.G.A. Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, 
No.760/1997(‘Diergaardt’) and Poma Poma v. Peru, Comm. 1457/2006(‘Poma Poma’). 
88 In the literature there are references to “collective rights” as well as “group rights”; following 
Sanders, the latter pertain to a group understood as the sum of the individuals (e.g., political parties) 
so a ‘group right’ would be at the same time an individual right, whereas ‘collective rights’ would be 
those that pertained to collectives with an internal cohesiveness, a particular cultural development and 
a goal of group survival (as opposed to assimilation). D. Sanders, “Collective Rights” 13 
Hum.Rts.Q.368(1991), pp 369-370. See also J. Donnelly, “Universal Human Rights in Theory and 
Practice”, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1989, p. 145. I will use group and collective rights in an 
interchangeable way. 
89 See for instance, Mikmaq, para. 1, were the author alleges that he submits the communication on 
behalf of the Mikmaq ‘people’ and Lubicon Lake Band, para. 7, arguing that the ‘victims’ are the 
members of the Lubicon Lake Band.   
90 OP-ICCPR Article 1. 
91 See for instance Lubicon Lake Band, para. 32.1; Diergaardt, para. 10.3; and Poma Poma, para. 6.3. 
92  OP-ICCPR Articles 1-2, expressly mentioning that the HRC can receive and consider 





There is no clear, universal understanding of self-determination in international 
law; 93  for instance, the UNGA just acknowledges that by virtue of self-
determination, peoples are able to “freely determine, without external interference, 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development”;94 the ICCPR and ICESCR repeats this almost verbatim (minus the 
‘without external interference’ part); 95  the HRC General Comment on Article 1 
considers this as an “inalienable right”96 and CERD’s General Recommendation 21 
notes that self-determination is a fundamental principle of international law.97  
In general, self-determination has a double aspect: 98  an external one 
concerning the status of a State in respect to the international community, and an 
internal one related to the relations inside the State. The former implies that “peoples 
have the right to determine freely their political status and their place in the 
international community based upon the principle of equal rights”99 and it is closely 
related, but not limited to, issues concerning States’ independence.100 The internal 
aspect is constituted by “the rights of all peoples to pursue freely their economic, 
social and cultural development without outside interference”,101 in turn linked to the 
right to take part in the conduct of public affairs at any level, as they are determined 
through political processes.102  In this sense, McCorquodale explains that internal 
                                                             
93  M. Saul, “The Normative Status of Self-Determination in International Law: A Formula for 
Uncertainty in the Scope and Content of the Right?”, p 611. 
94   1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res.2625/UN 
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No.28/UN Doc.A/8028(1970)121, (‘Declaration concerning Friendly 
Relations’).   
95  ICCPR and ICESCR Article 1.1.  
96 HRC, General Comment No. 12: Article 1, The Right to Self-determination of Peoples, 13 March 
1984 (‘HRC-General Comment 12’), which has no mentions of Indigenous peoples or minorities. 
97   CERD, “General Recommendation 21 The right to self-determination” (Forty-eighth session, 
1996), (‘CERD-General Recommendation 21), para. 2. 
98  See ibid and A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards (CUP, 2007), p. 159; 
R. McCorquodale, “Group Rights” in Moeckli et al (n 25), p 342 and A. Cassese, Self-determination 
of peoples: a legal reappraisal (CUP, 1995). 
99 CERD-General Recommendation 21, para. 3. 
100 The external aspect includes the creation of an independent and sovereign State, free association 
with another State or any other political status as freely determined by a people. Xanthaki (n 98), p 
159; McCorquodale (n 98), p 341 and Declaration concerning Friendly Relations. 
101 CERD-General Recommendation 21, para. 4; see also Declaration concerning Friendly Relations 
and Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR. 
102 Xanthaki (n 98), pp 157-158; CERD-General Recommendation 21, para. 3.  
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self-determination “concerns the right of peoples within a State to choose their 
political status, the extent of their political participation and the form of their 
government” and that its exercise may include control over social and cultural 
matters,103 meanwhile Cassese considers that this internal aspect is “best explained as 
a manifestation of the totality of rights embodied in the Covenant [ICCPR]”.104 Thus, 
internal self-determination covers a collective approach to cultural, social and 
economic development and political participation. 
There is a long controversy regarding Indigenous peoples’ right to self-
determination, which recognition has been resisted by States mainly because of the 
possibility of undermining their territorial integrity.105 It appears however that States 
have mostly accepted Indigenous internal self-determination 106  (this being the 
approach followed by the bodies), 107  although the secession/independence 
controversy, which is beyond the scope of this work, remains unclear.108 In any case, 
as noted above, the HRC does not address claims under Article 1, a refusal that Saul 
considers as an artificially strict construction of self-determination as ‘exclusively 
collective’,109 which is the next topic. 
 
 
                                                             
103 McCorquodale “Self-determination: A Human Rights approach” 43Int'l&Comp.L.Q.857 1994, p 
864. 
104 Cassese (n 98), p. 53. See also HRC-General Comment 12 paras. 1 and 2, noting how self-
determination is interrelated with other ICCPR rights and is an “essential condition for the effective 
guarantee and observance of individual human rights.”  
105 See G. Nettheim, “‘Peoples’ and ‘Populations’: Indigenous Peoples and the Rights of Peoples” in J. 
Crawford (ed), The Rights of Peoples (OUP 1988); C. Charters, “Indigenous Peoples and International 
Law and Policy” in B. Richardson, S. Imai and K. McNeil (eds), Indigenous Peoples and the Law: 
Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2009). 
106 Ward concludes that a modem concept of self-determination does not necessarily include the right 
to separate from a State, but instead alternatives like the right to participate in the conduct of public 
affairs and various forms of autonomy and self-governance. T. Ward, “The Right to Free, Prior, and 
Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples' Participation Rights within International Law” 10 Nw.U.J.Int'l 
Hum.Rts.54 2011-2012, p. 55; Saul (n 15), p 55; J. Anaya, “Report of the Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples” A/HRC/EMRIP/2010/2, 17 May 2010, paras. 30-33 and UNDRIP 
Articles 3 and 46.1.   
107 Saul (n 15), p 55. 
108  R. Barsh, “Indigenous Peoples” in D. Bodansky, J. Brunne and E. Hey, (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP, 2012), p 848, noting that the UN system has 
recognized an Indigenous’ right to internal self-determination but the struggle for external self-
determination continues; see also Anaya (n 15), p 185, noting that the endorsement of self-
determination by States in UNDRIP is not an endorsement of the right of Indigenous peoples to form 
independent states, which is not an aspiration in most cases.   
109 Saul (n 15), p 59. 
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3.2 Collective rights 
 
The original focus of the UNTS was the protection of the ‘individual’ rather than the 
communities within which they live and develop, 110  under the assumption that 
individual rights would protect group rights. 111  However, some collective rights 
cannot be protected by individual rights (like self-determination or land rights in the 
case of Indigenous peoples112) among other reasons because the protection of a group 
as a collective is different than the protection of the group as a sum of individuals.113 
Group rights are also needed for other purposes, like preserving ethnic minorities and 
overcome effects of past discrimination,114 and it is undeniable that at least some 
collective rights enjoy solid recognition in international law, like self-determination 
and, to a certain extent, Indigenous peoples’ rights.115  
In the General Comment 23, the HRC explicitly refers to ‘minorities’ and 
their cultural rights as a whole, not only in an individual character, 116  and 
                                                             
110 McCorquodale (n 98), p 333. Jovanovic explains that the recognition of universal but individual 
rights was due to the fact that the Nazis based their military conquests in the alleged violations of 
German minority rights in other countries. M. Jovanovic, “Are There Universal Collective Rights?” 
Hum Rights Rev (2010)11:17–44, p 32. 
111 M. Ahren, “The Provisions on Lands, Territories and Natural Resources in the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous peoples: An Introduction” in C. Charters and R. Stavenhagen (eds), Making 
the Declaration Work (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2009), p 201. Brownlie illustrates this arguing that if 
everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion then the right of the members of 
a religious community would be adequately protected. I. Brownlie, “The Rights of Peoples in Modern 
International Law” in Crawford (n 105), p 2. See also Sanders (n 88), p 374.  
112 Due to the very deep relationship with their territories in a way that includes social, cultural 
economic, spiritual and political dimensions and a very significant collective character with an 
intergenerational element. See E. Daes, “Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land”, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21, 11 June 2001, para. 20, and Barsh, (n 108), p 836: saying that “there is little 
doubt that Indigenous peoples hold and exercise rights as groups.”  
113  See P. Jones, “Individuals, communities and human rights”, 26 Review of International 
Studies(2000) 199-215, using as an example the individual right to speak their own language; a ban on 
language would be an individual violation, but the claim of a minority to have the public affairs 
conducted in their own language would be a collective right, since “the combined claim of all of the 
individuals in the linguistic group that suffices to make the case for the right. Thus, the group as 
whole possesses a right that none of its members possesses individually.”  
114 OHCHR Report 2012, p 8. In this respect, Alston notes that first and second generations rights, 
(civil and political and economic, social and cultural, respectively) were not flexible enough to 
respond to the new challenges in international law, and thus a third generation of human rights based 
on solidarity and collective identity was needed. P. Alston, “A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: 
Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?” Netherlands 
International Law Review, 29(1982), pp 307-308. 
115 J. Crawford, “The Rights of Peoples: ‘Peoples’ or Governments’?” in Crawford (n 105), pp 57 and 
67. 
116 HRC-General Comment 23, para. 5.2 and 9. See also A. Yupsanis, “Article 27 of the ICCPR 
Revisited-The Right to Culture as a Normative Source for Minority/Indigenous Participatory Claims 
in the Case Law of the Human Rights Committee”, Hague Yearbook of International Law Vol 
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acknowledges that minorities’ rights are exercised “in community with the other 
members of the group”, thus depending on the survival of the group as such.117 
Additionally, in various Indigenous cases under the complaint procedure it has either 
‘transformed’ the argument originally presented under Article 1 as a claim under 
‘cultural rights’ (Article 27)118 or stated that self-determination, a collective right, 
can be relevant in the interpretation of Article 27.119 Finally, more recently it has 
explicitly stated that “in the context of indigenous peoples’ rights, Articles 25 and 27 
of the Covenant have a collective dimension”,120 in line with the CESCR’s General 
Comment 21,121 and the CERD’s General Recommendation 23.122 This leads to the 
analysis of Indigenous ‘cultural rights’. 
 
3.3 Cultural rights  
 
The CERD, with its focus on combating racial discrimination, does not specify what 
cultural rights are, relying instead on its recognition by other instruments, like the 
Covenants; 123  for instance, ICERD guarantees the right of everyone “without 
distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, 
notably in the enjoyment” of several rights, including cultural rights.124 The other 
two Covenants, however, expand the understanding of cultural rights through general 
comments. According to the HRC’s General Comment 23, Indigenous cultural rights 
                                                                                                                                                                            
26(2013), p 368, noting that several authors argue that cultural rights have an inherent collective 
dimension. Steiner also highlights that “[g]roups and communities, not isolated individuals, transmit 
culture from one generation to the next” H. Steiner, "Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over 
Autonomy Regimes for Minorities" 64 Notre Dame LR(1991), p 1549.  
117 HRC-General Comment 23 paras. 6.2 and 9. See also Joseph and Castan (n 16), p 833 noting that 
CESCR and CERD can review collective claims.  
118 See for instance Lubicon Lake Band para. 33.1 and Poma Poma, para. 6.3,  
119 Apirana Mahuika, para. 9.2; Diergaardt, para. 10.3; 
120 Tiina Sanila-Aikio v. Finland No 2668/2015, para. 6.9 and Klemetti Käkkäläjärvi et al v. Finland, 
No 2950/2017, paras. 9.8-9.9. 
121 CESCR-General Comment 21 para. 9, noting that cultural rights can be exercised as individuals, in 
association with others or within a community or group, and paras. 36-37 noting its collective 
character in regard to Indigenous peoples. 
122 CERD-General Recommendation 23, para. 4. See also P. Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and 
Human Rights” (Manchester University Press, 2002), p 217. 
123  CERD, General Recommendation 20, “The guarantee of human rights free from racial 
discrimination” (Forty-eighth session, 1996), UN. Doc.A/51/18, annex VIII at 124(1996), para. 1. 
124 ICERD Article 5, in particular para.(e). It does highlight the existence of a special link between 
Indigenous peoples and their lands. CERD-General Recommendation 23, para. 5. 
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consist of a lifestyle inextricably associated with their lands,125 with their customs, 
knowledge, traditions and development depending on and determined by the 
territories they inhabit; in this sense, adverse impacts on the latter can seriously 
affect the former, as argued in the complaint procedure126 and noted in concluding 
observations.127 The HRC notes that because of the diverse characteristics of the 
lands inhabited and the different lifestyles, it is practically impossible to determine 
what constitute Indigenous cultural rights in abstracto,128 pointing out that “culture 
manifest in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the use of 
land resources, especially in the case of Indigenous peoples”,129 but according to the 
HRC, this includes traditional activities (fishing and hunting 130  and alpaca 
farming,131 among others); spiritual elements;132 and economic developments (as “an 
essential element of the culture of an ethnic community”),133 being as well a notion 
in constant evolution.134 Holder notes that the HRC characterise ‘cultural rights’ as a 
right to do ‘cultural things’ or activities, which express and develop a worldview, a 
history and an identity as peoples and individuals, exercised through objects, 
                                                             
125 HRC-General Comment 23, paras. 3.2 and 7; see also Lubicon Lake Band paras. 11.2 and 33, 
noting that the Band’s ‘way of life’ includes spiritual and cultural ties to their land and environment; 
HRC-concluding observations: Finland, CCPR/CO/82/FIN(2 December 2004), para. 17; Colombia, 
CCPR/C/COL/CO/7(17 November 2016) paras. 42-43; and J. Anaya and R. Williams, Jr., “The 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights over Lands and Natural Resources under the Inter-American 
Human Rights System, 14 HARV.HUM.RTS.J.33, p 53, noting that “under international law, the 
[S]tates' obligation to protect Indigenous peoples' right to cultural integrity necessarily includes the 
obligation to protect traditional lands because of the inextricable link between land and culture in this 
context.” 
126  See for instance, Lubicon Lake Band (destruction of the Indigenous lands by oil and gas 
companies); and Poma Poma below. 
127 HRC-concluding observations: Chile CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5(18 May 2007), para. 19, noting that 
ancestral lands are threatened by energy developments; United States of America(‘USA’) 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/4(23 April 2014) para. 25, and Russia CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7(28 April 2015) para. 
24, noting that Indigenous sacred areas are being contaminated and destroyed. 
128  HRC-General Comment 23 para. 7; see also Kitok para. 9.3; Länsman et al. v. Finland No 
511/1992 (‘Länsman I’) para. 9.3 and Apirana Mahuika para. 9.4.  
129 HRC-general comment 23 para. 7. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Poma Poma para. 7.3 
132 See for instance Apirana Mahuika, considering the religious, cultural and commercial significance 
of fishing for the Maories (paras. 9.8-9.9); see also HRC-concluding observations USA 2014 para. 25 
and Russia 2015 para. 24.  
133 See Kitok para. 9.2; Länsman 1 para. 9.2 and Apirana Mahuika para. 9.3, among others. 
134 Yupsanis (n 116), p 373, and HRC-General Comment 23, para. 9, noting that that the protection of 
cultural rights “is directed towards ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural, 




behaviours, languages and institutions.135 ‘Culture’ then is what people do when they 
live their lives as peoples, constituting an essential part of being human.136 Being TK 
a manifestation of a way of life that contributes to the development of a communal 
identity as peoples,137 it is also included here.  
The CESCR also recognises culture as a way of life, going into more detail 
about the different ‘cultural things’ by which individuals and communities express 
their humanity and represent their worldviews, such as language; music; religion or 
belief systems; ceremonies; natural and man-made environments; arts; and customs 
and traditions, among others.138 In the case of Indigenous peoples, and considering 
their special relationship with their lands and territories, these expressions also 
include their cultural heritage; TK and cultural expressions; and manifestations of 
their sciences, technologies and cultures (such as genetic resources, seeds, medicines, 
knowledge of the properties of flora and fauna and traditions, among others).139 Like 
the HRC, the CESCR consider ‘cultural rights’ “as a living process, historical, 
dynamic and evolving, with a past, a present and a future”.140 
These cultural rights constitute a vital part of the Indigenous identity, so 
affecting any of its elements, including their environment, may threaten their 
survival.141 In this context, the HRC stated that cultural rights “may require positive 
legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the effective participation” of 
minorities in decisions that could affect them, a protection “directed to ensuring the 
survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of 
the minorities concerned”.142 This leads to two important implications: first, as noted 
by the HRC, this protection is not absolute and States could affect Indigenous 
interests when taking legitimate steps to promote their economic development 
                                                             
135 C. Holder, “Culture as an Activity and Human Right: An Important Advance for Indigenous 
Peoples and International Law” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 33, No 1(2008), p 15. 
Yupsanis (n 116), pp 370-371. 
136 Holder (n 134), p 22; Yupsanis (n 116), p 371 
137 See Chapter III, section 4. 
138 CESCR-General Comment 21, para. 13. 
139 Ibid., paras. 27, 36-37, 49 (d) and 50 (c). 
140 Ibid., para. 11. 
141  HRC-General Comment 23, para. 9 and Poma Poma, para. 7.2. See also HRC-concluding 
observation Finland 2004 para. 17, noting how endangering their traditional culture and way of life 
also endangers their identity. 
142 HRC-General Comment 23, paras. 7 and 9. 
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(including natural resources),143 but this economic development cannot undermine 
cultural rights to the point that the restrictions imposed constitute a denial of this 
right. 144  Second, as highlighted by Holder, the protection of cultural rights can 
“ground rights to conditions, objects, or goods that are instrumentally necessary for a 
people's culture”,145 like the environment in the case of Indigenous peoples, as also 
noted by the CESCR, pointing out that their relationship with nature and their 
ancestral lands should be protected “in order to prevent the degradation of their 
particular way of life(…) and their cultural identity.”146 Now, if the protection of 
Indigenous peoples’ cultural rights entails the protection of values and elements that 
are necessary for the development and sustainability of their culture, and especially 
considering that the basis of their traditional livelihood is their environment, it could 
be argued that the existence of potential threats to these values requires the 
application of the PP, and thus States would have a duty to avoid the materialisation 
of potential impacts to their culture, also considering that because cultural rights 
cannot be determined in abstracto, there is a degree of uncertainty about what are 
these rights and how are they going to be affected. As I analyse below, there are 
some recent indications that the monitoring bodies are aware of the need to avoid the 
materialisation of potential threats of non-negligible harm to Indigenous peoples’ 
traditional livelihood and cultural rights, but the practice is inconsistent in this 
respect, especially regarding FPIC and if impact assessments form part of ‘effective 
participation’. 
 
3.3.1 The protection of cultural rights 
 
As noted by the HRC, the protection of cultural rights requires Indigenous 
peoples’ effective participation in decisions that could affect them,147 enabling them 
                                                             
143 Länsman I, para. 9.4; Apirana Mahuika, para. 9.4; and Poma Poma, para. 7.4.  
144 Ibid. 
145 Holder (n 134), p 10. 
146  CESCR-General Comment 21 para. 36, and CESCR-concluding observations: Ecuador 
E/C.12/1/Add.100(07 June 2004) para. 12, noting how the environmental impacts of the extraction of 
natural resources affect their cultural rights; and Chad, E/C.12/TCD/CO/3(16 December 2009) para. 
35, noting that exploitation of natural resources affects their livelihood and cultural identity, among 
others. 
147 HRC-general comment 23, paras. 7 and 9; CESCR-General Comment 21, para. 55(e); and CERD-
General Recommendation 23 para. 4(e). See also Yupsanis (n 116), p 371. 
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to use their knowledge and experiences to reduce uncertainties and raise awareness 
about possible risks that threaten particular conditions, objects or goods necessary to 
express their culture, including their environment and spiritual aspects associated to 
their lands. For example, in Länsman I, where Finland granted a contract to a private 
company to allow stone quarrying in an area home to a Saami community, the HRC 
recognised the value of reindeer husbandry and the spiritual significance of a 
mountain as an important part of the community’s culture. 148  Yet, the General 
Comment does not clarify what constitutes ‘effective participation’, for which it is 
necessary to analyse the bodies’ practice, starting with the HRC’s complaint 
procedure. 
 
a) Complaint procedure 
 
In analysing claims under Article 27, the HRC focuses on damages caused to 
Indigenous lands, a vital element for Indigenous culture, assessing if these damages 
effectively deny the enjoyment of cultural rights and way of life;149 if they do, there 
is an incompatibility with Article 27,150 but if the impacts are more limited, they do 
not infringe this Article.151 In doing so, the HRC relies information provided by the 
parties (including TK), to determine what are these cultural rights and how they 
could be affected, especially looking at if the authors participated in the decision-
making process, and if they can continue with their traditional activities. 152 
Following this, in several cases the HRC found no violation of Article 27 because 
Indigenous authors were consulted and their interests and concerns taken into 
account, resulting in changes to accommodate these concerns. For instance, in 
                                                             
148 Länsman I paras. 9.2-9.3. 
149 See for instance, Länsman I para. 9.5: “[t]he question that therefore arises (…) is whether the 
impact of the quarrying on Mount Riutusvaara is so substantial that it does effectively deny to the 
authors the right to enjoy their cultural rights”; a similar analysis can be found in Länsman II (para. 
10.4) and Äärela (para. 7.5), regarding logging activities. 
150 See Lubicon Lake Band, para. 33 in connection with paras. 11.2 and 29.1, where non-Indigenous 
exploitation of natural resources in their territories destructed their lands and threatened the Band’s 
way of living; and Poma Poma, para. 7.4. 
151 For instance, Länsman I, para. 9.4 and Apirana Mahuika, para. 9.4.  
152 Apirana Mahuika para. 9.5: “the Committee has emphasised that the acceptability of measures that 
affect or interfere with the culturally significant economic activities of a minority depends on whether 
the members of the minority in question have had the opportunity to participate in the decision-
making process in relation to these measures and whether they will continue to benefit from their 
traditional economy”; see also, Länsman I para. 9.5 and Länsman II para. 10.4.  
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Länsman I, Finland authorised quarrying activities with limited environmental and 
cultural impacts on the Saami livelihood, that would not affect reindeer herding 
activities;153 in Länsman II, the HRC noted that approval of logging plans by Finland 
in an area home to a community of Saami reindeer breeders did not threaten the 
survival of reindeer husbandry, as the State modified the original plans to limit 
environmental impacts (reducing logging areas and changing to manual methods) 
after consultations with the authors;154 and in Apirana Mahuika, the HRC highlighted 
that an agreement between the Maori and New Zealand was influenced by a lengthy 
consultation process, integrating their economic, cultural and religious concerns (in 
particular, the sustainability of the Maori fishing activities), preserving their 
traditions. 155  All this consistently indicates that ‘effective participation’ means 
‘consultations’, enabling the integration of TK to clarify effects on cultural rights; 
yet, the HRC has not mentioned particular requirements, resulting in allegations 
about ‘proforma’ consultations and violations of Indigenous’ rights against States, 
dismissed by the HRC, possibly because their concerns were at least partially taken 
into account.156  
It seems that the protection of cultural rights recognised by the HRC only 
extends to situations where the cause-effect relation was clear (e.g., the exclusion of 
certain areas from the original plans); in effect, when concerns about potential 
impacts from future activities were raised by Indigenous peoples, the HRC 
disregarded them, noting in both Länsman cases that only if the projected activities 
(possible expansion of mining and quarrying operations, in Länsman I; future mining 
and logging activities in the area for which licences were already granted and their 
possible cumulative impacts, in Länsman II) were to be approved on a larger scale or 
it could be shown that the effects are more serious than can be “foreseen at present”, 
then the HRC may have to consider if they constitute a violation of Article 27.157 
Likewise, in Äärela, and faced with contradicting domestic judgments regarding 
                                                             
153 Länsman I paras. 9.6-9-7 
154 Länsman II paras. 6.1, 6.13, 10.5 and 10.6.  
155 Apirana Mahuika paras. 9.5-9.8. 
156 See Länsman II, paras. 7.8 and 10.5, where the HRC noted “[t]hat this consultation process was 
unsatisfactory to the authors and was capable of greater interaction does not alter the Committee's 
assessment” and Apirana Mahuika paras. 9.6 and 9.8 where the HRC gave more weight to the fact that 
consultations were conducted, disregarding claims of lack of sufficient support for the agreement.  
157 Länsman I paras. 8.7-8.8 and 9.8; Länsman II, paras. 2.6, 7.11, 7.15 and 10.7. 
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potential long-term impacts of a logging area that the authors contended was 
important to the survival of the herd in emergency situations, the HRC was unable to 
“draw independent conclusions” about this controversy and the possible 
consequences on reindeer husbandry, thus finding no violation of Article 27.158 In 
regard to interim measures, the question of precaution is open because they were 
discussed in situations of ongoing159 or clear and immediate160 damages, in line with 
the restrictive interpretation of ‘likely to cause irreparable harm’ noted above.  
Although in Länsman I the concerns about potential impacts seemed too 
general and hypothetical (unspecified possible effects from possible future 
operations), in Länsman II and Äärela there was clear evidence of reasonable 
grounds for concern that potentially serious harm could occur, supported by the 
authors’ TK and practices (and disputed by States), meeting the precautionary 
standard of proof. In effect, in both cases it was argued that, based on previous 
experiences and observations, and considering that regular feeding grounds were 
already under pressure from various projects, the logging operations may in the long-
term affect emergency feeding grounds (lichen growing on trees), necessary in the 
case of unpredictable situations like crisis or difficult winters (where reindeers may 
be unable to dig lichen from the frozen ground), threatening the survival of reindeer 
herds.161 However, the HRC did not follow a precautionary approach, despite the fact 
that these credible potential risks would not simply affect the enjoyment of their 
cultural rights, but jeopardize the very existence of their traditional way of life.  
As the HRC gives great importance to the inclusion of Indigenous concerns 
and knowledge through effective participation/consultations (even highlighting its 
role in modifying projects, preventing harm), it seems that the lack of precautionary 
guidance is not grounded on questions of TK as a credible source of evidence of 
potential harm and uncertainties, but on the rather restrictive standards followed by 
the HRC, requiring ‘imminent’ or ‘foreseeable’ risks before addressing claims of 
potential violations of rights, as noted above. That being said, a more recent case 
                                                             
158 Äärela, para. 7.6.   
159 See Lubicon Lake Band, where oil and gas companies were destroying the Band’s lands (granted). 
160 See for instance, Sara et al, effects on reindeer herding and breeding due to logging, granted then 
discontinued due to inadmissibility issues; Länsman I, attempting to prevent imminent quarrying, not 
granted because quarrying was halted; and Länsman II, logging activities affecting lichen areas where 
the animal fed, granted but then revoked because the State showed that there were not needed. 
161 Länsman II paras. 2.6, 7.1-7.3, 7.11 and 7.15; Äärela, paras 2.2 and 5.3. 
115 
 
could indicate a different approach, despite the fact that this issue of potential harm 
was not raised. In Poma Poma, the Peruvian government diverted groundwater from 
the land of an Aymara community without consulting them, destroying their 
ecosystem and leading to the death of livestock, the abandonment of their land and 
the substantial disruption of the community’s traditional livelihood and identity, in 
violation of Article 27.162 In my view, and considering that in hindsight it is easier to 
identify cause-effects links and overlook potential risks that perhaps did not occur 
(causing a bias toward prevention), this was a situation where there was a threat of 
non-negligible harm (which materialised), and a government proceeding in a context 
of scientific uncertainty and controversy, without the best information available 
about possible substantive and existential impacts on the community’s livelihood, 
despite credible evidence presented in domestic proceedings. 163  There was also 
inadequate information about cultural and environmental impacts, with Peru 
conducting only a non-independent EIA without Aymara’s participation, wrongly 
concluding that “the foreseeable overall environmental impact was moderate” and 
that the amount of water to be withdrawn was less than the calculated renewable 
reserves.164 In this context, the HRC especially underscored that the absence of both 
a proper EIA to determine possible impacts and consultations contributed to the 
substantive effects on the environment and the author’s culture,165 unforeseen by the 
State.  
The explicit reference to EIAs is important because they provide a reasoned 
and ‘reasonable assessment’ of both foreseeable threats and possible risks of an 
activity when there are scientific uncertainties,166 normally constituting “‘the best 
information available’ that gives rise to reasonable grounds for concern” about 
potentially serious/irreversible environmental harm,167 thus giving decision-makers a 
stronger basis to move forward with a measure or adopt precautionary actions. 
                                                             
162 Poma Poma, paras. 2.2-2.3, 3.1 and 7.7. See also K. Göcke “The Case of Angela Poma Poma v 
Peru before the Human Rights Committee”, Max Planck Yearbook Vol 14 (2010), pp 341-343. 
163 Poma Poma, paras. 2.4-2.13. 
164 Ibid., para. 2.6. 
165 Ibid., para. 7.7.  
166 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14 
(‘Pulp Mills’), Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 96; N. De Sadeleer, Environmental 
Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP, 2002), p 207. 
167 A. Trouwborst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), p 175, A. 
Cançado Trindade “Principle 15: Precaution” in J. Viñuales (ed), The Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development: A Commentary (OUP, 2015), p 424. 
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Considering this, the emphasis on EIAs suggests an implicit recognition that cultural 
rights are subject to precautionary treatment, indicating that States must act before 
the risk is ‘imminent’ or ‘foreseeable’. Similarly, and albeit without mentioning the 
PP, Pentassuglia considers that this reference may indicate a ‘wider approach’, by 
which the HRC would include EIAs “to articulate the test of effective participation” 
under Article 27.168 If this is the case, States would have to conduct both EIAs 
(arguably with Indigenous participation, considering the importance given to TK by 
the HRC) and consultations, complementing each other 169  and allowing them to 
obtain the best information available regarding cultural rights and possible effects on 
Indigenous peoples’ way of life and environment. 
Another important question addressed in Poma Poma is consent; in effect, 
being a case where the consequences for the authors were ‘substantive’, destroying 
their livelihood and the relationship with their territories170 (going beyond the simple 
denial of the enjoyment of cultural rights), the HRC went further than previous cases, 
specifying that ‘effective participation’ requires not only consultation but FPIC,171 
although without elaborating on FPIC’s meaning or referring to other legal 
sources.172 Following this, several authors reject a literal interpretation that always 
requires FPIC, which would go beyond the scope of Article 27,173  and it is not 
followed by the HRC in the reporting procedure (see below); Pentassuglia notes that 
arguably what the HRC really refers to is a ‘sliding scale approach’ by which the 
level of effective participation is determined by the impacts on the community’s way 
                                                             
168 G. Pentassuglia, “Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights”, EJIL, 2011, 
p 184. 
169 See for instance the former Special Rapporteur, noting that environmental (and social) impact 
studies are “essential” to identify consequences and impacts and “must be” presented at the early 
stages of consultations J. Anaya, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, Extractive industries and Indigenous peoples”, 1 
July 2013, A/HRC/24/41 (‘2013 Report’), para. 53. See also section 6 below. 
170 Poma Poma, para. 7.7. 
171 Ibid, para. 7.6. see also Yupsanis (n 116), pp 399-403 and M. Barelli, “Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent in the UNDRIP” in J. Hohmann and M. Weller (eds) The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary (OUP 2018), p 259. 
172 Göcke (n 162), p 368 noting that this FPIC requirement is it is unclear what the HRC wanted to 
express when it included the FPIC criteria; Yupsanis (n 116), pp 395-396, criticising that the HRC has 
the obligation to clarify the parameters that make an effective participatory process. This was despite 
the fact that UNDRIP was already adopted and that Peru ratified C169. See also Pentassuglia (n 168), 
p 184 and Barelli (n 171), pp 259-260. 




of life,174 a notion that seems to be present in the CESCR-General Comment 21, 
noting that States should obtain Indigenous peoples’ FPIC “when the preservation of 
their cultural resources, especially those associated with their way of life and 
cultural expression, are at risk” [emphasis added]175 and, in my view, it would also 
follow a precautionary logic of ‘the higher the risk the greater the need for 
precaution’.176 If this is the case, this implies that FPIC would act as a ‘heightened 
safeguard’ applicable in situations where a proposed measure could cause 
substantive harm (foreseeable and potential).  
However, at the time of writing this issue of effective participation has not been 
subsequently addressed in the complaint procedure, so it is unclear if this actually 
constitutes a new standard to protect cultural rights, regarding both EIAs and FPIC. It 
is also unclear what is the criteria for considering when a certain measure constitute 
‘substantive harm’,177 making it difficult to determine if FPIC is applicable only to 
effects on Indigenous lands and territories or if it also extends to the spiritual values 
that could be affected (which would be beyond the scope of an EIA); for instance, 
there may be situations where proposed activities may not cause obvious disastrous 
environmental impacts, as happened in Poma Poma, but affect smaller areas which 
are of spiritual significance, potentially causing equally devastating effects on 
Indigenous peoples’ cultural rights.  
 
In sum, the protection of cultural rights in this procedure requires Indigenous 
peoples’ consultations, which allow them to incorporate their concerns in decision-
making, based on their TK and experiences; as such, it is instrumental in modifying 
projects and preventing foreseeable substantive environmental and cultural harm. 
When it comes to potential threats of harm, it seems that the HRC is not regularly 
guided the PP and generally disregard these claims; however, it may be moving 
toward a broader approach to effective participation, by which States would have to 
act before the potential harm is ‘imminent’ by conducting EIAs in conjunction with 
                                                             
174 Pentassuglia (n 168), p 184 and see also G. Pentassuglia, Minority Groups and Judicial Discourse 
in International Law: A Comparative Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff 2009), p 116; Yupsanis (n 116), 
pp 402-403; Barelli (n 171), pp 259-260. 
175 CESCR-General Comment 21, para. 55 e).  
176 Kamminga (n 41), p 185.  
177 Yupsanis (n 116), p 408. 
118 
 
consultations, and where in situations of potentially substantive harm, FPIC would be 
required as a heightened safeguard. Much remains to be clarified, however, before 
being able to consider this as a strong approach to FPIC and the protection of cultural 
rights, including regarding spiritual values associated to their lands and environment. 
 
b) Reporting procedure 
 
Through this procedure, the bodies make a broad assessment of States’ compliance 
with the respective convention, often expressing ‘concerns’ for infringements and 
making recommendations for redress and prevention of future violations. As it 
provides less details about particular issues than the complaint procedure, it is not an 
ideal way to clarify “the contours of critical legal questions”;178 however, it reflects a 
general understanding on how States should comply with treaty obligations. 
When it comes to cultural rights, both the HRC and CESCR have a very 
similar approach; in effect, the ICCPR guidelines about Article 27 require States to 
provide information about measures taken to ensure that minorities can enjoy these 
rights and ensure their effective participation in decisions that affect them,179 but like 
in the HRC-General Comment 23, it does not specifies what constitutes ‘effective 
participation’. However, building upon the connection between Articles 27 and 1 
(self-determination) noted above, Article 1 of the ICCPR guidelines instructs States 
to indicate “[t]he extent to which Indigenous and local communities are duly 
consulted, and whether their prior informed consent is sought in any decision-making 
processes affecting their rights and interests under the Covenant”. 180  The same 
language is used by the CESCR Guidelines on Article 1,181 being the one referring to 
                                                             
178  Barelli (n 171), pp 259-260. 
179  ICCPR, “Guidelines for the treaty-specific document to be submitted by States parties under 
Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (‘ICCPR 
Guidelines’)CCPR/C/2009/1(22 November 2010), Article 27. 
180  Ibid., Article 1. See for instance the following HRC-concluding observations recommending 
consultations: Peru CCPR/C/PER/CO/5(26 April 2013), para. 24; Bolivia, CCPR/C/BOL/CO/3(6 
December 2013), para. 25; Chile CCPR/C/CHL/CO/6(13 August 2014) para. 10; Venezuela 
CCPR/C/VEN/CO/4(13 August 2015), para. 21; Colombia 2016, paras. 42-43; Honduras, 
CCPR/C/HND/CO/2(22 August 2017), para. 47; Australia CCPR/C/AUS/CO/6(1 December 2017), 
para. 50 and Norway CCPR/C/NOR/CO/7(25 April 2018), para. 36. 
181 CESCR, “Guidelines on treaty-specific documents to be submitted by States parties under Articles 
16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (‘ICESCR 
Guidelines’) E/C.12/2008/2, 24 March 2009, Article 1.  
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Article 15.1(a) more oriented to culture as ‘high arts’ (for instance asking States 
about measures adopted to promote broad participation in cultural events such as 
concerts). 182  Following this, both bodies consistently express ‘concerns’ for the 
absence of Indigenous consultations and the effects on Indigenous peoples’ ‘way of 
life’, ‘culturally significant economic activities’ or a particular element of their 
culture, like their lands and territories, in a wide range of scenarios such as policy 
and legislation, 183  land rights, 184  and most of all, development projects and 
exploitation of natural resources,185 and both in regard to cases of preventive/ongoing 
damages, 186  as well as where there ‘may/might/would’ be serious effects on 
Indigenous peoples’ way of life. 187  This in my view suggests an awareness of 
situations in which States do not have full scientific certainty about potentially 
serious effects on Indigenous livelihood and environment; thus, like in the previous 
procedure, consultations would enable the incorporation of TK in the decision-
making process and an Indigenous understanding of risks and uncertainties, 
identifying and determining possible impacts that may not be considered without this 
input, and the adoption of effective measures to avoid them. In this sense, in at least 
some concluding observations there seems to be an effort to address potential threats 
of harm; for instance, the HRC recommended Bolivia to consult Indigenous peoples 
(and obtain their FPIC) “before any measures are adopted that would substantially 
                                                             
182 Ibidem, Article 15. 
183  HRC-concluding observations: Australia 2009 and Chile 2014, about establishing Indigenous 
representative bodies; Honduras 2017 and Australia 2017, about legislation that could impact their 
lands and rights. See also CESCR-concluding observations: Colombia, E/C.12/COL/CO/5(7 June 
2010) paras. 12-13 and Australia 2017, paras. 15-16.   
184 HRC-concluding observations: Nicaragua, CCPR/C/NIC/CO/3(12 December 2008) para. 21 in the 
context of demarcation of lands; and Honduras 2017 paras. 46-47, forced evictions and reparations; 
CESCR-concluding observations: Cambodia, E/C.12/KHM/CO/1(12 June 2009), paras. 15-16, where 
mining and oil operations affected ancestral lands; and Sweden, E/C.12/SWE/CO/6, (14 July 2016) 
paras. 13-14, concerning obstacles to access ancestral lands. 
185  HRC-concluding observations: Bolivia 2013, para. 25; USA 2014 para. 25; Guatemala, 
CCPR/C/GTM/CO/4(7 May 2018) para. 38-39; and Belize, CCPR/C/BLZ/CO/1/Add.1 (11 December 
2018), paras. 45-46; CESCR-concluding observations: Honduras 2016, paras. 11-12 in the context of 
exploitation of natural resources that may affect their economic, social and cultural rights; and 
Angola, E/C.12/AGO/CO/4-5(15 July 2016), para. 20 in the context of granting licenses for business 
for economic activities in their lands. 
186 HRC-concluding observation Suriname, CCPR/CO/80/SUR(4 May 2004) para. 21, where mercury 
was released into the environment as side-effect of logging and mining activities, affecting the 
traditional way of life. CESCR-concluding observation: Ecuador 2012 para. 9, regarding the adoption 
of an executive degree. 
187 See for instance, HRC-concluding observations: Venezuela 2015 para. 21(a) and Guatemala 2018, 
para. 39; CESCR-concluding observations: Cambodia 2009, paras. 15-16 and Honduras 2016, paras. 
11-12; among others. 
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jeopardize or interfere” their culturally significant economic activities, in the context 
of the Isiboro Securé National Park road-building project.188 Although the threats 
were not specified, the Indigenous opposition to the project was based on their 
previous experiences with projects of this kind and the assessments they made about 
potentially serious environmental and socio-cultural effects, mainly derived from the 
possible presence of foreigners and damages to local flora and fauna, potentially 
affecting the rich biodiversity that supports their traditional way of life and likely 
altering the delicate balance of the hydrological basin, with long-range 
consequences. 189  Likewise, the CESCR recommended Colombia to consult 
Indigenous peoples in the context of mining projects in Choco and Antioquia,190 
being the opposition based on previous experiences of serious environmental and 
social impacts, with particular concerns about deforestation that could alter the local 
fragile ecosystems and water reservoirs, subsequently affecting water and food 
supplies and their traditional livelihood.191 Similarly, in analysing States’ report the 
CERD regularly expresses concerns on the impacts on Indigenous lands and natural 
resources and their effects on their traditional way of life and rights; as such, it 
consistently recommends ‘prior consultations’ 192  to ensure that measures are not 
adopted without considering their concerns, rights and interests 193  (enabling the 
incorporation of TK) in a wide range of scenarios, among them, some in which the 
precautionary thresholds seem to be crossed. For instance, the CERD expressed 
concerns and recommended consultations regarding the Indonesian government’s 
                                                             
188 See HRC-concluding observation Bolivia 2013 paras. 25-26. 
189 See M. Muñoz, “El conflicto en torno al Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure: Un 
conflicto multidimensional”, Cultura y representaciones sociales, vol 7 n 14(March 2013), p 113, and 
D. Sanchez-Lopez, “Reshaping notions of citizenship: the TIPNIS Indigenous movement in Bolivia”, 
Development Studies Research, 2:1,20-32(2015), p 24. 
190 CESCR-concluding observation: Colombia 2010 para. 12.   
191 See F. Idárraga, D. Muñoz and H. Vélez, Conflictos Socio-ambientales por la extracción minera en 
Colombia: Casos de la inversión Británica (Amigos de la Tierra Colombia, January 2010), pp 146-
151. 
192 Saul (n 15), p 104; CERD-concluding observations: Honduras, CERD/C/HND/CO/1-5(13 March 
2014), para. 20, in the context of natural resources projects including hydro-electrical energy and 
mining; Finland, CERD/C/FIN/CO/23(12 May 2017), paras. 16-17, regarding projects that affect the 
use and development of their traditional lands and resources; and Kenya CERD/C/KEN/CO/5-7(12 
May 2017), para. 20, in the context of exploitation of natural resources on Indigenous lands. See also 
the following EWUA letters: Kenya, CERD/GH/mja/vdt(07 March 2014); Russia, 
CERD/GH/cg/ks(15 May 2015); and Canada CERD/90th/EWUAP/GH/MJA/ks(03 October 2016).  
193 CERD-General Recommendation 23, para. 4. 
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plan to establish oil palm plantations in the Kalimantan region,194 where Indigenous 
peoples in the area raised concerns about potentially serious impacts on the 
biodiversity (native forests and species) and risks to several water basins, threatening 
their traditional way of life.195  
Yet, the limited information contained in concluding observations and the 
absence to explicit references to the PP makes it unclear if this a part of a 
precautionary approach or, as noted above, an effect of the broad nature of the 
observations. Furthermore, the bodies have an inconsistent approach to impact 
studies, an important mechanism to identify possible threats and act before having 
full certainty about future harm, as mentioned above. In effect, so far only the 
CESCR and CERD have recommended States to conduct environmental and social 
impact assessments (with Indigenous participation) in conjunction with consultations 
in various scenarios, 196  suggesting the adoption of steps towards precaution and 
providing another instance to incorporate TK as a basis to effectively avoid 
potentially serious harm. This was the case in one of the two concluding observations 
where the CESCR referred to the situation of extractive projects that could affect 
Indigenous peoples’ lands in 2019, 197  and four out of seven by the CERD, 198 
indicating that these impact studies are often, but not always, recommended.  
There is also an inconsistent approach in regard to FPIC; for instance, 
according to the HRC and CESCR guidelines should be ‘sought’ through 
consultations, as noted above; however, these bodies have occasionally 
                                                             
194 CERD-concluding observation Indonesia CERD/C/IDN/CO/3(1 October 2007), para. 17.  
195 See E. Wakker, “The Kalimantan Border Oil Palm Mega-project”, AIDEnvironment, April 2006, 
section 3 
196  CESCR-concluding observations: Chad 2009, para. 13, about mining operations and oil 
exploration in indigenous territories; Cambodia 2009, paras. 15-16, regarding decisions that may 
affect their lives, especially mining and oil projects; Russia E/C.12/RUS/CO/6(16 October 2017), 
para. 15 and New Zealand, E/C.12/NZL/CO/4(1 May 2018), para. 9, before and during extractive 
activities; Mexico 2018, para. 13, regarding natural resources projects; and Argentina, 
E/C.12/ARG/CO/4(1 November 2018), paras. 18-21, recommending a ‘participatory assessment’ with 
Indigenous peoples of impacts on their economic, social and cultural rights before authorizing 
exploitation of natural resources. CERD-concluding observations: Finland 2017, paras. 16-17 
recommending cultural, environmental and social studies in collaboration with Indigenous peoples; 
and Peru 2018 paras. 16-17 and 20-21. 
197 See CESCR-concluding observation: Cameroon, E/C.12/CMR/CO/4(25 March 2019), paras. 13 
and 17, recommending economic, social and cultural impacts. The other was Ecuador, 
E/C.12/ECU/CO/4(14 November 2019), not recommending these studies. 
198 CERD-concluding observations: Honduras, CERD/C/HND/CO/6-8(14 January 2019), para. 23; 
Guatemala, CERD/C/GTM/CO/16-17(21 May 2019), para. 20; Mexico, CERD/C/MEX/CO/18-21(19 
September 2019), para. 21; and Colombia, CERD/C/COL/CO/17-19(12 December 2019), para. 19, 
the last two mentioning environmental and human rights impacts.  
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recommended ‘obtaining’ FPIC instead.199 It could then be argued that consultations 
with the aim of seeking FPIC could be understood as the general rule, but if there is a 
possibility of ‘substantive harm’ (like in Poma Poma), FPIC must be obtained. An 
example of this can be found in a concluding observation in which the HRC 
recommended to consult Indigenous peoples ‘with a view to obtaining’ FPIC about 
projects that affect their rights but ensuring that FPIC is ‘obtained’ “before any 
measures that might jeopardize, or substantially hinder, their culturally significant 
economic activities are taken.” 200  If this is the case, in situations where the 
precautionary thresholds are crossed (like in the case of the construction road in 
Bolivia mentioned above) presumably FPIC would act as an enhanced safeguard, 
proportional to the particular gravity of the threats. However, this criterion has not 
always been followed, because in seemingly similarly grave scenarios, these bodies 
have alternated between seeking201 and obtaining consent.202 The CERD presents a 
different contrast between theory and practice, with the General Recommendation 23 
having a strong wording, calling States to “[e]nsure(…) that no decisions directly 
relating to their rights and interests are taken without their informed consent”,203 but 
                                                             
199 See for instance HRC-concluding observations: Bolivia 2013, para. 25; Venezuela 2015 para. 21 
and El Salvador, CCPR/C/SLV/CO/7(9 May 2018) para. 42, in which uses a somewhat different 
language and recommends consultations to “safeguard the exercise of that population’s free, prior and 
informed consent” and CESCR-concluding observations Namibia E/C.12/NAM/CO/1(23 March 
2016), para. 16 and Venezuela, E/C.12/VEN/CO/3(6 July 2015), para. 9, among others. 
200 HRC-concluding observation Chile 2007 para. 10. 
201 Regarding “any measure that might have a substantial impact on their way of life and their culture” 
in the context of natural resource projects in Indigenous lands (HRC-concluding observations: 
Ecuador CCPR/C/ECU/CO/6(11 August 2016), paras. 35-36; Colombia 2016 paras. 42-43; and 
Guatemala 2018, para. 39; CESCR-concluding observations: Honduras 2016, para. 11) and relocation 
(HRC-concluding observation Honduras 2017) para. 47 and CESCR-concluding observation 
Cambodia 2009 paras. 15-16).  
202  Regarding measures that would “substantially compromise or interfere with their culturally 
significant economic activities” (HRC-concluding observation Peru 2013 para. 24 and CESCR-
concluding observation Sri Lanka 2010 para. 11, in the context of relocation) and HRC-Bolivia 2013, 
para. 25, concerning extractive projects) or “way of life and culture” (HRC-concluding observation 
Venezuela 2015 para. 21(a); CESCR-concluding observation Honduras 2016, para. 11, regarding 
projects that may affect Indigenous lands, territories and natural resources). 
203 CERD- General Recommendation 23, para. 4 (d). 
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in practice alternating in analogous scenarios between requiring FPIC204 and weaker 
formulations (“with a view to obtain”).205  
In other words, the bodies do not consistently follow a pattern when it comes 
to FPIC, but like in the case of impact assessments, it suggests that in occasions 
requiring FPIC could act as a strong precautionary safeguard that ensure the 
consideration of TK and Indigenous concerns in the decision-making process.  
 
In sum, like in the previous procedure the protection of cultural rights is 
achieved mainly through consultations (and sometimes impact assessments), 
applicable and recommended in a myriad of scenarios, including situations of 
reasonable concerns, based on TK and Indigenous experiences, about potentially 
serious effects on their traditional way of life and environment, acting then as a 
measure that contributes to the avoidance of serious impacts on their cultural rights. 
However, based on the information solely provided by the concluding observations, 
it is very difficult to assess if in situations where they ‘may/might/would’ be serious 
or substantive cultural effects on Indigenous peoples the bodies are actually guided 
by a precautionary approach, but at the very least there seems to be an awareness 
about the need to anticipate serious harm from early on, when there are not fully 
certain. When it comes to FPIC the issue is more open, because the general criteria 
regarding its application is not clear, as the bodies have recommended ‘seek’ and 
‘obtain’ Indigenous FPIC in analogous scenarios; despite the inconsistencies, there 
have been situations where obtaining FPIC has been recommended as an enhanced 
and proportional precautionary measure in the case of potential ‘substantive harm’ 
(like in the Bolivia road project), ensuring that Indigenous TK, interests and 
understanding of risks are incorporated in the decision-making process, although 
more work is needed to clarify it. 
 
                                                             
204 CERD-concluding observations: Finland 2017, para. 17 regarding any projects that affect the use 
of Sami traditional land and resources; Kenya 2017 para. 20 regarding projects to exploit ancestral 
lands or natural resources; and Nepal CERD/C/NPL/CO/17-23(29 May 2018), para. 23, regarding the 
approval of any project affecting their lands and resources. 
205 CERD-concluding observations: Nigeria 2007 para. 19, in the context of large-scale exploitation of 
natural resources; Chile 2013, para. 13 regarding projects that could affect their way of life; Peru 
2014, para. 14 exploitation of natural resources and mining; Peru 2018, para. 21 and Honduras 2019 





The Conventions are part of an important system that underpins the protection of 
human rights in international law; however, Indigenous peoples are absent from their 
texts. In practice, the monitoring bodies have reinterpreted the Conventions in order 
to accommodate their claims, relying on the rights to self-determination and culture 
(HRC and CESCR), or not to be discriminated (CERD). Generally speaking, the 
notion of cultural rights refers to Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life and the 
elements and values that are necessary for their development, that is, their lands; this 
means that the protection of cultural rights (which cannot be defined in abstracto), 
requires the protection of these elements, as well as the special protection that 
Indigenous peoples have with their territories.  
According to the bodies, the protection of cultural rights requires Indigenous 
peoples’ ‘effective participation’, which would enable the use of their TK in order to 
properly identify the practices and values that require protection. In the HRC’s 
complaint procedure, this has been consistently interpreted as ‘consultations’, often 
focused on the prevention of foreseeable cultural harm. A more recent case (Poma 
Poma) may have expanded this approach by underscoring the importance of EIAs (in 
theory, with Indigenous participation) and thus recognising the need to act before the 
potential harm is imminent; also, it may have established a new standard, aligned 
with the PP, by which when the potential effects are of a substantive nature, consent 
would be required. However, the absence of subsequent cases that could confirm the 
incorporation of EIAs into the notion of ‘effective participation’; clarify the meaning 
of FPIC and when it is needed; and what constitutes ‘substantive harm’ (including 
cases where spiritual values may be affected), makes it difficult to assess if these 
changes, that would strengthen the protection of Indigenous peoples’ way of life and 
environment, are an expression of a new approach. The reporting procedure could 
have provided some clues in this respect; yet, it is structured in a more general way 
and lacks in-depth information about particular issues like States’ compliance with 
Article 27 or the meaning of ‘effective participation’ or FPIC, thus being unsuitable 
to define “the contours of critical legal questions”.206 Yet, at the very least, this 
                                                             
206 Barelli (n 171), pp 259-260. 
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procedure requires States to consult Indigenous peoples, even in scenarios where 
potentially non-negligible effects ‘may/might/would’ occur, although the lack of 
references to the PP indicates that this is due to the broad nature of this procedure 
and not in response to a PP guidance. At the same time, the CESCR and CERD 
sometimes rely on impact assessments, in conjunction with Indigenous consultations, 
indicating an awareness that to effectively avoid negative effects, it is necessary to 
act from early on and to provide a role for TK through these two procedures to 
contribute to this effort. In regard to FPIC, there seems to be no general criteria about 
when to ‘obtain’ it and when ‘seek’ it; however, in at least some occasions FPIC has 
been arguably acting as an enhanced precautionary safeguard, ensuring that 
Indigenous knowledge, concerns, understanding of risks and uncertainties and 
alternatives are taken into account in decision-making.  
With all this in mind, it would be difficult to argue that the bodies tend to 
follow the PP, but it is clear that they have recognised the need to err on the side of 
caution in regard to Indigenous peoples’ cultural rights and environment, and in 
doing so they have acknowledged the relevant role of Indigenous peoples’ TK, in the 
form of consultations, impact assessments and even consent; however, there are 
several inconsistences and uncertainties in the implementation of these mechanisms, 
diminishing their effectiveness in the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights, 
especially when it comes to potentially substantive impacts and FPIC. 
 
5. The ILO Convention 169 
 
The ILO was created as a part of the Treaty of Versailles to improve conditions of 
labour and social standards, among other objectives.207 It has a structure in which 
governments, workers and employees have an equal voice (manifested in the 
composition of the International Labour Conference and the Governing Body),208 and 
a double supervisory system to monitor the implementation of the conventions 
ratified by its members.209 It has been involved with Indigenous topics for a long 
                                                             
207  ILO, “ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 1989 (No 169): A Manual” (‘ILO 
manual’), p 1.  
208 Ibid, p 2. 
209 The regular one is composed by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendation (‘CEACR’), in charge of examining State’s reports and issuing observations and 
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time, 210  elaborating the first international convention on Indigenous issues, ILO 
Convention 107 (‘C107’), 211  criticized for its assimilationist approach and 
characterisation of Indigenous peoples as ‘less advanced’.212 C169 was adopted to 
replace C107,213  establishing a framework that respects and protects Indigenous’ 
rights and tackles discriminatory practices. 214  This is the only treaty regarding 
Indigenous peoples in international law and it has only 23 parties to date; yet, its 
influence extends beyond this legal character with the institution of certain 
Indigenous standards215 and its role as a global reference.216  
The Convention was negotiated with participation of Indigenous peoples, but 
they did not directly influence the drafting process;217 despite this, it represents a step 
forward from C107, recognising Indigenous collective rights; 218  (internal) self-
determination;219 self-identification;220 land rights (including ownership, possession 
and use) and their special relationship with their territories;221 traditional cultural and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
direct requests, and the “Conference Committee on the Application of Standards”, in charge of 
reviewing the Annual Report submitted by the CEACR during the Annual Conference. The special 
one allows employers and workers to present a ‘representation’ to the Governing Body against a State 
that has “failed to secure in any respect the effective observance within its jurisdiction of any 
Convention to which it is a party” and delegates, governments or the governing body can file a 
‘complaint’ against a State, which if deemed receivable, appoints a Tripartite Committee and invites 
both parties to submit information, adopting a report with the findings. Indigenous peoples do not 
have direct access to the monitoring procedure, so their claims have been brought by workers’ unions. 
See S. Rombouts, “The Evolution of Indigenous Peoples' Consultation Rights under the ILO and UN 
Regimes”, 53STAN.J.INT'L169-224(2017), p 192. 
210 “Understanding the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No 169): Handbook for ILO 
Tripartite Constituents” (‘ILO handbook’), p 4. 
211 ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, C107, 26 June 1957. 
212 See for instance C107 Articles 1, 2 and 4; and Thornberry (n 122), pp 326-338. 
213 A. Yupsanis, “The International Labour Organization and Its Contribution to the Protection of 
Indigenous Peoples' Rights”, Canadian Yearbook of International Law Vol 49(2012), p 129. 
214 C169 preamble.  
215  Xanthaki (n 98), p 90. 
216  Rombouts (n 209), p 182; ILO Manual, Foreword. The Convention has been sometimes cited by 
the bodies in concluding observations (e.g., HRC-concluding observation Honduras 2017; CESCR-
concluding observation Ecuador 2004; and CERD-concluding observation Paraguay 2016) and 
regional courts, and influenced the drafting of UNDRIP.  
217 As Berman puts it, “the ILO has proceeded without the clear endorsement or effective participation 
of Indigenous peoples in its deliberations”. See H. Berman, “The International Labour Organization 
and Indigenous Peoples: Revision of ILO Convention No. 107 at the 75th Session of the International 
Labour Conference 1988”, 41ICJ.Rev.48(1988), pp 48-52. See also S. Venne, “The New Language of 
Assimilation” in Without Prejudice Vol. II No 2(1989), pp 64-65. 
218 C169, preamble and Articles 1-3. 
219 Although it is not explicitly mentioned in C169, it is implicit in the preamble (“[r]ecognising the 
aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic 
development”). See Rombouts (n 209), p 175 and Barsh (n 108), p 842. 
220 C169, Article 1.2. 
221 Ibid., Part II. 
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economic activities (including hunting, fishing and gathering) 222  and non-
discrimination,223 among others. It also explicitly recognises the different aspects of 
the Indigenous way of life; for example, Article 5 notes that in the implementation of 
the Convention their “social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices(…) 
shall be recognised and protected”; Article 7.1 refers to Indigenous peoples’ right to 
decide their own priorities for development, as it affects their lives, beliefs, 
institutions, spiritual well-being and their lands, and control, to the extent possible, 
their economic, social and cultural development;224 and Article 13.1 highlights the 
special relationship between Indigenous peoples and their lands, noting that the 
“special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of 
their relationship with the lands or territories” shall be respected when applying the 
Convention.225 In this context, the Convention explicitly refers to the environment in 
conjunction with socio-cultural values; for instance, Article 4.1 requires special 
measures to safeguard “the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and 
environment of the peoples concerned”, and Article 7.3 establishes  studies “to assess 
the social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impact” of certain activities” (see 
below). Also, there is a general obligation to protect the Indigenous peoples’ 
environment in Article 7.4 with their participation (“[g]overnments shall take 
measures, in co-operation with the peoples concerned, to protect and preserve the 
environment of the territories they inhabit”). This not only means that the protection 
of Indigenous’ values (cultural, spiritual, social) goes hand in hand with the 
protection of their environment,226 but also, as noted by Errico, that they interact with 
international environmental law,227 including then obligations that States may have to 
comply with and principles like the PP.  
                                                             
222 Ibid., Article 23. 
223 Ibid., Articles 2 and 3. 
224 See also Article 4.1 and 32. 
225  C169, Article 13.1. See also footnote 82, and International Labour Conference, “Record of 
proceedings 76th session” (1989)(‘ILC record of proceedings’), p 31/12, where the representative of 
New Zealand noted that this spiritual dimension “is of great importance to Indigenous people and lies 
at the heart of their relationship with the environment.” 
226 See for example Article 15.2, establishing the obligation to consult Indigenous peoples before the 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources in their ‘lands’, a notion that includes the concept of 
‘territories’, “which covers the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or 
otherwise use” [emphasis added] as per Article 13.2.  
227 S. Errico, “Control over Natural Resources and Protection of Indigenous Territories” in Hohmann 
and Weller (n 171), pp 452-453, mentioning that the existence of a relationship between the 
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6. The protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights 
 
Unlike the UNTS, where consultation was a form of participation, in the C169 they 
are independent but interconnected rights, established to ensure that Indigenous 
peoples can decide their priorities and exercise control over their development,228 
being therefore an expression of self-determination, 229  and constituting the 




The Convention does not impose a model of Indigenous participation, but the 
CEACR clarified that this participation has to be ‘effective’, allowing them to have a 
real voice and influence the policies likely to affect them. 231  In this context, 
participation is required in general issues like the development of systemic and 
coordinated action to protect Indigenous rights; 232  their control, “to the extent 
possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development”,233 including 
decision-making at every level; 234  and “the formulation, implementation and 
evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional development which 
may affect them directly”[emphasis added]. 235  It is also required in specific 
circumstances related to the environment, such as the use, management and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
enjoyment of human rights and the protection of the environment “adds to the specific obligations that 
States may have under environmental international law”, also mentioning the case of C169. 
228 ILO handbook, p 19; see also International Labour Standards Department, “Indigenous & Tribal 
Peoples’ Rights in practice: A Guide to ILO Convention No 169” (2009)(‘ILO Guide’), pp 59-60 and 
the following Reports of the Tripartite Committee, submitted following a Representation under Article 
24 of the ILO Constitution regarding ILO C169 (‘Tripartite Committee reports’): Brazil 2009 
GB.295/17, para. 44; Chile 2016 GB.326/INS/15/5, paras. 114-115 and Peru 2016, GB.327/INS/5/3, 
para. 292. 
229 Anaya (n 15), p 155 noting that consultation and participation “are grounded in general principles 
of self-government and self-determination.” 
230 ILO handbook, pp 11 and 18-19. The ILO Guide states that consultation and participation are “the 
basis for applying all the others [provisions]” ILO guide, p 59.  
231 CEACR, General Observation on Convention No. 169, 79th Session (2008)(‘General Observation 
2008’), p 1. 
232 C169, Articles 2 and 33. 
233 Ibid., Article 7.1. 
234 Ibid., Article 6.1(b), being the levels national, regional and local, according to the ILO Guide pp 
60-61.  Anaya also adds the international level. Anaya (n 15), pp 153-154.  
235 C169, Article 7(1). See also ILO handbook, p 18. 
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conservation of natural resources pertaining to Indigenous lands; 236  in adopting 
measures to protect their environment, as mentioned above; and in the case of 
planned development activities, where governments “shall ensure that, whenever 
appropriate, studies are carried out, in co-operation with the peoples concerned, to 
assess the social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impact on them”. 237  The 
travaux préparatoires note that these studies allow for the careful assessment of 
‘potential impacts’ of development activities on Indigenous peoples, 238  also 
considering that often effects on their way of life (especially cultural/spiritual) cannot 
be identified without their contribution. In this context, and albeit not mentioned in 
this Article,239 TK plays an important role, integrating an Indigenous perspective on 
the uncertainties, risks and threats of an activity based on their own knowledge and 
experiences. This was implicitly acknowledged during the discussion of Article 7, 
where an amendment requiring governments to ensure that Indigenous peoples could 
conduct their own impact studies was rejected to avoid parallel sets of studies,240 
indicating that their knowledge and concerns (that would have been included in their 
impact studies) must be incorporated in these impact assessments. This not only 
speaks to the notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’ as understood from a precautionary 
perspective (i.e., not based on a narrow notion of ‘science’ but including other 
knowledge systems), but also establish a stronger mechanism than regular impact 
assessments, which content is left to States 241  and often only include vague 
references to Indigenous participation or the consideration of their concerns.242 
                                                             
236 Ibid., Article 15.1.  
237 Ibid., Article 7.3. 
238 International Labour Office, “Partial revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention 
1957(No 107) Report VI(1)” 75th Session (1988)(‘ILO travaux report VI(1)’), p 65. 
239 Indigenous knowledge is mentioned in Article 27, in a context of education programmes that shall 
include it together with their histories, value systems, technologies and social, cultural and economic 
aspirations. Some implicit references can be found in Article 23, when mentioning the recognition of 
traditional activities in maintaining their culture and Article 25.2 regarding traditional healing 
practices. 
240 L. Swepston, The Foundation of Modern International Law on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Vol. 
I: Basic Policy and Land Rights (Brill-Nijhoff, 2015), pp 204-205. 
241 See Pulp Mills, para. 205.  




However, the qualification of ‘whenever appropriate’ (introduced because it 
was considered ‘not desirable’ to force States to undertake them),243 weakens this 
duty,244 because governments argue that these studies are not needed (i.e., are not 
‘appropriate’), even in situations of uncertainty. For instance, Bolivia claimed that 
some forestry concessions for logging granted by the government in areas occupied 
by Indigenous peoples did not seriously affect them, which is why it didn’t conduct 
studies (or consulted them), a claim rejected by the Committee, noting that the 
potential effects on Indigenous groups were substantial (especially due to social 
conflicts, the effects over their property rights and the impossibility to conduct 
traditional activities), recommending consultations and environmental, cultural, 
social and spiritual impact studies. 245  Similarly, Brazil argued that a draft bill 
concerning forests concessions excluded Indigenous lands, so they would not be 
affected, failing to conduct studies or consult them; this argument was rejected by the 
Committee, pointing out the existence of uncertainties regarding credible and serious 
potential impacts (logging, roads opening, foreign presence that would affect their 
property rights and their traditional activities) on Indigenous lands and way of life, 
which could be identified through impact studies and consultations.246  
In this context, the Committee often relies on Article 15.2,247 which states that “[i]n 
cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or 
rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain 
procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to 
ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before 
undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such 
resources pertaining to their lands.”[emphasis added].248 This implies that, when it 
                                                             
243 International Labour Office, “Partial revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention 
1957(No 107) Report IV(1), 76th Session (1989),  p 8. 
244 See Yupsanis (n 213), p 145. 
245 Tripartite Committee report Bolivia 1999, paras. 14-16, 31-32 and 38-41. 
246 Tripartite Committee report Brazil 2009, paras. 9-13, 20-23, 41-42, 46 and 49-59. 
247 See for instance Tripartite Committee reports: Bolivia 1999 paras. 38-39 and 44(b); Ecuador 2001, 
paras. 32 and 45(a); and Guatemala 2007 paras. 52 and 60(a), among others.  
248 Generally speaking, this Article has been opposed by Indigenous peoples because it deprives them 
of the ownership of these natural resources, despite what Article 13.2 may suggest when incorporating 
the notion of ‘territories’ and ‘total environment’ to ‘lands’ in Article 15 (i.e., that Indigenous peoples 
have rights over the trees, water, animals, air and minerals pertaining to their lands). See International 
Labour Office, “Partial revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention 1957(No 107) 
Report VI(2)” 75th Session (1988), p 53, mentioning the existence of a consensus about granting 
Indigenous’ control only over the wildlife and other resources (flora, fauna, waters) in their traditional 
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comes to environmental issues, something more than consultations is required, 
otherwise C169 would have just used a more direct language like in Articles 6 
(“governments shall consult the peoples concerned”) or 17 (“[t]he peoples concerned 
shall be consulted”). Considering the similar objectives of Articles 7.3 (assessing 
potential impacts on Indigenous peoples) and 15.2 (ascertain effects on Indigenous 
peoples’ interests), and that the only other measure detailed in C169 regarding 
natural resources/environment are impact studies, it is logical to conclude that the 
‘procedures’ mentioned in the latter refers to these studies, 249  which must be 
conducted in conjunction with consultations. 250  This enables the inclusion of 
traditional knowledge to obtain the best information available regarding potential 
effects on every aspect of Indigenous peoples’ life. 
 
6.2 Consultations  
 
According to Article 6, consultations must be conducted by States “whenever 
consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may 
affect them [Indigenous peoples] directly”251 [emphasis added], i.e., when a State’s 
decision can affect Indigenous peoples “in ways not felt by others in society”,252 with 
the C169 highlighting in particular the exploration/exploitation of natural resources 
that belong to the State in Indigenous lands253 and the transference of lands outside 
                                                                                                                                                                            
lands that “are fundamental to the continuation of their traditional lifestyles”, meanwhile most of 
States reserved their rights over minerals. See also Barsh (n 108), p 846 and Clavero (n 293), p 47, 
saying that “[t]here is no Indigenous right over the natural resources themselves, but rather a right to 
participate in the policy-making processes of the States that control resources.” 
249 See also Swepston (n 240), p 279, and ILO manual, p 37.  
250 See for instance Tripartite Committee reports in which Indigenous lands were affected: Bolivia 
1999, paras. 38-39; Colombia 2001 (license for oil exploration), para. 90; Ecuador 2001, para. 38-39 
(oil exploration/exploitation); Guatemala 2007, paras. 51-53 and 60 (mining); Brazil 2009, para. 62 
and Peru 2016, para. 315 (hydroelectric power plants), among others. See also observations from the 
CEACR in which consultation and participation procedures are treated together, such as Costa Rica 
2016, Chile 2017, Honduras 2017 and Peru 2018; ILO travaux report VI(1), p 36, noting that the 
studies would enhance the value of consultations by promoting a factual assessment of Indigenous 
concerns; Swepston (n 240), p 195; and J. Anaya, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous people” A/HRC/15/37, 19 July 2010, para. 
71, mentioning that impact studies are, by definition, related to the consultation process. 
251 C169, Article 6.1(a).  
252 This happens “when the interests or conditions of Indigenous peoples that are particular to them are 
implicated in the decision, even when the decision may have a broader impact”. J. Anaya, “Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
People”, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, 15 July 2009, (‘2009 Report’), para. 43. 
253 C169, Article 15.2. 
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the Indigenous community.254 This process is aimed to ensure Indigenous peoples’ 
participation in decision-making, a social dialogue, and a mutual understanding,255 
reversing a historical pattern of exclusion and avoiding the imposition of important 
decisions on them.256 To ensure this, it has certain requirements, so they must be 
conducted: 
- prior to the measure subject to consultation is taken, as the objective of the 
consultation is to reach an agreement/obtain consent257 and ascertain if and to what 
degree Indigenous interest may be affected;258 
- in good faith, implying trust and respect for the different interests and values, some 
flexibility and a “sincere wish to reach a common accord”;259 
- through Indigenous’ representative institutions, elected by the Indigenous peoples 
themselves260 (e.g., a council of elders or Indigenous parliaments), considering the 
diverse Indigenous societies and practices;261  
- through appropriate procedures, which in practice, translates to the creation of 
“favourable conditions for achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures, 
independent of the result obtained;”262 and  
- with the objective to achieve consent or agreement for the measure, meaning that 
consent is not the necessary result of the consultations263 (i.e., not a requirement), 
with the exception of Article 16, relocation (see next section).  
 There is no particular model of consultation, 264  because of the various 
circumstances in which they are required and the different ways in which Indigenous 
peoples are organised, reflecting their particular cultural identity and traditions; thus, 
                                                             
254 Ibid., Article 17.2.  
255 CEACR General Observation on Convention No. 169, publication 2019 (‘General Observation 
2019’), p 3. 
256 2009 Report, para 41. 
257 C169, Article 6.2  
258 Ibid., Article 15.  
259 CEACR, General Observation on Convention No. 169, adopted 2010, published 100th ILC session 
(‘General Observation 2010’), p 8, and ILO guide, p 62. 
260 Tripartite Committee reports: Ecuador 2001, para. 44; Mexico 2004 (GB.289/17/3), para. 102; 
Argentina 2008 (GB.324/INS/8/2), para. 75, highlighting that the institution needs to be ‘truly 
representative’. 
261 ILO handbook, p 15 and ILO manual, p 17. 
262 Tripartite Committee Reports: Mexico 2004 para. 89 and Brazil 2009, para. 42. 
263 International Labour Conference, “Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations” (2011), p 788. 




there is an important element of flexibility for States to conduct this procedure.265 
However, it has been criticised that the use of expressions like ‘appropriate 
procedures’ introduces a degree of ambiguity, 266  resulting in States arguing that 
public participation procedures contained in EIAs constituted consultations,267  or 
engaging in informative meetings, without deliberation or accepting Indigenous 
concerns, to discharge this duty. 268  This led to the ILO bodies to repeatedly 
emphasize that consultations should be conducted following all the requirements in 
Article 6; that ‘informative meetings’ and proforma consultations do not meet the 
requirements of C169; and that “there must be a genuine dialogue” between 
governments and Indigenous peoples, based on good faith and mutual respect.269 
More recently, the CEACR highlighted that consultations should be seen as an 
essential instrument to guarantee the “free, effective and permanent participation” of 
Indigenous peoples in decision-making processes that affects them,270 constituting an 
opportunity to influence a decision that may affect their interests.271 In this sense, 
Anaya and Puig note that the consultations requirements protect against 
arbitrariness,272 which is also reinforced by the fact that, as consultation itself is a 
process that may affect Indigenous peoples, this procedure “should be the product of 
consensus”, generating a climate of trust and mutual respect.273 
The wording of the Convention suggest that consultations are applicable in 
very broad scenarios where Indigenous peoples could suffer negative consequences, 
including situations when there is no full scientific certainty about possible effects on 
their way of life; in addition, the CEACR underscored that consultations must take 
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place as early as possible274 (at the ‘consideration’ stage) and that they “need to 
allow for the full expression of the viewpoints of the peoples concerned(…) based on 
the full understanding of the issues involved” so they can influence the outcome of 
the decision.275 This  means that there is an important role for Indigenous peoples’ 
perspectives and concerns, based on experiences, observations and scientific 
knowledge, of what constitutes a risk, the assessment of the possibilities that these 
risks could occur and the discussion of what measures can be adopted to avoid them, 
anticipating potential harm on their livelihood and environment. In this context, the 
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples noted that “Indigenous 
peoples should have a major role in establishing whether the measure or project 
affects them at all and, if it does, the extent of the impact. Indigenous peoples may 
highlight possible harms that may not be clear to the State or project proponent, and 
may suggest mitigation measures to address those harms”,276 among them, cultural 
and spiritual effects. For instance, in a case brought against Colombia before the 
Tripartite Committee, the government granted a license for oil exploration in 
Indigenous lands without consultation of the U’wa peoples, who had reasonable 
concerns not only about potential environmental effects based on the impacts of this 
activity, but also about their culture, as “the extraction of any component of 
Indigenous territory that is not undertaken in accordance with their own cultural rules 
affects their vision of the universe and undermines their cultural integrity as a 
people”. 277  The government argued that their own studies, conducted without 
Indigenous participation, showed that the U’wa were not going to be affected278 and 
therefore they were not consulted, proceeding with the concession without full 
certainty about potential effects (especially cultural/spiritual), further arguing that 
“even if there was originally a risk of the community of being affected, this has now 
been averted” because of a subsequent modification on the boundaries of the 
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concession.279 The Tripartite Committee noted that the project was situated within 
the U’wa’s ancestral lands and thus they should have been consulted before granting 
the license to determine if and how they would be affected, also emphasizing that 
they should be consulted in the future (and conduct impact assessments) in case of 
new exploration projects, to fully understand possible effects and the likely 
sociocultural impacts of a project,280 underscoring the role of consultations and TK in 
situations of potential threats of serious harm, including regarding cultural and 
spiritual values.  
 
6.3. Consent  
 
As noted above, achieving consent or an agreement is an objective of consultations, 
not a requirement, with the exception of Article 16, stating that Indigenous peoples 
can only be removed from their lands with their FPIC. The C169 does not clarify the 
meaning of FPIC, but the ILO Guide explains that ‘free’ means without coercion, 
intimidation or manipulation;281 ‘prior’, to consent sought in advance with sufficient 
time respecting Indigenous processes;282 finally, ‘informed’ refers to the information 
provided, which should include, among other things, the nature and size of the 
proposed project/activity; its purpose, duration and location affected; and “a 
preliminary assessment of the likely economic, social, cultural and environmental 
impact, including potential risks(…) in a context that respects the precautionary 
principle[emphasis added].” 283  This also confirms that impact assessments are 
required as an integral part of consultations, to obtain ‘informed’ consent, and the 
important connection with the PP.  
The term ‘consent’ itself is not defined, but from the context it seems to refer 
to control/permission to do something (adopt a measure or remove them from their 
lands). This understanding is supported by the travaux, because during the drafting 
of C169, it was discussed that Indigenous peoples “should have the right(…) to play 
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an effective participatory role in the planning and implementation of development 
programmes affecting them…[They should not] have absolute control and the right 
of ultimate decision”[sic], and that they should have an effective voice in decisions 
affecting them but without having a “power equal to that enjoyed by States”,284 or a 
veto power. 285  Doyle refers to this understanding as a “binary veto-no-veto 
conception of FPIC”.286   
This question of control, added to concerns about external self-determination, 
the creation of a ‘State within a State’,287 and fears that the inclusion of a provision 
that requires consent could prevent the ratification of C169, 288  led to the 
establishment of consent as a mere objective of consultations, even if this could 
result in situations where “no real account was taken of the views expressed and of 
the true needs of the people being affected”.289 This did not satisfy the aspirations of 
Indigenous peoples, who consider FPIC as a prerequisite and manifestation of self-
determination, being fundamental in decision-making,290 leading to heavy criticism 
from Indigenous leaders as well as academics.291 For instance, several Indigenous 
representatives expressed in the ILO Plenary that without consent, their lives and 
territories will remain vulnerable to destructive government action, allowing for all 
forms of resource exploitation on their lands, and that anything less than having the 
power to accept or reject projects or actions that affect them would deny their 
integrity and right to control their destiny.292 Clavero considers that consultations 
without FPIC are not an expression of self-determination, and that the Convention 
assumes “that a guarantee of informed consultation, along with the good faith with 
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which it is to be undertaken, can result in legitimate policies on matters on which no 
consent is reached”, an assumption that weakens the negotiating position of 
Indigenous peoples.293 Strelein argues that the absence of consent as a requirement 
reflects a paternalistic approach, where States maintain the power to determine what 
is acceptable in the treatment of Indigenous peoples.294 Venne points out that this 
consultation process allows States to have “an alibi to say that they did ask us, but 
there is no requirement to implement our position”, and that it would be better to 
“ignore the consultation game(…) [and] insist on consent as a prerequisite to any 
project that affects our life, livelihood or environment”.295  
Despite this, consultations are one of the most powerful tools of C169,296 not 
only requiring negotiations in good faith before a measure is adopted, allowing 
Indigenous peoples to influence the decision-making process and incorporate their 
knowledge, concerns, understanding of risks and uncertainties in this process, as 
noted above, but also constituting a safeguard against the violations of their human 
rights. 297  In this sense, even if States have the final saying about the measure 
consulted,298  they should at least take into account their concerns in good faith. 
Moreover, consultations are subject to international 299  and national oversight, 
meaning that Indigenous organizations can challenge the way they are/were 
conducted 300  (also considering that States often fail to comply with its 
requirements), 301  which has resulted in measures and projects being stopped or 
postponed by courts and bodies.302 
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However, it is true that there are certain situations that go beyond the 
protection that this safeguard can provide, because the possible effects of a measure 
subject to consultation by a State could jeopardize their survival303 as peoples. In my 
view, and aligned with the criticism regarding FPIC as an objective, decisions of 
these kind cannot be left to States, who often develop attitudes, doctrines and policies 
to justify taking lands and resources from Indigenous peoples.304 In other words, a 
stronger measure is needed to effectively protect their rights (in line with the 
precautionary approach), ensuring that Indigenous peoples’ input, concerns and 
knowledge are actually taken into account, implementing the solutions that they 
propose/negotiate and that only the risks that they deem acceptable could occur. At 
first, it seems that this approach is followed in Article 16, stating that Indigenous 
peoples shall not be removed from the lands without their FPIC and only as an 
exceptional measure.305 Albeit it is not always possible to make broad assumptions, 
generally speaking this is a scenario which could substantively disrupt Indigenous 
peoples’ life, severing ties with their lands and moving them to a place where they do 
not have any connection or history, thus creating a risk of extinction and cultural or 
physical rootlessness, deeply affecting their identity,306 and every aspect of their life, 
including material needs (e.g., hunting, or obtaining medicine or clothes); rituals, 
cultural and spiritual connections; and their TK (which then becomes useless and 
unable to be updated and passed down through the generations, ending up 
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forgotten).307  Therefore, it seems that the requirement of FPIC would act as an 
enhanced precautionary measure, acting from early on (at the ‘consideration’ stage, 
following consultations), before the threats become imminent. 
Yet, and greatly weakening this protection, Article 16 also establishes that 
States can circumvent the lack of consent if they follow “appropriate procedures 
established by national law and regulations”; that, ‘whenever possible’ they shall 
return to their lands; and that if this is not possible, they should be compensated with 
lands of at least equal quality and legal status or money.308 What is interesting is that 
during the discussion of C169, it was identified as a flaw of C107 the many 
exceptions to its Article 12, which prohibited the removal of Indigenous 
‘populations’ from their territories without their free consent, resulting in practice in 
their removal from their lands at the States’ will, without consent, based on economic 
and national security reasons. 309  Despite this, issues regarding self-determination 
mentioned above and economic reasons (a considerable number of projects regarding 
hydroelectrical or mineral extraction resulted in relocation) 310  led to this broad 
exception in Article 16.2, reducing the effectiveness of this provision and 
transforming it more into a consultation process that only requires more active efforts 
to reach an agreement,311 and leaving the ultimate decision to States, who can then 
impose projects and developments, as long as they can justify the decision to bypass 
consent. This fails to ensure that potentially substantive harm to Indigenous peoples, 
especially spiritual effects usually unknown to States,312 will not materialise, also 
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considering that relocations are becoming less and less ‘exceptional’ because of 
economic reasons,313 as illustrated in several observations and direct requests.314  
When it comes to another situation with potentially substantive effects on 
Indigenous peoples, the exploration/exploitation of natural resources in Indigenous 
lands (Article 15.2), 315  the C169 only mentions consultations (and impact 
assessments, as clarified in practice), despite the fact that in the travaux it is 
explicitly noted that these types of projects are one of the most common causes of 
removal from Indigenous lands 316  and that the effects on Indigenous peoples’ 
livelihood could be similar to those from relocations (e.g., loss of traditional lands, 
lack of control over their development, exhaustion of natural resources vital for their 
traditional livelihood, and the destruction of their traditional environment, making it 
impossible for them to preserve their traditional lifestyles). 317  Criticising this, 
Thornberry notes that relying on a mere consultation process “may not amount to 
much in practice”.318 MacKay says that the C169 “does little more than place a 
number of extremely weak procedural hurdles in the way of the continued 
exploitation and destruction of indigenous lands and territories”.319 Doyle remarks 
that their right to self-determination “is frozen in a state of perpetual limbo” if 
Indigenous peoples are constantly facing the prospect of having to accept imposed 
projects that could substantially impact them.320 Moreover, it is difficult to see how 
Article 15.2 (and Article 16) relates to Article 13.1 and the duty (‘governments 
shall’) to protect and respect the special relationship that Indigenous peoples share 
with their lands and territories,321 including their ‘total environment’,322 that is, all 
the things that belong to the lands themselves as a whole, such as waters, plant and 
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animal life and other natural resources;323 Venne even questions if “no one realizes 
that our relationship to the land is to a particular place(…) [i]n our worldview, the 
land which identifies us does not change like the wind”, being something that cannot 
be compensated.324  
In this context, Doyle notes the reluctance of the ILO bodies to engage with 
the implications of requiring FPIC in contexts beyond relocations, because of their 
rigid binary veto-no-veto approach, a position “which disconnects the requirement of 
FPIC from the rights which it serves to safeguard”. 325  He also notes that the 
Convention is “silent on what should happen when potentially significant impacts on 
rights” are identified in impact assessment processes and consultations, and consent 
is not obtained, 326  which generates doubts and uncertainties about the effective 
protection of Indigenous peoples in these cases. As mentioned above, these possible 
threats to Indigenous peoples’ way of life (including spiritual and cultural values) 
have the potential to be not only significant or serious, but of a substantive nature, 
jeopardizing their very survival as peoples. Thus, C169 fails to follow a 
precautionary approach, providing a weak degree of protection to Indigenous 
peoples. In these cases, this silence or lacuna can be addressed by the guidance 
provided by PP, taking into account its more flexible approach of ‘the higher the risk 
the greater the need for precaution’, clarifying and strengthening the protection of 
their rights. This could also influence the static conception of FPIC, moving from an 
understanding of FPIC as a ‘veto power’ in Article 16 to a more flexible approach, 
aligned with the PP, considering that, as noted by Barelli, Article 35 acknowledges 
that some provisions of the C169 could fall behind other international standards, 
implying that the standards of C169 can be subject to more progressive 
interpretations.327 
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The ILO Convention 169 constitutes a step forward for Indigenous peoples, 
explicitly recognising a variety of rights and clearly establishing a way to protect 
their way of life, the rights of participation and consultation, applicable both in 
situations of known and uncertain harm. This is especially important when it comes 
to the protection of their lands and the cultural/spiritual connection that they have 
with them, as the monitoring bodies have consistently required impact studies to 
assess possible spiritual, social, cultural and environmental risks, with Indigenous 
participation and in conjunction with consultations. This provides a more complete 
picture (‘the best information available’) of any potential threats, having then more 
instances to incorporate Indigenous knowledge in the decision-making process and 
identify risks, reduce uncertainties, interpret information and assess and discuss 
alternatives and mitigation measures. To do this, the ILO monitoring bodies’ have 
relied on Article 15, sidestepping the ‘whenever appropriate’ qualification in Article 
7.3, reflecting in my view an ‘erring on the side of caution’ approach. 
Regarding consultations, the Convention establishes several requirements to 
ensure a genuine dialogue that allows Indigenous peoples to influence the outcome 
of the decision, and also subjecting this process to judicial oversight, resulting in the 
suspension or modification of projects that could have affected their rights. However, 
C169 stops short of requiring consent (a point criticised by Indigenous 
representatives), a notion understood as a ‘veto power’, strongly relying on the 
assumption that consultation’s requirements and good faith constitute a sufficient 
safeguard. This may be accurate in certain cases, but it is insufficient when the 
potential threats to Indigenous peoples’ way of life are of a substantive nature, 
jeopardising their survival as peoples; in these situations, stronger measures are 
needed to effectively protect their rights. Despite establishing in Article 16 that 
relocations cannot be conducted without Indigenous peoples’ FPIC, which would 
ensure that their knowledge, concerns, suggestions and proposals are taken into 
account in decision-making, the C169 immediately undermines this enhanced 
                                                                                                                                                                            




safeguard, allowing States to circumvent it, following ‘appropriate procedures 
established by national laws and regulations’, ultimately giving States the final 
saying and failing to ensure that potentially devastating effects, physical and 
spiritual, will not take place. Similarly, in another situation that can have devastating 
effects, the exploration/exploitation of natural resources in Indigenous lands, the ILO 
bodies have remained silent about what to do if potentially serious or substantive 
effects are identified (including cultural/spiritual ones) and consent is not obtained. 
This indicates that, when it comes to FPIC, the C169 provides a weak degree of 
protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
The UNTS system and the C169 have a central part in the protection of Indigenous 
peoples and their traditional way of life, recognising important rights and addressing 
their concerns through the work of the respective monitoring bodies. In doing this 
work, they rely on TK to understand and identify social, cultural and environmental 
threats that could affect Indigenous peoples in various circumstances, where there are 
often uncertainties (as they cannot be determined in abstracto), a knowledge that is 
integrated through their effective participation in decision-making processes. For the 
UNTS, this means ‘consultations’ (without specific requirements) to protect their 
cultural rights, with a focus on prevention of direct effects, although the bodies have 
displayed in some occasions an awareness of the need to act before the possible harm 
becomes imminent through impact assessments, albeit this is not uniform across the 
work of the bodies. The C169 for its part also establishes the duty to consult, with a 
series of requirements designed to ensure that Indigenous peoples are able to affect 
the outcome of the decision-making process. Moreover, these consultations are 
applicable from early on, which allows for the early identification of potential risks 
and, according to the ILO monitoring bodies, must be conducted in conjunction with 
impact studies to assess social, cultural, spiritual and environmental harm, reflecting 
in my view more clearly a precautionary approach that aims for the use of the best 
information available in order to adopt decisions. However, it would be difficult to 
argue that this approach is followed in situations where the threats to Indigenous 
peoples’ traditional way life are of a substantive nature, jeopardising their survival as 
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peoples, thus requiring an enhanced safeguard like consent. In effect, the UNTS 
system has been very inconsistent, with one case in the complaint procedure where, 
due to the devastating environmental effects on the lives of the authors, FPIC was 
mentioned as a requirement, without clarifying its meaning or if this is a ‘one-off’ 
situation or a more permanent standard, being required in every case where the 
impacts are of a substantive nature. If this is the case, it is also unclear what would 
constitute ‘substantive’ nature and how is this applied when it comes to spiritual 
effects; as noted by Göcke and Yupsanis, among others, the HRC must still clarify 
these issues. The reporting procedure, where perhaps some degree of clarification 
could have been found (although Barelli mentions that it is not the ideal way to 
clarify the contours of questions like FPIC), provides conflicting information, 
sometimes requiring States to obtain FPIC and sometimes that they just ‘seek’ FPIC, 
even when the potential effects seems to be equally substantive, thus being unable to 
establish a general rule, creating some degree of uncertainty.  
The C169 for its part conceives FPIC as a ‘veto power’, required in situations 
of relocation, which can have disastrous consequences foe Indigenous peoples, 
including their extinction; in this sense, it seems to establish a heightened safeguard 
for a higher threat, ensuring that their concerns and suggestions are taken into 
account in decision-making and that only the risks that they deem acceptable may 
materialise. However, C169 allows States to circumvent FPIC, giving them the final 
word, thus debilitating this protection, as mentioned by several authors, also noting 
how this grant States the power to have the final say, even in the face of Indigenous 
opposition. Similarly, it remains silent when it comes to another case where 
Indigenous peoples’ traditional livelihood could be substantially, affected the 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources, being there a lacuna in a very 
important issue, as highlighted by Doyle.  
In sum, both the UNTS and C169 provide a weak application of FPIC, 
undermining the effective protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights, even in the face 
of potential threats that could affect their very survival.  
 
The human rights instruments analysed here are not the only ones applicable 
to Indigenous peoples; there is also UNDRIP, adopted almost twenty years later than 
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C169, as well as the reinterpretation of regional instruments in the Inter-American 
System (including a more recent adoption of a Declaration specific to Indigenous 
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1. Introduction  
 
Indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge (‘TK’) plays an important role in 
identifying and avoiding potential threats of serious harm to Indigenous peoples’ way 
of life, especially when it comes to projects and activities on their lands. In the 
previous chapter, I noted how this is reflected in its incorporation in decision-making 
processes (through consultations and impact studies), under the UN Treaty System 
(‘UNTS’) and the International Labour Organization Convention concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries C169 (‘C169’).1 However, 
due to inconsistencies in the practice of the UNTS, and C169’s limited application of 
consent, some questions remain about the effective degree of protection that they 
provide to Indigenous peoples’ rights, especially regarding possible impacts of a 
cultural/spiritual nature and those of a substantive nature. With this in mind, I 
analyse in this chapter the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(‘UNDRIP’),2 as well the development of Indigenous peoples’ rights in the light of 
two regional human rights conventions: the 1969 American Convention on Human 
Rights3 (‘American Convention’) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights (‘African Charter’).4 
 The interpretation and application of these instruments indicate an 
awareness of the need to anticipate the occurrence of harm, by ensuring the effective 
participation of Indigenous peoples in decision-making, considering their TK and 
                                                             
1  Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27 June 1989, C169, entered into force 5 
September 1991.  
2 UNGA, “UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295. 
3 Organization of American States (‘OAS’), American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 
1969, 1144UNTS123, entry into force 18 July 1978; 24 out of 35 OAS members are currently parties 
to this Convention. 
4 Organization of African Unity (‘OAU’), African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul 
Charter), OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21I.L.M.58(1982), entry into force October 21, 1986, 
ratified by almost all African Union Member States (except Morocco). 
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concerns. This is especially reflected in the inclusion of more situations where their 
free, prior and informed consent (‘FPIC’) is required, having then a stronger stance 
on this subject. UNDRIP for instance, explicitly requires FPIC in two situations and, 
depending on a more expansive or restricted view of the purpose of this Declaration, 
potentially a third, related to possible substantive effects on Indigenous peoples’ 
lands and cultural values. The Inter-American and African Systems for their part 
seem to follow a ‘sliding-scale approach’, requiring FPIC in consideration to the 
effects of large-scale projects on Indigenous lands, based on an interpretation of the 
rights to property (American Convention) or similar interrelated rights (African 
Charter) by the supervisory bodies. That being said, the more recent jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘IACtHR’) raises some questions about 
the actual application of this FPIC safeguard, especially in situations of substantive 
harm on spiritual/cultural values. In addition, there is an interesting contrast between 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘ACHPR’), which adopted 
a very strong position vis-à-vis Indigenous participatory rights (including FPIC), and 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘ACtHPR’) which, in a more 
recent case, has declined to address these issues in detail, omitting any mention of 
FPIC, creating some uncertainty about the standards applicable.  
 All this means that, albeit having overall better guarantees to protect 
Indigenous peoples’ rights in the face of potentially non-negligible harm than the 
UNTS and C169, there are still some remaining issues that could weaken this 
protection, mostly derived from controversies about self-determination and control 
over natural resources and lands, which are important to explore. 
 This chapter is divided in 4 sections; sections two analysis UNDRIP, 
starting with its legal status and influence in international law, moving then into the 
issue of participatory rights and some controversies surrounding consent, especially 
regarding extractive projects. Section three deals with the protection of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights under the American Convention (section 3.1), focusing on the 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR in regard to participatory rights and the questions 
surrounding the adequate protection of spiritual/cultural values. Section 3.2 deals 
with the African Charter and the different approaches adopted by its supervisory 
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bodies, especially in the issue of FPIC. Section four ends this chapter with some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
The UNDRIP is considered the “most advanced and comprehensive international 
instrument on Indigenous peoples’ rights” 5  and a milestone of Indigenous 
empowerment, 6  recognising several Indigenous rights such as (internal) self-
determination; 7  self-government; 8  self-identification; 9  collective rights; 10  land 
rights11 and the special relationship with their territories;12 and traditional cultural13 
and economic14 activities, among others. Its origin can be traced back to the 1982 
Working Group for Indigenous Populations (‘WGIP’), 15  then to the open-ended 
working group established to present the Declaration during the International Decade 
of the World’s Indigenous People (1995-2004)16 and its final adoption in 2007 by the 
UNGA, approved with 144 votes in favour, 11 abstentions and 4 votes against 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States; all of them later supported 
the Declaration).17 It is greatly influenced by the C16918 (going beyond it in some 
aspects, like consent), and throughout its drafting process Indigenous peoples were 
                                                             
5  M. Fitzmaurice, “The 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 
Austrian Review of International and European Law 17: 139-266, 2012, pp 139-141. 
6   S. Wiessner, “The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing 
Challenges”, EJIL Vol.22no.1 (2011), p 130. 
7 UNDRIP, Articles 3-4 and 46.1 See also R. Stavenhagen, “Making the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples Work: The Challenge Ahead” in S. Allen and A. Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples (Hart publishing, 2011), p 163.  
8 UNDRIP, Article 4. 
9 Ibid., Article 33. 
10 Ibid., preamble and Article 1, among others. 
11 Ibid., Articles 10 and 25-30, among others. 
12 Ibid., preamble and Article 25. 
13 Ibid., Articles 11-16, 24 and 31, among others. 
14 Ibid., Article 20. 
15  ECOSOC Resolution 1982/34. See also P. Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights” 
(Manchester University Press, 2002), p 371 and J. Anaya and L. Rodriguez-Piñeiro, “The Making of 
the UNDRIP” in J. Hohmann and M. Weller (eds) The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: A Commentary (OUP, 2018). 
16  Commission on Human Rights, resolution 1995/32. 
17  See Anaya and Rodriguez-Piñeiro (n 15), p 60. 
18 Ibid., p 45;  L. Swepston, “Indigenous and tribal peoples’ culture and work under the ILO” in C. 
Lennox and D. Short (eds), Handbook of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights (Routledge, 2016), p 343 noting 
that “UNDRIP was built in large part on the foundation of Convention 169”; and  J. Anaya, “Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People”, 11 August 2008, A/HRC/9/9 (‘2008 Report’), para. 43. 
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involved, influencing the final text and allowing them to incorporate issues and 
questions that “are otherwise not reflected in states’ foreign policy positions”,19 
contributing to enhance the legitimacy of the Declaration.20 Nevertheless, and as 
mentioned below, the final result was a compromise between their aspirations, 
experts’ advice and States’ goodwill.21 
 
2.1 Legal status of the Declaration  
It has been argued that some provisions of UNDRIP constitute customary law, like 
those regarding self-determination; cultural rights and identity; and the right to their 
traditional lands, territories and resources, among others,22 which is controversial. 
Countries like Australia and New Zealand for example stated during the UNDRIP 
vote that this Declaration cannot be cited as evidence of customary law;23 and some 
authors noted that UNDRIP is non-binding in character, and “some if not the 
majority of its provisions do not represent customary international law or are 
emergent rules, in the process of crystallization”.24  
                                                             
19 C. Charters, “The Legitimacy of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in C. 
Charters and R. Stavenhagen, Making the Declaration Work: The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2009), p 286. 
20 Ibid. See also C. Tennant, “Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions, and the International 
Legal Literature from 1945-1993” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1994), p 49 noting that 
“the greater the participation by indigenous peoples in an institutional process, the more legitimate are 
the process and its results”, and M. Barelli, Seeking Justice in International Law: The significance and 
implications of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Routledge, 2016), pp 51-52. 
21   J. Burger, “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: From Advocacy to 
Implementation” in Allen and Xanthaki (n 7), p 42.  
22   See, among others, International Law Association (‘ILA’), “Resolution 5/2012, Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples” (2012), “Conclusions” paras. 2-10; J. Anaya and S. Wiessner, ‘The UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment’ Jurist (3 October 2007);  
Anaya and Rodriguez-Piñeiro (n 15), p 62;  and M. Scheinin and M. Ahren, “Relationship to Human 
Rights, and Related International Instruments” in Hohmann and Weller (n 15), p 64; and V. Tauli-
Corpuz, “Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the rights of indigenous 
peoples”, 21 July 2017, A/72/186 (‘2017 Report’), para. 9. 
23 UNGA Department of Public Information, “General Assembly adopts Declaration on Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples”, 13 September 2007, (‘UNDRIP press release’). 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/ga10612.doc.htm  [accessed August 2020], explanation of vote by 
the representatives of Australia and New Zealand. 
24   Fitzmaurice (n 5), p 156. The larger discussion about the possible customary character of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights is outside the scope of this research; in any case, and as noted by Voyiakis, 
during the voting process States “were not explicitly asked to take a view on the current status of 
those rights under customary law or on the desirability of those rights becoming part of customary law 
in the future.” E. Voyiakis, “Voting in the General Assembly as Evidence of Customary International 
Law?” in Allen and Xanthaki (n 7), p 210. 
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 Formally, this Declaration can be considered as soft law, that is, a non-
legally binding instrument,25 as emphasized by some States during its adoption.26 
This, however, does not mean that the Declaration lacks legal importance. In effect, 
and as also mentioned in chapter II, soft-law instruments are carefully negotiated to 
accommodate different views, involving an important degree of good faith 
commitments;27 in this sense, UNDRIP is one of the most extensively negotiated 
texts in UN history. In effect, it was discussed for almost a quarter of a century,28 
going through various stages and forms, approved or considered by multiple bodies, 
such as the WGIP; the UN Commission on Human Rights; the UN Open-Ended 
Inter-sessional Commission on Human Rights Working Group on the draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (comprised of States with 
Indigenous peoples’ participation) and the UNGA, among others.29 This illustrates 
the long but ultimately successful effort to “produce a document capable of 
responding to the claims of indigenous peoples while remaining acceptable to States 
and in accordance with international law”, 30  reflected in the widespread support 
received at the time of the voting and beyond. This is important because “as a 
resolution adopted by the General Assembly with the approval of an overwhelming 
majority of Member States, the Declaration represents a commitment on the part of 
the United Nations and Member States to its provisions”.31  
                                                             
25 A. Boyle, “Soft law in international law-making”, in M. Evans (ed), International Law (5th ed, 
OUP 2018), p 121, mentioning UNGA resolutions as an example of soft-law instruments. See also 
Stavenhagen (n 7), p 151; and S. Allen, “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and 
the Limits of the International Legal Project” in Allen and Xanthaki (n 7), p 225 arguing that 
UNDRIP’s significance comes from its political legitimacy rather than its legal character. 
26  See UNDRIP press release, explanations accompanying the votes from the representatives of 
Australia, Canada, Guyana, and Turkey, among others. 
27 See Chapter II, section 2; see also ILO, "ILO standards and the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: Information note for ILO staff and partners", p 2, noting that UNDRIP, as a 
UNGA Declaration, “reflects the collective views of the United Nations which must be taken into 
account by all members in good faith.”  
28 Anaya and Rodriguez-Piñeiro (n 15), p 49. 
29 C. Charters, “Use It or Lose It: The Value of Using the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in Māori Legal and Political Claims” in A. Erueti, International Indigenous Rights in 
Aotearoa New Zealand (Victoria University of Wellington Press, 2017), pp 143-144. 
30 Barelli (n 20), p 49.  
31 2008 Report, para 41; C. Baldwin and C. Morel, “Using the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Litigation” in Allen and Xanthaki (n 7), pp 122-123. See also Boyle 
(n 25), pp 120-121, saying that “widespread acceptance of soft law instruments will tend to legitimize 
conduct and make the legality of opposing positions harder to sustain.” The Office of Legal Affairs of 
the UN Secretariat remarked that when the GA opts to adopt an instrument in the Declaration format, 




 Furthermore, UNDRIP’s provisions relate to existing law previously 
accepted and implemented in international law, such as cultural rights; the special 
relationship that Indigenous peoples’ have with their lands; and the rights of 
consultation and participation, among others, are recognised in the UNTS, C169 and 
the Biodiversity regime, discussed in previous chapters. Also, Article 3 states that 
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination, using the same language as 
Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and building 
upon the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) and the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as noted in Chapter IV; among other 
examples. Even in those cases where UNDRIP goes beyond existing legal standards, 
this is built on the practice of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies like the UNTS bodies 
and regional systems (see below), being this expansion “in accordance with the 
ongoing evolution of the respective legal standards”. 32  All this strengthens its 
character as an authoritative and legitimate instrument.33  
 Finally, and unlike the UNTS, UNDRIP does not have specific monitoring 
bodies to ensure compliance; however, Article 42 establishes that UN bodies 
(expressly mentioning the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, UNPFII), 
specialised agencies and States “shall promote respect for and full application of the 
provisions of this Declaration”, reflecting an approach that focuses on how to make 
the rights recognised in UNDRIP effective.34  The UNPFII works as an advisory 
body, with a mandate to discuss Indigenous issues and provide expert advice and 
recommendations, and promote the integration and coordination of activities within 
the UN, among other things.35 In 2008, it adopted UNDRIP as its legal framework,36 
and has encouraged States and international bodies to implement its standards and 
objectives.37  
                                                             
32 Barelli (n 20), pp 54-55; Anaya and Rodriguez-Piñeiro (n 15), p 61; Charters (n 29), pp 145-146, 
among others. 
33 Barelli (n 20), p 55. 
34  L. Rodriguez-Piñeiro, “’Where Appropriate’: Monitoring/Implementing of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights under the Declaration” in Charters and Stavenhagen (n 19), p 329. 
35 UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 2000/22, (‘ECOSOC’), 28 July 2000. 
36 UNPFII “Report of the Seventh Session” UN Doc E/C.19/2008/23, para. 131. 
37 See for instance, UNPFII, “Report of the sixteenth session” UN Doc E/C.19/2017/11, paras. 14-15. 
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 Among the UN bodies included in Article 42, there are two that play a 
critical role in this context. First, there is the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples,38 whose original mandate of promoting and protecting the rights 
of Indigenous peoples was extended to include the promotion of UNDRIP in 2007.39 
This is achieved through the production of annual thematic40 and country-specific 
reports, bringing attention to important issues and including recommendations to 
advance the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights, as well as compliance with the 
Declaration standards.41 The mandate also includes the promotion of best practices 
regarding the effective protection of the rights of Indigenous peoples,42 an aspect 
addressed by the Special Rapporteur by focusing on the implementation of 
UNDRIP’s standards, providing assistance for legal reforms and monitoring the 
implementation of recommendations previously made by the Special Rapporteur 
(including follow-up visits), among others.43  
The second mechanism is the Expert Mechanisms on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (‘EMRIP’), established by the Human Rights Council to provide thematic 
expertise on the rights of Indigenous peoples, mainly through studies and research;44 
provide expertise and advice on Indigenous peoples’ rights “as set out” in UNDRIP, 
and assist States, “in achieving the ends of the Declaration through the promotion, 
protection and fulfilment of the rights of indigenous peoples.”45  To do this, the 
EMRIP prepares annual studies on the status of Indigenous peoples’ rights “in the 
achievement of the ends of the Declaration”, including challenges, good practices 
and recommendations.46 This is reflected for instance in the 2018 study on FPIC, 
which aims to contribute to a better understanding of FPIC in the context of practices 
                                                             
38 Established by the Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/57. 
39 Human Rights Council, “Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, 
socials and cultural rights, including the right to development” UN Doc. A/HRC/6/L.26 (25 
September 2007). This was renewed by Resolution 42/20, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/42/20 (8 October 
2019) para 1(g).  
40 See for instance, 2017 Report. 
41 Barelli (n 20), p 57. See for example, V- Tauli-Corpuz, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
rights of Indigenous peoples: visit to Ecuador”, A/HRC/42/37/Add.1 (4 July 2019). 
42 Resolution 42/20 para. 1(a). 
43  See website “About the mandate of the Special Rapporteur for indigenous peoples” 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/SRIndigenousPeoples/Pages/Mandate.aspx [accessed 
October 2020]. 
44 Human Rights Council Resolution 6/36 of 14 December 2007, para. 1. 
45 Human Rights Council Resolution 33/25 of 5 October 2016, para. 1. 
46 Ibid., para 2. 
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and interpretations of these rights as enshrined in the Declaration,47 including an 
annex with recommendations to other international institutions and States.48 Finally, 
UNDRIP is referenced by international courts and bodies as a legal basis to justify 
decisions,49 and it influences the work of other institutions,50 as well as national 
law.51 
 In sum, UNDRIP is a vital milestone, negotiated in a way that 
accommodates and balances different views and interests of States and Indigenous 
peoples, establishing certain minimum standards regarding the content of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights,52 in line with existing instruments and practice and that also relate to 
various ongoing developments in international law. Despite being formally a soft-law 
instrument, it has an important normative weight, influencing the conduct and 
policies of States and international institutions (supported by the work of the Special 
Rapporteur and EMRIP), becoming an authoritative reflection of an international 
consensus regarding Indigenous peoples’ rights.53  
 
2.2 The protection of Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life 
 
The Declaration recognises the particularities of Indigenous peoples’ traditional way 
of life, based on a special relationship with their environment; for instance, the 
Preamble mentions that Indigenous peoples’ control over their lands, territories and 
resources will enable them to maintain their institutions, culture and traditions, and 
that their rights “derive from their political, economic and social structures and from 
                                                             
47 Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, “Free, prior and informed 
consent: a human rights-based approach”, A/HRC/39/62 (10 August 2018) (‘EMRIP Report 2018’), 
para 2. 
48 Ibid., annex “Expert Mechanism advice No 11 on indigenous peoples and free, prior and informed 
consent. 
49  See section 3 below, and ACHR, “Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 41st Ordinary Session, 
Accra, Ghana (May 2007), among others 
50  See for instance Food and Agriculture Organization, “FAO Policy on Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples” (2nd edition, March 2015).  
51 See F. Gómez, “The UNDRIP: an increasingly robust legal parameter” International Journal of 
Human Rights 23(1-2)(2019), p 9; M. Barelli, “Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the UNDRIP” in 
Hohmann and Weller (n 15), pp 265-267, among others.  
52  2017 report para. 9; Charters (n 29), p 144; UNDRIP, Article 43: “The rights recognized herein 
constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the Indigenous peoples of 
the world.” 
53  2008 Report, para. 43; Anaya and Rodriguez-Piñeiro (n 15), p 62; Gomez (n 51), p 10; Barelli (n 
51), p 67; Rodriguez -Piñeiro (n 34), pp 336-337. 
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their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to 
lands, territories and resources”.54 Article 25 recognises the existence of a special 
spiritual relationship between Indigenous peoples and their lands, territories and 
natural resources, including the ‘cultural relationship’ that they have with these 
territories and all the associated practices and traditions,55 which, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, cannot be determined in abstracto and depend on their own 
location, circumstances and experiences (being then some degree of uncertainty 
about them);56 among other examples.  
 The Declaration uses more often the terms ‘lands’, ‘territories’ and 
‘resources’ than  ‘environment’; however, these notions should be interpreted 
broadly, as including the physical and symbolic space in which Indigenous culture 
has developed.57 Charters also notes that ‘territories’ was included in UNDRIP in an 
effort to best reflect the special relationship between Indigenous peoples and these 
spaces, 58  with important social, cultural, economic, religious and environmental 
aspects deeply intertwined,59 as also emphasised during the drafting process by the 
Chairperson of the WGIP, pointing out that “the term ‘territory’ (…) conveys some 
notion of the totality of indigenous peoples’ relationship to the land and to all of its 
resources and characteristics.”, a relationship that must be understood as “a special 
and comprehensive kind of relationship that is historical, spiritual, cultural and 
collective.”60  
 In any case, UNDRIP recognises that Indigenous peoples have the right to 
the conservation and protection of their territories, for which States “shall establish 
and implement assistant programmes (…) for such conservation and protection, 
                                                             
54 UNDRIP, Preambular paras. 7 and 10. 
55 C. Charters, “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Lands, Territories, and Resources in the UNDRIP: 
Articles 10, 25, 26, and 27” in Hohmann and Weller (n 15), p 411. 
56 See Chapter IV, section 3.3. 
57 A. Regino and G. Torres, “The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
The Foundation of a New Relationship between Indigenous Peoples, States and Societies” in Charters 
and Stavenhagen (n 19), pp 160-161 
58 Charters (n 55), p 406. 
59 UNCHR, Report of the Working Group Established in Accordance with Commission on Human 
Rights 
Resolution 1995/32, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/98 (6 March 2002) para 38. See also Chapter III. 
60  UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, “Explanatory Note 
Concerning the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add.1 (19 July 1993).  
157 
 
without discrimination”.61 Errico highlights that this encompass the prevention of 
environmental damage, and that negotiations regarding UNDRIP were conducted 
“against the backdrop of increasing international attention to environmental 
issues”,62 being the implication that environmental law obligations and principles are 
applicable here, including the precautionary principle. 
 This comprehensive approach means that the safeguards established by 
UNDRIP to protect Indigenous peoples’ rights, consultation and participation, 63 




The right to participate is an expression of self-determination, 64  also linked to 
consultation, as the latter would also be a way to express the former,65 allowing 
Indigenous peoples to influence decision-making processes, as noted in the previous 
chapter. Like in C169, participation is included throughout the Declaration, seeking 
to put an end on the historical exclusion of Indigenous peoples in decision-making,66 
in both general and particular situations; an example of the former is Articles 5 and 
18, recognising Indigenous peoples’ right to participate within their distinct political, 
legal, economic, social and cultural institutions (internal decision-making) and in the 
political, economic, social and cultural life of the State “if they choose to” (external 
decision-making).67 In addition, Articles 23 and 32.1 recognise Indigenous peoples’ 
right to determine their own priorities for development, including social and 
                                                             
61 UNDRIP, Article 29.1 
62 S. Errico, “Control over Natural Resources and Protection of Indigenous Territories” in Hohmann 
and Weller (n 15), p 451. 
63 2017 report, paras. 22 and 62, noting that UNDRIP’s implementation requires the full and effective 
participation of Indigenous peoples, and that consultation is an essential safeguard to protect 
Indigenous peoples’ rights. See also EMRIP Report 2018, paras. 14-19.  
64 Burger (n 21), pp 43 and 46-48; EMRIP Report 2018, para. 14. According to the drafting history, 
for several States self-determination meant participatory rights. H. Quane “The UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: New Directions for Self-Determination and Participatory Rights?” in 
Allen and Xanthaki (n 7), p 286. 
65 Burger (n 21), p 48 and Quane (n 64), p 273. See also EMRIP Report 2018, para 14. 
66 EMRIP Report 2018, para. 17. 
67  UNDRIP, Articles 5 and 18. See also B. Gunn, Understanding and Implementing the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, an Introductory Handbook (Indigenous Bar 
Association, 2011), p 19. See ILA, “Rights of Indigenous Peoples Interim Report” (The Hague 2010), 
(‘ILA Report 2010’), p 14 mentioning that participation has to be effective so Indigenous peoples can 
influence the decision. 
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economic programmes, and the use of their lands, territories and other resources, 
respectively. More specific scenarios in which their participation is required are the 
implementation of a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process in 
conjunction with States to recognise Indigenous rights to lands (Article 27) and 
regarding contacts and relations between Indigenous peoples across borders (Article 
36). It is also required in specific circumstances related to the environment, like 
assistance programmes to conserve and protect the Indigenous environment (Article 
29); and measures to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or 
spiritual impacts (Article 32.3). However, and despite the fact that UNDRIP goes 
further than C169 and explicitly recognises Indigenous peoples’ rights over natural 
resources (like flora and fauna68 and minerals69) and, as mentioned before, strongly 
acknowledges the special relationship that they have with their lands and territories, 
there are no explicit references to conducting impact studies with Indigenous 
participation to “assess social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impacts”,70 not 
even in Article 32.2, which refers to the case of exploration/exploitation of natural 
resources in Indigenous lands (where consultations are required).71  
 This seems an unusual omission, considering the potentially serious effects 
on Indigenous peoples’ economic, social, spiritual and cultural rights and 
environment, which can only be properly identified and addressed with their 
participation and  knowledge, especially those of a spiritual and cultural nature;72 the 
influence of C169 in UNDRIP and the important role that these studies have for 
consultations and in avoiding the materialisation of potential harm;73 and the several 
references to the protection of cultural sites 74  and lands, territories and natural 
resources 75  in UNDRIP, to which a mechanism like impact studies is clearly 
                                                             
68 UNDRIP Article 24, recognising the rights to conserve their vital medicinal plants and animals.  
69 Ibid. and Article 32.2 where the duty to consult when it comes to any project affecting their lands or 
territories and other resources is established, especially regarding “the development, utilization or 
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.” See also J. Gilbert and C. Doyle, “A New Dawn 
over the Land: Shedding Light on Collective Ownership and Consent” in Allen and Xanthaki (n 7), p 
302. 
70 C169, Article 7.3. See Chapter IV section 6.1. 
71 UNDRIP, Article 32.2. 
72 As noted in previous chapters. 
73 See Chapter IV section 6.1-6.2 and section 3.1 below. See also V. Tauli-Corpuz, “Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples”, A/HRC/45/34 (18 June 2020)(‘2020 
Report’), para 58. 
74 UNDRIP Articles 11 and 12, among others. 
75 Ibid., Articles 26 and 29, among others. 
159 
 
relevant. Considering this, it can be argued that, similar to the situation of C169 
Article 15.2, the requirement of ‘appropriate measures’ to mitigate adverse 
environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impacts in the case of 
extractive activities in Article 32.3 refers to impact studies, established precisely to 
determine possible impacts and avoid and mitigate their effects, as noted in previous 
chapters (following a precautionary approach), as it cannot be a reference to 
consultations, mentioned in Article 32.2. This is also the view of several authors.76 
 In addition, the Declaration establishes that Indigenous peoples’ FPIC is an 
objective of consultations (see below), and in certain cases, a requirement. In order 
for this consent to be ‘informed’ and conduct reliable consultation processes, it is 
necessary to conduct “independent and impartial social, cultural and environmental 
impact studies that cover the full spectrum of rights that could be affected by a 
measure or project”.77 Similarly, the former Special Rapporteur James Anaya noted 
that it is “essential for the State to carry out environmental and social impact studies” 
to have a full and objective assessment of potential and expected consequences about 
the different ways in which a project could affect Indigenous peoples’ livelihood, in 
order to make an informed decision.78 This understanding of impact studies as an 
element of ‘informed consent’ has also been acknowledged by the EMRIP,79 and 
several authors.80   
 Although TK is not mentioned in the context of participation (it is in regards 
to cultural heritage, seemingly in a context of something that requires protection),81 
the preamble recognises that Indigenous knowledge, cultures and practices contribute 
to sustainable development and the proper management of the environment 82 
                                                             
76 J. Pasqualucci, “Critique of the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in light 
of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 27Wis.Int'lL.J.51 2009-2010, 
pp 93-94, saying that one way to mitigate impacts is determine them in advance; J. Anaya and S. Puig, 
“Mitigating State Sovereignty: The Duty to Consult with Indigenous Peoples” Arizona Legal Studies 
Discussion Paper No.16-42, p 25, saying that mitigation measures should be based on impact studies 
made with Indigenous participation; and Errico (n 62), pp 448-449. 
77 2020 Report, para. 58. See also E. Stamatopoulou, “Taking Cultural Rights Seriously: The Vision of 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, in Allen and Xanthaki (n 7), p 410. 
78 J. Anaya, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People”, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, 15 July 2009, (‘2009 Report’), paras. 53 
and 70. 
79 EMRIP Report 2018, para. 22. 
80 Burger (n 21), p 49; Barelli (n 51), pp 250-251; Errico (n 28), p 452, among others. 
81 UNDRIP, Article 31, analysed below. 
82 Ibid., preamble. 
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implicitly recognising the importance of this knowledge in avoiding serious harm to 
their lands and, subsequently, to their traditional way of life.83 Moreover, the Special 
Rapporteur highlights that Indigenous peoples’ participation in impact studies is 
essential to identify possible impacts and ways to avoid them,84 which requires the 
use of TK. In effect, it would be very difficult for States to find out which areas or 
resources are of cultural/spiritual and/or historical significance and the risks that they 
face, including sacred sites and animals, without the assistance of Indigenous 
peoples, also considering that TK provides an holistic understanding (‘the best 
information available’) about their traditional way of life. Thus, it is clear that TK 
plays an important role in the avoidance of potential harm through impact studies, 




UNDRIP requires States to “consult and cooperate in good faith” with Indigenous 
peoples, “in order to obtain” their FPIC, before adopting and implementing 
legislative or administrative measures that may affect them,85 that is, when their 
particular interests or conditions are implicated in the decision. 86  A literal 
interpretation would mean that consultations are applicable only in situations of 
uncertainty (i.e., ‘may’ affect them) but this would restrict its scope, so it makes 
more sense to interpret this as a way to cover as much scenarios as possible, 
including preventive situations. Certain particular cases where consultations are 
required are in adopting measures to combat discrimination (Article 15.2); before the 
use of Indigenous lands for military activities (Article 30) or before the approval of 
“any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in 
                                                             
83 Ibid. See also T. Stoll, “Intellectual Property and Technologies” in Hohmann and Weller (n 15), p 
312, noting that Indigenous knowledge is also important for impact assessments, among other things, 
as recognised by the Akwe: Kon Guidelines (analysed in Chapter II section 6.2). 
84 Report 2020, para 58. 
85 UNDRIP, Article 19. 
86 2009 Report, para. 43. 
161 
 
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or 
other resources”.87  
 This duty to consult and cooperate has the aim to build a dialogue in good 
faith, leading to a mutual understanding and consensual decision-making,88 being a 
process that does not occur at a single moment in time but extends over the course of 
a project or measure.89 As such, it would allow Indigenous peoples to incorporate 
their concerns and perspectives, based on their own knowledge and experiences, 
regarding possible risks and threats to their way of life and how to address them,90 
including cultural and spiritual effects, influencing the outcome of the decision.91 To 
ensure this, Article 19 establishes stringent obligations to have ‘meaningful 
consultations’,92 which are: 
- they shall be conducted before adopting/implementing legislative or administrative 
measures that may affect Indigenous peoples, so they are involved as early as 
possible in the process, having enough time to understand and analyse the 
information, engage in their own decision-making processes,93  and influence the 
outcome, which cannot be done when the decisions are already made;94 
- in good faith, which requires a climate of confidence and mutual respect that 
favours productive dialogues, creating the conditions to achieve an agreement;95 
- through Indigenous’ representative institutions, established through their own 
decision-making procedures;96 and 
- with the aim to obtain their consent, which is then an objective and not a 
requirement, except in certain situations (see below). 
                                                             
87 UNDRIP, Article 32.2. Other instances of consultations can be found in Article 17 (protection of 
Indigenous children), and Article 36.2 (measures to maintain relations with their own members across 
boundaries), among others. 
88 2009 Report, para. 49. 
89 EMRIP Report 2018, para. 15. 
90 Ibid., para. 34. J. Anaya, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, Extractive industries and Indigenous peoples”, 1 July 
2013, A/HRC/24/41 (‘2013 Report’), para. 59, noting that consultations allow them to “actively 
contribute to the prior assessment of all potential impacts of the proposed activity, including the extent 
to which their substantive rights and interests may be affected. Additionally, consultation procedures 
are key to the search for less harmful alternatives or in the definition of mitigation measures.” 
91 EMRIP Report 2018, para. 15; see also 2009 Report, para 46. 
92 Barelli (n 20), p 37. 
93 EMRIP Report 2018, para. 21(a) and (b).  
94 2009 Report, para 46. 
95 Ibid., para 50. EMRIP Report 2018, para. 20(a) and (b).  
96 2009 Report, para. 52. EMRIP Report 2018, para. 20(c). 
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Article 19 does not require consultations to be conducted ‘through appropriate 
procedures’; this requirement is present in Article 18, referring to participation in 
decision-making, but applies to consultations97 and provides a degree of flexibility, 
as there is no ‘single model’ of consultations, 98  considering the various 
circumstances where they are required, the nature of the measure and the specific 
ways in which Indigenous peoples organise. That being said, consultations 
procedures themselves should be the product of consensus,99 contributing to create a 
climate of trust and respect, and protecting Indigenous peoples from arbitrariness, 
‘informative meetings’ and proforma consultations.100  
In sum, consultations have detailed requirements that would enable 
Indigenous participation and influence in the decision-making process; this, together 
with impact assessments, allows them to incorporate their TK, perspectives and 
alternatives to protect their social, cultural, economic, political and spiritual aspects 
of their way of life, as well as their lands and resources, from possible and known 
harms, constituting the best information available to anticipate potentially serious 
effects on their livelihood. 101  What still remains to be analysed is if UNDRIP 




The Declaration refers to consent in various Articles, although in some of them (like 
Articles 19 and 32), the wording used leaves ample space for interpretation, 
reflecting the tensions during the negotiation process between States and Indigenous 
peoples,102 requiring a more cautious and flexible approach to this issue.103  
                                                             
97 ILA Report 2010, p 14. 
98 2009 Report, para. 45. 
99 Ibid., para 51; EMRIP Report 2018, para. 20(d). 
100 Anaya and Puig (n 76), p 23; 2009 Report, para. 46. 
101 EMRIP Report 2018, para. 34: “Indigenous peoples should have a major role in establishing 
whether the measure or project affects them at all and, if it does, the extent of the impact. Indigenous 
peoples may highlight possible harms that may not be clear to the State or project proponent, and may 
suggest mitigation measures to address those harms.” 
102 Barelli (n 51), pp 248-249; D. Newman, “Interpreting FPIC in UNDRIP”, International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights 27 (2019), p 235. 
103 Barelli (n 51), p 251. 
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 The Declaration itself does not clarify the meaning of FPIC; however, 
following a report from the UNPFII, it can be argued that: 
- ‘free’ implies that the process to obtain consent should be without coercion, 
intimidation or manipulation;  
- ‘prior’, refers to seeking consent sufficiently in advance of any authorization or the 
initiation of activities, respecting Indigenous decision-making processes; and  
- ‘informed’ means that a certain minimum of information must be provided, 
covering at least the nature, pace, reversibility and size of the proposed 
project/activity; its purpose, duration and location affected; personnel involved; 
procedures that it may entail; and “a preliminary assessment of the likely economic, 
social, cultural and environmental impact, including potential risks(…) in a context 
that respects the precautionary principle”[emphasis added].104  This reaffirms the 
notion that impact studies are incorporated in UNDRIP, mentioned above.  
Interestingly, there is no elaboration on the word ‘consent’; its ordinary meaning 
refers to the idea of “permission to do something”,105 but Article 19 (and 32.2) refers 
to consultations “in order to obtain” consent, an expression that according to the 
Special Rapporteur, should not be understood as giving Indigenous peoples a general 
‘veto power’ over decisions that could affect them,106 moving away from the ‘binary 
veto-non-veto’ approach of C169. This is also supported by the different wording 
used in situations of relocation and storage of hazardous materials in Indigenous 
lands, that ‘shall’ not take place “without their free, prior and informed consent”, 
thus being consent a requirement (see below); and also the drafting history of Article 
19, which originally had a more mandatory text, i.e., “States shall obtain” Indigenous 
peoples’ FPIC,107 changed at the proposal of the Chairman of the Working Group 
due to concerns expressed by States about a perceived ‘right to veto’.108 All this 
                                                             
104 UNPFII, “Report on Free, Prior and Informed Consent”, UN Doc.E/C.19/2005/3, 17 February 
2005, p 12. This is very similar to C169. 
105  Oxford online dictionary 
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/consent_1?q=consent [accessed 
November 2020]. 
106 2009 Report, paras. 46 and 48. 
107 See Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 1995/32 on its eleventh session” E/CN.4/2006/79 (22 March 2006) Annex I Article 20. 
108 Ibid. See for instance “Report of the working group established in accordance with Commission on 
Human Rights resolution 1995/32” (10 December 1996) E/CN.4/1997/102 para 227, where the 
Norway representative mentioned that Article 20 was sometimes interpreted as granting a right to 
veto, requiring clarification. See also S. Errico “The Controversial Issue of Natural Resources: 
164 
 
implies that, according to UNDRIP’s text, there is no absolute obligation to obtain 
consent, being generally an objective of the consultation process.109 This does not 
mean that States can simply move forward with measures that could affect 
Indigenous peoples’ way of life and environment; States still have to consult 
Indigenous peoples, a process that aims to avoid “the imposition of the will of one 
party over the other”,110 following a series of stringent requirements. As noted above, 
this allows Indigenous peoples to influence the outcome of the decision-making 
process,111  providing some degree of protection to their rights.  
 In any case, there are two clear situations where UNDRIP expressly 
precludes States from taking certain actions in the absence of Indigenous FPIC. The 
first one is Article 10, relocation (which could have potentially disastrous effects on 
Indigenous peoples’ way of life and survival, as discussed in the context of C169),112 
establishing that Indigenous peoples “shall not be forcibly removed from their lands 
or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed 
consent of the Indigenous peoples concerned(…)”.113 Unlike C169, UNDRIP does 
not contemplate a possibility to circumvent this,114 although cases of force majeure 
or necessity still apply. 115  The second situation is Article 29.2, by which States 
cannot store or dispose of hazardous materials in Indigenous lands “without their 
free, prior and informed consent”. The possible effects of this situation are long-
lasting, affecting not only the environment but also the current and future 
developments and survival of the communities. For instance, Brook characterises the 
dumping of nuclear and solid waste in Indigenous reservations in the US as 
‘environmental genocide’, noting the serious effects on the health of present and 
future generations (cancer and birth defects, among others) and the absorption of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Balancing States’ Sovereignty with Indigenous Peoples’ Rights”, in Allen and Xanthaki (n 7), p 361 
and M. Barelli, “Free, prior and informed consent in the aftermath of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: developments and challenges ahead, The International Journal of 
Human Rights, 16:1 (2012), p 9. 
109 2009 Report, para 46; EMRIP Report 2018, para. 15; Barelli (n 51), p 253; Quane (n 64), p 278; 
Gilbert and Doyle (n 69), p 313, noting that FPIC is required in certain circumstances but not Article 
19.  
110 2009 Report, paras 46 and 48. 
111 Ibid.  
112 See Chapter IV, section 6.3. 
113 UNDRIP, Article 10. 
114 Charters (n 55), p 409, noting that Article 10 “suggest a deliberate intention to retain a strong, 
blanket prohibition.” 
115 ILA Report 2010, p 21.  
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toxins by the soil, plants and animals fundamental for their livelihood;116 likewise, 
the impacts of tar sands developments in Canada have been also described in similar 
terms (‘slow industrial genocide’), as Indigenous peoples’ abilities to maintain their 
traditional way of life has been severely affected by the lack of availability of game 
and fish, and the high level of pollution of the air, soil and water have resulted in 
disproportionate levels of various form of lethal diseases which will affect 
generations to come.117 Thus, both Articles, using a very clear language, address 
situations of potentially catastrophic effects for Indigenous peoples’ way of life and 
environment, relying on FPIC as an enhanced safeguard in the face of these more 
substantive threats, constituting an improvement compared to C169. 
 
2.2.3.1 The exploitation of natural resources on Indigenous lands 
An important issue that involves the core of Indigenous peoples’ traditional 
livelihood and cultural identity is the exploitation of natural resources on their lands. 
While UNDRIP does not define ‘culture’, its provisions reveal a broad understanding 
of it,118 i.e., as a ‘way of life’ intertwined with their lands and resources.119 This is 
reflected several Articles, such as: the recognition of the rights to practise and 
revitalise their cultural traditions and customs, including the protection of historical 
sites, artefacts and ceremonies (Articles 11.1); to revitalise, use, develop and transmit 
to future generations their histories, oral traditions and languages (Article 13.1); to 
maintain, control and protect their cultural heritage, TK and cultural expressions, 
including knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora (Article 31.1); and to their 
traditional medicines and health practices, including the conservation of vital 
medicinal plants, animals and minerals (Article 24.1); among others. In addition, 
UNDRIP recognises Indigenous peoples’ right to “maintain and strengthen their 
                                                             
116 D. Brook, “Environmental Genocide: Native Americans and Toxic Waste”, American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology, Vol. 57, No. 1 (1998), pp 105-113.  
117 J. Huseman and D. Short, “A slow industrial genocide’: tar sands and the Indigenous peoples of 
northern Alberta”, International Journal of Human Rights, 16:1 (2012), pp 216-237. 
118 A. Xanthaki, “Culture: Articles 11(1), 12, 13(1), 15 and 34” in Hohmann and Weller (n 15), p 283. 
One author even notes that “one can find the cultural rights angle in each article of the Declaration”. 
Stamatopoulou (n 77), p 392. 
119 S. Wiessner “Indigenous self-determination, culture, and land: a reassessment in light of the 2007 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in E. Pulitano (ed.), Indigenous Rights in the 
Age of the UN Declaration (Cambridge University Press 2014), p 48; Xanthaki (n 118), pp 283-286, 
noting that UNDRIP in this point is influenced by the UNTS.  
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distinctive spiritual relationship” with their traditionally owned or otherwise 
occupied and used lands, territories and natural resources (Article 25), as well as 
their right “to manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual and religious 
traditions, customs and ceremonies” and “maintain, protect and have access in 
privacy to their religious and cultural sites” (Article 12.1), although without 
specifying which mechanism(s) would ensure these protection and private access, 
nor the ‘effective measures’ that States shall adopt to protect their cultural rights in 
Articles 13.2 and 31.2.  
 In this context, and as discussed during UNDRIP’s (contentious) 120 
negotiations by Indigenous organizations, it is critically important for them to own 
and control their lands, territories and resources, so they can protect their profound 
relationship with their environment 121  (which may require not only access but 
exclusive possession and use, to fully realise their spiritual relationship), 122 
maintaining their cultural integrity and ensuring their survival as peoples.123 Yet, 
States insisted that these provisions could not go against national regulations about 
nature conservation, security and strategic resources, arguing that “ultimate control 
over the land must lie with the Government(…) and land rights could only be 
considered within the framework of national legislation”. 124  In addition, as 
mentioned in previous chapters, cultural and spiritual rights are not absolute, 
admitting some restrictions, as also repeatedly argued by States.125 The result was the 
adoption of Article 26.2, recognising Indigenous peoples’ right to own, use, develop 
and control lands, territories and resources they possess (Article 26.2) (which shall 
be recognised and protected by States, as per Article 26.3); however, this must be 
understood in the light of Article 32.2, recognising States’ interest in the exploitation 
of natural resources, even those located within Indigenous peoples’ lands.  
                                                             
120 Charters (n 55), pp 401-402. 
121  UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), Report of the Working Group Established in 
Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1996/84 (4 January 1996), para. 84. 
122 Charters (n 55), p 411. For instance, the Kichwa Sarayaku people allow only the shamans to enter 
certain sacred places and interact with the spirits. See IACtHR, “Case of the Kichwa Indigenous 
People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador (Merits and Reparations)” Judgment of June 27, 2012 (‘Sarayaku’), 
para. 57.  
123 Wiessner (n 119), p 47; Errico (n 108), p 333. 
124 UNCHR (n 121), paras 83 and 85. 
125 See Chapter IV section 3.3.1; Xanthaki (n 118), p 287; Charters (n 55), p 415. 
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 Article 32.2 requires States to consult Indigenous peoples “in order to obtain 
their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their 
lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the 
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources”. Gilbert 
and Doyle argue that this means obtaining consent, based on the drafting history 
(some countries attempted to unsuccessfully change the word ‘obtain’ for ‘seek’, 
implying that consent is required); 126  the right to self-determination; 127  and the 
context provided by Article 32.1, referring to Indigenous peoples’ right to “determine 
and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or 
territories and other resources” for which consent would be necessary.128 However, 
the majority position is that FPIC is an objective, due to its wording (‘in order to 
obtain’, same as Article 19), which does establish consent as a precondition, in 
contrast with Articles 10 and 29.2; that an earlier version of Article 32.2 required 
“States obtain their free and informed consent…”[emphasis added], which was 
ultimately changed, thus supporting the notion that FPIC is not required;129 and that, 
as noted by Errico, UNDRIP has a similar approach as C169, recognising States’ 
ownership of subsoil resources, limiting Indigenous peoples’ rights, with Article 32.3 
assuming the undertaken of extractive activities by States under certain conditions 
(redress and mitigation measures) and therefore what UNDRIP actually requires here 
are ‘authentic negotiations’ and not consent. 130  However, it is clear that these 
negotiations must be informed by the profound relationship that Indigenous peoples 
have with their lands, territories and resources, as also noted in Article 32.3, 
requiring States “to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or 




                                                             
126 Gilbert and Doyle (n 69), p 317. 
127 Ibid., and C. Verbeek, “Free, prior and Informed Consent: the Key to Self-determination, and 
Analysis of the Kichwa People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador” 37Am.IndianL.Rev.263 2012-2013, pp 277-
278. 
128 Gilbert and Doyle (n 69), p 313; see also S. Rombouts, “The Evolution of Indigenous Peoples' 
Consultation Rights under the ILO and UN Regimes”, 53STAN.J.INT'L169-224(2017), p 202. 
129 Barelli (n 51), pp 252-253. 
130 Errico (n 108), pp 337-341 and 347. See also 2009 Report, para. 46. 
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2.2.3.2 Extractive projects and potential threats of substantive harm 
 
One important issue is the possibility that development/extractive projects have 
potentially devastating effects on Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life and/or 
territories (as they often do),131 threatening their physical and/or cultural survival. 
This includes material and spiritual effects (e.g., the destruction of a sacred site, the 
impossibility to conduct vital rituals), more difficult to identify and avoid without 
Indigenous participation and knowledge. 132  If Articles 10 and 29.2 are of any 
guidance, these types of impacts would require FPIC, but there is no distinction in 
the text of Article 32.2.  
 Yet, as noted by Newman, UNDRIP can be interpreted using a purposive 
approach, which may lead to a different understanding relative to its text,133 resulting 
in broader or more limited roles for FPIC depending “on how one reads the purposes 
in which FPIC is to be situated”.134 In this context, Barelli argues that, as UNDRIP 
recognises and protects the special relationship between Indigenous peoples and their 
lands and resources, as well as their right to self-determination and the related right 
to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development, “allowing States to 
implement projects which may have serious consequences on the lands, lives and, 
ultimately, existence of indigenous peoples, without their consent, appears 
incompatible with the spirit and normative framework of the Declaration”. 135 
Following this, measures that would not substantially interfere with the enjoyment of 
their fundamental human rights require only consultations, but for measures “likely 
to produce a major (negative) impact on their lands, cultures and, ultimately, lives of 
Indigenous peoples, the presumption is that States will have a duty” to obtain their 
FPIC. 136  This approach has been supported by several academics; 137  the Special 
Rapporteur, mentioning that “[a] significant, direct impact on indigenous peoples’ 
lives or territories establishes a strong presumption that the proposed measure should 
                                                             
131 2013 Report, paras. 1-3; see also section 3 below. 
132 Barelli (n 51), p 269 
133 Newman (n 102), p. 243. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Barelli (n 20), p 38. 
136 Barelli (n 51), p 269. 
137 See for instance, Anaya and Puig (n 108), p 26; Newman (n 102), p 242; Errico (n 108), p 441; 
Rombouts (n 128), p 202; and Xanthaki (n 118), p 287; ILA (n 22), para. 5, among others. 
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not go forward without indigenous peoples’ consent. In certain contexts, that 
presumption may harden into a prohibition of the measure or project in the absence 
of indigenous consent”;138 and the EMRIP, noting that “if a measure or project is 
likely to have a significant, direct impact on indigenous peoples’ lives or land, 
territories or resources then consent is required”.139  
 Contrasting this (and the majority of favourable views about UNDRIP 
presented in previous sections), there are scholars with a different perspective; for 
instance, Engle argues that albeit UNDRIP may appear to be progressive and 
‘pushing the envelope’ in regards to self-determination and cultural rights, it also 
represents the persistence of “an international human rights paradigm that eschews 
strong forms of indigenous self-determination and privileges individual civil and 
political rights”;140 Churchill says that UNDRIP fails to fully recognise Indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination, excluding its ‘cardinal principle’, i.e., that ‘all 
peoples’ can opt for independence from alien powers, turning “the rhetoric of self-
determination to the opposite purpose (…) consecrating in law the very structure of 
internal colonial domination and exploitation at the hands of state entities from 
which Indigenous nations have been struggling to free themselves.”141 Watson and 
Venne, in a similar vein, argue that this failure to fully recognise Indigenous peoples’ 
self-determination leaves them “captives of the colonial state”,142 where even the 
right to internal self-determination is determined by these colonial States “which 
occupy indigenous peoples’ lands”, remaining “the final determiner of all things 
within the life of the state, including the lives of Indigenous peoples”;143 and Merino 
mentions that UNDRIP’s recognition of self-determination reinforced States’ power 
on Indigenous territories, in exchange for some autonomy, but retaining the power to 
decide in cases where an agreement in not reached, except for some cases like 
                                                             
138 2009 Report, para. 47. See also 2013 Report, para. 31. 
139 EMRIP 2018 Report, para 35. See also para. 26(a), noting that “withholding consent is expected to 
convince the other party not to take the risk of proceeding with the proposal”. 
140 K. Engle, ‘On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the 
Context of Human Rights’ 22 EJIL (2011), pp 141-142. 
141 W. Churchill, “A Travesty of a Mockery of a Sham”, Griffith Law Review, Vol 20 No 3 (2011), p 
527. 
142 I. Watson and S. Venne, ‘Taking up Indigenous Peoples’ Original Intent and a Space Dominated 
by State Interventions’ in Pulitano (n 119), pp 97-98. See also S. Newcomb, “Domination in relation 
to Indigenous (‘dominated’) Peoples in international law”, in I. Watson (ed), Indigenous Peoples as 
Subjects of International Law (Routledge, 2018), pp 28-31. 
143 Watson and Venne (n 142), pp 90 and 99.  
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relocation.144 This perspective leaves little space for an expansive interpretation of 
FPIC, even in the face of potentially substantive effects.  
 This is all the more important in regard to impacts on spiritual and cultural 
aspects, because they do not follow a lineal logic (e.g., the destruction of one tree 
could be devastating if it is the most sacred one) and there is often uncertainty about 
their materialisation, being difficult to foresee and fully understand (e.g., the 
consequences of the spirits abandoning certain sites). In this context, Watson and 
Venne argue that UNDRIP “provides no protection for indigenous places”,145 also 
highlighting a previous draft of Article 12 which required States to “take effective 
measures, in conjunction with the indigenous peoples concerned, to ensure that 
indigenous sacred places(…) be preserved, respected and protected”[emphasis 
added],146 implying that stricter measures were required to protect these vital places. 
Similarly, Jensen and Perez note that, because States consider spiritual issues as a 
private matter, the recognition of these rights in UNDRIP is inconsequential, as 
attested by the many cases where the ‘religion of the colonised’ has not been 
considered respectable or valid, and thus the spiritual value of Indigenous peoples’ 
lands and resources is not a serious consideration in States’ social and judicial 
spheres.147  
 In addition, States have actually relied on a ‘less expansive’ interpretation of 
FPIC; Newman for instance mentions that Canada, in implementing the Declaration, 
recognised Indigenous peoples’ rights to be consulted “with the aim of securing their 
free, prior and informed consent”, 148  a wording more in line with a textual 
interpretation of FPIC that “sits less easily” with a purposive approach.149 Similarly, 
                                                             
144 R. Merino, “Law and politics of Indigenous self-determination: the meaning of the right to prior 
consultation” in Watson (n 142), pp 130-131. 
145 Watson and Venne (n 142), p 101. 
146 See supra 107, Article 13. 
147  M. Jansen and G. Perez, “The Indigenous Condition: An Introductory Note” in M. Castillo and A. 
Strecker, Heritage and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Leiden University Press 2017), pp 33-34. 
148  Department of Justice, Principles Respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship with 
Indigenous Peoples, Government of Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Justice and Attorney General of 
Canada, 2018), p 12. 
149  Newman (n 102), pp 243-244. See also C. Rodriguez-Garabito, “Ethnicity.gov: Global 
Governance, Indigenous Peoples, and the Right to Prior Consultation in Social Minefields“ Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol 18 N 1(2010), noting that the emphasis on procedural aspects in 
conflicts involving Indigenous peoples reflects the prevalence of a neoliberal governance paradigm 
that leaves intact power asymmetries, resulting in multiple interpretations of consultations’ 
requirements, including weak interpretations by some States which do not consider FPIC. 
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Williams criticises the narrow view adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court 
regarding Indigenous peoples’ spiritual practices, diverging from an international 
trend that recognises and fortifies Indigenous peoples’ rights reflected in UNDRIP,150 
by deciding that there was no violation of the Ktunaxa peoples’ rights when the State 
approved, after a lengthy period of consultations but without their consent, a 
proposed year-round ski resort in a sacred place, which they opposed because of 
concerns that any permanent development would desecrate the place and drive the 
Grizzly Bear Spirit away, thus rendering many of their spiritual beliefs and traditions 
futile.151 Finally, even regional courts have recently sidestepped any mentions of 
FPIC in the face of substantive harm to spiritual/cultural values, despite their reliance 
on UNDRIP in the legal reasoning, as I will analyse in the next section. 
 In sum, there is a majority position that defends an expansive (purposive) 
interpretation of UNDRIP, which would provide a strong protection of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights by expanding the cases where consent is needed, especially in those 
situations of projects and developments in their lands that could have substantive 
impacts on their traditional way of life. However, State practice, relying on a less 
expansive approach, and the consideration of UNDRIP as an instrument that fails to 
fully recognise Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, replicating 
‘colonialist’ dynamics, provide an interesting counterargument, generating some 
uncertainty about the standard applicable. This is an issue where the precautionary 
principle could play an important role, supporting the argument in favour of an 
expansive interpretation, and providing guidance when there are reasonable concerns 
that potentially substantive harm to Indigenous peoples’ livelihood (including 
spiritual/cultural aspects) could occur, requiring States to ensure that this harm would 
not materialise (independent from the right to self-determination), relying as well on 
heightened safeguards applicable to Indigenous peoples, such as obtaining FPIC, as I 
will explain in more detail in the next chapter. 
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The broadly supported Declaration constitutes another positive step for Indigenous 
peoples in international law, consolidating the progress achieved in the last couple of 
decades by recognising several rights like (internal) self-determination, 
cultural/spiritual rights, and right to lands and resources. It also includes important 
participatory mechanisms to protect these rights, specifically prior consultations, 
which allows them to influence the outcome of a decision that could affect them. 
Interestingly, unlike C169, UNDRIP does not explicitly mentions the duty to conduct 
impact studies; yet, these studies are implicitly integrated as a way to identify 
potential risks and effects on their way of life (social, cultural and spiritual aspects) 
and environment, constituting a vital part of ‘informed’ consent. These impact 
studies provide another instance, together with consultations, to incorporate TK in 
decision-making processes and acquire the best information available, anticipating 
possible harm and propose alternatives, especially when it comes to spiritual and 
cultural aspects, where there is often a degree of uncertainty about how they are 
going to be affected. 
As in the case of C169, consent is not generally a requirement; however, and 
going beyond this convention, UNDRIP clearly establishes two situations where it 
shall be obtained (both of which represent a substantive threat to the Indigenous 
survival), relocation and the storage of hazardous materials in Indigenous lands, 
acting as an enhanced safeguard. Regarding potentially substantive effects derived 
from the exploitation of natural resources in Indigenous lands, this is more 
controversial; depending on the ‘purposes in which FPIC is to be situated’, there are 
two interpretations: a majority one that highlights UNDRIP’s recognition of 
Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination and role in protecting Indigenous 
peoples’ rights and relationship with their territories, which defends the need to 
obtain FPIC in the face of substantial threats; and another that considers UNDRIP as 
an instrument that replicates colonial paradigms, arguing that States retain the final 
decision-making power in this context, a position also seemingly favoured by States 
(and arguably, supported by recent regional jurisprudence, where an expansive 
173 
 
interpretation of FPIC as not been followed, as I will analyse below). In this sense, 
although in general establishing stronger safeguards to protect Indigenous peoples’ 
rights, there is some degree of uncertainty about FPIC, especially when it comes to 
the protection of cultural and spiritual sites and values from substantive threats of 
harm.  
I move on now to the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights in the Inter-
American and African systems. 
. 
3. Regional protection of Indigenous peoples  
 
The protection and recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights has been the focus of 
regional institutions since a long time, resulting in important developments regarding 
participatory, cultural and land rights, especially in the Inter-American and African 
systems.152 In this context, both the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, 
and the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights have been interpreted 
in order to accommodate Indigenous peoples’ claims and protect their rights by their 
monitoring bodies, although with some regional differences. These developments, 
especially those regarding participation and FPIC, are the focus of this section, 
starting with the Inter-American system, due to its influence on the African system, 
which will conclude this section. 
 
3.1 The American Convention on Human Rights  
 
The American Convention is one of the main instruments of the Inter-American 
Human Rights System,153 which also includes the 1948 Charter of the Organization 
of American States (‘OAS’);154 and the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and 
                                                             
152 Barelli (n 51), pp 257 and 261. Xanthaki (n 118), p 277. See also S. Young, Indigenous Peoples, 
Consent and Rights: Troubling subjects (Routledge, 2020), pp 157-158; S. Rombouts, Having a say: 
Indigenous peoples, international law and free, prior and informed consent (WLP, 2014), p 219. 
153 I. Madariaga, “ILO Convention 169 in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Consultation 
and Consent”, International Journal of Human Rights, 24:2-3, (2020), p 257. 
154 OAS, Charter of the Organization of American States, 30 April 1948, 119UNTS3, entry into force 
13 December 1951. 
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Duties of Man,155 among others.156 This Convention157  recognises a series of rights 
and freedoms that States must respect and ensure158 (mostly of a civil and political 
character),159 such as the rights to life (Article 4), to personal liberty (Article 7), and 
property (Article 21), as well as freedom of conscience and religion (Article 12), of 
thought and expression (Article 13) and of association (Article 16), among others. 
Also, Article 26 requires States to adopt measures for the ‘progressive achievement 
of economic, social, and cultural standards’ defined in the American Declaration,160 
which considers cultural rights as manifestations of arts and sciences,161 although the 
monitoring bodies have adopted a broader approach on Indigenous peoples’ cultural 
rights (see below). 
The American Convention establishes that two organs, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (‘IACHR’)162 and the IACtHR,163 are competent to 
address “matters relating to the fulfilment of the commitments” made by States164 
(being also able to interpret this Convention);165 yet, they do not function as a ‘first 
instance-appeals court’ system,166 having full autonomy and independence.167  
                                                             
155 OAS, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res.XXX(1948), OAS Doc. 
OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4rev.13 (2010). 
156  See ‘Basic Documents in the Inter-American System’ 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/intro.asp [accessed November 2020]. 
157 Complemented by the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("Protocol of San Salvador"), 16 November 1999, and 
the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, 8 June 
1990. 
158 American Convention, Articles 1-2. 
159 T. Antkowiak and A. Gonza, The American Convention on Human Rights (OUP, 2017), p 6. 
160 Article 26 mentions “the implicit rights set forth” in the OAS Charter, which does not define these 
standards; however, the American Declaration “contains and defines the fundamental human rights 
referred to in the Charter.” IACtHR, “Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights,” 
Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, 14 July 1989, para. 43.  
161 See Article XIII: “Every person has the right to take part in the cultural life of the community, to 
enjoy the arts, and to participate in the benefits that result from intellectual progress, especially 
scientific discoveries.”; see also San Salvador Protocol, Article 14. 
162 Established by the 5th Meeting of Consultation, Santiago, Chile, August 12-18, 1959. Final Act, 
OAS Official Records, OEA/Ser.C/II.5, p 10-11. The American Convention details its organization, 
function, competence and procedure (Chapter VII), and every OAS member is subject to it by signing 
the American Declaration. 
163 Established by the American Convention (Chapter VIII), which also regulates its organization, 
jurisdiction and function, and procedure. 
164 American Convention, Article 33. 
165 Antkowiak and Gonza (n 159), p 1. 
166 Ibid., p 13 
167 IACtHR, “Control of Due Process in the exercise of the Powers of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (Articles 41 and 44 to 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights”, Advisory 
Opinion OC-19/05, 28 November 2005, para. 25. 
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a) the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
 
The IACHR’s main function is to “promote the observance and protection of human 
rights” and serve as a consultative organ to the OAS.168 To do this, it can inter alia 
make recommendations to States; prepare studies and reports; submit an annual 
report to the OAS General Assembly; and take action on petitions and other 
communications regarding violations or complaints of violations of the American 
Convention by States (or the American Declaration, if a State has not ratified the 
Convention), 169  brought by any person, group, or non-governmental entity 
recognised in at least one member State.170 In this procedure, the IACHR examines 
the admissibility of the petition and, if admissible, carries out an investigation,171 
with the possibility of reaching a friendly settlement of the matter.172 If not, the 
Commission makes a preliminary report, transmitted to the State(s) concerned, which 
includes written and oral statements of the parties; the facts and recommendations; 
and a deadline to comply with them.173 Although these recommendations are not 
legally binding, they have a very important role in influencing State’s conduct;174 
moreover, if the Commission considers that there is insufficient compliance with the 
recommendations, and if the State has accepted its jurisdiction, it refers the case to 
the IACtHR,175 which will issue a binding judgment. The Commission can decide to 
publish the report if the State has not adopted adequate measures.176  
During this procedure, the IACHR can issue precautionary measures, on its 
own initiative or at the request of a party, regarding situations that are serious (i.e., a 
“grave impact that an action or omission can have on a right or the eventual effects 
                                                             
168 OAS Charter, Article 106. 
169 American Convention, Article 41; Antkowiak and Gonza (n 159), p 9; see for instance IACHR, 
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American Convention. Antkowiak and Gonza (n 159), p 10. 
176 American Convention, Article 51. 
176 
 
of a petition or case”) and urgent (i.e., a “risk or threat that is imminent and can 
materialise”) which could cause irreparable harm to persons or the subject matter of a 
pending petition or case, 177  requiring only a prima facie standard of proof. 178 
However, some of the requirements could reduce their effectiveness; for instance, the 
Commission must take into account if the situation was brought to the attention of 
authorities or the reasons why this has not been possible, as well as information 
presented by States,179 slowing the process and allowing States to retaliate against the 
petitioners. 180  This, added to the ‘imminence’ requirement, indicate that these 
measures are more oriented to avoid foreseeable (and not uncertain) harm, such as 
credible threats to life and personal integrity, 181  even in Indigenous issues. For 
instance, the IACHR required Brazil to adopt measures to protect an Indigenous 
community and its leaders from threats to life and personal integrity from third 
parties and State agents, who have engaged in acts of violence and invaded their 
lands; however, regarding the potential risk of a dam breaking close to their lands, 
these measures were denied because it could not determine that the risk was 
imminent, despite the existence of damage.182 Similarly, it required Peru to provide 
medical assistance and access to clean water and food to Indigenous communities in 
the Amazon at risk of dying and suffering serious health issues, due to frequent oil 
spills in the area; yet, and although the Commission mentioned that it is ‘reasonable 
to expect’ environmental effects from these oil spills, jeopardising the communities’ 
health, it did not require measures to avoid or mitigate their occurrence, needing 
more information to assess the gravity and urgency.183  
That being said, these precautionary measures may have broader effects, so it 
is not unreasonable to consider that they could anticipate potential harm. For 
instance, the Commission requested Mexico to adopt all the necessary measures to 
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protect the life and integrity of the Choreachi Indigenous community members, 
directly threatened by violent episodes and harassment conducted by people from 
different communities (who disputed the ownership of their lands), and drug dealers 
(who wanted to use their lands for illegal activities).184  This tense situation also 
resulted in the impossibility for the Choreachi to conduct their social and cultural 
activities, including ceremonies, affecting their livelihood.185  While the measures 
granted were focused on the imminent threats to the life and physical integrity of the 
community, the implementation of effective (preventive) measures would enable the 
continuation of their traditional activities, avoiding subsequent cultural impacts. 
 
b) The Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
 
The IACtHR has an advisory jurisdiction, issuing authoritative opinions about the 
Convention or other treaties concerning the protection of human rights, at the request 
of States and organs, including the Commission;186 and an adjudicatory jurisdiction, 
addressing claims of States’ alleged violations of the Convention, brought by the 
Commission or another State.187 In these proceedings, the Court must interpret the 
applicable norms, assess the evidence submitted and determine if a State has violated 
the Convention, in which case it “shall rule that the injured party be ensured the 
enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated” and, if appropriate, that the 
consequences be remedied and fair compensation paid.188  
The Court can adopt provisional measures, based on a prima facie standard of 
proof,189 in situations of extreme gravity (i.e., at its most intense degree) and urgency 
(i.e., imminent, requiring immediate remedies) to avoid “irreparable damage to 
persons”. 190  They can be requested at any stage of the proceedings by the 
                                                             
184 IACHR, “Resolución 51/2016, Medida Cautelar No. 60-14, Ampliación de beneficiarios a favor de 
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188 Ibid., Article 63: Antkowiak and Gonza (n 159), p 12.  
189 See for example, IACtHR, “Four Ngöbe Indigenous Communities and their members (Request for 
Provisional Measures by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights regarding the Republic of 
Panama),” May 28, 2010, para. 11. 
190 Ibid., paras. 8-9. American Convention, Article 63.2. 
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Commission,191 or the (alleged) victims,192  and, like any other decisions adopted 
during the proceedings, they are legally binding.193 Like the IACHR, they are mostly 
granted to avoid foreseeable harm, like direct threats to life and personal integrity, 
which in the case of Indigenous peoples derives from violence and land conflicts; for 
instance, the IACtHR required Ecuador to provide protection and remove explosive 
material located in the territories of the Kichwa Sarayaku peoples, in order to protect 
their life and integrity, threatened by third parties interested in the exploitation of 
natural resources in their lands.194 Interestingly, the Court mentioned the existence of 
not only actual but also ‘potential’ risks from the explosives, and the need to avoid 
possible environmental, social and cultural effects during their removal,195 indicating 
an awareness of the importance of a broader approach regarding Indigenous peoples’ 
rights, later reflected in the Sarayaku judgment (see below). 
In general, and following Article 29 of the American Convention (precluding 
a restrictive interpretation of the rights enshrined therein),196 both supervisory bodies 
rely on the interpretation most favourable to the protection of the rights involved (pro 
homine principle); 197  in doing so, they follow a progressive approach regarding 
human right treaties, considering them “live instruments whose interpretation must 
adapt to the evolution of times and, specifically, to current living conditions”,198 thus 
taking into account normative developments in international human rights law. In the 
case of Indigenous peoples, this includes C169, UNDRIP and Reports of the Special 
Rapporteur, among others;199 yet, the more recent 2016 American Declaration on the 
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Rights of Indigenous Peoples (‘ADRIP’)200 has not played a prominent role in the 
Court’s interpretation of the American Convention,201 been used in only one case so 
far, involving the granting of oil concessions in an Indigenous territory, without 
conducting impact studies or consultations.202 In this case, the Court relied on its 
Article XXIII.1 (right to participate in decision-making, through their own 
representatives, in matters that affect their rights, related to the development and 
execution of laws, public policies, and programs, among others), in connection with 
Argentina’s duty to adopt legislative and other measures to protect their right to 
property;203 however, in the interpretation of this judgment, when clarifying if these 
measures specifically included consultations, there was no reference to the 
ADRIP.204  
 
3.1.1 Indigenous peoples’ rights in the American Convention 
 
The American Convention does not explicitly mention ‘Indigenous peoples’; 
however, the supervisory organs have paid particular attention to their rights, 205 
developing important standards of protection and extensive jurisprudence, 206 
especially regarding the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights to their ancestral 
territories.207  
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As noted by the IACHR, Indigenous peoples have a unique and shared 
worldview based on their close relationship with these territories, critical for their 
physical, cultural and spiritual vitality,208 and manifested in different ways such as 
the traditional presence on their lands; maintaining sacred or ceremonial sites; and 
customary use of natural resources, among others.209 Similarly, the IACtHR noted 
that Indigenous peoples “by the fact of their very existence, have the right to live 
freely in their own territory”, recognising their collective property over their lands, 
and the existence of a material and spiritual element that constitutes the fundamental 
basis of their cultures, spiritual life, integrity and economic survival.210 In this sense, 
these territories and resources are not only a means of subsistence, but “a part of their 
worldview, their religiosity, and therefore, of their cultural identity”, and are closely 
connected to their oral expressions and traditions, customs, arts and rituals, TK, 
practices, and values.211  
The special relationship between Indigenous peoples and their territories is a 
fundamental part of their culture (understood as a way of life),212 and spiritual life213 
without which “their very physical and cultural survival” is at stake.214 To protect 
this, and in accordance with its progressive approach, the IACtHR interprets Article 
21 of the American Convention, right to property, in a broad way, defining 
‘property’ as both materials things and rights that can be part of a person’s 
patrimony, including “corporeal and incorporeal elements and any other intangible 
object capable of having value”,215 integrating this relationship into the guarantee 
established by this Article.216 This means that States must adopt ‘special measures’ to 
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ensure Indigenous peoples’ “full and equal exercise of their right to the territories 
they have traditionally used and occupied” 217  so they can continue with their 
traditional livelihood218 and “freely determine and enjoy their own social, cultural 
and economic development, which includes the right to enjoy their particular 
spiritual relationship” with these territories and resources.219 This links Article 21 to 
self-determination220 (including the control over natural resources and lands)221 and 
highlights the importance of protecting cultural and spiritual aspects and 
manifestations, such as sacred sites, ancestral burial places, and ceremonies and 
festivities,222 “inextricably linked to the collective understanding of the concepts of 
property and possession” and their identity.223 
Among these special measures we can find, inter alia, the legal recognition of 
their diverse and specific forms of control, ownership, use and enjoyment of their 
territories, 224  which includes the protection of their environment; 225  delimit, 
demarcate and title their lands, with the full participation of Indigenous peoples;226 
the restitution of lands and territories that they have unwillingly left or lost 
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217 Saramaka, para. 91; Maya Indigenous Communities, para. 131 
218 Saramaka para 121. See also Ancestral lands, paras. 2 and 57, noting that “the guarantee of the 
right to territorial property is a fundamental basis for the development of indigenous communities’ 
culture, spiritual life, integrity, and economic survival”, and a prerequisite to the enjoyment of other 
basic rights such as food, water, cultural integrity and survival, and their traditional livelihood. 
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226 Awas Tingni, para. 164; and Sawhoyamaxa, para. 143; Xucuru, para. 117. 
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possession of;227 and their effective participation in decision-making, which require 
further analysis.  
 
3.1.2 Article 21 and Indigenous peoples’ effective participation 
 
Indigenous peoples’ rights over their lands and natural resources are not absolute, as 
explained by the Court in a landmark judgment, Saramaka v. Suriname. In this case, 
Suriname granted gold mining and logging concessions in Saramaka territory 
without conducting impact assessments or consultations (and thus without full 
certainty about all the potential impacts), arguing that the concessions did not affect 
Saramaka traditional interests.228 The Court noted that although extractive activities 
could affect the use and enjoyment of natural resources by the Saramaka, the right to 
property “should not be interpreted in a way that prevents the State from granting 
any type of concession for the exploration and extraction of natural resources within 
Saramaka territory”.229 Thus, States can restrict the use and enjoyment of the lands 
and resources, if these restrictions are established by law, necessary, proportional, 
with the aim of attaining a legitimate goal in a democratic society,230 and do not deny 
their survival as peoples.231 This must be determined on a case by case basis232 (as 
Indigenous peoples have different traditional livelihoods and uses for natural 
resources), but to ensure that Indigenous peoples’ survival is not at risk, the Court, 
following among others UNDRIP’s Article 32, 233  established three specific 
safeguards: first, their effective participation, in conformity with their customs and 
traditions, regarding any development or investment plan 234  in their territories; 
second, that States must guarantee they will receive a reasonable benefit; and third, 
                                                             
227 Ancestral lands, para. 123; Sawhoyamaxa, paras. 128-129. 
228 Saramaka, paras. 124, and 147-148. 
229 Ibid., para. 126. See also Yakye Axa, paras. 144-145. 
230 Saramaka, para. 127 
231  Ibid., para. 128; Sarayaku, para. 156. ‘Survival’ refers to their ability to continue with their 
traditional way of life and the preservation and protection of their special relationship with their lands, 
cultural identity social structure and customs, beliefs and traditions. IACtHR, “Case of the Saramaka 
People v. Suriname (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs)” Judgment of August 12, 2008 (‘Saramaka interpretation’), para. 37.  
232 Yakye Axa, para. 146; Ancestral lands, para 264.  
233 Saramaka, paras. 130-131; also mentioning jurisprudence of the HRC regarding Article 27 ICCPR. 
234 Defined as “any proposed activity that may affect the integrity of the lands and natural resources”, 
especially logging or mining concessions. Saramaka, footnote 127. 
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States must ensure that no concession is granted without prior environmental and 
social impact assessments (‘ESIA’), conducted by independent entities.235  It also 
noted that, contrary to Suriname’s assertions, the evidence showed the effects that 
logging concessions had over natural resources traditionally used by the Saramaka,236 
including substantive cultural and spiritual impacts237 and long-reaching effects,238 
impacts difficult to determine and foresee without Indigenous peoples’ participation 
and TK. 
In the interpretation of this judgment, the Court mentioned that ESIAs are 
part of the duty to guarantee the ‘effective participation’ in the process of granting 
concessions, together with the duty to ‘actively consult’ Indigenous peoples.239 This 
enables the inclusion of Indigenous peoples’ TK in the identification of potential 
effects on their traditional livelihood (that go beyond strictly environmental aspects), 
ensuring the awareness of possible risks, “in order that the proposed development or 
investment plan is accepted knowingly and voluntarily”,240 as well as the evaluation 
of potential alternatives and mitigation measures.241 These ESIAs must conform to 
the relevant international standards and best practices, i.e., the Akwe:Kon Voluntary 
Guidelines,242 ensuring the full and effective participation of Indigenous peoples in 
not only ESIAs, but also cultural (including values and customs) and cultural 
heritage (including sacred sites) impact assessments, considering their interests, 
concerns, and TK, under the explicit guidance of the precautionary principle.243 
                                                             
235 Ibid., para. 129. See also Kaliña Lokono, para. 226 
236 Saramaka, para. 148. 
237 Ibid., para 150, like massive damage to ecological and cultural functions and services, causing 
great offense to the spirits. 
238 Ibid., para. 152, mentioning the blockage of creeks due to poorly constructed bridges built by 
logging companies, rendering the water unusable for drinking, cooking, fishing and irrigation, 
resulting in less productive crops and the subsequent abandonment of farms, affecting their traditional 
way of life. 
239 Saramaka interpretation, para. 41. 
240 Saramaka, para. 133; Sarayaku, para. 208; Extractive industries, para. 214. These Guidelines were 
analysed in depth in Chapter III, section 6. 
241 Ancestral lands, paras. 263 and 267, highlighting the role of TK in identifying potential impacts on 
their way of life, and alternatives and mitigation measures. 
242 Saramaka interpretation para. 41 and footnote 23. See also Sarayaku, para 206. 
243 See Chapter III, section 6. 
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Regarding consultations, the Court established in Saramaka certain 
requirements, further developed in another case, Sarayaku v. Ecuador,244 where the 
government granted oil exploration concessions in Indigenous lands, without their 
effective participation and disregarding social, spiritual and cultural impacts on the 
Sarayaku people.245 Following this, consultations must be conducted from early on, 
before adopting administrative/legislative measures that could affect Indigenous 
peoples’ rights, providing enough time for debate;246 in good faith, establishing a 
dialogue without coercion, based on trust and mutual respect, which entails constant 
communication efforts and the dissemination and exchange of information; 247 
through culturally appropriate procedures, taking into account their own 
circumstances and respecting their decision-making methods, in accordance with 
their own traditions;248 and with the objective of reaching an agreement, allowing 
them to influence the decision-making process. 249  Moreover, the Court ruled in 
Saramaka that in the case of “large-scale development or investment projects that 
would have a major impact” on Indigenous peoples’ territories, States’ have a duty to 
obtain FPIC,250 explicitly referring to the argument that “the level of consultation(…) 
required is obviously a function of the nature and content of the rights” of Indigenous 
peoples, 251  reflecting a sliding-scale approach, indicating a strong degree of 
protection252 where, as noted by the IACHR, FPIC works as a ‘heightened safeguard’ 
in relation to Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life and environment 253 
including in the face of potential threats of substantive harm. 
                                                             
244 Also concluding that consultation is a general principle of international law. Sarayaku, para. 164; 
see also IACtHR, “Case of the Garífuna Community of Triunfo de la Cruz and its members v. 
Honduras (Merits, Reparations and Costs)”, Judgment of October 8, 2015 (‘Garifuna’), para. 222.  
245 Sarayaku paras 184, 192-193, 207 and 218, among others. 
246 Saramaka para 133, Sarayaku, paras 166 and 180-181. 
247 Saramaka, para 133; Sarayaku, paras. 185-186 and 208, also referring in footnote 244 to the 
UNPFII report in supra 104 and highlighting the characteristics of ‘informed’ consent, which includes 
respecting the precautionary principle. 
248 Saramaka, para 133; Sarayaku, paras, 201-202. 
249 Saramaka, para 133; Sarayaku para 167 and 185. See also Garifuna, paras. 215-218 and Kaliña 
Lokono, para 201. The IACHR notes that this duty also includes accommodating Indigenous peoples’ 
concerns and interests, and “failing such accommodation, to provide objective and reasonable motives 
for not doing so.” Ancestral Lands, paras. 323-327. 
250 Saramaka, para. 134. 
251 Ibid., para. 137. 
252 Pentassuglia (n 216), p 178; Barelli (n 51), p 258; Rombouts (n 152), pp 272-273. 
253 Ancestral lands, para. 333. 
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There is, however, a controversy about the meaning of ‘large-scale 
developments that would have a major impact on indigenous lands’; for instance, 
Pasqualucci noted that in the interpretation of the Saramaka judgment, the Court 
identified ‘major developments or investments plans’ as those that “may have a 
profound impact on the property rights of the members of the Saramaka people to a 
large part of their territory”,254 thus limiting consent to only those situations, giving 
States “leeway to grant smaller concessions that could seriously impact” Indigenous 
peoples’ way of life without their consent;255 and Verbeek, in agreeing with this, also 
criticises that the “full protection of property rights should not depend on the amount 
of land involved”.256 It is important to note that the Court has not further elaborated 
on the issue of FPIC in recent cases; however, based on its progressive approach and 
the fact that States cannot threaten Indigenous peoples’ survival, it seems that the 
requirement to obtain FPIC is not in fact limited to large-scale projects that could 
cause profound impacts on a large portion of their territory; furthermore, in the 
interpretation of the Saramaka judgment, the Court itself required States to ensure 
that ‘cumulative impacts’ do not cause serious effects that could jeopardise the 
survival of Indigenous peoples,257 also noting that, depending on the level of impact 
of the proposed activity, obtaining consent may be required;258 and the Commission 
expressed that ‘large-scale projects’ should be interpreted in a broad way, taking into 
account at least two criteria: the characteristics of the project, such as its magnitude 
or scale; and the human and social impact of the activity, considering the particular 
circumstances of the peoples concerned.259  
In sum, the Court has established an important standard, by which 
consultations and ESIAS are required before the adoption of measures that could 
affect Indigenous peoples; however, and as noted by a majority of authors,260 if these 
                                                             
254 Pasqualucci (n 76), p 90, citing Saramaka interpretation footnote 14. 
255 Ibid., p 91. See also T. Ward, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples' 
Participation Rights within International Law 10 Nw.U.J.Int'lHum.Rts. 54 2011-2012, p 64. 
256 Verbeek (n 127), pp 269 and 278-279. 
257 Saramaka interpretation, para. 41; see also Extractive industries, paras. 190-191. 
258 Saramaka interpretation, para. 17. See also Rombouts (n 152), p 269 and Barelli (n 51), p 258, 
arguing that the Court has aligned itself with UNDRIP (interpreted expansively) regarding FPIC. 
259 Pan-Amazon report, para. 35. This would include cases of relocations and the storage of hazardous 
materials in Indigenous lands. Errico (n 204). 
260 See for instance, Barelli (n 51), pp 257-258; Rombouts (n 152), p 269; Pentassuglia (n 216), p 184; 
2020 report, para. 60; among others.   
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measures could jeopardise their survival, States must obtain their FPIC. Yet, recent 
developments raise some questions about the application of this FPIC criterion. 
 
3.1.3 FPIC and the protection of cultural and spiritual rights 
 
Despite the above, it can be argued that some uncertainty remains regarding potential 
substantive impacts on Indigenous peoples’ spiritual and cultural relationship with 
their lands. This is due to the fact that the Court has abstained from requiring FPIC 
after Saramaka, despite its importance, relying instead on consultations, which 
provides a lesser degree of protection, seemingly contradicting the progressive 
approach previously adopted. For instance, in Sarayaku, the concessions devastated 
‘the living forest’ inhabited by spirits, who provide the Kichwa peoples the energy to 
survive;261 and resulted in the destruction of the great tree of Lispungu, preventing 
one of the shamans to use its powers to cure ailments, causing his death, as well as 
the Wichu kachi mountain, making the Spirit owner to abandon the place along with 
the animals, rendering the place sterile.262 The Kichwa also had to retreat into the 
jungle for six months, disrupting the spiritual transmission of knowledge, 263  and 
suspending important ancestral cultural rites and ceremonies, including the Uyantsa, 
where social relationships and their bonds with their lands are renewed.264 Although 
the Court noted the “profound impacts on their social and spiritual relationships” and 
cultural identity, and the ‘great concern and suffering’ caused by the destruction of 
their cultural heritage and sacred sites265 (relying not only on UNDRIP’s Articles 11 
and 12, but also those referring to self-determination, effective participation and 
consultations, including Article 32 in its legal analysis),266  in acknowledging the 
failure of Ecuador to comply with its obligations it only mentioned the violation of 
the duty to consult but nothing about obtaining consent.267 Some authors argue the 
                                                             
261 The Kichwa consider that all the natural elements have spirits, Sarayaku, para 57 and paras 152-
153. 
262 Ibid., paras. 104-105 and 218. 
263 Ibid., paras. 100 and 218. 
264 Ibid., paras 104-105 and 218. 
265 Ibid., paras 219-220. 
266 Ibid., paras. 215 and 217 and footnotes 283 and 288. 
267 Ibid., para 230. See Verbeek (n 127), p 281, criticising the Court for failing to consider the value of 
the land in its analysis, as well as the serious disruptions on their daily life. See also Newman et al (n 
220), p 16. 
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Court found it unnecessary to address the latter, as Ecuador did not comply with the 
preliminary obligation to consult;268 however, this was also the case in Saramaka.269  
In a later case, Kaliña and Lokono v. Suriname, there were cumulative 
impacts that affected these Indigenous communities’ physical and spiritual 
relationship with their lands and traditional way of life,270 derived from the non-
recognition of their collective rights to property, including the granting of mining 
concessions, the acquisition of lands by third parties and the maintenance of nature 
reserves in their territories.271 For instance, Suriname authorised the construction of 
an urban project near their villages (disregarding their concerns and claims) along the 
Marowijne River, an essential element of their culture and spirituality,272 restricting 
the access to the river, affecting its traditional use. 273  Similar restrictions were 
imposed on certain sacred sites and resources, fundamental for their identity and 
livelihood (including medicinal plants), as they were included within areas 
unilaterally declared natural reserves.274 Finally, a concession for a bauxite mine was 
granted without prior consultations275 or ESIA with Indigenous participation276 (thus 
proceeding without properly evaluating possible effects on the communities).277 This 
disturbed the balance between humans and nature278 and caused serious damage to 
their environment and cultural and spiritual values, as sacred trees were logged, 
animals left the area due to noise and explosions (affecting the hunting), and the soil 
and water were contaminated, harming the fishing and causing traditional plants to 
                                                             
268 L. Brunner and K. Quintana, “The Duty to Consult in the Inter-American System: Legal Standards 
after Sarayaku”, ASIL Insights, Vol. 16, Issue 35, (2012); see also Rombouts (n 152), p 296. 
269 This was also a missed opportunity to clarify certain questions surrounding FPIC, such as the 
meaning of ‘major impact’ or ‘large portion of territory’. See M. Orellana, “Saramaka People V. 
Suriname”, AJIL Vol. 102, No. 4 (2008), p 846; and Verbeek (n 127), p 281. 
270 F. MacKay, “The Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname and the UN Declaration on 
the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Convergence, Divergence and Mutual Reinforcement” ELR (April 
2018) | No. 1, p 39. 
271 Kaliña Lokono paras. 114, 142, 160, 198, and 230, among others. See also MacKay (n 270), p 31. 
272 As explicitly noted by the Court, “local Indigenous peoples have a strong spiritual relationship” 
with this river. Kaliña Lokono, para. 98. 
273 Ibid., paras. 96-99, 147, and 152-154. 
274 Ibid., paras. 84 and 194-197. 
275 Ibid., para. 212. 
276 Ibid., para 226. 
277 Ibid., paras. 207 and 214.  
278 Ibid., paras 36 and 118. According to their beliefs, this can bring disease and misfortune. See 
IACHR, “Report No. 79/13 Case 12639 The Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname” (2013)(Kaliña 
and Lokono Report’), para. 36. 
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stop growing.279 As recognised by the IACtHR, these negative effects “continued 
over time, thus affecting the traditional territory and the means of survival” of these 
communities.280 Mackay notes that these cumulative effects negated the Kaliña and 
Lokono peoples’ ability to preserve, protect and guarantee the special relationship 
with their territories,281 having then a substantive impact on their traditional way of 
life, been this a situation where consent should be required, as also concluded by the 
Commission in regards to the mining operations, following the Saramaka criteria.282 
Yet, and despite relying on UNDRIP’s Articles 12 and 25 as well as on Articles 18 
and 32, 283  the Court focused only on the ‘consultation aspect’ of effective 
participation (even leaving out the part about FPIC when citing Article 32), 284 
continuing “a trend of minimising or omitting any discussion of the consent 
requirement”, 285  that seemingly protects States’ prerogative to make decisions 
regarding natural resources in their territories.286  
All this indicates that, despite seemingly recognising strong participatory 
rights to Indigenous peoples in order to avoid the materialisation of serious and 
substantive harm, following a sliding-scale approach, in practice there is some 
uncertainty regarding the actual application of these strong safeguards when it comes 
to cultural/spiritual values.  
 
3.2 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The African Charter287 is the main instrument in the African human rights system,288 
which also includes the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
                                                             
279 Kaliña and Lokono, paras. 95, 118 and 217-220. 
280 Ibid., para. 222. 
281 MacKay (n 270), p 40. 
282 The IACHR observed that this “is precisely the type of activity that the Inter-American Court has 
stated should be subject to consultations and consent of the affected indigenous peoples”. Kaliña and 
Lokono Report, para. 155. 
283 Kaliña and Lokono, paras. 180-181 and 202. 
284 Ibid., para 202; MacKay (n 270), p 41. 
285 Ibid., pp 40-41; Kaliña Lokono, para. 287, ruling that Suriname must take the necessary measures 
to ensure that no actions that could affect the Kaliña and Lokono peoples’ territories are adopted 
without consultation. 
286 L. Lixinski, “Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname”, AJIL, Vol. 111:1(2017), pp 
153-154. See also Young (n 152), p 182. 
287 Supplemented by the 1998 Protocol on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (‘African Court Protocol’); the 2003 Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa; and 
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Child289 and the 2011 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,290 
among others. This Charter recognises a series of rights and freedoms that States 
must respect and give effect to,291 such as the rights to life (Article 4), to property 
(Article 14), to education and culture (Article 17), to self-determination (Article 20), 
to free disposal of wealth and natural resources (Article 21), and to economic, social 
and cultural development (Article 22),292 and freedoms from discrimination (Article 
2), of conscience and religion (Article 8), and association (Article 10), among others. 
Like the Inter-American system, there are two monitoring bodies in charge of 
supervising States’ compliance with the African Charter. 
 
a) The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
Part II of the Charter establishes the ACHPR, with the mandate of promoting human 
and peoples’ rights through studies, research and dissemination of information, 
among others;293 interpreting the Charter, at the request of a State, an institution of 
the OAU294 or an African organisation recognised by the OAU;295 and protecting 
human rights,296 through State reporting, activities of working groups and special 
rapporteurs, and its communication procedure. 297  In this procedure, the African 
Commission can receive inter-state complaints, or by individuals or NGO against 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the 2018 Protocol on the Rights of Older Persons in Africa. See https://www.achpr.org/resources 
[accessed January 2021]. 
288 R. Murray, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Commentary (OUP 2019), p 2. 
See also ACHPR, “Celebrating the African Charter at 30: A guide to the African human rights 
system” (PULP 2011), p 7.  
289 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entry into force November 29, 1999. 
290 Adopted by the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (2007). 
291 African Charter, Article 1. 
292 In the context of the African Charter, ‘culture’ refers to a way of life. See ACHPR, “Principles and 
Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights”, (2011), p 8; and ACHR, “Communication No. 276/2003 Centre for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v. Kenya” (25 November 2009)(‘Endorois’), para. 241, noting that culture refers to a 
‘complex whole’ which includes “a spiritual and physical association with one’s ancestral land, 
knowledge, belief, art, law, morals [and] customs”, among others. 
293 African Charter, Article 45.1. 
294 The OAU was transformed into the African Union in 2001. ACHPR (n 285), p 7. 
295  African Charter, Article 45.3, by issuing advisory opinions. See also ACHPR, “Rules of 
Procedure” (2020)(‘Commission Rules of procedure’), Rule 127. 
296 African Charter, Article 45.2. 
297 ACHR (n 286), p 17. 
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one or more States on alleged violations of human rights, 298  analyse its 
admissibility, 299  and, if admissible, examine the matter (with the possibility of 
reaching a friendly settlement), 300  adopting a decision (which, according to this 
Commission, are of a binding nature;301 however, it recognises that there is a lack of 
compliance of its decisions and a ‘general misgiving’ regarding their binding nature 
by States 302 ) and issuing recommendations 303  (‘drawing inspiration’ from other 
international law instruments like the UN Charter, customary law and general 
principles of law),304 which are then transmitted to the parties and published.305 The 
African Commission can decide to refer a communication to the African Court (with 
the consent of the complainants) before deciding on its admissibility, if the 
respondent has ratified the African Court Protocol, becoming the Commission an 
applicant in the proceedings.306  
During its procedure, the ACHR can adopt provisional measures,307 on its 
own initiative or at the request of a party, “to prevent irreparable harm to the victim 
or victims of the alleged violation as urgently as the situation demands.”308 While the 
language indicates an emphasis on direct harm, they seem to have broad effects that 
addressed potential harm; for instance, in the Endorois complaint (see below), it 
urged Kenya to ensure that no further issuance of mining concessions or transfers of 
                                                             
298 African Charter, Articles 48-49 and 55. 
299 Ibid., Article 56. 
300 Commission Rules of procedure, Rule 123. 
301  Ibid., Rule 125; ACHR, “Resolution on the Importance of the Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights by States Parties”, 
ACHPR/Res.97(XXXX)(2006); and “International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on 
behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr. and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 
161/97” (31 October 1998),(‘Saro-Wiwa’), paras 113-116; Murray (n 288), p 33; among others. 
302 ACHPR, “Report of the Second Regional Seminar on the Implementation of Decisions of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (September 2018), pp 6-7. See also A. 
Majekolagbe and O. Akinkugbe, “The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights Decision In the 
Ogiek Case: An Appraisal”, in A. Manirabona & Y. Vega (eds), Extractive Industries and Human 
Rights in an Era of Global Justice: New Ways of Resolving and Preventing Conflicts (LexisNexis, 
2019), p 180, mentioning that the creation of the African Court is “to ‘breathe’ enforceability into the 
African Human Rights System; and E. Tramontana, “The Contribution of the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights to the Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights”, (2018) Federalismi.it, p 
18. 
303 Commission Rules of procedure, Rule 114; African Charter, Article 53. 
304 African Charter, Articles 60-61. As noted in the Endorois case, regarding Indigenous peoples, this 
includes jurisprudence of the IACtHR and the UNTS; the UNDRIP, and C169, among others.  
305 Commission Rules of procedure, Rule 120. 
306 Ibid., Rule 130; see also ACtHPR, “Rules of Court” (September 2020), (‘Court Rules’), Rule 36.2. 
307 Which are binding, according to the ACHPR. See Saro-Wiwa, paras. 114-115. 
308 Commission Rules of procedure, Rule 100.1. 
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lands subject of the dispute occur,309 aiming to protect the Endorois from foreseeable 
impacts but also their ability to potentially benefit in the future from their lands and 
resources.310  
 
b) The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The ACtHPR was established by the 1998 African Court Protocol311 to “complement 
the protective mandate” of the African Commission, 312  having both an advisory 
jurisdiction to issue authoritative opinions “on any legal matter relating the Charter 
or any other relevant human rights instrument” at the request of  any State member, 
organs or African organizations recognised by the African Union; 313  and an 
adjudicatory jurisdiction, addressing claims and disputes regarding the interpretation 
and application of the African Charter, the African Court Protocol and any other 
relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned,314 brought by the 
African Commission, a State Party or African Intergovernmental Organizations.315 
NGOs and individuals can submit cases only if the State Party has made a special 
declaration in this sense, 316  which is a factor in the small docket of judgments 
adopted on the merits. 317  In these proceedings, the Court must review the 
admissibility following Article 56 of the African Charter, 318  and if admissible, 
examine the case (with the possibility of reaching an amicable settlement), 319 
rendering a binding judgment,320 applying the African Charter and any other relevant 
human rights instruments ratified by the parties concerned;321 if it finds violations of 
                                                             
309 Endorois, para. 32. 
310 Ibid., para 124. 
311 Article 1. This protocol entered into force on January 25, 2004 after being ratified by more than 15 
countries (currently 31). See https://www.african-court.org/wpafc/basic-information/  
312 Ibid., Article 2. 
313 Ibid., Article 4; Court Rules, Rule 82. 
314 African Court protocol, Article 3; Court Rules, Rule 29.1. 
315 African Court protocol, Article 5.1. 
316 Ibid., Articles 5.3 and 34.6. Court Rules, Rule 39.1. Currently only six parties have done so. 
317 Murray (n 288), p 11.  
318 The Court can also transfer a case to the Commission. African Court protocol, Article 6. 
319 Ibid., Article 9. Court Rules, Rule 64, requiring the Court to render judgment limited to the facts 
and solution adopted. 
320 African Court protocol, Articles 30 and 28; Court Rules, Rule 72. 
321 African Court protocol, Article 7. In Indigenous issues, the Court has cited jurisprudence of the 
IACtHR, reports from UN organs; and the UNDRIP, among others. 
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human rights, “it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation”, including 
compensation.322  
During this procedure, and in cases of “extreme gravity and urgency, and 
when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons” it shall adopt binding 
provisional measures, at the request of a party or motu proprio,323 following a prima 
facie standard of proof.324 These measures are often adopted regarding direct threats 
to life and personal integrity;325 however, this Court granted provisional measures 
banning Kenya from conducting transactions of land in the ancestral home of the 
Ogiek peoples that could directly result in their eviction and harassment, but also 
looking to avoid broader potential effects on their traditional livelihood,326 indicating 
an awareness of the importance of a broader approach regarding Indigenous peoples’ 
rights. 
 
3.2.1 Indigenous peoples’ rights in the African Charter 
 
The African Charter does not mention ‘Indigenous peoples’, but an increasing 
number of conflicts regarding their rights over lands and natural resources in Africa 
have enabled the monitoring bodies to elaborate on this issue in the context of the 
African Charter327 (although there is not nearly as much jurisprudence as in the Inter-
American system), taking into account Indigenous peoples’ particular way of life, 
intimately connected to their lands and resources, and their spiritual/cultural 
aspects.328 Unlike the IACtHR and its focus on the right to property, the protection of 
this special relationship and various aspects of Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of 
                                                             
322 Ibid., Article 27.1; Court Rules, Rules 69 and 71. 
323 African Court protocol, Article 27.2; Court Rules, Rule 59.1 and 59.6. This is decided on a case-
by-case basis. 
324 See for instance ACtHPR, “African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Kenya (Order 
of Provisional Measures)” Application No 006/2012, March 15, 2012 (‘Ogiek provisional measures’), 
para. 16; Court Rules, Rule 41.9. 
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326 Ogiek provisional measures, para. 10. 
327 R. Home and F. Kabata, “Turning Fish Soup back into Fish: the wicked problem of African 
Community Land Rights” Journal of Sust. Dev, Law & Policy Vol 9(2018), pp 2-3; Barelli (n 51), p 
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328 See for instance Endorois, paras. 150-156, among others; and ACtHPR, “African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Kenya (Judgment)” Application No 006/2012, May 26, 2017 
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life is linked to several interrelated rights recognised in the African Charter, to which 
I turn now. 
In 2010, the African Commission issued a decision about the situation of the 
Endorois in Kenya, who traditionally inhabited the Lake Bogoria area before being 
forcefully evicted by the State (and their access to these ancestral lands for cultural 
and spiritual purposes denied) without prior consultation, to establish a protected 
area and a mining operation.329 The ACHPR, based on the fact that there was no 
dispute regarding the Lake Bogoria area being the traditional land of the Endorois, 
recognised their collective right to property under Article 14 (which includes 
undisturbed possession, use and control, as well as rights, interests and benefits of 
communities in their lands)330 over their “ancestral lands, the possessions attached to 
it and their animals”,331 and their natural resources (Article 21) “contained within”.332 
It also mentioned the need for ‘special measures of protection’ to safeguard 
Indigenous peoples’ physical and cultural survival and their particular relationship 
with their lands (heavily drawing inspiration from the Saramaka case),333 such as 
titling, demarcation and delimitation of their territories.334 However, these rights are 
not absolute, and can be encroached upon ‘in the interest of public need/general 
interest of the community’ (a particularly stringent requirement in the case of 
Indigenous peoples, because of the importance of their lands and resources to their 
survival and self-determination) 335  and ‘in accordance with appropriate laws’, 336 
which, to the ACHPR (citing almost verbatim the Saramaka case), includes the 
‘effective participation’ of Indigenous peoples, i.e., prior ESIAs with Indigenous 
                                                             
329 Endorois, paras. 1-14. This was the first case recognising Indigenous peoples’ rights over their 
ancestral lands and their right to development. 
330 Ibid., paras. 186-187. 
331 Ibid., para. 184. 
332 Ibid., para. 267. See also ACHPR, “Communication No. 155/96 Social and Economic Rights 
Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v. Nigeria” (27 May 
2002), paras. 56-58. Pentassuglia (n 216), p 188, notes that this refers to all the natural resources 
found on or beneath the land.  
333 Endorois, paras. 197-198 and 260-267. 
334 Ibid., paras. 205-209. 
335 Ibid., paras. 212-214 and 266. By engaging in forced evictions, this requirement was not met, para. 
218. 
336 Ibid., paras. 211 and 267. 
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participation, and consultations, in order to preserve and protect the special 
relationship that they have with their lands.337  
This issue is also analysed in regard to Article 22, the right to development, 
where the African Commission considers the existence of a two-pronged test.338 The 
first part is a procedural aspect that consists of the ‘effective participation’ of the 
affected people before conducting development projects, i.e., ‘prior consultations’339 
which, following the IACtHR jurisprudence, must be in good faith, with the State 
disseminating and accepting information, through culturally appropriate procedures 
and with the objective of reaching an agreement.340 Moreover, in the case of any 
development or investment projects that would have a major impact on Indigenous 
peoples’ territories, it is necessary to obtain FPIC,341 adopting the strong standard of 
protection recognised by the IACtHR, with FPIC acting as a heightened safeguard. 
The second prong refers to the substance of the right to development, i.e., the 
empowerment of the communities and increasing their well-being, which in this case 
means, among other things, obtaining some benefit from the project.342 The State 
failed both prongs of the test, merely informing the Endorois about the establishment 
of a reserve, without clarifying the extent of the impacts on their traditional way of 
life, severely affecting their quality of life.343 
Regarding cultural and spiritual aspects, the African Commission recognised 
the Endorois’ special link with their ancestral lands and its manifestations, such as a 
pastoralist way of life, the use of natural resources, their spiritual beliefs, maintaining 
sacred sites and ceremonial practices around the Lake Bogoria (the spiritual home of 
all Endorois, living and dead), mainly in the context of Articles 8 (freedom of 
conscience and religion) and 17.2 and 17.3 (cultural rights).344 Like other rights, they 
admit proportionate and reasonable restrictions, established by law, and applied “not 
                                                             
337  Ibid., paras. 226-228 and 266-268, also noting that Kenya failed to guarantee this effective 
participation.  
338 Ibid., para. 277. 
339 Ibid., para. 281.  
340 Ibid., para. 289. See also para. 226, noting that States have an obligation to “consult and to seek 
consent”. 
341 Ibid., para. 291.  
342 Ibid., paras. 283-288 and 294-295 
343 Ibid., paras. 281-282 and 290-298. 
344 Ibid., paras. 165-167, and 249-251 
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in a manner that would completely vitiate the right”345 The ACHPR noted that the 
forced eviction from their lands “removed them from the sacred grounds essential to 
the practice of their religion”, making it virtually impossible to maintain their 
cultural and spiritual practices,346 denying as well “the very essence of the Endorois’ 
right to culture”.347 The duty to consult/FPIC was not mentioned in this context, but 
these impacts played an important role in the considerations of the ACHPR 
throughout the complaint, consistently highlighting how the violations of the rights 
to property, natural resources and development, as well as the absence of ESIAs and 
adequate consultations, substantially affected the Endorois’ spiritual and cultural 
aspects,348 indicating that the notion of ‘major impacts’ and the strong degree of 
protection granted by the duty to obtain consent (inspired by the IACtHR) also 
applies to substantive threats to these immaterial aspects of Indigenous peoples’ 
traditional livelihood. 
Finally, while the ACHPR did not explicitly highlighted the role of TK 
(incorporated in decision-making via consultations and ESIAs, as previously 
mentioned) in avoiding potential harm, it can be argued that the heavy reliance on the 
Saramaka case indicates an implicit recognition of this role in the identification of 
possible risks and the evaluation of less-harmful alternatives for the environment and 
their traditional livelihood. For instance, the ACHPR notes that the Endorois, as 
‘ancestral guardians of the land’, are “best equipped to maintain its delicate 
ecosystems” and highlighted their willingness to work with the State in their 
conservation work,349 sharing their knowledge.  
 
The African Court also approached the protection of Indigenous peoples’ 
special relationship and traditional way of life by focusing on multiple rights of the 
African Charter, as noted in a more recent case, Ogiek v. Kenya, albeit without 
touching on various issues addressed in Endorois, such as the practical implications 
of the recognition to the rights to property (i.e., the duty to demarcate, delimit and 
title Indigenous lands); the extent of Indigenous peoples’ right to natural resources or 
                                                             
345 Ibid., paras. 172 and 249. 
346 Ibid., para 173 
347 Ibid., para 251. 
348 See for instance ibid., paras 210, 227-228, 244, 260-267, 286-293 and 298. 
349 Ibid., paras. 215 and 235. 
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to development; and ESIAs or consultations’ requirements (neither the role of TK in 
addressing potential threats), prompting an author to consider the legal analysis 
“often scant and poorly articulated”.350 
In 2017, the ACtHPR issued a judgment about the situation of the Ogiek 
peoples in Kenya, who inhabited the Mau Forest complex before being forcefully 
evicted from their ancestral lands, without prior consultations, arguably to protect the 
environment, although subsequently some logging concessions in the area were 
granted.351 The ACtHPR, noting that there was no dispute about the Mau Forest 
being the traditional home of the Ogiek, recognised their collective right to property 
under Article 14 over these ancestral lands, which includes possession, occupation, 
use and control of them,352 and the enjoyment and use of their natural resources 
(Article 21), as among the rights recognised under Article 14 is also the right to use 
and to enjoy the produce of the land.353 The African Court mentioned that these 
rights admit necessary and proportional restrictions, established in the public 
interest;354 however, the State was unable to prove that the presence of the Ogiek on 
the Mau Forest caused environmental harm, and thus their eviction “without prior 
consultation and without respecting the conditions of expulsion in the interest of 
public need”, was not proportional or necessary to achieve the purported justification 
of environmental protection.355 In regards to the interconnected right to development 
(Article 22), the African Court did not refer to the two-pronged test mentioned in 
Endorois (thus not addressing the question of FPIC), nor the scope of this right to 
development in the African Charter, simply ruling that because the evictions affected 
their development and were done without effective consultations, this right was 
violated.356  
Similar to the Endorois case, the recognition of the special relationship that 
the Ogiek have with their lands and resources was mainly addressed through the lens 
                                                             
350 Tramontana (n 302), pp 9-10 and 19; see also Majekolagbe and Akinkugbe (n 302), p 195. 
351 Ogiek paras 6-7. This was the first time the Court addressed the issue of Indigenous peoples’ 
rights. Majekolagbe and Akinkugbe (n 302), p 163. The Court has not to date ruled on the reparations. 
352 Ogiek, paras. 127-128. 
353 Ibid., paras. 124-128 and 200-201. 
354 Ibid., paras 129 and 201. 
355 Ibid., paras 130-131 also noting that the evidence show that the factors behind environmental 
degradation were encroachment from their parties and ill-advised logging concessions 
356 Ibid., para 210. See also Tramontana (n 302), p 17, criticising the lack of elaboration of this 
rationale, especially in the light of the Endorois case. 
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of freedom of religion and cultural rights, with the ACtHPR highlighting the need for 
Indigenous peoples to have access to their lands and natural environment to engage 
in their cultural and spiritual practices.357 In the case of the Ogiek, the Mau Forest is 
recognised as their spiritual home and centre of their religion and cultural 
manifestations, such as a distinct way of life as a hunter-gatherers; the practice of 
traditional medicine; traditional wedding ceremonies and burial rituals; the 
maintenance of sacred sites; and the use of natural resources.358 It also noted that the 
preservation of their traditional way of life and culture “is of particular importance”, 
as they have often been affected by economic activities from third parties and ‘large-
scale developmental programmes’,359 a reference to their right to development. The 
African Court noted that the eviction from the Mau Forest and the access restrictions 
imposed did not allow the Ogiek peoples to undertake their religious practices and 
‘greatly affected’ their ability to preserve their traditions,360 constituting unjustifiable 
interference with the freedom of religion and cultural rights.361 Like the ACHPR, the 
African Court did not mention the duty to consult in the context of these rights; 
however, it did point out that the evictions without prior consultations “have 
adversely impacted on their economic, social and cultural development” in the 
context of Article 22.362 Also, and as noted above, the evictions from their lands 
without consultations violated their right to property, interpreted by the ACtHR in 
the light of UNDRIP’s Article 26.2, which, among other things, recognises the 
‘traditional’ use of their lands and resources, 363  including cultural and spiritual 
practices. This implies that the protection of Indigenous peoples’ spiritual and 
cultural rights requires consultations; however, the way in which these consultations 
must be conducted are not specified by this Court, nor if ESIAs are also required.  
Furthermore, and despite its reliance on UNDRIP, it sidestepped the question 
of FPIC, opting “for the lesser ‘effective consultation’ standard”.364 This is despite 
the (uncontested) claims that some sacred sites in the Mau Forest have been 
                                                             
357 Ogiek, paras. 164 and 180-181. 
358 Ibid., paras. 165 and 182-183. 
359 Ibid., para 180. 
360 Ibid., paras 166 and 183. 
361 Ibid., paras 169 and 189. 
362 Ibid., para 210. 
363 Ibid., paras 126-127 and 131; see also paras. 200-201, recalling this in the context of the violation 
of the right to natural resources. 
364 Majekolagbe and Akinkugbe (n 302), p 195. 
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destroyed and, due to the lack of access, the knowledge about others sites has not 
passed on by the elders to the younger generations, affecting the Ogieks’ whole 
spiritual life and entire existence as peoples.365 Moreover, as also acknowledged by 
the ACtHPR, the impacts were so significant that it was impossible for the Ogieks to 
continue with their religious practices.366 In other words, there was a substantive 
impact on the Ogieks’ cultural and spiritual relationship with their environment, 
threatening their survival as peoples; yet, this Court failed to uphold the stronger 
protection established in Endorois, FPIC. This leaves open the question about the 
precise standards of protection applicable to indigenous peoples in the African 
System when it comes to substantive spiritual/cultural effects and/or major impacts 




These two regional systems play a central part in protecting human rights; as such, 
they have also accommodated Indigenous peoples’ claims, despite not being 
mentioned in the American Convention or the African Charter, developing important 
standards through their jurisprudence. In particular, there is a clear recognition in 
both systems of a collective rights to property and of the particular relationship that 
they have with their lands and resources (which includes social, cultural, spiritual 
and environmental aspects), aligning these regional instruments with international 
standards, such as UNDRIP and C169. When it comes to Indigenous peoples’ 
effective participation in decision-making, the Inter-American system has elaborated 
in much more detail how to ensure this and protect Indigenous peoples’ rights, under 
the right to property, explaining how consultations should be conducted as well as 
the standards required in regard to ESIAs. In addition, there is a duty to obtain FPIC 
in situations of ‘large-scale developments that would have a major impact’ on 
Indigenous lands (which includes cumulative impacts and should be interpreted in a 
broad way), providing a strong protection for Indigenous peoples and  clear 
requirements that enable the incorporation of their TK in decision-making, to 
identify risk, propose alternatives and avoid potentially serious/substantive impacts 
                                                             
365 Ogiek, para 158 and 160. 
366 Ibid., para. 168. 
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on their traditional way of life and environment. That being said, the subsequent 
practice of the IACtHR raises some doubts about the implementation of this criterion 
in regard to substantive effects on cultural and spiritual values, due to its reluctance 
to engage with the issue of FPIC in the face of devastating impacts on sacred sites, 
customs and traditions. 
The African system for its part frames the issue of Indigenous participation 
mostly in the context of three rights, to property, to natural resources and to 
development, and the recognition of their special relationship with their lands in the 
context of the rights to religion and to culture. Interestingly, the Commission 
incorporates these safeguards of consultations, ESIAs and consent in nearly identical 
terms as the IACtHR (although approaching the question of TK and the avoidance of 
potential risks more implicitly), as it was heavily inspired by its jurisprudence; in 
fact, it can be argued that it provides a better implementation of FPIC in regard to 
serious/substantive impacts on the spiritual and cultural aspects of Indigenous 
peoples’ livelihood, as noted in the analysis of the Endorois case. However, the 
implementation of these strong safeguards in the African system is unclear, as the 
African Court has recently failed to uphold them (except for the duty of prior 
consultations, although the Court did not dwell into it in more detail), even in the 
case of (potentially) substantive impacts.  
This means that, despite the recognition of a strong participatory structure, 
some degree of uncertainty remains when it comes to the consistent implementation 
of FPIC and the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights in the face of substantive 
harm, especially those of an immaterial nature. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The UNDRIP and the regional supervisory bodies play an important role in 
Indigenous issues, recognising a series of rights and establishing important 
safeguards that allow them to protect their traditional livelihood and their special 
relationship with their lands and resources, which, as they cannot be determined in 
abstracto, are aspect where there are often uncertainties about the possible effects 
that certain projects could have, as they are difficult to assess. Building upon the 
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work of previous instruments such as C169, we can find among these safeguards the 
duty to consult Indigenous peoples, so they can influence the outcome of the 
decision-making process, explained in detail in both UNDRIP and the Inter-
American system (and relying on the latter, in the African Commission), as well as 
the requirement to conduct impact assessments, implicit in UNDRIP but more 
advanced in the jurisprudence of the IACtHR (even integrating the Akwe:Kon 
Guidelines as the ‘best standard’) and, by extension in the African system through 
the African Commission. Both mechanisms enable the incorporation of TK in 
decision-making, allowing them to identify potentially serious social, cultural and 
environmental effects and consider alternatives, minimising or avoiding the 
materialisation of harm, as especially noted by the Special Rapporteur and EMRIP in 
the context of UNDRIP, as well as the IACtHR in Saramaka, thus having a 
precautionary role. 
Consent is generally an objective of consultations; however, UNDRIP 
requires it in the cases of relocations and the storage of hazardous materials in 
Indigenous lands, which constitutes an improvement compared to previous 
instruments, especially C169. Both situations threaten Indigenous peoples’ survival, 
being then FPIC a heightened safeguard that meets the level of the threat. 
Furthermore, and based on the spirit of the Declaration and the right to self-
determination, a majority of authors argue that UNDRIP requires Indigenous 
peoples’ consent in the case of major negative impacts on their traditional way of life 
(including spiritual and cultural impacts), providing a strong implementation of 
FPIC; yet, this approach is disputed by authors that consider UNDRIP as an 
instrument that perpetuates a colonial mentality which, when there is no agreement, 
leaves the final determination to States, an approach that the latter seem to have 
relied upon in practice. In this context, spiritual and cultural values (as well as their 
manifestations, such as sacred sites), which are often seen as a private matter by 
States, would not be adequately protected, even if their disruption could threaten 
Indigenous peoples’ survival as peoples. 
The question of consent in the Inter-American system has been developed in 
the context of Indigenous peoples’ collective right to property, by which ‘large-scale 
developments that would have major impacts’ of their lands require FPIC, replicating 
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the idea of consent being a higher safeguard and ensuring a strong protection of their 
rights. Although at first it may seem that this is a requirement linked to material 
aspects, both the IACtHR and the IACHR have interpreted it broadly, based on a 
sliding-scale approach, which would include the protection of cultural and spiritual 
values. However, the subsequent practice of the Inter-American Court where, despite 
the acknowledgement of devastating effects on sacred sites, spiritual landmarks, and 
disruptions to vital ceremonies, the IACtHR omitted any references to FPIC, 
seemingly undermines this safeguard in favour of an approach that protects States’ 
ability to have the final decision in relation to natural resources.  
The case of the African system, where the question of FPIC is discussed 
mainly in relation to the interconnected rights to property, to development, and to 
natural resources, is very interesting: on the one hand, there is the African 
Commission, which has been inspired by the IACtHR and fully adopted this strong 
FPIC standard, and it can be argued that it even applied it to the protection of 
spiritual and cultural values. On the other hand, there is the African Court which, in a 
more recent case, did not refer to the duty to obtain FPIC, even when acknowledging 
that there were substantive impacts on the Ogieks’ traditional way of life, including 
cultural and spiritual ones, threatening their survival as peoples, focusing only on the 
lesser duty to consult and thus casting doubt on the precise nature of the protection 
granted by the African system. 
I will now move on to the question of how the precautionary principle can 
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Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life is characterised by a profound 
relationship with their territories and resources, manifested in various ways across 
the different parts of the world, e.g., traditional practices like hunting and fishing; 
ceremonies and rituals; the maintenance of sacred sites; and particular beliefs, among 
others. Generally speaking, this makes it difficult to understand and anticipate with 
certainty how determined activities taking place on their lands could affect 
Indigenous peoples (and to what degree), especially when it comes spiritual and 
cultural aspects specific to them. As previously noted, this makes it essential to rely 
on locally developed systems of knowledge that support their traditional livelihood, 
known as ‘traditional knowledge’, able to provide an important amount of 
information about customs, practices, risks, threats, and possible ways to avoid 
impacts on their way of life.1  
                                                             
1 See Chapter III, sections 3-5. 
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While this traditional knowledge is incorporated in decision-making through 
consultations and impact assessments, the discussions surrounding Indigenous 
peoples’ participation in decision-making mostly focus on issues about their self-
determination and consent, 2  as highlighted in the last two chapters. This has 
seemingly drawn attention away from the role of traditional knowledge and 
consultations/impact assessments in avoiding the materialisation of potentially non-
negligible harm to Indigenous peoples’ way of life when there are activities 
conducted on their lands. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to analyse how a ‘wider’ 
precautionary principle i.e., one that incorporates traditional knowledge as a 
scientific basis for the adoption of precautionary action, can strengthen the protection 
of Indigenous peoples’ rights, when States’ actions may affect their lands and 
territories. 
In order to do this, and drawing from previous chapters, I begin by briefly 
contextualising the importance of traditional knowledge as a source of scientific 
knowledge, that allows for a better understanding of Indigenous peoples’ livelihood, 
including risks and threats (especially those of a cultural/spiritual nature). This 
provides the best information available necessary regarding reasonable grounds for 
concern about potential threats of harm derived from these States’ activities, 
highlighting the need to consider it when decisions are being adopted. I then analyse 
the way in which Indigenous peoples are able to influence decisions, arguing that, 
considering the rationale behind Indigenous consultations and impact assessments, 
and the way in which they are implemented, they act as precautionary measures. This 
precautionary character in turn means that Indigenous knowledge and interests, and 
concerns must be accommodated in the decision, at the risk of failing to avoid 
potentially serious harm to Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life. This also has 
implications for the situations where free, prior and informed consent (‘FPIC’) is a 
requirement of consultations, often limited by issues related to Indigenous peoples’ 
self-determination and control over their lands, as mentioned in previous chapters. In 
this context, I argue that obtaining FPIC constitutes a heightened precautionary 
                                                             
2 See for instance J. Anaya, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People”, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, 15 July 2009, (‘2009 
Report’), para. 46-49; V. Tauli-Corpuz, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous 
peoples”, A/HRC/45/34, 18 June 2020 (‘2020 Report’), para 61; and Chapters IV, section 6 and V 
section 2.2, among others. 
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safeguard, following a logic of ‘the higher the risk the greater the need for 
precaution’,3  moving away from these controversies and ensuring that traditional 
knowledge is actually considered before the adoption of projects and developments 
on their territories. Finally, as Indigenous peoples’ rights are not absolute, I analyse 
the situation of circumventing Indigenous peoples’ FPIC, including possible tensions 
between this requirement and the need to act in order to avoid the materialisation of 
potentially serious or irreversible harm to values important for society at large (or 
even Indigenous peoples themselves). I do this by considering three scenarios: 
situations where a rapid response is needed; the establishment of conservation areas 
in Indigenous lands; and measures to mitigate the potential effects of climate change. 
This chapter finishes with some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge, decision-making and precaution 
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, Indigenous peoples have a particular way of life, 
based on a special relationship with their lands, where spiritual, cultural, 
environmental and social aspects are deeply intertwined. This traditional livelihood, 
which constitutes an essential part of their cultural identity and survival as peoples, is 
closely linked to the (sustainable) use of their territories and natural resources, and is 
influenced by their territories, history, and worldview. This is manifested in various 
ways, such as particular rituals and ceremonies; traditional medicinal practices; 
activities such as hunting, fishing or herding, among many others; and the 
establishment and maintenance of sacred sites and particular landmarks like rivers 
and mountains. Furthermore, Indigenous peoples have developed a local system of 
knowledge, tested and improved during long periods of time in a rigorous and 
systematic way, able to provide answers and predict outcomes, known as traditional 
knowledge, which provides them an integral understanding of their environment, 
underpinning their traditional way of life.  
                                                             
3 M. Kamminga, “The Precautionary Approach in International Human Rights Law: How It Can 
Benefit the Environment” in in D. Freestone and E. Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle and 




The various factors that influence Indigenous peoples’ development means 
that their livelihood, cosmovision and culture cannot be determined in abstracto,4 
which also makes it difficult to assess with certainty how they could be affected by 
measures and actions taking place on their lands and territories, especially regarding 
effects on their spiritual and cultural aspects. In this sense, physical actions that may 
seem inconsequential from an outsider perspective could cause serious or substantial 
harm. For instance, the mere presence of foreigners in Indigenous peoples’ lands 
could desecrate sacred sites, as mentioned in the case of the Suba peoples in Chapter 
III. Physical impacts could disrupt traditional ceremonies and force spirits to 
abandon certain places, rendering them sterile, as it happened to the Kichwa peoples, 
analysed in the previous chapter; taking elements from Indigenous territories without 
following cultural rules could affect their cosmovision and cultural integrity, as noted 
in the case of the U’wa in Chapter IV. Finally, development projects may affect the 
relationship that Indigenous peoples have with their lands, animals and/or plants and 
disturb ancestors’ resting places,5 among other possible consequences.  
In this context of uncertainties and non-negligible threats, the recognition in 
international law of traditional knowledge as ‘scientific’, allows its integration into 
the precautionary element of ‘scientific uncertainty’, enabling the use of this 
knowledge as the basis for the adoption of precautionary action.6 This knowledge 
constitutes the ‘best information available’ about their traditional way of life, 
including credible evidence, ‘reasonable grounds for concern’, about possible risks 
and how to address them, leading to the adoption of effective actions to avoid the 
materialisation of potential impacts on their livelihood, their special relationship with 
their lands, and their cultural identity.7  
In general, and following the analysis made in previous chapters, 
international law enables Indigenous peoples to influence decision-making processes 
                                                             
4 Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’), General Comment No. 23: Article 27(Rights of Minorities), 8 
April 1994, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5; Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘IACtHR’), “Case of 
the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs)” Judgment of 
June 17, 2005, para. 146; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (‘IACHR’), “Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources” OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 56/09 
(30 December 2009) (‘Ancestral lands’), para. 264, among others. 
5 I. Watson, “First Nations, Indigenous Peoples: our laws have always been here” in I. Watson (ed), 
Indigenous Peoples as Subjects of International Law (Routledge, 2018), p 109. 
6 See Chapters II, section 4.3.1 and III section 4.1.  
7 See Chapters II, sections 3.2 and 4.3.1, and III, sections 3-5. 
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and incorporate their knowledge through consultations, with the objective to obtain 
their FPIC or agreement. These consultations must be conducted in conjunction with 
impact studies with their participation,8 which play a central role in regard to the 
element of ‘informed consent’ at the heart of consultations.9 The former Special 
Rapporteur highlighted that this is aimed to reverse “the historical pattern of 
exclusion from decision-making, in order to avoid the future imposition of important 
decisions on indigenous peoples, and to allow them to flourish as distinct 
communities on lands to which their cultures remain attached”, 10  indicating an 
emphasis on participation. Similarly, the majority of the discussions and 
controversies surrounding this issue are about self-determination and control over the 
participatory process, 11  drawing attention away from another important aspect, 
related to the precautionary principle, to which I turn now. 
 
2.1 Precaution, consultation and impact assessments 
 
Consultations (and impact assessments) are required before the adoption of measures 
that may affect Indigenous peoples, according to the 2007 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (‘UNDRIP’) and the International Labour Organization 
1989 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (‘C169’).12 This occurs “when the 
interests or conditions (…) that are particular to them are implicated in the decision, 
                                                             
8 See for instance Report of the Tripartite Committee submitted following a Representation under 
article 24 of the ILO Constitution regarding C169: Ecuador 2001 GB.277/18/4, para. 38; J. Anaya, 
“Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous Peoples, Extractive industries and Indigenous peoples”, 1 July 2013, A/HRC/24/41 (‘2013 
Report’), para. 65; G. Pentassuglia, “Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land 
Rights”, EJIL (2011), p 184; chapter IV sections 3.3.1 and 6; Chapter V, sections 2.2, 3.1.2 and 3.2 a), 
among others. 
9 Creik notes that separating consultations from impact assessments could result in consultations 
becoming meaningless and isolated from the broader information and decision-making process. N. 
Creik, The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessment: Process, Substance and 
Integration (CUP, 2008), p 32. See also Chapter V section 2.2.1; 2009 Report, paras. 53 and 70; and 
Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, “Free, prior and informed 
consent: a human rights-based approach” (‘EMRIP Report 2018’) 10 August 2018, A/HRC/39/62, 
para. 22, among others. 
10  2009 Report, para. 41; 2020 Report, para. 50. See also D. Leydet, “The Power to Consent: 
Indigenous Peoples, States and Development Projects”, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol 69 
No 3 (2019), p 372. 
11 See Chapter IV, section 6.3 and Chapter V section 2.2.3.  
12  Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27 June 1989, C169, entered into force 5 
September 1991, Article 6.1(a); UN General Assembly, “UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples”, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295, Article 19. 
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even when the decision may have a broader impact”,13 which is especially relevant 
regarding their particular cultural aspects and identity,14 often threatened in ways that 
are “not felt by others in society”.15 In this context, the Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous peoples (‘EMRIP’) remarks that Indigenous peoples should 
have a major role in establishing if “the potential broader impact of a decision” 
affects them, as they “may highlight possible harms that may not be clear to the State 
or project proponent, and may suggest mitigation measures to address those 
harms”. 16  This indicates that, to initiate the consultation process, there must be 
something more than a mere belief or hypothesis, some credible evidence that 
Indigenous peoples’ interests or concerns are involved and could be affected by a 
proposed measure, i.e., that there are ‘reasonable ground for concern’, in line with 
the precautionary element of ‘scientific uncertainty’.17 Moreover, this evidence can 
be provided by Indigenous peoples themselves, recognising the important role of 
traditional knowledge as a scientific basis for precaution, identifying risks that States 
are often unable or unequipped to fully understand. This is often the case when it 
comes to activities taking place on their lands and territories, which could threaten 
their livelihood on several levels, including physical, cultural and spiritual. 
The remaining two elements of the precautionary principle, i.e., the existence 
of a ‘threat’ of a ‘serious/irreversible’ nature to Indigenous peoples’ way of life and 
environment, are also present in the various instruments, reports and jurisprudence 
regarding consultations and impact assessments. For example, according to the 
travaux preparatoires of the C169, the rationale behind States’ obligation to carry 
out studies “in cooperation with the peoples concerned, to assess the social, spiritual, 
cultural and environmental impact on them of planned development activities”,18 was 
to allow for the careful assessment of “potential impacts” of these activities on them 
and their relationship with their lands, especially in the context of large-scale 
projects, which often have effects of a non-negligible nature.19 The ILO Tripartite 
                                                             
13 2009 Report, para 43; 2020 Report, para. 57. 
14 Ancestral lands, para. 276.  
15 2009 Report, para 43; EMRIP Report 2018, para 33. See also Chapter III, sections 3-5. 
16 EMRIP Report 2018, para. 34. 
17 See Chapter II, sections 3.2 and 4.3; Chapter III, sections 4-5. 
18 C169, Article 7.3 
19 International Labour Office, “Partial revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention 
1957(No 107) Report VI(1)” 75th Session (1988) (‘ILO travaux report VI(1)’), p 65.  
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Committee, in cases involving potentially serious effects on Indigenous peoples’ 
lives and territories from the exploitation of natural resources in their lands, has also 
noted a similar role for consultations. 20  The Special Rapporteur for her part 
mentioned that ‘adequate consultation processes’ must provide enough time for 
Indigenous peoples to fully understand “possible environmental, health and other 
risks”, and that international standards require independent social, cultural, and 
environmental impact assessments, with Indigenous participation, that cover “the full 
spectrum of rights that could be affected by a measure or project” on their lands, in 
order to identify possible impacts, alternatives and mitigation measures.21 In cases 
where there were non-negligible effects on Indigenous peoples from extractive 
activities in their lands, the IACtHR ruled that States must guarantee their effective 
participation in decision-making, by conducting consultations and environmental and 
social impact assessments (‘ESIAs’) with Indigenous participation, and ensure that 
they are “aware of possible risks”, so they can knowingly and voluntarily accept the 
development proposed, preserving and protecting their special relationship with their 
lands and environment. 22  It also noted that ESIAs “serve to assess the possible 
damage or impact [that] a proposed development or investment project may have on 
the property in question and on the community”, including how “existing and future 
activities could jeopardize the survival” of Indigenous peoples.23  
It is also important to recall the 2005 UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues (‘UNPFII’) report about free, prior and informed consent 24  (which has 
influenced the interpretation of C169,25  UNDRIP,26 and the jurisprudence of the 
                                                             
20 See Report of the Tripartite Committee, submitted following a Representation under Article 24 of 
the ILO Constitution regarding ILO C169: Colombia 2001 (GB.276/17/1), paras. 84-93 and Chapter 
IV sections 6.1-6.2. 
21 2020 Report, paras. 56-58; EMRIP Report 2018, paras 22. (b), 33-34 and 44. 
22 See for example, IACtHR, “Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname (Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs)” Judgment of November 28, 2007 (‘Saramaka’), paras 129 and 133, 
and “Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs)” Judgment of August 12, 2008 (‘Saramaka 
interpretation’), para. 40, among others. See also Ancestral lands, paras. 267 and 308-309, also noting 
how Indigenous peoples can identify possible risks to their special relationship with their lands and 
alternatives/mitigation measures. 
23 Saramaka interpretation, paras. 40-41. 
24 UN Economic and Social Council, Permanent Form on Indigenous Peoples, “Report on Free, Prior 
and Informed Consent”, UN Doc.E/C.19/2005/3, 17 February 2005. (‘UNPFII Report’). 
25 See for example, International Labour Standards Department, “Indigenous & Tribal Peoples’ Rights 
in practice: A Guide to ILO Convention No 169” (2009), p 63 
26 See Chapter V, section 2.2.3. 
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IACtHR),27 which states that ‘informed’ refers to the information provided during 
consultations, and should include a “preliminary assessment of the likely economic, 
social, cultural and environmental impact, including potential risks (…) in a context 
that respects the precautionary principle”28 [emphasis added]. Finally, in the context 
of the biodiversity regime, there are the Akwe:Kon Voluntary Guidelines, 29 
considered by the IACtHR as the standard that must be followed regarding ESIAs.30 
These guidelines, expressly guided by a precautionary approach,31 have the aim to, 
among other things, incorporate Indigenous peoples cultural, environmental and 
social concerns and interests (as well as their knowledge and practices) in impact 
assessments procedures (which also include consultations at different stages), to 
avoid “potential adverse impacts on the[ir] livelihoods”.32  
Following this analysis, it is clear that the duty to conduct 
consultations/impact assessments, established in various instruments and recognised 
by international jurisprudence, is triggered when there are reasonable grounds for 
concern about ‘potential adverse impacts on their livelihoods’; ‘likely economic, 
social, cultural and environmental impacts’; and ‘possible risks’ that Indigenous 
peoples must be made aware of (including those that could ‘jeopardise their survival’ 
as peoples), among other situations that could affect them in significant ways, i.e., 
when there are threats of serious or irreversible damage to their traditional way of 
life, in a context of lack of full scientific certainty. In this sense, consultations and 
impact assessments act as precautionary measures,33 that enable the incorporation of 
traditional knowledge in decision-making. This means that States, before doing any 
activities on Indigenous peoples’ lands, are under the obligation to not only conduct 
these consultations and impact studies, but are also to avoid the materialisation of 
                                                             
27 IACtHR, “Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador (Merits and Reparations)” 
Judgment of June 27, 2012, para. 208 and footnote 244. 
28 UNPFII Report, p 12. 
29 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, “Akwe: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for the 
Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments regarding Developments 
proposed to take place on, or which are likely to impact on, Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters 
Traditionally occupied or used by Indigenous and Local Communities” (CBD Guideline Series, 2004) 
(‘Akwe:Kon’). See Chapter III section 6.1. 
30 Saramaka interpretation, para. 41. 
31 Akwe:Kon, para. 61. 
32 Akwe:Kon, foreword and introduction. See also Chapter III section 6.1 
33 As mentioned in Chapter II, consultations and impact assessments have been generaly recognised as 
precautionary measures. Chapter II, section 4.1. 
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potentially non-negligible harm to Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life. In this 
context, they need to rely on the vital scientific role of traditional knowledge as the 
best information available about risks, alternatives and uncertainties, especially in 
regard to spiritual and cultural aspects, at the risk of failing to comply with their 
precautionary duties.34 
There are two important implications here. First, if after consultations/impact 
studies an agreement is not reached or FPIC is not obtained, Indigenous peoples’ 
knowledge, concerns and interests must still be accommodated by States, modifying 
the original project or development based on the outcome of this process,35 at the risk 
of causing non-negligible harm to Indigenous peoples’ livelihood. For instance, the 
HRC noted in Länsmann II that the Finnish authorities consulted the Saami and took 
their concerns into account before granting a logging permit in their lands, amending 
the original project by excluding certain zones; reverting to the use of winter roads; 
and deciding on using manual logging methods, which have lighter effects than 
mechanical logging, thus avoiding serious effects on their traditional reindeer 
herding activities.36 If States do not accommodate their concerns, and keeping in 
mind that the precautionary principle lowers the standard of proof, 37  Indigenous 
peoples need only demonstrate that, based on the best information available (which 
includes their traditional knowledge), there is ‘credible evidence’ that 
serious/irreversible harm may be caused to their traditional way of life (instead of 
proving ‘beyond reasonable doubt’), being then the turn of the State to disprove this 
allegation, that is, that the project/development planned on their lands would not 
cause serious/irreversible harm, despite disregarding Indigenous peoples’ input; this 
could be a difficult thing to prove, especially regarding spiritual and cultural impacts. 
Failure to disprove this requires then the adoption of effective precautionary actions, 
with Indigenous participation, as it must be assumed that these effects will 
materialise.38 
                                                             
34 See also Chapter III, sections 4-5.  
35 The IACHR is of a similar opinion but based on the ‘due process guarantees’ established in the 
Inter-American system. Ancestral lands, para. 324. See also 2020 Report, para 63. 
36 HRC, Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 671/1995(1996), paras. 6.1, 6.13 and 
10.5. 




The second implication is that if the potential threat is more than serious, 
something more than consultations/impact assessments is required, to which I turn 
now. 
 
2.2 Precaution and consent 
 
As noted in chapter II, when the precautionary principle is triggered, States must 
adopt ‘effective’ and ‘proportionate’ action to anticipate potential harm, i.e., 
measures able to avoid this harm without causing more damages than the original 
threat, and that bear an appropriate relation between the degree of the risk and the 
response.39 This means that substantive risks require more rigorous precautionary 
measures, following a logic of ‘the higher the risk the greater the need for 
precaution’.  
In the case of Indigenous peoples, and due to their particular livelihood, 
‘substantive risks/harm’ refers to not only (possible) physical effects, like impacts on 
their right to life or personal integrity, but also to their survival as peoples, i.e., their 
ability to continue with their traditional way of life and the protection, preservation, 
respect and guarantee of the special relationship that they have with their lands; their 
distinct cultural identity; social structures; economic systems; and customs, beliefs 
and traditions.40 For example, removing Indigenous peoples from their lands may not 
result in physical injuries, but it would cut their connection with their territories, 
making it impossible or very difficult for them to continue with their traditions and 
ceremonies; fulfil their material needs like obtaining food, medicine or clothes; and 
apply their traditional knowledge, rendering it useless and unable to be updated and 
passed down to the younger generations, which would severely affect their cultural 
identity and risking their cultural extinction.41 As noted by the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples, “[n]ext to shooting Indigenous Peoples, the surest way to kill us 
is to separate us from our part of the Earth. Once separated, we will either perish in 
                                                             
39 Ibid., section 4.1. 
40 Saramaka interpretation, para. 37; Saramaka, paras. 91, 121 and 129. 
41 See Chapter IV section 6.3; Chapter V, section 2.2.3; IACtHR, “Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala 
(Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs)”, 25 May 2010, para. 147; D. Posey, 
“Introduction: Culture and Nature-The Inextricable Link” in D. Posey (ed), Cultural and Spiritual 
Values of Biodiversity (UNEP, 1999), p 5.  
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body or our minds and spirits will be altered so that we end up mimicking foreign 
ways, adopt foreign languages and build a foreign prison around our Indigenous 
spirits (…)”.42 Venne further highlights that “[r]emoving us from our land base is, in 
fact, to take away our lifeforce”.43 As previously mentioned, effects of a similar 
magnitude could occur from large-scale projects and developments on their lands, 
including destruction that could force Indigenous peoples to abandon part of their 
territories or rendering them unusable from traditional purposes,44 as well as from 
smaller, cumulative ones. 45  The former Special Rapporteur has even noted that, 
given the invasive nature of extractive activities, it is ‘perhaps mostly a theoretical 
possibility’ that they cannot cause substantive effects on Indigenous peoples.46  
  It is important to mention that when it comes to projects related to the use of 
natural resources, States often have a vested interest;47 this, added to the lack the 
proper understanding regarding impacts on Indigenous peoples’ special relationship 
with their lands, 48  makes consultations insufficient to ensure that potentially 
substantive effects on their way of life will not materialise.49 In addition, these types 
of projects seems to leave little space to effectively accommodate Indigenous 
peoples’ concerns and interests; for instance, there is not much that can be done to 
protect sites of cultural or spiritual significance that will be underwater due to the 
                                                             
42  Cited in M. Colchester-Forest peoples Programme, Dams, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic 
Minorities, 
Thematic Review 1.2 prepared as an input to the World Commission on Dams, Cape Town (2000), p 
18. 
43 S. Venne, “The New Language of Assimilation”, Without Prejudice Vol. II No 2(1989), p 63. 
44 ILO travaux report VI(1), p 63; Chapter IV section 6.3; Chapter V, section 2.2.3; HRC, Poma Poma 
v. Peru, Comm. 1457/2006. 
45 F. MacKay, “The Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname and the UN Declaration on 
the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Convergence, Divergence and Mutual Reinforcement” ELR (April 
2018) | No. 1, p 40. See also J. Reyes, “La Tierra Desde La Visión del Mundo Ayuuk” in M. Castillo 
and A. Strecker, Heritage and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Leiden University Press 2017), pp 184-
185 mentioning how the gods were angered and brought misfortune to the peoples due to the 
construction of various roads without celebrating rituals and asking them for permission. 
46 2013 Report, para. 31. 
47 E. Daes, “Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land”, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21, 11 June 
2001, para. 23 
48 See for example, Colchester (n 42), p 18, noting that “[w]hat may appear to planners as a minor 
impact – the submergence of ancestral graves, for example (…)- can have serious social 
repercussions, since the economic and religious life of many indigenous peoples is often linked to 
specific topography of their lands” p 18. See also Chapter III, sections 3-5. 
49 P. Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights” (Manchester University Press, 2002), p 
357; F. MacKay, A Guide to Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in the International Labour Organization” 
Forest Peoples Programme (2003), pp 16 and 18; Chapter IV section 6.3, among others.  
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construction of a dam in ancestral lands. 50  Considering this, and as analysed in 
previous chapters, on several occasions in international law the approach has been to 
rely on a stronger measure; for example: 
- the IACtHR, to ensure that Indigenous peoples’ survival as peoples is not at risk, 
established in Saramaka the duty to obtain Indigenous peoples’ FPIC in the case of 
“major development or investment plans that may have a profound impact on the[ir] 
property rights”[emphasis added].51 This includes individual and cumulative effects 
of current and future activities that could jeopardise Indigenous peoples’ survival,52 
and it is based on a ‘sliding-scale approach’ that relies on “the anticipated degree of 
impact on the community” [emphasis added],53 by which “the measures which have a 
potentially substantial impact on the basic physical and/or cultural well-being of an 
indigenous community should not proceed without their consent”;54  
- in the context of UNDRIP and possible effects of extractive activities in Indigenous 
lands, a majority of authors consider that, taking into account this Declaration’s spirit 
and normative framework, FPIC is required when a measure could have substantive 
effects on their environment and way of life.55 For instance, Barelli mentions that 
consent is required regarding measures “likely to produce a major (negative) impact 
on their lands, cultures and, ultimately, lives of Indigenous peoples”[emphasis 
added]. 56  Furthermore, Gilbert and Doyle argue that UNDRIP establishes an 
obligation to obtain consent when there are measures or projects “with potentially 
major impacts or threatening the physical or cultural survival of a people.”57  
                                                             
50 As it happened in Chile during the 1990s, with the construction of dams in Pehuenche territory that 
submerged their homes and entire forests of sacred trees (Araucarias); in addition, Pehuenche families 
were threatened with forced evictions. See American Anthropological Association, “Report of the 
Committee for Human Rights:  The Pehuenche, the World Bank Group and ENDESA S.A. violations 
of Human Rights in the Pangue and Ralco Dam Projects on the Bío-Bío River, Chile” (March 1998). 
As noted during the drafting of C169, the displacement of Indigenous peoples due to these types of 
projects is a recurrent issue. ILO travaux report VI(1), pp 63-65. 
51 Saramaka, para. 137; see also para. 134.  
52 Saramaka interpretation, paras. 17 and 41; Chapter V, section 3.1.2. 
53 Pentassuglia (n 8), pp 178 and 180; Saramaka, para 137; M. Barelli, “Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent in the UNDRIP” J. Hohmann and M. Weller (eds) The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary (OUP, 2018), p 258. 
54 J. Gilbert and C. Doyle, “A New Dawn over the Land: Shedding Light on Collective Ownership and 
Consent” in S. Allen and A. Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous peoples (Hart publishing, 2011), p 308. 
55 Chapter V section 2.2.3.2. 
56 Barelli (n 53), p 269.   
57 Gilbert and Doyle, (n 54), p 318. 
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- the EMRIP noted that “if a measure or project is likely to have a significant, direct 
impact on indigenous peoples’ lives or land, territories or resources then consent is 
required”, 58  and approach shared by the Special Rapporteur, 59  who adds that 
“consent may not be required for extractive activities within indigenous territories in 
cases in which it can be conclusively established that the activities will not 
substantially affect indigenous peoples in the exercise of any of their substantive 
rights in relation to the lands and resources within their territories” [emphasis 
added], 60  which also includes their relationship with their lands and its 
manifestations.  
- the Akwe:Kon Voluntary Guidelines establish that the prior and informed consent 
should be obtained when a proposed development is likely to impact sacred sites or 
lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by Indigenous peoples,61 which have 
a particular importance for their cultural and spiritual significance,62 so any effects 
on them could threaten their cultural survival. 
- Finally, both C169 and UNDRIP require FPIC in the context of relocations 63 
(which potentially substantive effects were mentioned above), and the latter also 
requires consent in the case of the storage or disposal of hazardous materials in 
Indigenous lands,64 that could cause long-terms health impacts on current and future 
generations, and the extreme pollution of the local water, soil, flora and fauna, 
affecting Indigenous peoples’ capacity to maintain their traditional way of life and 
practices.65  
In this sense, obtaining Indigenous peoples’ consent constitutes “a heightened 
safeguard for the rights of indigenous peoples”, following a logic of proportionality 
                                                             
58 EMRIP 2018 Report, para 35. See also para. 26(a), noting that “withholding consent is expected to 
convince the other party not to take the risk of proceeding with the proposal”. 
59 See 2009 Report, para. 47, 2020 Report, para. 60; Leydet (n 10), p 399; Gilbert and Doyle, (n 54), p 
308.  
60 2013 Report, para. 31.  
61 Akwe:Kon, paras. 52-53. See also S. Rombouts, Having a Say Indigenous peoples, international 
law and free, prior and informed consent (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2014), p 330 and Chapter III, 
section 6. 
62 Akwe:Kon, para. 6(e). 
63 C169, Article 16; UNDRIP, Article 10. 
64 UNDRIP, Article 29.2. 
65 Chapter V section 2.2.3. 
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in regard to their rights,66 by which a State should not move forward with a proposed 
measure until this consent is obtained.67 
Despite this, as noted in previous chapters, concerns about control over 
natural resources and issues of participation and self-determination have resulted in a 
limited recognition and application of the need to obtain FPIC. For instance, the 
IACtHR after Saramaka has focused more on the ‘consultation aspect’ of 
participation, even in the face of substantive effects that threatened Indigenous 
peoples’ cultural survival, which MacKay considers constitutes “a trend of 
minimising or omitting any discussion of the consent requirement”, that protects 
States’ ability to have the final say regarding natural resources. 68  The 
characterization of UNDRIP by (mostly Indigenous) academics as an instrument that 
perpetuates a colonial approach to Indigenous peoples also implies that States remain 
the ‘final determiner’  and ‘retain the power to decide’ when it comes to Indigenous 
issues, even if there is a substantive threat of harm.69 Moreover, this decision-making 
power has been exercised by States (and it has been seemingly supported by regional 
Courts, as previously noted), viewing FPIC as a mechanism to include Indigenous 
concerns in decision-making but without sharing any ‘decision-making authority’, 
privileging “a more diluted version of FPIC as a participatory right, which results in 
a procedural obligation to seek consent through what is often technical (and 
symbolic) consultation”.70 Finally, C169 is silent about potentially substantive threats 
of harm from extractive activities on their territories, and establishes a weak version 
of FPIC in situations of relocation, that leaves the final decision to States, prioritising 
their concerns about self-determination, and economic reasons.71 
                                                             
66 Ancestral lands, para. 333; 2013 Report, para. 33, noting that “consent performs a safeguard role for 
indigenous peoples’ fundamental rights”; see also EMRIP Report 2018, para. 35. 
67 EMRIP Report 2018, paras. 22 (a)-(b) and 26-28, noting that withholding consent is expected to 
convince the counterpart not to move forward with a measure and that Indigenous peoples may use 
this to look for adjustments or amendments to a proposal; 2009 Report, para. 47. See also Barelli (n 
53), p 254. 
68 MacKay (n 45); Chapter V, section 3.1.3. 
69 Chapter V, section 2.2.3.2. 
70 M. Papillon and T. Rodon, “The Transformative Potential of Indigenous-Driven Approaches to 
Implementing Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Lessons from Two Canadian Cases”, International 
journal on Minority and Group Rights 27 (2019), p 6, as also noted in the various jurisprudence 
throughout this work. See also Chapter V, section 2.2.3.2. 
71 Chapter IV, section 6.3; see also ILO travaux report VI(1), p 65, expressly mentioning that the 
‘ultimate decision’ will remain with governments. 
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Considering the fact that consultations/impact assessments act as 
precautionary measures, as well as the ‘proportionality’ requirement, by which 
stricter measures are needed in the face of higher threats of harm, in situations of 
‘major development or investment plans that may have a profound impact’ on 
Indigenous peoples’ way of life; and/or where there are measures that could ‘have a 
potentially substantial impact on the basic physical and/or cultural well-being of an 
indigenous community’, ‘substantially affect indigenous peoples in the exercise of 
any of their substantive rights in relation to the lands and resources within their 
territories’, or are ‘likely to produce a major (negative) impact on their lands, 
cultures and, ultimately, lives of Indigenous peoples’, there is an obligation for States 
to obtain Indigenous peoples’ FPIC. This obligation is independent from arguments 
about control over territories and resources, or power dynamics on the decision-
making process, as it originates in the precautionary duty to avoid the materialisation 
of possible substantive impacts on their traditional way of life, especially their 
cultural and spiritual aspects, which entails subordinating other considerations to this 
duty.72  
In other words, FPIC does not only constitute a ‘heightened safeguard’, but a 
heightened precautionary safeguard, which has to be obtained in any situation where 
there is credible evidence of substantive risks to their traditional way of life or their 
survival as peoples. This provides a more balanced and consistent standard, 
applicable regardless of controversies about control over natural resources, self-
determination or participatory issues. It also ensures that traditional knowledge (‘the 
best information available’) is actually considered in the decision; that only the risks 
Indigenous peoples deem acceptable may occur, especially in regards to spiritual and 
cultural aspects; that they maintain the ability to determine what constitutes a 
‘substantive risk/harm’ and when FPIC is needed; 73  and that their fundamentals 
rights are not infringed,74 which in turn strengthens the protection of Indigenous 
peoples’ special relationship with their lands. For instance, in 2010 the Warlmanpa 
People of Muckaty initiated court proceedings against the Australian government’s 
                                                             
72 See Chapter II section 4.3. 
73 Gilbert and Doyle (n 54), p 319. see also J. Parra, ‘The Role of Domestic Courts in International 
Human Rights Law: The Constitutional Court of Colombia and Free, Prior and Informed Consent’, 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 23(2016), pp 365-366. 
74 2013 Report, para. 33; Saramaka, para. 137. 
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attempt to establish a nuclear waste dump site in their territories, claiming among 
other things that they failed to obtain the consent of the Traditional Owners,75 who 
consider these lands of special significance as it was handed down to them by their 
ancestors (and form part of stories about their dreaming), together with the 
knowledge to look after them, a knowledge that need to be passed to future 
generations. 76  In 2014, this conflict concluded in an arrangement by which the 
government agreed not to build the site in their lands.77 Another example is the 
collaboration between the Saami and the Finnish government in the creation of a 
management plan for the Hammastunturi Wilderness Area, that protect the Saami 
traditional way of life and preserve their culture from the possible threats represented 
by other competing land use forms, such as extractive industries and development 
initiatives, and leaving the management and maintenance of sacred sites in the hands 
of the Saami.78  
In addition, this also influences the way in which States can act in the absence 
of Indigenous peoples’ consent, to which I turn now. 
 
2.3 Precaution and circumventing Indigenous peoples’ FPIC 
 
As noted by the IACtHR, Indigenous peoples’ rights can be subject to limitations, 
which have to be necessary and proportional, established by law and with the 
objective of achieving a legitimate purpose, in accordance with human rights 
obligations. 79  This also applies to the fundamental rights protected by FPIC. In 
effect, according to the former Special Rapporteur, States can move forward with a 
measure without obtaining FPIC if they are able to demonstrate that no rights are 
                                                             
75 Watson (n 5), p 107. 
76  See Beyond Nuclear initiative, Press release, June 19, 2014 https://www.foe.org.au/muckaty-
winnerz [accessed January 2021]. 
77  A. Newman and G. Nagtzaam, Decision-making and Radioactive Waste Disposal (Routledge, 
2016), pp 164-165. See also Papillon and Rodon (n 70), pp 19-20, recounting the Cree’s opposition to 
an uranium mining project in their ancestral lands, refusing to engage in negotiations with the mining 
company; this led a moratorium on uranium mining issued by the government of Quebec, based on 
among other reasons the lack of consent from the Cree and the protection of Aboriginal peoples, 
including their societies, communities and economy. 
78 S. Juntunen and E. Stolt, Application of Akwe:Kon Guidelines in the Management and Land Use 
Plan for the Hammastunturi Wilderness Area: Final Report (Metsähallitus Natural Heritage Services 
2013), pp 9, 33-35 and 53. See also section 2.3 c) below. 
79 Saramaka, para. 127; 2013 Report, para. 32; UNDRIP, Article 46.2, among others. 
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being limited or, if they are, the limitation is valid under international law (so, for 
example, the right to be free from torture cannot be limited);80 and that this limitation 
is necessary and proportional and in pursuit of a valid purpose or objective 
‘motivated by concern for the human rights of others’, excluding commercial or 
revenue-raising objectives.81 In addition, other safeguards must be implemented to 
minimise the limitations of rights (like compensations) and the decision should be 
subject to judicial review.82 It is also important to recall that C169 also allows for 
States to overcome the lack of consent, but under more favourable conditions for 
them, i.e., following ‘appropriate procedures established by national law and 
regulations’ and, ‘whenever possible’ enabling Indigenous peoples’ return to their 
lands or, if this is not possible, compensate them with lands of at least equal quality 
and legal status or money.83  
In general, and considering the degree of the impacts caused by extractive 
projects and other developments in Indigenous lands, it seems difficult that States are 
able to meet these requirements.84 Even if they do, States’ duty to adopt effective and 
proportionate action to avoid these non-negligible impacts on Indigenous peoples’ 
livelihood persists, so they must ensure that the substantive harm would not occur, at 
the risk of failing to comply with the precautionary principle. In theory, this implies 
that, as long as States adopt measures that effectively stop the occurrence of 
substantive harm, they could circumvent the lack of Indigenous peoples FPIC, in line 
with the notion that FPIC does not constitute a veto power.85 However, considering 
the difficulties to assess (much less properly understand) the possible effects on 
Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life in these situations, in particular those of a 
cultural/spiritual nature, short of cancelling or suspending a project that would have 
caused the impacts, it seems very unlikely that other measures would achieve this 
result, making it necessary to obtain their consent. In this context, it is also important 
                                                             
80  2013 Report, paras. 33-34; EMRIP Report 2018, para. 38. See also J. Anaya and S. Puig, 
“Mitigating State Sovereignty: The Duty to Consult with Indigenous Peoples” Arizona Legal Studies 
Discussion Paper No.16-42, p 27. 
81 2013 Report, paras. 34-36, and EMRIP Report 2018, para. 38. It is useful to recall that economic 
considerations also take a back seat when the precautionary principle is triggered. Chapter II section 
4.3. 
82 2013 Report, paras. 38-39; Anaya and Puig (n 80), p 27; EMRIP Report 2018, para. 38-41. 
83 C169, Article 16.2-16.4. 
84 Barelli (n 53), p 269. See also Anaya and Puig (n 80), p 27; EMRIP Report 2018, para. 38; 2013 
Report, para 36. 
85 2009 Report, paras. 46-48; EMRIP Report 2018, para. 26 (a); 2020 Report, para 59, among others. 
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to note that Indigenous peoples need only to prove the existence of ‘reasonable 
grounds for concern’ about potentially substantive threat to their traditional way of 
life, following a precautionary standard of proof. 
 That being said, States could argue that the need to consult Indigenous 
peoples or their lack of acquiescence may interfere with the (precautionary) 
protection of other values that are important for the society, or even Indigenous 
peoples themselves. Although this is difficult to assess in abstracto, I will explore 
this issue looking at three situations: when a rapid response is required to avoid 
harm; in situations of conservation and the establishment of parks and reserves 
affecting Indigenous peoples’ territories; and in the context of measures to combat 
climate change. 
 
a) Rapid responses: emergencies and natural disasters 
 
As previously noted, Indigenous peoples must be consulted (and obtain FPIC if 
required) whenever there is a measure that could affect them directly. This is a 
lengthy process 86  with several steps, which although adequate to analyse and 
integrate different perspectives, possible risks and integrate traditional knowledge, it 
seems unsuitable for situations where a rapid response is required, including when 
there are potentially serious or irreversible risks of harm. Trouwborst for instance, in 
illustrating what to do in a situation where there is no scientific information 
available, draws the example of a ship loaded with chemical substances that was 
damaged in a storm and its content is leaking into the ocean, without information 
about the possible effects of these chemicals in the water.87 If this is happening right 
before an area where a coastal Indigenous community lives, there would be little 
time to prepare consultations with their representative institutions (e.g., gather a 
Council of Elders) or to conduct impact assessments, so precautionary measures 
without Indigenous consent or even consultations can be adopted, including perhaps 
temporary relocations; failure to do so could result in serious or substantive effects 
                                                             
86 See Rombouts (n 61), p 416 expressing that an “obvious drawback of the FPIC system discussed is 
that it will undoubtedly require a lot of time and resources to conduct the necessary consultation 
processes, 
impact assessment, and mapping operations.” 
87 A. Trouwborst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), p 144. 
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on their way of life. Similarly, this would apply to natural disasters, like tsunamis, 
especially considering that they can be caused by the displacement of a large volume 
of water that is not necessarily detected on land, like an underwater earthquake.88 
Naturally, when the emergency stops, consultations must be conducted about the 
next steps, and consent obtained if for example relocation has to be permanent or 
there are other substantive effects. The ILO Tripartite Committee has expressed a 
similar approach, agreeing with the position of the Chilean government that 
Indigenous consultations could not be required during states of emergency or 
exception because “prior consultations cannot be held in situations where decisions 
must be taken quickly and effectively (…) and where it would be impossible to 
follow the steps set out in the Regulations on Consultation with Indigenous Peoples”, 
noting that “while certain circumstances, such as natural disasters, may require the 
taking of urgent and emergency measures, consultation procedures should be re-
established as soon as possible.”89 When it comes to UNDRIP this is less clear, 
because it does not establish any way to bypass Indigenous consent (unlike C169 in 
relocation);90 furthermore, regarding relocations, there is a ‘blanket prohibition’91 
established in Article 10 (“Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from 
their lands of territories”) as it was noted by States during the drafting procedure, 
which raised concerns that the use of the word ‘forcibly’ would not allow them to 
relocate Indigenous peoples in the case of natural disasters or emergency situations.92 
Yet, the International Law Association noted that the “lack of express exceptions in 
Article 10 may not, however, prevent removals or relocations in cases of necessity or 
force majeure” like war and catastrophe,93 which I believe is the correct view.  
                                                             
88 Pacific tsunami warning center frequently asked questions  https://ptwc.weather.gov/ptwc/faq.php 
[accessed July 2019]. 
89 Report of the Tripartite Committee submitted following a Representation under article 24 of the 
ILO Constitution regarding ILO C169 Chile 2016, paras. 84, and 136-137. 
90 Barelli (n 53), p 255.  
91  C. Charters, “Indigenous peoples’ Rights to lands, Territories and Resources in UNDRIP” in 
Hohmann and Weller (n 53), p 409, noting that Article 10 “suggest a deliberate intention to retain a 
strong, blanket prohibition.” 
92  Economic and Social Council, “Report of the working group established in accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/32” E/CN.4/2002/98 6 March 2002, para. 79; see also 
Charters (n 91), p 409 and Barelli (n 53), p 255. 
93 See ILA, “Rights of Indigenous Peoples Interim Report” 2010, p 21. See also Barelli (n 53), p 255 
pointing out that the Declaration, compared to C169, sought to “limit the scope of the permitted 
exceptions” to relocation, implying that there are exceptions. 
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In other words, in situations of emergency or natural disasters where 
potentially serious, irreversible or substantive harm could occur, States can proceed 
without Indigenous consent, being this a necessary and proportionate course of 
action adopted for a valid purpose; otherwise, there may not be Indigenous peoples 
to consult if the precautionary action is delayed. However, after the urgent measure is 
put in place, States are still under the obligation to consult and obtain consent, if 
required. 
 
b) Conservation efforts and the creation of parks and reserves 
 
It is not uncommon for States to argue that Indigenous peoples’ must be/had to be 
relocated against their consent, notwithstanding the potentially catastrophic effects 
on their traditional way of life, in order to protect the ‘wilderness’ from current and 
potentially serious impacts, based on a conservation perspective of ‘minimum human 
interference’ that excludes Indigenous peoples and any people living in a particular 
area.94 For instance, as analysed in the previous chapter, Kenya ordered the eviction 
of the Ogieks from their ancestral home in the Mau Forest without consultations, 
threatening their very survival as peoples, to allegedly preserve the natural ecosystem 
from activities like hunting and fishing and their possible negative impacts on the 
environment;95 and the Endorois were removed from their ancestral lands without 
consultations to establish a Game Reserve, leaving them unable to continue using 
their natural resources and sacred sites, seriously disrupting their traditional way of 
life (including spiritual practices), and threatening their survival as peoples. 96 
Similarly, Tanzania evicted the Maasai without consultation from their villages 
arguing environmental concerns about their practices (agriculture, tree cutting and 
hunting) in the Loliondo Game Control Area, burning their homes and crops and 
                                                             
94 Originated from the world’s first national park, Yellowstone, in the United States. E. Desmet, 
Indigenous Rights Entwined with Nature Conservation (Intersentia, 2011), pp 14-15, and 101-102; 
and E. Bernbaum, “Mountains: the Heights of Biodiversity” in Posey (n 41), p 342. See also Chapter 
III, section 3. 
95 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights v. Republic of Kenya”, Application No 006/2012, Judgment, 26 May 2017 (‘Ogiek’), paras. 7-
8, 130 and 174. 
96 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘ACHR’), “Case 276/03: Centre for Minority 
Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare 
Council)/Kenya” (‘Endorois’), paras. 6-7, 16 and 120. 
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leaving them homeless and without food;97 and Uganda expelled the Batwa from 
their traditional forest lands without consultations to, among other things, create the 
Bwindi and Mgahinga National Parks, substantially changing their way of life from 
hunter-gatherers to working in farms, suffering abuses and discrimination and being 
unable to access their sacred sites or traditional medicines.98  
It is clear in these cases there was no agreement for the relocations and States 
acted against their will, despite the substantive effects on their traditional way of life. 
This could be in theory presented as a clash between the need to avoid possible 
serious or irreversible harm to the environment (conservation) and the avoidance of 
serious or substantive harm to Indigenous peoples; however, this tension seems to be 
in most cases more apparent than real, for two reasons:  
- first, the argument that forced relocations were conducted to protect the 
environment and even to uphold a responsibility towards the society at large and 
future generations99  is often contradicted by States’ actions. For instance, Kenya 
granted logging concessions in the Mau Forest, 100  “raising doubts about the 
legitimacy of the environmental justification for the resettlement of the Ogiek”;101 
similarly, it granted concessions for mining in the ancestral lands of the Endorois, 
which could cause irreparable damage to the land;102 and Tanzania has favoured the 
business of private enterprises in Maasai lands, including the construction of housing 
and an airport in the middle of wildlife corridors, causing noise and pollution and 
disturbing the wildlife.103 These economic reasons do not constitute a “valid purpose 
or objective” to override Indigenous peoples’ consent, as noted above. The only case 
in which there seemed to be real conservation efforts without an economic ‘hidden’ 
                                                             
97 J. Anaya, “Report by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people: Cases examined by the Special Rapporteur (June 2009–July 2010)” 
15 September 2010, A/HRC/15/37/Add.1 (‘2010 Report on examined cases’), para. 424 (c), (d), (h), 
(i) and (j). 
98 N. Mukasa, “The Batwa Indigenous People in Uganda and their Detachment from Forest Livehood: 
Land Eviction and Social Plight”, Deusto Journal of Human Rights No 10/2012, pp 77 and 80. See 
also A. Namara, “From Paternalism to Real Partnership with Local Communities? Experiences from 
Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (Uganda)”, Africa development, Vol XXXI No 2 (2006), p 60. 
99 See for instance Ogiek, para. 174 and Endorois, para. 178, arguing that the establishment of a Game 
reserve is to ensure management and conservation of wildlife to benefit the nation in general. 
100 Ogiek, paras. 130-131. 
101 2010 Report on examined cases, para. 259, implying that this interest was not genuine as during the 
evictions Kenya was granting logging concessions. 
102 Endorois, paras. 117 and 210. 
103 2010 Report on examined cases, para. 424 (j) and (q). 
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motive was in the case of Uganda; however, the effects on the Batwa were so 
devastating that in my view they clearly surpass any possible effects from their 
practices on the environment (which in any case did not really posed an 
environmental threat, as I will mention below), failing to comply with the 
proportionality requirement, as they caused more negative effects that the ones 
attempted to avoid,104 devastating their life as peoples. In this context, Anaya notes 
that “because the relocation of indigenous peoples who have strong cultural and 
material connections to the lands from which they are removed is understood to 
implicate threats to a range of human rights, the establishment of environmental 
conservation areas should not result in the relocation of indigenous peoples.”105 
- Second, in the majority of situations Indigenous peoples were not causing 
environmental harm, and they were actually contributing to nature conservation; for 
example, the African Court noted that Kenya was unable to prove that the Ogiek’s 
presence in the area caused environmental harm, being the actual causes the 
encroachment by other groups and logging concessions,106 also noting that “each 
[Ogiek] clan ensures the maintenance of the environment”; 107  the African 
Commission explicitly mentioned that the Endorois “as the ancestral guardians of the 
land are best equipped to maintain its delicate ecosystems” and could continue the 
conservation work started by the government;108 the Special Rapporteur remarks that 
there was no evidence that the Maasai posed an environmental threat to their lands 
but that their traditional pastoralist lifestyle “preserves the environment and does not 
cause harm to the regions wildlife;”109 and it has been stated that before their eviction 
the Batwa had a low-impact and sustainable use of forest resources.110  
As noted in previous chapters, these Indigenous attitudes towards their 
environment are common among them, with Indigenous peoples and their traditional 
knowledge having an important role in contributing to identify possible risks, address 
                                                             
104 In this context, Mukasa mentions that “Studies have categorically stated that radical creation of 
protected areas – including forest resource was not an effective conservation policy.” Mukasa (n 98), 
p 77. 
105 2010 Report on examined cases, para. 260. 
106 Ogiek, para. 130. 
107 Ibid., para. 183. See also 2010 Report on examined cases, para. 259. 
108 Endorois, para. 235. 
109 2010 Report on examined cases, para. 424 (i). 
110 J. Lewis, “The Batwa Pygmies of the Great Lakes Region” Minority Rights Group International 
(2000), p 3. 
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uncertainties and adopt effective precautionary action, as they depend on their 
environment for their survival.111  This is also highlighted in several instances in 
international law, like in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,112 
the Convention on Biological Diversity and Akwe;Kon Guidelines, 113  the 
IACtHR;114 and the Special Rapporteur,115 among others. Further corroboration can 
be found in the documented environmental impacts that follow the absence of 
Indigenous peoples, like soil degradation and reduction of wildlife.116 What this all 
means, in my view, is that the tensions between the PP and Indigenous lack of FPIC 
here are more apparent than real, because forcefully relocating Indigenous peoples 
would not avoid the materialisation of serious or irreversible harm to their 
environment. On the contrary, it would be detrimental for their territories, which also 
means that the requirement of being a ‘necessary measure to comply with a valid 
purpose’ to circumvent FPIC is not met, also considering that often there is no valid 
purpose, because of economic interests behind seizing Indigenous lands. Even if it 
this was not the case, in general Indigenous relocations cause such devastating 
effects on Indigenous peoples’ way of life, including their special connection with 
their lands and territories and its manifestations, that they cannot be considered a 
‘proportionate measure’ to avoid other types of harm.  
In sum, States would not have the legal justification to move forwards with a 
measure of this kind without FPIC, and doing so would constitute a failure to comply 





                                                             
111 See Chapter III, sections 3-4.  
112 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I)/31ILM 
874(1992), Principle 22 “Indigenous people (…) have a vital role in environmental management and 
development because of their knowledge and traditional practices” 
113 See Chapter III section 6. 
114 See IACtHR, “Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname (Merits, Reparations and 
Costs)”, Judgment of November 25, 2015, para. 173, noting that Indigenous peoples “may play an 
important role in nature conservation, since certain traditional uses entail sustainable practices and are 
considered essential for the effectiveness of conservation strategies.” 
115  V. Tauli-Corpuz, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples”, 1 
November 2017, A/HRC/36/46 (‘2017 Report’), para. 7. 
116 See Chapter III, sections 3-5.  
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c) Mitigating climate change impacts 
 
Climate change is a problem where there is a huge amount of uncertainty and where 
the precautionary principle plays an important role.117 The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (‘IPCC’) is currently working on the 6th Assessment Cycle to 
produce a report due for release in 2022, but previous reports show estimates about 
the increase in global temperature of 2 degrees Celsius (likely) and more than 2 
degrees Celsius (more likely than not) although temperature raises of up to 4 degrees 
have been projected as well.118 In this context, there is indeed a need for States to 
implement measures to at least avoid the worst case scenarios, adopting all the 
measures possible to mitigate the effects of climate change. 
Indigenous peoples are among the ones more vulnerable to climate change 
because of the dependence on their ecosystems, so the fact that more extreme events 
(e.g., floods, heatwaves, cyclones) will occur more frequently impacts them more 
directly, as there are more risks of diseases, reduction of biodiversity and food 
insecurity, among others.119 These, however, are not the only risks that they face 
related to climate change; there is also the issue of projects that are promoted as a 
measure to mitigate climate change but that could substantively affect their 
traditional way of life, with effects that may range from relocation to impacts on 
certain sites of cultural or religious significance.120 Thus, there could be tensions 
between State’s projects genuine directed to address climate change (i.e., not having 
economic motivations) 121  and the potentially substantive effects of those same 
projects in Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life, a situation where their FPIC 
                                                             
117 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,1771 UNTS 107; UN Doc. A/AC.237/18(Part 
II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849 (1992), Article 3.3. 
118 M. Collins, R. Knutti, J. Arblaster, J.-L. Dufresne, T. Fichefet, P. Friedlingstein, X. Gao, W.J. 
Gutowski, T. Johns, G. Krinner, M. Shongwe, C. Tebaldi, A.J. Weaver and M. Wehner, “Long-term 
Climate Change: Projections, Commitments and Irreversibility” in Climate Change 2013: The 
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC 
(CUP 2013).  
119 2017 Report, paras. 6-7. 
120 Ibid., para. 12. 
121 Although the limits are often blurred; for example, El Diquis hydroelectrical project in Costa Rica 
(that would have affected Indigenous peoples’ territories) was first planned as a strategic development 
project but later focused on energy commercialisation to neighbours and as a mean to achieve carbon 
neutrality in line with the Paris Agreement. M. Mora, “Sacrifices for Development or Thirst for 
Capital Accumulation? Case Study on the “El Diquís Hydroelectric Dam” in Costa Rica” (2019). 
International Development, Community and Environment (IDCE), pp 34-39. 
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would be required. Having in mind that this is very difficult to address this in 
abstracto, in my view generally any project that has as a consequence the relocation 
of Indigenous peoples cannot proceed without their consent. In effect, even though it 
could be argued that there is a ‘valid purpose or objective’ and the limitation may be 
‘necessary’, the severe effects on Indigenous peoples’ lives fail to comply with both 
the ’proportionality’ requirement and the duty to avoid substantive harm, as noted 
above. In addition, it is often the case that hydroelectrical projects, which are usually 
the ones that involve Indigenous’ relocations122 are not completely ‘climate-change 
friendly’, in some cases emitting as much greenhouse gases per kilowatt/hour as 
thermal power plants and destroying forests that act as carbon sinks,123 in which case 
they do not constitute ‘a necessary limitation’ in pursue of a valid purpose. Finally, it 
is necessary to consider that among the potential consequences of relocations are the 
loss of important traditional knowledge and techniques that could be useful to 
mitigate climate change effects, as noted by the IPCC, such as the Inca’s practices of 
crop diversification, agroforestry and water harvesting, among others.124  
When it comes to other types of impacts that could contribute to avoid the 
worst effects of climate change, opposed by Indigenous peoples’ due to the 
potentially substantive impacts on their way of life, this requires a case-by-case 
analysis. This is because being this an area in constant development, it is virtually 
impossible to foresee and anticipate all the potential ramifications on Indigenous 
peoples’ livelihood, especially those of a spiritual nature. For example, the IPCC 
remarks that according to the best estimates, we are not in the path to ensure that the 
temperature rise would be limited to 1.5 degrees Celsius or less, which can only be 
achieved if CO2 emissions start to decline well before 2030; 125  this means that 
renewable energy projects planned to enter the power grid after that date may 
contribute much less to mitigate climate change effects. Conversely, the development 
                                                             
122 2017 Report, paras. 50 and 109-117. See also supra 50. 
123  M Pearson, D. Aronofsky and E. Royer, “Chile's Environmental Laws and the Hidroaysen 
Northern Patagonia Dams Megaproject: How is this Project Sustainable Development?” 41 Denv. J. 
Int'l L. & Pol'y 515 (2013), p 552. 
124 IPCC, “Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Part A: Global and Sectoral 
Aspects, Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC” (CUP, 2014), p 
517. 
125 V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. 
Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, 
E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.), “Special Report: Global Warming of 
1.5°C: Summary for Policymakers” (IPCC 2018), p 18. 
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of technologies able to sequester all the emissions from a sacred volcano, affecting 
Indigenous peoples’ spiritual and cultural practices, could significantly contribute to 
limit global warming’s effects. Both degrees of contributions must be taken into 
account when weighing the ‘necessity and proportionate’ requirements in evaluating 
circumventing Indigenous consent, also keeping in mind that the State still has a 
precautionary duty to avoid the materialisation of substantive harm in moving 
forward with the measure opposed by Indigenous peoples. 
Finally, these tensions do not need to be a zero-sum game (actually the whole 
process is oriented to the exact opposite), especially having in mind that withholding 
consent does not constitute a ‘veto power’, as noted above.126 For instance, in Chile, 
the authorization for a wind park project (Parque Eolico Chiloe, part of a plan to rely 
on non-conventional renewable energy sources) 127  was revoked by the Supreme 
Court because Indigenous peoples in the area were not consulted and an ESIA was 
not conducted, in violation of C169.128 This Indigenous opposition was partly based 
on the existence of several culturally significant sites, threatened by the project,129 so 
after a consultation process by which the number of generators was reduced, new 
noise standards were adopted and the intervened area was reconsidered and made 
smaller, Indigenous peoples gave their consent.130  
 
In sum, in situations where there is a need for a rapid response, like 
emergencies or natural disasters, it is possible to adopt precautionary measures 
(including relocations) without Indigenous peoples’ FPIC, provided that after the 
situation is stabilised, consultations take place (and consent obtained, depending on 
the circumstances). Aside from this, due to their devastating effects on Indigenous 
peoples’ way of life, measures that entail their relocation would not satisfy the 
criteria to circumvent consent, failing as well to comply with a precautionary 
                                                             
126 See supra 85. 
127  See Gobierno de Chile, “Contribución Nacional Tentativa de Chile (INDC) para el Acuerdo 
Climático París 2015” Septiembre 2015 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Chile/1/Chile%20INDC%
20FINAL.pdf [accessed December 2020]. 
128 Corte Suprema de Chile, Rol número 10090-2011, 22 March 2012.  
129 Ibid.  
130  Universidad de Los Lagos, Conflictos de Energía en Chile 2004-2014, Parque Eólico Chiloé 
http://proyectoconflictos.ulagos.cl/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Parque-E%C3%B3lico-
Chilo%C3%A9.pdf [accessed December 2020]. 
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approach. Finally, other types of measures need to be analysed on a case by case 
basis; for example, those adopted for conservation purposes require the consideration 
of Indigenous peoples’ important contribution in environmental and biodiversity; and 
measures to mitigate the effects of climate change, the evolution of what is 
‘necessary’ or ‘proportional’, depending on technological advances and how the fight 
against climate change progresses.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
It is often difficult to properly understand possible effects that measures taking place 
on their lands may have on Indigenous peoples’ way of life, considering their 
particular relationship with their territories which involve cultural, social, spiritual 
and environmental aspects. In this context, even activities that could be considered 
‘minor’ from an outsider’s perspective could have devastating consequences, such as 
offending the spirits and bringing misfortune and disease, or desecrating places of 
particular significance. Following this, a wider precautionary approach that relies on 
traditional knowledge as a source of scientific information, incorporated in decision-
making through impact studies and consultations, plays a central part in identifying 
and addressing possibly serious risks to their livelihood, cosmovision and identity. 
This provides the best information available about uncertainties and potential threats 
on vital Indigenous values and its manifestations, like sacred sites, cultural/spiritual 
activities, and traditional practices, among others, so as to adopt effective 
precautionary measures. 
 Aligned with this, it is important to highlight that the duty to conduct 
consultations/impact assessments is triggered when there is credible evidence that a 
measure ‘may’ affect Indigenous peoples; moreover, its rationale is to ‘carefully 
assess’ potential risks, and allow Indigenous peoples to ‘fully understand’ and ‘be 
aware of’ possible adverse impacts on their traditional livelihood and environment, 
reflecting the three elements of the precautionary principle, thus acting as 
precautionary measures. This in turn has two important implications: first, 
considering how determined effects that Indigenous peoples suffer are ‘not felt by 
others in a society’ and are difficult to understand and assess (especially those of a 
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cultural/spiritual nature), their concerns and knowledge must be accommodated by 
States (e.g., by modifying the original proposal). Failing to do so may cause 
serious/irreversible harm to their traditional way of life, which would breach their 
obligations under the precautionary principle. Second, and following a logic of ‘the 
higher the risk the greater the need for precaution’, when the threats are of a 
‘substantive’ nature, Indigenous peoples’ FPIC needs to be obtained, independent 
from considerations about self-determination or control over natural resources and 
lands (which have mired the implementation of consultations and the duty to obtain 
FPIC), ensuring that their traditional knowledge, concern and interest are actually 
taken into account in the decision. These issues do not contribute to the avoidance of 
harm and, considering that when the precautionary principle is triggered, stopping 
the materialisation of non-negligible impacts trumps all other considerations, their 
importance subside.  
In other words, if there are reasonable grounds for concern that a substantive 
threat to Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life exists, FPIC needs to be 
obtained. This constitutes then a heightened precautionary safeguard, that ensures 
only the risks that they deem acceptable could materialise, strengthening the 
protection of Indigenous peoples’ special relationship with their lands and 
environment, especially the spiritual and cultural aspects. Moreover, if Indigenous 
peoples consider that States are not complying with these duties, they only have to 
demonstrate that, based on the best information available (which includes their 
traditional knowledge), there is ‘credible evidence’ that serious/irreversible harm 
may be caused to their traditional way of life, following another effect of the 
precautionary principle,  the lowering of the standard of proof.  
As Indigenous peoples’ rights are not absolute, States may be able to move 
forward with a certain measure, despite the lack of FPIC, under certain stringent 
requirements. Yet, under the precautionary principle, States are still obliged to avoid 
substantive impacts on Indigenous peoples’ way of life, making it more difficult to 
proceed without obtaining Indigenous peoples’ consent, especially regarding possible 
effects of a cultural/spiritual nature.  
Finally, there may be situations where the need to obtain FPIC may interfere 
with other precautionary measures, protecting values that are important for society, 
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or Indigenous peoples themselves. Albeit it is difficult to assess this in abstracto, it is 
possible to conclude from the analysis above that situations where a rapid response is 
required (e.g., natural disasters), States can proceed without conducting consultations 
or obtaining Indigenous FPIC, provided that, after the situation is stabilised, 
consultations are implemented, and consent is obtained. Aside from this 
circumstance, in general any measure that requires the relocation of Indigenous 
peoples would not be ‘proportional’ and would also fail to avoid devastating effects 
on their traditional way of life. This also includes conservation measures such as the 
creation of national parks in Indigenous territories, which also tend to disregard the 
important role of environmental management carried out for centuries by Indigenous 
peoples. Finally, other types of measures, including those that are adopted as part of 
climate change mitigation efforts, would require a case by case approach, as there are 
too many variables and uncertainties regarding the actual benefits and possible 
impacts to take into account (including the loss of traditional knowledge that could 
contribute to mitigate climate change), which may affect the understanding of 
‘necessary’ and ‘proportional’ at the time of the proposal.  
In sum, the implementation of a ‘wider’ precautionary principle, relying on 
traditional knowledge as a scientific basis for the adoption of precautionary action, 
strengthens the protection of Indigenous peoples’ way of life, ensuring that their 
knowledge, interests and concerns are actually taken into account in the decision-
making process, and that only the risks that they consider are acceptable may occur. 








Chapter VII: Conclusions 
 
It is clear that the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights in international law has 
greatly advanced in the last decades. This is illustrated by the adoption of 
instruments such as the International Labour Organization Convention concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries C169 (‘C169’) and the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (‘UNDRIP’), as well as the 
reinterpretation of human right treaties at both the UN and regional levels, enabling 
monitoring bodies and Courts to address claims about violations of their rights. An 
important aspect of this protection is represented by Indigenous peoples’ 
participation in decision-making, achieved mainly through the broadly recognised 
duty for States to consult them, with the objective to obtain their free, prior and 
informed consent (‘FPIC’) or reach an agreement, a duty that also includes 
conducting impact assessments to assess possible spiritual, cultural, economic and 
environmental impacts. This was established with the aim to correct historical 
injustices and a pattern of exclusion, by which consequential decisions were imposed 
on Indigenous peoples, 1  guaranteeing their “free, effective and permanent 
participation” in decision-making processes that affects their traditional way of life.2  
While this duty must be conducted following a series of procedural 
requirements that would allow for a good faith dialogue and the possibility to 
exercise some influence over the decision-making process, there has been some 
criticism from Indigenous peoples, mainly due to the establishment of FPIC as an 
objective instead of a requirement (except in specific situations). This was based on 
States’ concerns about granting Indigenous peoples a ‘veto power’ or a power 
equivalent to theirs, and provides a way to maintain existing power imbalances 
between States and Indigenous peoples, failing to fully recognise their right to self-
determination, or ensure the control over their territories and resources. This was 
even acknowledged during the travaux preparatoires of C169, pointing out that the 
absence of consent could result in situations where “no real account was taken of the 
                                                             
1 J. Anaya, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples” 15 July 2009, A/HRC/12/34 (15 July 2009) (‘2009 Report’), para. 
41. 
2  ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendation, General 
Observation on Convention No. 169, publication 2019, p 4. 
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views expressed and of the true needs of the people being affected” (although this 
was still considered an improvement compared to existing law).3  In the view of 
Indigenous authors, this also means that the final determination about projects and 
developments that may affect them and their territories remains in the hand of States, 
without requiring them to implement Indigenous peoples’ positions, views or 
concerns.4  
In practice, States tend to approach this duty to consult more as a simple 
procedural obligation, that does not require them to share any ‘decision-making 
authority’. 5  Moreover, States often fail to conduct consultations, alleging that 
Indigenous peoples would not be affected, or engage in consultation processes that 
do not comply with internationally recognised requirements, by conducting 
informative meetings regarding projects when a decision was already adopted. In 
addition, even in situations where consent is a requirement, there is a resistance from 
States to comply with this. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter IV, and based on 
the idea that Indigenous peoples should be ‘consulted as much as possible’ but the 
ultimate decision must remain with governments, States have taken advantage of the 
exception established in Article 16 of the C169, which allows them to relocate 
Indigenous peoples without their consent following “appropriate procedures 
established by national law and regulations”.6 In addition, States have often adopted 
a ‘less expansive’ interpretation of UNDRIP which prioritises consultations instead 
of consent, an approach that is seemingly supported by the more recent regional 
jurisprudence by avoiding any discussion of FPIC, even in situations of non-
negligible harm to their cultural and spiritual values.7   
  In this context, it is often the case that projects and developments taking place 
on Indigenous peoples’ lands are implemented without States having full certainty 
about the potential effects on Indigenous traditional livelihoods (either due to a lack 
                                                             
3 International Labour Office, “Partial revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention 
1957(No 107) Report VI (1)” 75th Session (1988), p 30.  
4 See for instance, S. Venne, “The New Language of Assimilation” in Without Prejudice Vol. II No 
2(1989), pp 58-59. See also Chapter IV sections 6-3-6.3 and V section 2.2.3. 
5 M. Papillon and T. Rodon, “The Transformative Potential of Indigenous-Driven Approaches to 
Implementing Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Lessons from Two Canadian Cases”, International 
journal on Minority and Group Rights 27 (2019), p 6. See also supra 4. 
6 Chapter IV section 6.3. See also A. Alva-Arevalo, “El derecho a la consulta previa de los pueblos 
indigenas en el Derecho Internacional” Cuadernos Deusto de Derechos Humanos Num 76, 
Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao (2014), p 72. 
7 Chapter V, sections 2.2.3.2; 3.1.2 and 3.2.1. 
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of knowledge or the existence of controversies) in particular those aspects of a 
cultural and spiritual nature. This could cause serious or even substantial harm to 
their way of life, as these aspects are difficult to identify, much less understand, 
without Indigenous peoples’ full participation. For instance, the presence of 
foreigners can offend the spirits, affect their cosmovision or desecrate sacred places, 
affecting Indigenous peoples’ cultural integrity and jeopardising their survival as 
peoples, as it involves more than physical aspects (like their right to life or personal 
integrity), but also their ability to maintain their special relationship with their lands 
and environment, as well as the protection of their distinct cultural identity, social 
structure, economic system, customs, beliefs and traditions.8  
Considering the existence of these participatory power-imbalances, 
uncertainties and possible risks of serious/substantive harm to Indigenous peoples’ 
traditional way of life, I analysed how the precautionary principle could strengthen 
the protection of their rights when States’ actions may affect their lands and 
territories.  
 
The precautionary principle was originally incorporated in international 
environmental law, to deal with the introduction of poorly understood technologies 
and chemicals and their possible effects and interactions on the environment. 
However, it has been implemented in other fields as well, such as trade, biodiversity, 
and human rights, including issues regarding Indigenous peoples, as illustrated by, 
for instance, the Akwe:Kon Voluntary Guidelines for cultural, social and 
environmental impact assessments.9 In Chapter II, I mentioned that, in my view, the 
precautionary principle has achieved the status of ‘general principle of international 
law’, following the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and the 
argument that, due to its flexibility and the fact that the precautionary approach does 
                                                             
8 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Case of the Saramaka people v. Suriname, Judgment of 
August 12, 2008 (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs)”, paras. 29 and 37. 
9 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, “Akwe: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for the 
Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments regarding Developments 
proposed to take place on, or which are likely to impact on, Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters 
Traditionally occupied or used by Indigenous and Local Communities” (CBD Guideline Series, 
2004). See also M. Kamminga, “The Precautionary Approach in International Human Rights Law: 
How It can Benefit the Environment” in D. Freestone and E. Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle 
and International Law: The Challenge of Implementation (Kluwer, 1996), p 185. 
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not require States to adopt specific actions (granting them discretion to adopt any 
effective and proportionate measure), there is no widespread and consistent practice 
to consider it as customary law. 
This principle is triggered when there is a ‘threat’, of a ‘serious/irreversible’ 
nature, in a context of ‘scientific uncertainty’, with the idea that even if there is no 
clear cause-effect link established between a potential damage and its source, 
effective and proportionate action to avoid the materialization of this harm must be 
taken. This ensures that if mistakes are made, as often happens in situations of 
uncertainty, it is best to err on the side of caution. In this context, I mentioned that 
this principle has been influenced by a narrow notion of ‘science’, due to the 
historical context in which it was established, but inadequate to deal with risks and 
uncertainties that originate in human activities. For instance, extractive projects 
affect a multitude of complex relationships and human-environment dynamics, 
beyond the reach of the realms of conventional sciences like physics or biology; thus, 
a narrow approach that overlooks these aspects could result in ineffective 
precautionary action and serious or irreversible harm to both the environment and 
humans. This has been mentioned in the literature, with authors arguing in favour of 
expanding the notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’, by embracing other types of 
scientific knowledge that are able to address these dynamics, leading to effective 
precautionary measures. 10  Building upon this, I argued in Chapter II that, in 
situations where Indigenous peoples may be affected, it is necessary to integrate their 
traditional knowledge into this idea of ‘scientific uncertainty’.  
In this context, one important contribution of my research is related to the 
scientific nature of traditional knowledge. In effect, this is a system of knowledge, 
aimed to understand the universe and able to predict outcomes, that is tested and 
perfected through long periods of times by Indigenous peoples, in a systematic and 
rigorous fashion, through the incorporation of their practices and experiences. As 
such, it conforms to the general notion of science, i.e., “the intellectual and practical 
activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the 
physical and natural world through observation and experiment”,11 having then a 
                                                             
10 See Chapter II, section 3.2. 




clear scientific nature, that I argued in Chapter III has been recognised in 
international law. In this character, traditional knowledge can be integrated into the 
notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’, constituting a scientific basis for the adoption of 
precautionary measures. This implies that the types of potential threats of non-
negligible harm identified by relying on this knowledge are subject of precautionary 
treatment, expanding the precautionary principle. Following this, possible non-
negligible effects on Indigenous peoples’ livelihood (in particular cultural/spiritual 
aspects), originated from activities on their lands, fall under the scope of this 
principle, as there would be reasonable grounds for concern (provided by traditional 
knowledge) about potential ‘threats’ of a ‘serious/irreversible’ nature.  
Another important contribution of my research, related to the above, is the 
acknowledgement of the role of traditional knowledge in the avoidance of potentially 
non-negligible harm to Indigenous peoples’ way of life, as I detailed in Chapter III. 
In effect, this knowledge is developed by Indigenous peoples themselves, based on 
an integral understanding of their lands and the multiple relationships between its 
elements. It is also applied on their daily activities, underpinning their customs and 
practices, and combines spiritual, cultural, social and environmental aspects, even 
incorporating the existence of uncertainties as portrayed in their cosmologies. As 
such, it constitutes the best information available about Indigenous peoples’ 
traditional livelihood, being able to fill information gaps, providing data about 
aspects not well-known outside the Indigenous community, such as traditional 
practices, or the location of sacred sites. Moreover, this knowledge can also 
determine the existence of uncertainties and possible risks, and how to address them. 
This is particularly important regarding cultural and spiritual aspects, which could be 
seriously affected by activities that, from an outsiders’ perspective, may not seem 
materially significant but they are devastating at this cultural-spiritual level, such as 
the destruction of a single but sacred tree. 
Embracing other types of knowledge in a precautionary context brings into 
focus the role of mechanisms for public participation necessary to incorporate them 
in decision-making,12 which in the case of Indigenous peoples, refers to the duty to 
                                                             
12 J. Peel, Science and Risk Regulation in International Law (CUP, 2010), p 336; L. Boisson de 
Chazournes, “New Technologies, the Precautionary Principle, and Public Participation” in T. Murphy 
(ed), New Technologies and Human Rights (OUP, 2009), p 179. 
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consult, which includes impact assessments. As such, they enable the incorporation 
of Indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge, concerns and interests in decision-
making, including those regarding the anticipation of harm. Considering this, in my 
analysis I approached consultations/impact assessments from the perspective of their 
role in the avoidance of potentially non-negligible harm to Indigenous peoples’ way 
of life (which is something that, to my knowledge, it has not been done before), 
instead of focusing on their participatory aspects, mentioned above,  
In this context, as I mentioned in Chapter III, the Biodiversity regime 
provides a clear example where traditional knowledge is considered as a basis for the 
adoption of precautionary action, both in regard biodiversity conservation and the 
protection of Indigenous peoples’ livelihood, being integrated into decision-making 
processes through environmental, cultural, social and cultural heritage impact 
assessments, as well as consultations. Moreover, a stronger safeguard, obtaining 
Indigenous peoples’ consent, is established regarding possible effects on sacred sites, 
and lands and waters traditionally occupied and used by them, reflecting a 
precautionary logic of ‘the higher the risk the greater the need for precaution’. This 
not only provides a strong degree of protection to their spiritual and cultural values, 
but also ensures that Indigenous interests and concerns are actually taken into 
account in the decision-making process. 
However, and as I analysed in Chapter IV, this model is not replicated in the 
UN Treaty System. While traditional knowledge plays a role in the avoidance of 
future impacts, the Human Rights Committee has often relied on it to address ‘direct’ 
or ‘imminent’ threats of harm, disregarding concerns about potential effects that 
could not be “foreseen at present”.13 That being said, I also noted that, based on a 
2009 decision, the Human Rights Committee may be open to consider potential 
threats of negative effects that are not imminent, by requiring conducting impact 
assessments, as well as obtaining Indigenous peoples’ FPIC in the case of substantive 
harm to their rights. Yet, much remains to be clarified, as there are some 
inconsistencies in the practice of the monitoring bodies in regard to FPIC and 
anticipating harm, especially in the reporting procedure. These inconsistencies create 
                                                             
13 Chapter IV section 3.3 a). 
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uncertainties about the standards applicable to the protection of Indigenous peoples’ 
rights, undermining their effective protection. 
The C169 for its part, analysed on the same chapter, seemed to follow a 
precautionary approach in regard to consultations and impact assessment in situation 
where Indigenous peoples’ livelihood and lands could be affected (with the ILO 
monitoring bodies even sidestepping the qualification of ‘whenever appropriate’ in 
the case of impact studies),14 recognising the importance of integrating Indigenous 
perspectives, concerns and knowledge in the decision-making process. However, I 
argued that it fails to continue with this approach when it comes to potential threats 
of substantive impacts; in effect, due to concerns about granting Indigenous peoples’ 
a power similar to States, and based on a ‘veto power’ understanding of FPIC, C169 
establishes a weak version of consent in the case of relocations, as noted above, and 
it is silent about cases of extractive activities on Indigenous peoples’ lands which 
could affect their survival. Therefore, C169 does not establish effective safeguards 
against possible effects on Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life originated on 
the exploitation of their territories. 
By contrast, from the analysis conducted in Chapter V, UNDRIP and the 
Inter-American and African systems seem to provide a better safeguard for 
Indigenous peoples’ rights. UNDRIP for instance, follows a similar approach to 
consultations and traditional knowledge than C169, and despite not explicitly 
including them in its text, I argued that impact assessments are incorporated as 
‘appropriate measures’ to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural 
or spiritual impacts in the case of extractive activities (Article 32.3) and as an 
important part of ‘informed consent’, in a context that respect the precautionary 
principle.15 Moreover, UNDRIP clearly recognises the duty to obtain consent in two 
instances of potentially devastating impacts on Indigenous peoples’ way of life: 
relocations (without circumventing procedures) and the storage or disposal of 
hazardous materials on their lands. In addition, a majority of the doctrine considers 
that, when projects and developments could have major impacts on their lands and 
traditional livelihood, consent would also be required, based on an expansive 
                                                             
14 Chapter IV, section 6.1. 
15 Chapter V, section 2.2.1. 
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interpretation of UNDRIP’s purpose. That being said, a minority of mostly 
Indigenous authors argued that, by not fully recognising Indigenous peoples’ right to 
self-determination, this Declaration perpetuates a colonial approach, which implies 
that final determinations about projects in their lands are left to States. As mentioned 
above, this approach seems to be supported by States’ adopting a ‘less expansive’ 
view of FPIC. In this context, there is some uncertainty about the standard applicable 
in FPIC, but I consider that the majority argument aligns better with a precautionary 
approach. 
 The Inter-American system for its part provides a strong degree of protection 
to Indigenous peoples in situations of possible non-negligible harm from activities on 
their lands; in effect, it not only recognises States’ duty to consult and conduct social 
and environmental impact assessments, but also (and aligned with the precautionary 
approach) it establishes the need to obtain Indigenous peoples’ FPIC when there are 
‘large-scale developments or investment projects that would have a major impact on 
their territories, a notion that, as I noted in Chapter V, should be interpreted broadly. 
This standard is also applied by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, influenced by the work of the Inter-American Court; however, recent 
jurisprudence from both regional courts, where the issue of FPIC was not even 
discussed despite the existence of devastating harm on Indigenous peoples’ 
territories and cultural/spiritual aspects, leaves some doubt about the application of 
this strong standard. 
 From this analysis, it is clear that there is no uniformity in international law 
about the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights from activities on their lands that 
could cause non-negligible harm to their traditional way of life. Considering these 
uncertainties and potential threats, I argued that it is necessary to rely on the 
precautionary principle. In this context, and constituting another important 
contribution of my research, I discussed in Chapter VI that consultations/impact 
assessments act as precautionary measures, which have several important 
consequences for the way in which States must act. In effect, as noted in Chapter VI, 
consultations and impact assessments are necessary to ‘carefully assess potential 
impacts’ on Indigenous peoples’ traditional livelihood, and for them to understand 
‘possible risks’ of an environmental, social, and cultural character, ensuring that they 
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are aware of such risks, in order to accept the possible impacts on their way of life. In 
addition, consultations and impact assessments play a vital role in the identification, 
anticipation and understanding of possible threats of a serious/irreversible nature to 
Indigenous peoples’ traditional livelihood, as well as how to address them. It is also 
important to consider that States must conduct this duty to consult before the 
adoption of measures that ‘may’ affect Indigenous peoples, which occurs “when the 
interests or conditions (…) that are particular to them are implicated in the decision, 
even when the decision may have a broader impact”,16 i.e., when there is credible 
evidence, provided by Indigenous peoples themselves, that they could be affected by 
a certain measure. Putting this together, the conclusion is that consultations (and 
impact assessments) are triggered when there are reasonable grounds for concern that 
potentially non-negligible harm could affect Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of 
life, acting as precautionary measures. This generates several important effects: 
- first, when the precautionary principle is triggered, States have the duty to avoid the 
materialisation of non-negligible harm, putting other considerations on a secondary 
place. This means that questions about self-determination or control over natural 
resources, among others, cannot interfere with States’ fulfilment of this 
precautionary duty in regard to Indigenous peoples’ way of life.   
- Second, while in strict sense States can adopt any precautionary measures, as long 
as they are proportionate and effective in avoiding the materialisation of non-
negligible harm, it is important to recall that Indigenous peoples have a particular 
way of life, which is not able to be determined in abstracto, influenced by the 
relationship that they have with their lands and environment, and manifested in 
different ways across the world. This means that, as noted throughout this research, it 
is very difficult to identify possible threats of harm to their livelihood, in particular 
cultural and spiritual aspects, without relying on their traditional knowledge, the 
‘best information available’ about their customs, traditions, values, ceremonies, and 
generally every aspect of their life. Thus, it is very unlikely that States can disregard 
Indigenous peoples’ knowledge, concerns and interests in decision-making; doing so 
would risk the failure to comply with the precautionary principle, except perhaps in 
                                                             
16  2009 Report, para 43; V. Tauli-Corpuz, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
indigenous peoples”, A/HRC/45/34, (18 June 2020), para. 57. 
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the case that States cancel or suspend the measure(s) that generated the potential 
threat before consultations.  
- Third, and related to the above, when the potential risk is of a ‘serious’ nature, at 
the very least Indigenous peoples’ knowledge and concerns must be accommodated 
into the decision-making process, by for instance modifying the project or 
development. Yet, if the possible threat is of a ‘substantive’ nature, following a logic 
of ‘the higher the risk the greater the need for precaution’, a stronger precautionary 
measure is required. From the analysis of international law instruments and bodies in 
previous chapters, FPIC is required when it comes to situations of projects or 
development plans that ‘may have profound impacts’ or ‘potentially substantially 
affect Indigenous peoples in the exercise of any of their substantive rights in relation 
to the lands and resources within their territories’, among others. Thus, it is clear that 
consent constitutes a heightened precautionary safeguard (i.e., the potential 
substantive harm would not occur if an agreement is not reached or FPIC is not 
obtained), which guarantee that their positions, views and concerns are actually taken 
into account in the decision-making process and that only the risks that they deem 
acceptable could occur, erring on the side of caution. Considering the particularities 
of Indigenous peoples’ traditional way of life, this is applicable even if the possible 
impacts do not seem to be of a great magnitude in physical terms, but nevertheless 
could have devastating effects on their livelihood, as identified and assessed by 
Indigenous peoples (such as effects on sacred sites). This also provides a consistent 
standard, by which States must obtain Indigenous peoples’ consent if the answer to 
the question ‘is there credible evidence of potentially substantive effects on 
Indigenous peoples’ way of life and/or environment?’ is affirmative, moving away 
from issues like the meaning and interpretation of ‘large-scale developments that 
would have a major impact’, as mentioned in Chapter V, or self-determination and 
control over natural resources, as noted above.  
- Finally, if Indigenous peoples consider that the course of action adopted by a State 
is not going to abate the potentially non-negligible harm, they can challenge this, 
needing only to comply with the precautionary standard of proof, i.e., a prima facie 
case that, based on the best information available, there are ‘reasonable grounds for 
concern’ that serious/irreversible harm may be caused to their traditional way of life 
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and/or environment. If this standard is met, then the State would have to prove that 
this potential impact will not occur, and if it can’t, it would have to adopt (or correct) 
precautionary measures, aligning itself with Indigenous peoples’ knowledge and 
concerns.  
All this indicates that a wider precautionary principle, enriched by the use of 
traditional knowledge, is able to strengthen the protection of Indigenous peoples’ 
rights when States’ actions may have a negative impact on their lands and 
environment. 
 
 A possible avenue to continue doing research, based on this study, would be a 
comparative analysis of how traditional knowledge is integrated into decision-
making processes from an Indigenous perspective. This would help to refine 
participatory mechanisms put in place by States, in order to properly assess threats to 
Indigenous values which are not always well-understood by non-indigenous peoples, 
like cultural or spiritual aspects, and generating better instances to respectfully 
integrate traditional knowledge in the consideration of potential threats of serious or 
irreversible harm. This would also help to clarify, at a local level, what could 
constitute ‘substantive’ harm, requiring their consent, establishing clear guidelines on 
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